Threats, military expenditure and national security : analysis of trends in Nigeria's defence planning, 1970-1990.

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Threats, Military Expenditure and National Security: Analysis of Trends in Nigeria's Defence Planning, 1970 - 1990

By

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
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council
AOC	Air Officer, Commanding
ARMSCOR	Arms Corporation of South Africa
BOSS	Bureau of State Security
CAS	Chief of Air Staff
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria.
CDC	Constitution Drafting Committee
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CGE	Central Government Expenditure
CNS	Chief of Naval Staff
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
CONS	Coordinator for National Security
DICON	Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria
ECA	Economic Community for Africa
ECOMOG	Economic Community Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
FOC	Fleet Office, Commanding
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GOC	General Officer, Commanding
HFMG	Head, Federal Military Government
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JCSC	Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDA	Nigerian Defence Academy
NDC	National Defence Council
NIIA	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NIPSS	Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies
NLC	Nigerian Labour Congress
NOM	National Orientation Movement
NSC	National Security Council
NSO	Nigerian Security Organisation
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ROAPE	Review of African Political Economy
SIPRI	Stockholm Institute for Peace Research
SMC	Supreme Military Council
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
WAI	War Against Discipline

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study has had a long gestation period and more people and institutions contributed to its development than I can possibly acknowledge. The idea of working on Nigeria's defence vaguely occurred to me while pursuing graduate studies at the University of Ife, Nigeria. It firmly took root as a comprehensive analysis of Nigeria's post-war defence planning after a long discussion with Professor J 'Bayo Adekanye in 1988. Although he might not agree with its more interpretive arguments, his pioneering work in the field of civil-military relations has inspired this study in many ways and he is, in a sense, its intellectual godfather.

Since I came to King's College in 1990, I have incurred several other debts in the course of producing this work. My supervisor, Dr Efraim Karsh offered firm guidance to the work, and encouraged me to articulate my position clearly and succinctly. My head of department, Professor Lawrence Freedman supported my work in several ways and was instrumental to my obtaining the MacArthur Foundation Research Grant in 1991 for fieldwork. Dr Chris Dandeker read drafts of the work and offered valuable suggestions.

On the home front, the work has been the source of suspense and anxiety to those who know about it. There are those in the intellectual community and within the armed forces, who expect it to be the *magnum opus* on why Nigeria should spend less on defence. Others, especially within the armed services expect it to provide the most intellectual justification for post-war defence planning while at the same time addressing the perceived lopsidedness in spending among the services. Since my study does not address any of these specifically - even as it critically examines spending in planning - I am not sure I have done justice to either and, I do not know to what extent their yearnings have been satisfied. Nevertheless, the support offered by them, in the course of advancing various points of view, has been of tremendous help to this work. In fact, by the time I completed the study, some of the materials received had to be dropped, primarily for lack of space and not relevance. Unfortunately, not many of them will even allow me to acknowledge their assistance because of the sensitivity of the positions they hold or held.

The work benefited from the assistance and accessibility provided by many

libraries and information centres. In particular, my sincere thanks go to the staff at the following libraries: Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies library in Jos, Nigerian Defence Academy library in Kaduna, Nigerian Army Training and Doctrine Command library in Minna, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs library and Ministry of Defence Information Centre, both in Lagos as well as the University of Ibadan library. I would also like to thank Mr Andrew Orgill, Librarian of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst for his assistance.

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DEDICATION

To Olabisi Oluyemi for giving so unflaggingly

of her love, time and effort.

ABSTRACT

This study is a comprehensive analysis of post-war defence planning process in Nigeria. It analyses the institutional and strategic developments in the country's defence planning in the two decades following the Nigerian civil war. By challenging traditionally value neutral ways of thinking about wars and exploring wars' transformative potentials for nation states' defence planning within a single country framework, the study arrives at a central thesis that war experience does not in, and of itself change the direction of defence policy, especially where there are no geo-strategic gains or losses and no holistic understanding of national security.

These issues are addressed in seven chapters through five central questions, namely: What precisely are the goals of Nigeria's defence policy, and what real or perceived threats govern its conception and articulation? What programmes are adopted to attain the ends of this policy? To what extent, if at all does the nature of threats really influence doctrine, force structure, arms procurement and other defence related issues? What conditions and circumstances aided or militated against the successful implementation of defence policy? And, finally, to what extent is policy traceable to planning method or lack of it?

The central theme is illustrated with theoretical as well as empirical accounts of the making of the security elite and the roots of threat perception. By injecting a historical perspective to a rational model analysis of national security, the work strips bare the notion of the nation state as a continuous arena of anarchy. This is applied more specifically to a searchlight on the military organisation, military strategy and military expenditure in national security.

The study explains that the Nigerian experience is proof that the outcome of war, rather than war *per se* encourages significant change in the defence planning process *post-bellum*. By suggesting options for defence planning improvement based on an interpretive evaluation of the period covered in the study, the work breaks ranks with earlier scholars of the military establishment - who are either content with subsuming unique circumstances in cross-national explorations, or simply happy at providing historical descriptions of the nature of the armed forces in Nigeria without any critical examination of the agent-structure relations in Nigeria's defence planning.

In conclusion, this study emphasises the importance of broadening the scope of national security beyond the state, to include hitherto less regarded internal dimensions of security in order to fully assess the various levels of threats, firmly distinguish between objective and subjective threats and minimize the wide ranging risk of errors in security policy making.

INTRODUCTION

The only thing as important for a nation as its revolution is its last major war

Robert Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics.

This is an inquiry into Nigeria's defence planning process since the end of the civil war. Broadly speaking, there are two main questions that this study seeks to answer: namely, in what ways are post war defence plans affected by the outcome of a previous war and the subsequent chain of events. Secondly, what are the dynamics between military considerations and broader political forces in the defence planning process? The central issues addressed are: What precisely are the goals of Nigeria's defence policy, and what real or perceived threats govern its conception and articulation? What programmes are adopted to attain the ends of this policy? More concretely, to what extent, if at all does the nature of threats *really* influence doctrine, force structure, arms procurement and other defence issues? What conditions and circumstances have aided or militated against the successful implementation of defence policy? And finally, to what extent is policy traceable to planning method or lack of it.[1]

The approach to the analysis rests on two main assumptions. The first is that any rational spending of State's resources must result from a careful coordination of the goals and the means of accomplishing a project. Although the premise of a causal link between decisions(goals) and resource allocation(means) is one espoused in all budget statements since the end of the Nigerian civil war,[2] one needs to transcend rigid and mechanistic boundaries of causality and inject a deep historical

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[1] While taking into consideration the traditional view that any inquiry of this nature should concentrate on an examination of force's employment, acquisition, deployment and declaratory policies, as espoused by Martin Edmonds, this study concentrates more on inputs rather than outputs because policies and programmes are not as rationally ordered and clear cut as in more developed settings. See Martin Edmonds[ed.] Central Organisation of Defence (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1985)

[2] See for details, Pius Okigbo, National Development Planning in Nigeria, 1900 - 92 (London: James Currey, 1989)

approach in explaining the dynamic and dialectical relationship between subjective and objective forces in post-war defence planning. The changing nature of threats, for example, impinge on the means-ends chain and thus emphasises the need for addressing specific threat index as related to each country within a historical materialist context.[3] While national security literature tends to emphasise the importance of external security, in terms of regional and inter-state threats and dwells on the inevitability of systemic forces to the detriment of internal sources of threat, it remains an empirical question whether the security elite exists in a vacuum and whether defence planning develops a logic of its own, driven by anarchic preconditions and unrestrained by domestic pressures. It is the contention of this study that only a deliberate mix of the rational-choice explanation and the recognition of the state as a historical product of the international system as well as societal pressures that can provide a comprehensive line of inquiry in this type of research.

This then takes us to the second assumption underlying our analysis of the subject: the need for a sector specific study. Most studies of the Nigerian defence setting have formed part of comparative studies on Third World Military Expenditure or Third World Defence Planning.[4] Although cross-national comparative studies enhance our understanding of national security issues through conceptual paradigms, there is a tendency in such studies to assume knowledge of all countries from the study of a few. This could lead to hasty generalisations in an attempt to show existence of common causes and strip bare the explanatory power case studies often provide. Without underestimating the importance of disaggregated studies, the missing link can only be filled by sector specific studies of individual countries in

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[3] For a contemporary reconstruction of historical materialism in international relations, see Stephen Gill (ed) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[4] See for example, R.D.Mckinlay, Third World Military Expenditure,(London: Pinter, 1989); David K. Whynes, The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure,(London: Macmillan, 1979); Saadet Deger and Robert West(eds), Defence, Security and Development, (London: Macmillan, 1986) and Nicole Ball, Third World Security Expenditures: A Statistical Compendium,(Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Institute, 1983) among many others.

which neo-classical, political economy or organisation theory models are used in the examination of decision makers' policy choices. Good as they are, conceptual paradigms will be of little help if they cannot facilitate our quest for explanatory hypotheses while not obscuring the unique aspects of each state. The argument that case by case approach tends to emphasise 'idionsyncratic factors and obscure the systematic incentives and constraints that affect large numbers of states'[5] cannot render case studies useless.

Besides, most scholars of third world armed forces generally concentrate on civil-military relations, military intervention and the propensity for praetorian politics. Nigerian scholars are no exception to this phenomenon. Existing literature on Nigeria's defence and foreign policies since the civil war ended have concentrated on the political and humanitarian impact of the war[6], on civil-military relations, especially military intervention in politics[7] leading, somehow, to the paucity of materials on the military lessons (or the lack of it) for Nigeria's defence and security. Significantly though the political nature of the military never ceases to be a natural avenue for academic inquiry,[8] little or no attention is paid to the composition and strategic purpose of the armed forces. Recent attempts to correct

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[5] Robert Looney, Third World Military Expenditure and Arms Production, (London: Macmillan, 1988),p.24.

[6] See for example, Anthony Kirk Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook,1966-69, Vols.1&2, (London: Collins, 1971); John Stremlau, The International Politics of Nigeria's Civil War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); and St John de Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1973) among many others.

[7] See for example, Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of authority and revolt,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971);T.O.Odetola, Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability, (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Books, 1978); Victor O.Olorunsola, Soldiers and Power: The Development Performance of Nigerian Military Regimes, (Stamford CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1977) and J.'Bayo Adekson, Nigeria: In Search of a Stable Civil-Military Relations, (London: Gower, 1981) among many others.

[8] Michael J. Barnett, Confronting the Cost of War: Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and Israel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.285.

this phenomenon in the case of Nigeria have been more descriptive than analytical.[9] Whatever their individual merits, which are many, these works do not add up to a coherent investigation of the defence planning process because little priority was given to strategic purpose and resource efficiency issues. Whilst they may not have tapped into these potentials, they have all generated useful ways of looking at the security sector in general and defence planning in particular. More concretely, the number of studies which attempt to assess defence policy from the standpoint of central organisation of defence and resource efficiency is minimal, if not non-existent.[10] Bassey's[11] recent attempt at an institutional analysis improves on previous efforts in its recognition of the military organisation as the departure point of any explanation of defence planning. However, as shown in this study, presidential addresses, ministerial lectures and presentations by senior members of the armed forces[useful as they are], hardly provide adequate evidence beyond what is intended for popular consumption. Besides, they often concentrate on organisational structure and institutional survival in isolation of strategy. Indeed, countervailing empirical evidence abound both within and outside the armed forces, that this is the case. Perhaps it is this inadequacy of independent sources that leads Bassey to assume that the "modernising effect of the military in defence planning is a continuous institutional feature of the last twenty years". As subsequent chapters indicate, a careful reading of post-war military development literature exposes the assumption

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[9] See, for instance works by T.A.Imobighe,(ed) Nigerian Defence and Security: Issues and Options for Policy,(Kuru,Jos: NIPSS & Macmillan, 1987); F.A.Adisa, The Development of Nigeria's Defence Policy 1960-1979, Unpublished P.hd Thesis, University of London, 1983; A.E.Ekoko & M.A.Vogt(eds) Nigeria's Defence Policy: Issues and Problems,(Lagos: Malthouse, 1990), Celestine O.Bassey, 'Defence Planning and The Nigerian Armed Forces Modernization Process(1970-1991): An Institutional Analysis.' Armed Forces and Society, Vol.19, No.2, Winter 1993, pp.253-277.and J.Bayo Adekson, op-cit.

[10] There is a sense in which the paucity can be described as total, except for the memoirs of retired military officers which often contain critical mass of raw information on policymaking and unpublished essays submitted in part fulfillment of officers' course at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, and these are usually not for general public consumption.

[11] Bassey, op-cit

as a creative extrapolation based on inadequate empirical evidence exemplified by previous modernisation theories.[12] As Nicole Ball correctly argues in her seminal critique of the "military as moderniser" theories, "...modernising characteristics ascribed to the military frequently lacked substance. In other instances, the modernising attributes can be shown to have existed in particular countries at specific points in time but they cannot be assumed to exist *continuously*."[13][emphasis added]

Although this study takes the military institution as the departure point for its analysis, it also examines how national and international security feed on each other and enquires into the concept of national security in far broader terms than the classical concentration on military intervention, praetorian politics and external enemies, and probes issues around defence composition and military expenditure.[14] This examination of the intervening variables seems imperative if we are to understand the conflict between internal political pressures and external demands which lie at the heart of the anarchical world, and in turn influence national security policies.

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[12] For previous studies on modernisation theories, see, for example, pioneering works by Samuel Finer, Man on Horseback, (Hammondsworth: Peregrine Books, 1976); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964) and John Johnson(ed), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Even lately, David K.Whynes, writing on Third World military expenditure, concluded that 'in many cases, the military is the most progressive sector of an LDC economy, in terms of organisational structure, technology and ideology. It therefore possesses an immanent desire for modernisation.' David K. Whynes, op-cit, p113.

[13] Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World, [London: Adamantine Press, 1989], p.17.

[14] Recent literature in the field has challenged the strictly militarist view of security exemplified by the power politics school, calling attention to the non-military aspects of security. However, in the desperation to improve concern for the non-military aspects, such studies fail to explain how society has internalised the myth of the military aspect by regarding security issues an untouchable aspect of society, avoiding an in-depth examination of the institution itself. See, for example, Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations(Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983) and also Edward Azar and Chung-in-Moon(eds) Third World National Security: Issues, Concepts and Implications,(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1987).

Therefore, in spite of the overt preference in this study for an examination of the institutional aspects of defence and national security, it is the effectiveness of resource allocation in defence planning that we consider a more interesting task. In effect, by subjecting previous studies to critical scrutiny, we argue that mixing achivements with failure over time and space distorts the real picture of modernisation in defence planning and confuses cosmetic changes with 'considerable progress'. It suggests that political decisions require efficiency criteria expected of economic actions and this is explained, in terms of the wide gap that continues to exist between defence organisation and strategic purpose, through the role of actors in defence planning arena and through the examination of the security elite's ability to achieve national defence based on central coordination rather than service needs.

In summary, this study's objective is embedded in four major components. Firstly, it aims at ascertaining the impact of war on a country's defence planning process; secondly, to review and propose changes to the post-war defence planning literature, based on a careful analysis of a single country's experience; thirdly, to examine if the defence planning trend is simply a product of external forces or a combination of internal and external factors, historically determined and institutionally weighed and, finally, to evaluate and suggest options for improving Nigeria's defence planning process.

0:1 Hypotheses and Methodology.

In the first place, it is argued that certain distortions of threat analyses in Nigeria's defence policy planning resulted from the existing forms of force pre-determined by Africa's artificial boundaries, and this was reinforced by the prevailing orthodoxies in international relations and superpower rivalry in Africa in the period under study. Not only did the British colonial authorities on departure from Nigeria encourage local representatives who were more in favour of continuity than change to take over the running of the State, but the colonial agenda also strongly influenced national security policy, in terms of its articulation of perceived 'enemies' in the international scene. It is then argued that this led to a concentration on 'external enemies' which encouraged an underestimation of major internal threats

to national security. This affected decision makers' prioritisation of defence needs and spending plans in the period under study.[15]

Whereas the civil war experience enabled the ruling elite to see the flaws in this one sided orientation of foreign and defence policy making, our contention remains that the maintenance of the **status quo ante bellum** paled this seeming change into insignificance in the post war years in spite of the existing capacity for independent policy making.[16] In effect, this study proffers that the outcome of war, rather than war itself has a decisive impact on State's defence policy and cessation of conflicts, and that the state of the economy plays a less significant role in resource allocation decisions in the defence sector. Put differently, we argue that had the war altered Nigeria's national boundaries with the creation of Biafra, in the way the Second World War culminated in the creation of West and East Germany, threat levels and intensity would have been more clearly defined. Inevitably, that clarity would have had an impact on the defence planning process. It is also argued that the relatively high levels of military expenditure in Nigeria in the post-war period was institutionally driven, a prestige factor rather than a function of threats. Indeed, evidence suggests that the higher the increase in military expenditure, the lower the state of combat readiness in the armed forces.[17] This is demonstrated in the study comparatively and empirically.

Finally, while accepting in broad terms that appropriation of personal benefits and the increased capacity for patronage have been largely responsible for the intense battle between continuity and change in defence planning process, this study

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[15] A good example is the way all pre-war administrations- civilian and military - pursued a decidedly anti-Soviet Union policies despite Soviet Union's attempt to help the young state's development efforts.

[16] The post-war shift to the Eastern bloc appeared to have resulted from the West's reluctance to aid Nigeria's war effort. For a comprehensive overview of Nigeria-Soviet Union relations, see Olatunde J.B.Ojo, 'Nigeria-Soviet Relations: Retrospects and Prospects', African Studies Review, 19, (3) 1976, pp.43-63 and Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Ideology and Pragmatism: Soviet Role in Nigeria, 1960-77,' Orbis 21 (4) Winter 1978, pp.803 -30.

[17] Existing literature on Nigeria's defence disagrees with this position significantly. See Bassey, op-cit, who considers it speculative.

argues that there has been no proper decision making process in terms of structure and strategy during this period, although there is renewed pressure on the leadership for accountability in the post-cold war era. Indeed, it is argued that a significant shift is now noticeable in the defence establishment's recognition of the need for planning and a coordinated strategy for allocation of resources.[18]

Although this study makes use of recognised paradigms and frameworks of analysis, it has dwelt less on political theory, concentrating on empirical evidence of how Nigeria's decision makers and independent defence analysts see and interpret trends in defence planning. To this end, I interviewed a range of actors[19] in the defence decision making process in Nigeria in the period under study.[20] Where personal interviews with political and military leaders were difficult to obtain, their memoirs proved very helpful. In a country that boasts of the freest press in Africa, a lot could be gained from its national press. For this reason, considerable use was also made of relevant articles and news reports, and commissioned as well as general studies in research institutes and other related concerns were also consulted. The evidence presented also comes from government documents, legislative hansards and memoirs of former political leaders and ex-military officers.

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[18] This is not only reflected in every major speech by senior military and defence officials, the 1994 defence budget highlights the changing orientation with the special budget for peacekeeping operations fast becoming a major area for the Nigeria Armed Forces in the post-cold war dispensation.

[19] This included one former Head of State, two former Defence Ministers - one civilian, one military; two former Permanent Secretaries in MoD, and a range of defence attaches, staff officers, field commanders, academic analysts and journalists. A biographical sketch on interviewees is provided in the appendix.

[20] For many military men, especially serving officers, confidentiality is often the pre-requisite for frankness and release of valuable information. Except where cleared with individuals involved, statements are not credited to those interviewed. A list of those interviewed and short biographical sketch is given at the end of the study, excluding those who would not have their names mentioned under any circumstance. While recognising the academic pitfalls in this approach, I have made sure that the notes indicate the rank and position of those interviewed, be they civilian bureaucrats or military professionals. Also, many of the issues touched upon are corroborated elsewhere in the study by quotable sources. Even where the evidence offered by such quotable sources appear suspect, the overlapping nature of different sources tend to attenuate such difficulties.

Since the study places considerable emphasis on the relationship between resource allocation, inter-operability and economic management of defence, recurrent and capital allocations were examined as part of Central Government Expenditure(CGE), Gross National Product(GNP) and Gross Domestic Product(GDP), in comparison with major social expenditures like education and health, towards explaining planning successes and errors. All this aided the examination of resource efficiency in defence spending.

Also, the multi-disciplinary approach of the study rests on two key concepts: strategic and organisation theory. The former deals with issues like threat analysis, doctrine and the use of force; and the latter can be defined as an organisational approach to the management of defence.[21] While the latter makes use of behavioural approaches in determining resource allocation, historical explanation plays a key role since defence planning, national security and budgetary issues have significant human implications which cannot be fully understood by mechanistic deductions. The expectation is that the mix will bear out the unique circumstances of the Nigerian state and reveal to what extent defence planning has resulted from them.

0:2 **Scope of Work and Periodization.**

The period covered in the study is between 1970 and 1990, two decades following the war. The choice of dates is done with a view to maximising evidence in terms of the political and socio-economic implications of events for the defence establishment. 1970 remains an indelible landmark in Nigeria's history as it marked the end of the only war[22] ever engaged in by the Nigerian armed forces. Its theoretical significance also comes under focus. After three years of sustained

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[21] Analysing defence planning through these two concepts help our understanding of the power politics - national security complex and the interaction between sub-state actors and the international environment.

[22] Since then, Nigeria's military involvement have been essentially peace-keeping operations i.e. UN operations in Congo and Lebanon, Somali and Bosnia, OAU's peacekeeping effort in Chad and ECOMOG peacekeeping initiatives in Liberia which she spearheaded.

increase in defence spending occasioned by war(66/67 - 69/70), the end of the war logically led to considerations on how to scale down military activities and defence spending in peacetime.[23] 1990 on the other hand represents a turning point in armed forces' modernisation efforts by accident rather than design. An abortive coup d'etat in April 1990, in which the president nearly lost his life, forced the regime to address questions of accountability and morale in the armed forces. The period is significant, as it confirms the view in this study that all organisations, including the military will innovate when pressurred, especially when pressure comes from societal actors or a controlling authority with leverage over its existence.[24] Significantly, as the year was originally intended for the return to democratic rule, the date serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it is chosen to examine if there is a clear distinction in defence spending under military and civilian governments. It is worth noting that among many analysts of the national security bureaucracy under military and civilian administrations, the view has often persisted that military regimes were more decisive in the use of force and more judicious in the allocation of resources.[25] Yet, the myth of a belligerent and financially prudent armed forces is hardly supported by available evidence, as this work will show in its analysis of the efficacy of military expenditure. Equally, the notion of belligerent military

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[23] Although the character of security during war differs from its peacetime context, the national security problem remains a permanent feature of national planning, especially in its extra-military dimensions. As a result, those who argue conclusively, for instance, that Nigeria's military spending after the civil war plummetted considerably seemed to have neglected this amorphous feature of third world security whilst placing undue emphasis on a rational explanation. For an example of this argument, see Edward Kolodziej and Robert Harkavy(eds) The Security Policies of Developing Countries(Mass & Toronto: Lexington Books, 1982) p.10.

[24] See General Ibrahim Babangida, 'The Military and the Nation: Perspectives in Development,' Presidential Address at the Graduation Ceremony of Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna, 29 June 1990 in which the armed forces' re-organisation gained prominence.

[25] . See for instance all books in note 7 except Adekson's.. For example, Bassey writes of a 'qualititatively different and more complicated budgetary process' and "defence spending hikes" under civilian adminstration[1979 - 1983] Bassey, op-cit, p.268.

governments always diverting funds to the defence establishment as espoused in Adekson's thesis of 'military extractive ratio',[26] while understandable, can not be justified against the background of inadequate information of defence planning under civilian regimes at the time he wrote.[27] What seems clear from this study of post-war defence planning process is that with civilian administrations, the leadership may be beholden to the military elite previously in authority on grounds of regime security and institutional survival. The cut off date is also chosen to examine the difference in defence spending in a depressed and buoyant economy within a sector specific framework.[28]

In all, the study spans seven chapters divided into two parts. Part one evaluates leadership's threat perception, formulation of national security objectives and its impact on the defence planning process in the first four chapters: Chapter One deals with the security elite perception of threat and how this influenced the defence policy process. Chapter two analyses the impact of external dimension of threat on Nigeria's security and Chapter three examines the internal dimensions of threat to national security while Chapter four focusses on defence organisation and military strategy. Part two gives an overview on the correlation between strategy and defence spending and the impact of the latter on defence planning process and resource efficiency. This is done in two chapters which examine budgets in the defence planning process and the efficacy of military expenditure as a function of perceived threats. The concluding chapter evaluates trends in the planning process over the period under study and contends that the change in post-war defence planning has more to do with content, rather than form and largely uninformed by any co-ordinated grand strategy. Moreover, it contends that with the prevailing

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[26] See J. Bayo Adekson, op-cit.

[27] This was evident in his post-civilian regime analysis. See J.Bayo Adekanye, 'Military Expenditure under a civilian Presidency: Nigeria under Shehu Shagari 1979-83', Paper presented at the Nigerian Political Science Association Conference, University of Ilorin, May 1985.

[28] Some disaggregated cross section analyses tend to confirm a marked difference while others disagree. See R.D.McKinlay, op-cit.. Also, see Nicole Ball, op-cit.

changes in the post cold war world, internal considerations, more than inter-state and global changes are likely to determine the future of defence planning and national security formulation. This, it argues, will be triggerred more by events rather than rational design. Finally, while the study agrees that the state retains a level of primacy as the basic entity of international relations and the concrete focus for defence planners, it rejects the neo-realist orthodoxy which continues to restrict national security to the logic of anarchy,[29] and calls for an expanded and broader based definition of security which reflects a coalition of "internationalist" and "nationalist" groups of interests.[30]

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[29] For an example of a recent neo-realist insistence, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

[30] For recent outstanding critiques of neo-realism and the anarchic logic, see Barry Buzan, et al, The Logic of Anarchy: Neo-Realism to Structural Realism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Justin Rozenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations, (London: Verso, 1994.)

Part One:
Evaluating Threat Perception

An Analytical Framework

The whole process of determining whether threats exist against the security of a country is rendered both wider and more complex by the fact that threat perception is not an irreducible unit of analysis. Often expressed in terms of acts against the "national interest", described by Joseph Frankel as the 'sum total of all the national values...which can be regarded as the product of its culture and as the expression of its cohesion'[1], threats are neither a product of mechanical causality identifiable by all nationals but a product of the interrelationship betwen subjective and objective social forces in every state. As Furniss and Snyder contend, 'although national interest is what the nationals believe it is, decision makers actually decide what it is.'[2] Karl Marx had earlier expressed this view more bluntly by contending that the 'ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.'[3]

Yet some interests are given and incontestable. For instance, every nation has its sovereignty and territory to protect - hence many states are open to threats in the course of achieving this national objective. Aside from this 'core' interest, other ancillary interests may derive from a nation's location within the international environment, its capabilities and vulnerabilities as well as its geo-strategic attributes. Sometimes, these other interests assume their own abstract logic recognisable only by the ruling elite with little attention paid to explaining the nature of the state and the 'complexity of state-civil society relations'. This is more so in highly stratified societies where cohesion and equilibrium of forces cannot be taken as given and the synthesis between internal politics and the international environment as major sources of threats are not treated in an inclusive manner.

Due to the wide range of threat possibilities in such nation-states, recognition of the seriousness of certain threats remains a long lasting dilemma for the security

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[1] Joseph Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World, (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) pp.85-86.

[2] J.Furniss & G.H.Snyder, National Interest, (New York: Free Press, 1965) p.25.

[3] Karl Marx, The German Ideology, (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1965), p.37.

elite and a certain level of over-reaction or understatement develops. It is fair to say, however, that some of these threats are bound to be assessed differently by a less emotional outsider. For instance, a detached outsider is unlikely to see any significant threat against a 'big' Nigeria surrounded by "mini-states" which are virtually dependent on her for economic survival. To an involved insider, though, perceptions are often one of danger: a desperate South Africa in search of new allies, implacable neighbours like Cameroon with extended deterrence by France, great power pressures aimed at subverting Nigeria's 'non-alignment', a largely mono-product economy open to sabotage from outside and the tender fabric of her federal structure forever under tension all make threats more real than imagined. Charles Schultze captures this dilemma aptly when he argues that the concept of national security does not lend itself to 'neat and precise formulation since it deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and contingencies whose nature we can only dimly perceive.'[4] Donald Pruitt, in the same vein, has argued that threat perception hinges more on an inference rather than 'the perception of something tangible'.[5] Klaus Knorr's search for a middle ground between cognition and emotion in threat perception offers us a stronger basis for evaluation. As he concludes, while threat perception depends on estimates of past and present,

> these estimates are inferences from usually fragmentary, opaque, and contradictory bits of information...Threat perception is thus, above all, a cognitive construct which creates an image of reality; it is a device, *a hypothesis*[emphasis mine][6]

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[4] Charles Schultze, 'The Economic Content of National Security Policy,' Foreign Affairs, (51) No.3, 1973, p.529.

[5] D.G.Pruitt, 'Definition of a Situation as a determinant of International Action,' in H.G.Kelman (ed) International Behaviour (New York: Free Press, 1965), p.401.

[6] Klaus Knorr, 'Threat Perception,' in Klaus Knorr(ed) Historical Dimension of National Security Problem, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1976), p.79.

Given the apparent problem decision makers face in properly identifying threats to national security, a great deal of conceptions are made [rightly or wrongly], while many are discarded - reducing threat analysis to a very selective process. In effect, 'the peculiar mindset of the perceiver', as Knorr concludes becomes very important, since 'the personality of a decisionmaker can induce a high or low receptivity to threatening information.'[7] The Nigerian experience, as this study intends to show, appears to confirm this.

Yet, while psychological traits, personality and pre-dispositions of decision makers are important in any evaluation of threat perception, situational factors of geopolitics, resource allocation and internal political pressures also come into play in decision makers' perception of threats, especially in states with fragile structures where too many forces confound the leadership's delineation of threats. The mix is a very important one, although it is difficult to determine the percentage of each in the making of any decision. Nevertheless, an emphasis of the former at the expense of the latter runs the risk of misperception of threats. David Easton made this point when he cautions that, 'an inordinate commitment to psychology...can lead to the concealment of the situational aspect.'[8]

The question that springs to mind from the above is: how then can decision makers achieve the necessary balance between the psychological and the situational aspects in the attempt to perceive threats accurately? Is this objective achievable? This study argues mainly that it is possible to come close to accurate prediction periodically, but contends that the wide ranging possibilities for misperception and disagreements contributed to leadership's difficulty in identifying objective and subjective threats, in the period under study. This part of the study analyses this dilemma through an examination of the interface between internal and external dimensions of threats.

Due to our interest in evaluating threat perception in the period under study, Raymond Cohen's working principles provide a basis for our analysis, especially in

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[7] Knorr, ibid, p.78-81.

[8] David Easton, The Political System: An inquiry into the State of Political Science, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953) p.208.

the area of external threat perception. Cohen stated six principles in an attempt to strike a balance between the psychological and the situational aspects of threat perception. These are: (1) Previous relations between the perceiver of the threat and the source of the threat, including historical as well as recent events; (2) Any personal experience of threat on the part of the perceiver, and other personal characteristics with a bearing on the subject; (3) The balance of capabilities between relevant actors which shall be defined broadly to include diplomatic capabilities, military and economic means and help from allies; (4) Structural factors such as the influence of bureaucratic forms and procedures, institutional interest, and contingency planning; (5) Juridical framework (including internal agreements, international law and norms of behaviour) within which relations between relevant actors are conducted; and, (6) The policy and interest of the perceiver in the area or issue in question.'[9] Subsequent chapters have drawn significantly on this perspective in the attempt to clarify the blurred nature of objective and subjective threats, and in an effort to understand the security elite's perception of the international environment within which the armed forces must operate as well as their assumptions about the internal environment in which it already functions.

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[9] Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis, (Wisconsin: Wisconsin University Press, 1979) pp.25-26.

CHAPTER ONE

SECURITY ELITES[1], SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND THE DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

Introduction

Traditional power politics has dominated general thinking on security since the nation state assumed salience in international politics.[2] Because realists see the nation-state as essentially a creation of the international environment, threat perception and national security have been approached from the anarchic preconditions of self help.[3] While this approach offers a useful analytical tool for national security studies, in its emphasis on territorial protection against external aggression, the result is either the "underestimation of local security dynamics...or the ignoring of the local patterns of regional security,"[4] as well as an often

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[1] By security elite, I mean the sector of the bureaucracy that deals with national security formulation- especially the armed forces, the intelligence services, the civilian bureaucracy, the legislature as well as the country's political leadership.

[2] Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison, 1979)

[3] A selection of seminal contributions on power politics include, E.H.Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, 2nd.edn.(London: Macmillan, 1946); Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations,(New York: Knopf, 1948); F.H.Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); John Herz, International Politics in The Atomic Age,(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society, (London: Macmillan, 1977); Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, (London: Cassel, 1973); Raymond Aron, Peace and War,(New York: Praeger, 1967); R.W.Tucker, The Inequality of Nations,(New York: Basic Books, 1977) and G.Schwarzenberger, Power Politics,(London: Stevens, 1964) among others.

[4] Barry Buzan, 'People,State and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World', in Edward Azar & Chung-in-Moon, Third World National Security: Issues, Concepts and Implications,(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1987) p.41.

incomplete and distorted analysis of security perceptions in defence planning process.

This became the reality for post- second World War independent states, as their concept of national security assumed the military and external character of older states.[5] As the neo-realist, Kenneth Waltz observes, 'in the national defence orientation, the emphasis is primarily on the state and its military capabilities, taking likely rivals into account...'[6] Strengthened by this rationale and discounting its inadequacies, Nigeria's security elite's interpretation of national security remained inclusive and parochial, promoting the management of violence and the primacy of power politics in the period covered by this study. On the international scene, the pre-dominance of the realist school gave rise to counter hegemonic perspectives as exemplified by the idealist and historical materialist schools of international relations; to scholars who believed that the existing order needed transformation, not management and that individuals represent 'the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security must be applied'.[7] Realists, of course, continue to consider such postulations as inherently utopian. The falseness of this distinction between realist and idealist utopias, has since become the subject of debate in the field of international relations theory.[8]

As important as the debate is to the understanding of the interconnections between external and internal threats, and to our attempt to delineate objective and

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[5] A careful examination of the national security literature indicates a heavy concentration on the military aspects of national security objectives. See for example, all the books mentioned in note 2 above and Ray Cline, World Power Trends and U.S.Foreign Policy (Boulder,Colorado: Westview Press, 1980); Frank N. Trager and Phillip S.Kronenberg(eds), National Security and American Society: Theory, Process and Policy, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1973), Michael Howard, Studies in War and Peace, (London: Temple Smith, 1970) among others.

[6] Waltz, op-cit., p.79.

[7] Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983) p.12.

[8] See Christian Reus-Smit, 'Realist and Resistance Utopias: Community, Security and Political Action in the New Europe,' Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 21, No.1., (Spring 1992) pp.1-28.

subjective threats, more important to us is how the Nigerian security elite reacted to the pressure of coping with the dialectical demands of the nation state and the civil society; between the legitimacy of national interests and the legitimacy of sub-national interests, in its cultural, ethnic and economic dimensions. To the extent that national security became measurable by the ability to protect state sovereignty and preserve territorial integrity, the Nigerian security elite would appear no different from any other. But in their effort to protect state sovereignty, not only was account not taken of the ways actors themselves affected the power dynamics often in emphasis, but also underrated as threts to national security or interpreted as threats to regime security, were the differing components of the Nigerian nation state and their potential centrifugal underpinnings.

Although it has been argued by realists that what is raised to the level of domestic security threats are usually "little local difficulties" among competing political interest groups for state control,[9] this view of international politics is often invalidated by the potential of internal conflicts in destroying the state's tenuous fabric.[10] This is more so in states like Nigeria, where the new state did not correspond to the existent pre-colonial formations. Indeed, if one were to consider the impact of artificial borderlands on inter-state and intra-ethnic relationships in the third world, one cannot agree more with Nzongola Ntalaja's observation that "more important than the external factors, which admittedly prolong and exacerbate the crisis of state, are the internal factors which give rise to it...primarily related to the differential adaptation of a country's ethnic groups to the political economy of

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[9] Cohen,et-al argue for instance that domestic violence is a necessary feature of 'primitive central state power...' Youssef Cohen, B.R.Brown, and A.F.R.Organski,' The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order,' American Political Science Review, 75:4(1981) pp.909-10. Also, see Aristide R.Zolberg, 'The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Africa,' American Political Science Review, 62(1968), pp.77.

[10] Barry Buzan, 'People, State and Fear,' in Azar and Moon,op-cit., pp.24-5. For a clearer perspective on the dilemma of state nations and nation states, see, Onwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria,(Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1982); Mostafa Rejai and C.H.Enloe, 'Nation States and State Nations,' in Michael Smith et-al.(eds), Perspectives in World Politics,(London: Croom Helm Open University Press, 1981) Ralph Pettman, State and Class, (London: Croom Helm, 1979) and Hugh Seton Watson, Nations and States,(London: Methuen, 1977)

colonialism."[11].

Yet, scholars of the Nigerian situation have also referred to the pre-existing economic links, pre-colonial encounters and the complimentarity of geographical regions, which served as the ultimate elixir for mutual interdependence among competing ethnic interests.[12] Not surprisingly, this description of the nation-state as co-extensions of ethnic and individual boundaries followed closely in the tradition of classical realists. As Hans Morgenthau contends, national societies are bound together by suprasectional loyalties, which transcend the particularistic interests of individuals and groups within such societies, thus containing domestic conflict.[13] In the words of Christian Reus-Smith, Morgenthau's 'idealised national community', is one in which, 'individual security is synonymous with national security, and political action is reduced to the collective defence of the nation-state.'[14]

By simply reproducing the realist assumptions of homogeneity between individual security and state survival, the Nigerian security elite obscured the sub-structural contradictions within the state, so much that any challenge to the idea of the state [as the Nigerian Civil War depicted], is often interpreted as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the government in power. In consequence, internal dimensions of threat often needed to assume the cloak of regime security, to receive attention of the decision makers. Thus, as John Ostheimer and Gary Buckley argued,

> [G]iven the political instabilities of the past, one must also assume that anyone governing Nigeria, civilian or military, will be likely to make national security policy decisions that are indirectly designed to keep

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[11] Nzogola-Ntalaja, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Africa: Essays in Contemporary Politics, (London: Zed Press, 1987) p.55

[12] A.E.Afigbo, 'History and National Development in Nigeria', in Nigerian Defence Academy Journal, Volume 1, No.1, February 1989, pp.43-59..

[13] Morgenthau, op-cit., p.527-8.

[14] Reus-Smit, op-cit., p.16.

the regime in power.[15]

In spite of the above rationale for regime security, the assumptions of unitary interests which served as the main pivot of realist arguments seems distant from the reality in many third world states. There is no evidence to suggest that individuals necessarily identify their security with the survival of the Nigerian state, or with the security of some other groups within the nation-state. This was perhaps, rooted in the people's history. To the contrary, there is evidence to support Buzan's observation that, 'it is neither unusual nor paradoxical to find individuals dependent on the state for maintenance of general security environment, while at the same time seeing the state as a significant source of threat to their personal security.'[16] For example, political leaders and traditional rulers of the various ethnic groups in Nigeria related to one another, in terms of conquest and subjugation, and rarely cooperation and co-existence in pre-colonial times. Colonialism re-inforced tribal antagonisms so deeply that relationships after independence were still coloured by the historical-cultural memory of earlier conquest and domination. As a result, group and individual interests have always remained underneath the surface of national security interests, among erstwhile enemies, now members of the same union.

Yet, this is hardly surprising, since national interest, as we noted earlier is the product of a country's history, sense of identity and political values. In effect, ethnic groups within the nation state, with disparate cultural backgrounds and political orientation will interpret national interest in terms of those interests consonant and consistent with their various backgrounds. Hence, in situations where national interest became difficult to define, in the light of competing sectional interests - some sections will always find the protection of their interests

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[15] John Ostheimer and Gary Buckley, 'Nigeria' in Edward Kolodziej and Robert Harkavy, Security Policies of Developing Countries, (Mass. & Toronto, Lexington Books, 1982),p.289. Elsewhere in developed countries, governments devote money against the subversion of their authority, either overtly as in centralised communist states, or covertly, in democratic states.

[16] Buzan, op-cit., p.24.

predominant. Instead of unanimity, the 'heterogenous nature of modern nation states bring to the foyer', according to James Rosenau, 'the question of identifying whose interests is prevalent in a particular policy and whose interest is relegated to the background.'[17]

This sets the scene for our examination of elite preferences in the period under study. It has also informed to the contention in the study that, while the security elite operated largely within the realist preconditions of self-help, which was aided by the cold-war environments, competing interests not only served different political functions for regime security, but also contained contrasting conceptions of the external and domestic environment. However, rather than confirm *a priori* that elite preferences are always in pursuit of externally perceived dangers to the detriment of internal dissension [a view which is not necessarily wrong], to reach that conclusion one needs an examination of the defence decision making process, a distinction between the state and the system, and a scrutiny of the 'peculiar mindset' of Nigeria's security decision makers during this period.

II. Nigeria's Security Elites: Structure and Composition

> Given strong leadership and strong direction from the top, I think you can achieve essentially the same results with a variety of structures; contrariwise, I don't believe that given weak leadership, changes in formal structure would influence materially the results of the organisation.[18]

The structure and composition of the Nigerian security system is modelled after the British central organisation of defence, and the structure bequeathed at

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[17] James Rosenau, "National Interest," in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Volume II, 1969, p.254.

[18] Robert McNamara, Essence of Decision, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) cited in Amos Jordan and William Taylor, Jr, American National Security: Policy and Process, (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) p.187.

independence still stands with little or no changes. Since their [security elite's] only experience of security management resulted from colonial bequest, as far as the security elite in Nigeria was concerned, its close relationship with the British defence system was 'the most probable consequence of a cold war that required adjustment of policies to either of the dominant international ideologies.'[19]

Without extending the above too far, and given the fact that decision-makers' pre-dispositions may not have been unconnected with precedence and historical experience inculcated through years in overseas institutions and even after return, it is possible to contend that the past can influence decisionmakers' predispositions without an awareness on their part, as Robert Jervis argued. Yet, it is the contention of this study that the degree of perceived legitimacy by the national security leadership affected not only how threats were contextualised, but also the conception of defence planning and resources allocation in the period covered by this study. Indeed, all Nigerian Heads of State in the period under study, especially unelected ones seemed to have borrowed the words of Robert McNamara quoted above, paying more attention to how structures can be circumvented to work better for them. In explaining the structure and composition of the national security setting in the period under study, I examine Executive influence over national security policy; Legislative and bureaucratic input into defence decision-making; the Armed forces in National security formulation and the Intelligence Services in National Security.

Leadership Content in National Security Policy - Strengthened by the favourable aftermath of the Nigerian civil war, General Yakubu Gowon did not immediately turn his attention to the defence sector that prosecuted the war. The legitimacy provided by the successful resolution of the internal conflict was quickly utilised

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[19] Interview with Alhaji Abubaker Alhaji, Nigeria's High Commissioner to Britain. London. November 1993. The High Commissioner was formerly Permanent Secretary and later Director General in Ministries of Trade, Finance, Defence and Education as well as Minister of State, Planning and Budget Affairs and later Finance Minister. Also see Segun Osoba, "The Transition to Neo-Colonialism," in Falola, T(ed.) Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development?(London: Zed Press, 1987) pp.223 - 248.

in consolidating the unity of the country and incorporating 'Biafra' into Nigeria. In essence, the ruling structure remained as it were before the war. The highest ruling body, Supreme Military Council was still in place. Comprising service chiefs and state governors with no cross cutting links with the armed forces, the body became largely ceremonial while General Gowon doubled as Head of State and Minister of Defence. According to Professor Billy Dudley, the Supreme Military Council, rather 'than being a deliberative decision making body...was in fact, little more than a ratificatory organ'.[20] This was also confirmed later by General Gowon's successor, Brigadier [later General] Murtala Mohammed, who claimed in his maiden speech that 'After the civil war, the affairs of the state, hitherto a collective responsibility, became characterised by lack of consultation...Things got to a stage when the Head of the Administration became inaccessible even to official advisers.'[21] The Ministry of Defence, supposedly under the administrative leadership of the Head of State had no visible direction and the armed forces' re-organisation, considered a prime task of the administration hardly got off the ground. Much the same could be said of the executive control over central coordination of defence, even though one of the crucial lessons the civil war underscored was the need for coordination, in order to deal with the broader questions of regional integration/security and continental power, now at the forefront of foreign and defence policies. Despite his loss of grip over defence matters, the Head of State insisted on retaining direct control over policy formulation and implementation; resource allocation and weapons procurement and this he preferred to deal with outside the confines of designated structure.

Two security related issues illustrate this point well: General Gowon's inaction over the demobilisation plan of an armed forces that grew from 15,000 men in 1966 to 250,000 men after the civil war, and the procurement of Hercules'

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[20] Billy Dudley, Instability and Political Crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p.128.

[21] Federal Republic of Nigeria, Drift and Chaos Arrested: Text of First Broadcast to the Nation by his Excellency Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, HFMG and C-in-C of the Armed Forces, July 30, 1975, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, n.d) p.5.

C-130 transport planes by the Nigerian Air Force. On the one hand, the Head of State saw the need and sanctioned the recommendation of the committee on demobilisation set up by the Nigerian Army, to reduce its size, but no action was taken until General Gowon was overthrown in 1975 - five years after the war. On the other hand, virtually nothing was done to resolve the nagging question of inadequate barracks accommodation for soldiers responsible for the severe tension in civil-military relations after the war. On the subject of Hercules C-130 aircraft, not only did the Head of State override a Ministry of Defence policy on Government to Government purchase, the manner of purchase and the Head of State's preference for uncorroborated brief raised serious questions about the leadership content of national security policy.[22]

General Gowon's decisions in all these cases were probably understandable given the circumstances, as his official biographer tried to explain. After all, one of his most immediate demands after the war was the task of "reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation" and his preoccupation with the latter had precluded him from effectively monitoring developments within the armed forces, yet he insisted on undermining decision making structures, either by procrastinating on recommendations from official advisers or basing his decisions on extra-military, non-bureaucratic advice.[23] According to Professor Elaigwu, 'as Gowon settled to issues of state governance after the war, his contacts with the military gradually decreased' as his relationship with the civilian bureaucracy grew.[24]

As an authoritarian structure of control preoccupied with its own institutional survival as well as material interests, the military class found it inappropriate to have to depend on the bureaucracy for survival. Hence, it blamed the inaction in defence policy decision making and the failure to reorganise the army not on General Gowon's weakness and dependency *per se* but on the

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[22] See 'Federal Government Statement on the Lockheed Bribery in Nigeria,' in Nigeria Today (London), No.73. November 1976. See Appendix II.

[23] J.Isawa Elaigwu, Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman, (Ibadan: West Books, 1986).

[24] ibid., p.194

ascendancy of the tiny clique of civilian bureaucrats under his leadership.[25]

It would appear that one of the lessons learned by General Gowon's successors in 1975 was the need to diffuse the concentration of power in the Head of State' office. Indeed, it has been confirmed that the original intention was to constitute the three senior members of the military junta into a ruling triumvirate with a rotational leadership. When the junta finally settled for what was essentially the mode of rulership under General Gowon, with the Supreme Military Council intact, power was to be shared between the Head of State, Brigadier [later General] Murtala Mohammed and the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier [later General] Olusegun Obasanjo. Also, in order to provide a renewed sense of direction in the armed forces, one of its most senior officers and erstwhile Chief of Staff [Army], Brigadier Iliya Bisalla was appointed Defence Minister. The new Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma commanded overwhelming respect among the officers and the rank.

Even then, McNamara's view on leadership seemed to have stuck firmly. The strong leadership exhibited by General Murtala Mohammed not only demanded but received a variety of alternative options from the intellectual elite and the military itself, but it also precluded the structure from working in a delegatory manner. As the regime's Chief of Staff, General Obasanjo later revealed in his memoirs, the relative ease with which service chiefs and corps commanders established a link with the Head of State and the Chief of Staff created an impression as though the regime had no need for a Defence Minister. This perceived neglect was raised repeatedly by the Defence Minister, Brigadier Bisalla, especially after the military promotion exercise which saw the Army Chief higher in rank and this was adduced as a reason for his involvement in the abortive coup that resulted in the assasination of the Head of State, General Mohammed.[26]

Undoubtedly, Brigadier Mohammed also assumed a creative role in the

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[25] See Drift and Chaos, op-cit.

[26] See Olusegun Obasanjo, Not My Will: An Autobiography of a former Head of State, (Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1990)

defence planning process himself,[27] and as a result the first steps towards the systematic realignment of the ends of security policy to the means of achieving policy goals began under the regime. However, the regime still failed to resolve the problem of coordination of structure, the bane of the armed forces since the civil war days and it probably complicated its resolution more when General Obasanjo also assumed office as Head of State, Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence. Inevitably, instead of the reduced role for the bureaucracy promised at its inception, it is interesting to note that defence planning - more than any other sector witnessed a considerable amount of power sharing during General Obasanjo's time as Head of State since matters of state pre-occupied him.[28] Although nothing was done to resolve the structural problems during the administration, the Head of State made sure that the structure of the defence decision making process formed part of the brief for the Constitutional Drafting Committee in 1976. In fact, for the first time the 1979 constitution included a clause on the office of Chief of Defence Staff - an overall coordinating officer for the services, also vested with the responsibilities of Presidential Principal Adviser on defence matters.

Again, while constitutional responsibilities were clearly defined and the National SecurityCouncil/National Defence Council's functions clearly delineated with both under civilian control, the incoming president discovered a precarious relationship fraught with numerous problems. The first was the refusal of service chiefs to allow any *primus-inter-pares* in the person of Chief of Defence Staff to act as an intermediary between them and the president. They wanted direct access unrestrained by structural hierarchies and ensured that the office of the Chief of

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[27] The post-July 1975 military leadership included the radicals of the previous regime who had insisted on the armed forces' re-organisation and maintenance of professionalism through the exit of military class from political power.

[28] Although the Permanent Secretary, Mr Festus Adesanoye insisted that he remained a less important figure 'in the scheme of things'(Personal Interview, 23 May 1991) and it is possible that the visible role he played between 1975 and 1979 was cosmetic and superficial, it is less plausible to argue that he had no significant input into policy formulation during the period. What can, of course, be said, is that there existed a more diffused set up since the cabinet office also assumed prominent role in defence and foreign policy formulation during the period. See Joseph N.Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1987)

Staff was largely ceremonial. Ironically, despite their commitment to the improvement of the armed forces' decision-making structure in order to cope with the regime's defence objectives, leading members of the security elite were incapacitated by their lack of experience and expertise in security matters and their inherent fear of the military class. Although President Shehu Shagari had served in various governments since independence, his reluctance to take up the leadership mantle seemed to have provided subordinates with the opportunity to amass power to his detriment. Yet the two Ministers of Defence that served under him, even though respected professionals in their field, fell victims of the military faction's shadowy presence. While it is difficult to establish a link between the fear of the military and the leadership's preference for diplomacy over deterrence, the attempt to create alternative powercentres, not only within the armed forces through the shift in funds to the air force, but also outside the triad - to the para-military forces and the intelligence services seems to be an indication of their fear of the army and a genuine diffidence in the army's combat readiness.[29] For these reasons, while the civilian era saw the first concrete steps taken towards doctrine formulation, sector type allocation of forces and the mechanisation of the armed forces, all this failed to resolve the in-built structural tension every elected leader will confront in time to come[30]

The attempt to raise the profile of the internal security organs by President Shagari's government led to a systematic, albeit cautious neglect of the armed forces whose institutional interests had come into sharp conflict with the aims of the increasingly repressive civilian administration. The fact that the regime had lost legitimacy in the face of dwindling economic fortunes and constant accusation of profligacy and corruption gave the military the opportunity to stage a comeback without antagonising the majority of the population. As a result, when they

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[29] Personal Interview with Alhaji Akanbi Oniyangi, Defence Minister, 1981 - 1983. Ilorin, May 8, 1991. See Chapter Four for details.

[30] For details on events during this period see, Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-84 (London: Zed Books, 1986) and Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics: The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic,(Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991).

intervened in defence of 'national interests' on New Year's eve in 1983, in fact many were jubilant.

Drawing a historical parallel between their regime and that of Generals Mohammed/Obasanjo, Generals Buhari and Idiagbon, who ousted the civilians did not concentrate their attention on defence and national security initially. While their concentration on domestic issues was not unexpected, their forays into the international scene revealed a deliberately restricted world view, which some had argued was what the country needed at the time.

As a result, defence planning witnessed little change. In fact, it reverted back to *status quo ante* on some advances made under the civilians. For example, the regime re-introduced the Supreme Military Council as the highest decision making body, abrogated the office of the Chief of Defence Staff and created an amorphous Defence Headquarters[DHQ] separate from the Ministry of Defence. Although, a widely respected officer was appointed Minister of Defence, it was clear that power was flowing directly from Dodan Barracks, Nigeria's seat of government. In no time, the Head of State and his deputy faced accusations of lack of consultations from other senior military personnel and once again, defence policy decision making fell victim of the very feature many had always recommended: strong leadership.

Another palace coup d'etat replaced the regime with a more consensus driven leadership under General Ibrahim Babangida, erstwhile Chief of Army Staff in September 1985. General Babangida was an officer known for his remarkable political adroitness and at the same time respected by subordinates and colleagues as a professional soldier. He was on record before assuming leadership, for attributing the structural deficiencies in defence planning to the presence of bureaucrats unschooled in the 'art of the military' and the refusal to select as Defence Minister, a respected officer who "is the next most respected colleague and confidante of the president."[31] Keen observers of the paralysed defence decision-making structure had hoped that the structure would work more effectively, at least in strategic planning terms, without succumbing to the usual claims of lack of

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[31] See National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies Proceedings 1980 (Kuru, Jos: NIPSS, 1980)

consultations by the armed forces, the bureaucracy and other participant observers.

This view was further encouraged when General Babangida announced an all encompassing Armed Forces Ruling Council as the highest ruling body, retained the Defence Minister in the previous administration, General Bali and went ahead to replace the civilian head of the Defence Ministry's administrative staff with a retired military General who had just completed a degree in Business Administration. In furtherance of the changes, he also named General Domkat Bali, a widely regarded professional as Defence Minister and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, [a style modelled after the American national security structure] although as the occupant later revealed, the office lacked the clout of an American JCS' Chairman's office.[32] Yet by the time General Babangida was forced out of office in 1993, there was a general consensus of local and international opinion that he presided over a ruling council and cabinet in which only his views counted.[33]

Whatever the reasons for General Babangida's refusal to allow these new offices function as intended, it is of interest to this study that despite the elaborate nature of the checks and balances drawn up under the regime, the personalisation of power in a single individual affected whatever good intentions that might have prompted General Babangida's creations. Yet if the executive branch of government did all these, what was the response of the Legislature in the civilian setting, the armed forces and civilian bureaucracies under authoritarian regimes and the Intelligence agencies under both and how did they contribute to national security policy in the light of executive control?

The Legislature and Civilian bureaucracy in National Security Policy: Due to the concentrated nature of power in the office of the Head of State under military rule, the four year experience of democracy(1979 - 83) was hardly enough to develop a

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[32] It must be said however, that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff position in the US' Pentagon did not acquire supra-service powers in one fell swoop. It was a gradual process in which service chiefs were initially more powerful.

[33] See Africa Confidential(London), The Independent(London) and The Financial Times (London) in June 1993 for comprehensive accounts of General Babangida's exit.

legislature, capable of challenging presidential prerogatives as intended in the 1979 constitution in the best interest of national security. Although the constitution conferred on the National Assembly rights to approve government spending in all areas, defence spending proved to be the most difficult.

Comprising two chambers - the Senate and the House of Representatives, the National Assembly had 547 members with an Armed Forces Committee in both chambers of the house. In an executive presidential system heavily weighted against legislative influence, not to mention the inherent fear of the military [still lurking in the shadow of civilian rule], defence budgets and appropriations remotely connected to the military became "untouchables." Yet, apart from the natural disadvantage brought upon the legislature by an uncooperative Presidency and the heavy weight of military influence, other factors seem responsible for the low influence the National assembly had on national security policy.

Objectively, legislators' perception of national security policy and processes was tied more to how defence spending impinged on their constituents' well being. In a country where opinion moulders had always criticised defence spending as excessive under military rule, some legislators considered it imperative to block any attempt to increase defence spending in an elected government. So, in the national assembly, concern was more about the structure of military policy and spending, and less concern, if any, was shown for strategic motives behind such appropriations. Secondly, by their very nature, the Nigerian national assembly like any other the world over was ill suited to quick decision making even though it was more open and accountable. To an armed forces not used to seeking approval from any countervailing institution, the national assembly was a cog in the wheel of progress on grounds of secrecy and speed - core rules for defence appropriations in thirteen previous years of military rule.

The residual prejudice against defence spending apart, legislators' lack of interest in matters pertaining to military strategy was also due to lack of knowledge and expertise. Save for a few legislators, majority of whom were retired military officers [mostly, advocates of status quo *ante*], questions of strategy were hardly raised even at committee stage because the necessary knowledge was not available. Besides, instead of employing assistants who could obtain necessary information,

most legislators preferred their assistants to concentrate on constituency matters. In the few instances where they did, access to information was deliberately blocked by the executive, the intelligence service or the armed forces themselves. Equally, since there were no military-industrial concerns located in any area with many civilians in employment, acquisition of knowledge in military matters was deemed relatively unimportant by elected representatives

In effect, the legislature was not structurally suited to playing an active role in defence policy decision-making; it was arguably fifth in importance in the policy making structure after the armed forces, the President, the intelligence body and the bureaucracy, despite the constitutional provision for a National assembly fully involved in the process of defence policy decision making.[see Figure 1.1]

Much the same could be said of the civilian bureaucracy except that it had acquired its own knowledge of the military constituency and proficiency in how the levers of central government operate. Bureaucrats involved in national security policy making are usually located in three ministries: Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet Office; Defence being the hub of activities. In the Ministry of Defence, the three services: army, navy and the air force were served by three departments led by civilian bureaucrats, but there is an Inter-service department responsible for coordination.

As policy implementers, the civilian bureaucrats were supposed to play a very important role, especially in the preparation of budgets and implementation of projects for the armed forces. But as explained in Chapter 5, even civilian bureaucrats were never allowed to function effectively in this regard. Not only were they shadowed constantly by military staff officers re-located to the ministry from their field jobs, especially under military regimes, many of them were also not accountable to the Ministry's Permanent Secretary because they were directly recruited into the various services, not centrally by the Federal Public Service Commission. Besides, ninety percent of the civilians recruited to the ministry occupied lowly positions with no significant role to play in policy making.[34]

In effect, senior bureaucrats depended more on their personal relationship

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[34] For details, See Chapter 6.

with senior military officers even during civilian rule to influence policy in any way. But apart from the problems highlighted, there was also the inability even among civilian bureaucrats to understand military strategy and how this influences the structural imperatives guiding budgetary concerns. For this reason, senior military officers had always blamed the military's lack of cooperation with civilian bureaucrats on their inability to grasp the inner workings of their institution[35]. The attempt to inject military expertise into the civilian bureaucracy has not shown any significant improvement even now, but it may be too early to pass any judgement on how this might eventually impact on policy making. This leaves national security effectively in the hands of two key bodies and they have both tried to outplay each other in the battle for pre-eminence in national security policy making: the armed forces and the intelligence services.

The Armed Forces in National Security Policy Making: That the armed forces have always played a primary role in national security policy formulation is hardly in contention. But this is not just because they control the means of coercion - a factor which aided their pre-eminent role in politics, but also because they have a considerable control over available expertise on defence matters through the services and training institutions.

Better equipped to influence broad questions of strategy and procurement, the Nigerian armed forces influence policy formulation through the various institutions - Training and Doctrine Command[TRADOC], Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies[NIPSS], Nigerian Defence Academy, Command and Staff College and lately the National War College where debates and multiple simulations of possible war scenarios have consistently taken place.

Arguably, political control provided the military with its exalted place in policy making. It is however important to note that the political leadership's position often conflicted with the broad consensus within the armed forces. Besides, even during the four year civilian administration, military advisers were often deferred

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[35] See Major General Ibrahim Babangida, "Defence Policy Within the Framework of National Planning," Gold Medal Public Affairs Lecture Series, 1 March, 1985. An Unpublished Paper.

to by civilian policy makers because of their superior knowledge. However, this superior knowledge has been cultivated through constant exposure of promising officers to education and overseas postings. For instance, military officers were always leading figures in key embassies and high commissions abroad. Not only do they provide the Head of Mission with advice on military matters [whether he is a military officer or not], in most cases they outnumber career diplomats in missions abroad. In London, Nigeria's most important overseas mission for example, there were seventeen defence attaches in 1990 directly from the armed forces or sent from the National Intelligence Agency. On the other hand, only ten career diplomats were directly from the Ministry of External Affairs.[36]

A fundamental dilemma of military influence over national security policy arose through the inter-service competition for defence pre-eminence. Post civil war recognition of the need for an effective strategy and coordinative capacity led to a severe competition for strategy formulation in the three services. This was brought to a head by 1990 when the army, navy and the air force all promoted their doctrines as the guide to future defence policy. While this brought the issue of services' coordination to the forefront of national security policy agenda once again, the patron-client nature of military rule significantly undermined their corporate influence. For example, service chiefs were dealt with directly in a move to undermine the Chief of Defence Staff or Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and communication channels were maintained with Corps Commanders without the knowledge or approval of their divisional heads or service chiefs. Although this provided the Head of State with the ability to 'divide and rule' as a means of sustaining his leadership, overall military influence in defence decision making was regularly undermined.

It is noteworthy, however, that despite the disagreements within the military hierarchy over defence policy decision making, military advice was never subordinated to civilian control throughout the period under study, not even during civilian dispensation. And, as discussed in subsequent chapters, this had a severe impact on the way defence policy and processes developed in the post-war years.

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[36] See Her Majesty's Diplomatic List, (London: HMSO, 1991)

Intelligence Services and National Security. Having failed to read accurately the strength and weaknesses of the breakaway republic of Biafra, military intelligence was partly blamed for the failure of the Nigerian armed forces to complete the operation in forty eight hours as planned. It was also blamed for not articulating correctly the role played by Nigeria's neighbours in the crisis. The Special Branch, as it was known in the post-civil war years was responsible for domestic security intelligence but it lost its pre-eminent role in this regard after failing to uncover the 1976 abortive coup d'etat in which the Head of State, General Mohammed was assasinated.[37] Although the post war regime considered re-organising the structure of 'collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all collected information', this only resulted in a strong internal covert operation.[38] The new body created after the abortive coup d'etat that killed General Mohammed was called - Nigerian Security Organisation[NSO] and it assumed wider powers in intelligence duties, including responsibility for external intelligence. [The decree setting up the NSO incorporated the External Affairs Ministry's Research Department as NSO's external wing]. While administrative supervision of the section remained with the ministry, the operational control was with the NSO. This affected relations between the two bodies later. Ironically, the role played by military intelligence' directorate in the July 1975 coup plot which brought General Obasanjo to office convinced him of the need to curb military intelligence' involvement in national security policy making.[39] The civilian government inherited this view of a reduced role and the President expanded the powers of the NSO while its Director, Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi also doubled as his Principal Adviser on Intelligence matters. Although the nature of the democratic set up made the organisation accountable, its public image as a gestapo unit for hounding private citizens equally gathered pace.

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[37] Yet, even when the Head of Special Branch, Alhaji M.D.Yusuf uncovered the July 1975 coup plot and tried to confront the plotters he was dissuaded by the Head of State, General Gowon. See Elaigwu, op-cit, p.228

[38] Not My Will, op-cit.

[39] Obasanjo, personal interview. See also ibid, p.52

By the time the military overthrew the civilians in December 1983, the tension between the NSO and the foreign ministry had reached a high point. Simultaneously, the competition for dominance in the intelligence service between military intelligence and NSO was intense. The change of leadership at the NSO seemed to have worsened relations. Under the new dispensation, the security organisation had a career diplomat with wide ranging background in intelligence as the Head. As if to exacerbate the tension, the Head of the NSO became a member of the Supreme Military Council - the highest policy making body. alongside the Director of Military Intelligence, who had always been a member. On the other hand, the personal animosities between the NSO Director and the administration's external affairs minister affected the smooth running of the intelligence services. According to the Minister, since the Director of NSO was a member of the ruling council and he [the Minister] was not, 'he appeared to have seen himself as the member of the Supreme Military Council with the supervisory role over the ministry.'[40] Having contributed to major decisions affecting the Ministry prior to the Minister's appointment, including the selection of new ambassadors and the reduction of Foreign Ministry's staff, the NSO' head was widely respected by the military leadership as a professional intelligence officer whose experience was invaluable. Apparently, that much confidence was not reposed in the Minister, an academic with no practical experience in governance. Equally, the confidence the leadership had in military intelligence at the time was low.[41] To regain its frontline status, military inteligence now resorted to a portrayal of the other services as uncouth and brutal with no regards for human rights. Consequently, just as the public perception of the NSO became one of an organisation out of control, the

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[40] Ibrahim Gambari, Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making: Nigeria after the Second Republic, (New Jersey/London: Humanities Press, 1989) p.25. The author was the Foreign Minster during the period.

[41] For details, see 'Why I was Toppled', Exclusive interview with General Mohammadu Buhari, The News Magazine [Lagos] July 5, 1993. Since overthrown in a palace coup in 1985, this was the first interview granted by the former Head of State detailing how his colleagues used the intelligence service to undermine his administration. He referred to the Head of Military Intelligence in the interview as a fifth columnist.

Directorate of Military Intelligence[DMI] continue to agitate for prominence, albeit unsuccessfully. Perhaps this was responsible for its [military intelligence] deep involvement in the coup that ousted General Buhari's administration and brought in General Ibrahim Babangida in 1985. As now confirmed by the former Head of State, General Buhari, 'it was later that I realised it was one of the master plans of the fifth columnist to embarass and discredit my administration...I knew it was the military intelligence, not the police, not the NSO.'[42] Even though the new regime made a much publicised attempt to expose the excesses of the Nigerian Security Organisation under the previous administration and to re-instate professional credibility to the intelligence service, the attempt appeared superficial and more directed toward regime security. The ultimate beneficiary of this move by the new administration was the Directorate of Military Intelligence, which had lost much grounds in the Buhari administration. Not only was its head, threatened with dismissal by the previous government, re-instated, the NSO was disbanded.[43] But as with previous regimes, General Babangida's determination to re-structure the intelligence service only gathered pace after the abortive coup of April 1990. As he informed the Command and Staff College graduates two months after the coup

> We must in the light of the April [aborted] coup also review and reconceptualise the responsibilities of the security and intelligence services...The leadership must evolve a professional rigour of threat identification which enables it to respond to early warnings against all forces of destabilisation as well as develop the capacity to differentiate categories of threats.[44]

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[42] ibid.

[43] As now confirmed by one top military aide to General Babangida, "the coup itself was not a nationalistic one. He (General Babangida) was trying to protect his interest by protecting Aliyu Mohammed(Head of DMI)among other things" See my interview with Major Debo Bashorun, former Public Relations Officer to General Babangida in The News Magazine (Lagos) 24 January 1994.

[44] General Ibrahim Babangida, The Military and The Nation: Perspectives in Development, Address to the Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna, 29 June 1990, p.3.

The new regime tried to reduce the need for fruitless competition among intelligence bodies afterwards by creating the post of a Coordinator for National Security[CONS] in 1988 to superintend the activities of three earlier created bodies - State Security Services [SSS] -responsible for internal security; National Intelligence Agency[NIA] - responsible for external intelligence and Defence Intelligence Agency [DIA]- charged with responsibility for intelligence among the armed services. While this new arrangement did not curb competition fully, the intelligence services became more powerful in the hierarchy of national security policy making, particularly in ensuring regime security, and continues to play a very important role in the determination of threats internally and externally.

Although, the foreign office, internal affairs ministry, the academic community and public opinion played some role in national security policy formulation, it is difficult to determine a consistent level of influence in the period under study. While the corporatist nature of most military administrations in Nigeria ensured the involvement of academics, if only at a superficial level, this seems dependent on the degree of devolution allowed by leadership or the accommodational characteristics of the key players in government. For instance, several academics and some research institutes played frontline role in foreign policy decision making especially during the regime led by Generals Mohammed and Obasanjo as well as the government headed by General Babangida, but not that much can be said of any other regime.[45] It is safe to conclude that the security elite comprised mainly of the sections discussed above, with the leadership playing a more dominant role in the period under study.[See Figure 1.1]

From the above, it would be useful for any attempt at delineating the nature and character of security leadership to recognise the precarious hold most leaders had on the security machinery in Nigeria. In theory, most Nigerian leaders were strengthened by the limited nature of their accountability to the civil society. Ironically, the informal structure which they all made to work for regime security

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[45] For details on the role of academics in defence policy making, see Chapter 7. Also see Gambari, op-cit and Bolaji Akinyemi, Farewell to Policy, Valedictory Lecture (Lagos: NIIA Press, 1983)

FIGURE 1.1. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY RINGS



1. Head of State/President & Close Advisers
2. Armed Forces and the Intelligence Services
3. Civilian bureaucracy, Foreign Office and the Legislature
4. Intelligentsia, the Media & Public Opinion

and legitimacy was also subject to manipulation by the intelligence network. The Nigeria leadership's distaste for structure quickly turned the often associational and corporatist character of their regimes at inception to authoritarian regimen after power has been consolidated. Yet, it remains an irony of the Nigerian leadership structure in that just as it discouraged delegation as the leaders became the nucleus of security policy making, leadership dependency on certain sections of the security elite increased as the demands of office grew. This, in turn, affected their perception of threats to national security and the security elite, especially the intelligence services encouraged leaders to perceive innocuous features as malicious intent and vice versa. In the process, security developed a life of its own not necessarily in response to the basic parameters of territorial protection and maintenance of state's integrity. Although all of the leaders covered by this study actually strove to become relevant to the goals of national security, it would appear this only succeeded at moments where dangers to the security threshold were co-terminous with those of regime security. What is of interest to this study is the degree of control weilded by them and how that affected their perception and the direction of security policy formulation under their leadership. The next section examines this link.

III. Security Perceptions and the Defence Planning Process

Although a basic premise of this study is that governments are equipped to make rational choices on behalf of the state and its people, government actions cannot be explained solely in terms of rational strategic choices. That political orientation and perceptual biases played a role in the defence planning process in Nigeria during this period would seem apparent from the preceding analysis. To the extent that it provides the link that translates the personal as well as corporate goals of the security elite into specific state objectives and provides the mechanism for satisfying these objectives through states funds, the political and the perceptual conditions of the security elite become inextricably linked to the defence planning process.

Even though threats by their very nature are not static, hence the need for

a constant re-appraisal of actual and potential threats depending on events, this study contends that the perception of threats by Nigeria's security elite almost always remained the same during the period under study. But one of the underlying themes of this study is to examine the security elite's simultaneous search for power and peace which created the struggle between security and prestige in Nigeria's defence policy. Whilst defence plans and national objectives separate these dilemma to an extent, inputs like weapons procurement, force employment and doctrine formulation mask leaderships' motivations and overall intent in the power-peace complex.

To assess reaction to perceived threats therefore, examining the basis and objectives of security from regimes' standpoint seems a good departure point. As expressed in his speech to the nation after the civil war, General Gowon was determined to strengthen the unity of the country, create a dynamic economy, industrial development, regional and continental leadership and a free and democratic society.[46] The Foreign Policy Review of 1976 developed these broad objectives into more specific goals and made the usual link in national security literature between security, power and size. The report, adopted in full by the government states Nigeria's national objectives as: (a) The defence of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity;(b) the creation of the necessary political conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which would facilitate the defence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria;(c) The creation of the necessary economic and political conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which would foster Nigeria's national self reliance and rapid economic development;(d) The achievement of collective self reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world; (e) The promotion and defence of social justice and respect for human dignity; and, (f) The promotion and defence of world peace.[47]

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[46] Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Guidelines for the Projection of Nigeria's Philosophy and Action (Lagos: Ministry of Information, 1971) p.141.

[47] See Report of The Committee on the Review of Nigeria's Foreign Policy including Economic and Technical Cooperation under The Chairmanship of Professor Adebayo Adedeji,(Lagos: Government Printer, 1976) and The Government White Paper on Foreign Policy, 1976

While emphasis did shift from one government to the other, one is inclined to cite the more specific guidelines outlined under the civilian leadership of President Shehu Shagari as the main features followed by all regimes covered in this study. The list includes:

> a) The weakness and poverty of our neighbours expose them to French manipulations. Our defence policy must ensure that French machinations in Africa generally and the West African sub region in particular are curtailed.
>
> b) The defence policy must ensure that our neighbours are not destabilized - if need be Nigeria must have the means to guarantee stability within the subregion.
>
> c) It must also ensure that the military and economic strength of South Africa are defeated anywhere in Africa. This should constitute the maximum objective of policy.
>
> d) The minimum objectives of the policy must guarantee South Africa does not defeat Nigeria in the event of conflict anywhere in Africa.
>
> e) Complete protection of Nigeria from internal enemies.[48]

Whereas all regimes - civilian and military - covered in this study would appear to share these specific objectives, one hesitates to conclude that they all reacted to threats in a similar manner without examining the content of defence planning formulation in relations to threats perceived. Without attempting to assess these objectives, it is assumed here that a way of determining the motivation for

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[48] M.I.Wushishi, 'The Nigerian Army - Growth and Development of Combat Readiness' in Tom Imobighe,(ed) Nigerian Defence and Security: Issues and Options for Policy, (Kuru,Jos: NIPSS/Macmillan, 1987) p.56. The writer was Chief of Army Staff during the civilian administration. Of interest also is Joseph Wayas, Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa,(London: Macmillan, 1979) where the need for a strong continental leadership is further stressed.

security elites' perception is to examine the types of actions governments undertake in accordance with their self perception. For instance, those governments convinced of the need for 'complete protection of Nigeria from internal enemies' will emphasise those instruments most appropriate for, say counter-insurgency operations or riot control, rather than fighter bombers more directly relevant in inter-state conflicts and continental engagements. Perceptual influences on the defence planning process have therefore been examined in terms of regimes' reaction in the period under study.

From Civil War to State Consolidation - 1970 - 1975. While the civil war experience prompted concentration on domestic reconstruction and rehabilitation; General Gowon's government was still reeling from what it perceived as a decidedly pro-Biafra role by many of Nigeria's neighbours. To the regime, if the objectives of state consolidation, economic independence and territorial integrity were to be achieved, Nigeria would have to play a more prominent role in the region. Couched in national interest and national prestige terms, even though cognisant of the precariousness of the internal situation, the leadership chose to interpret national security as resting more on a global and continental agenda rather than on 'national' issues.

However, despite this inter-state and sub-regional direction of defence policy as reflected in the Second National Development Plan(1970 - 74), the regime recognised that without internal cohesion, even the lofty goal of regional integration would remain unattainable. Since the post-civil war regime was determined to enhance its own power and to build on the legitimacy offered by the civil war's resolution, General Gowon became the nucleus of the decision making structure and power was concentrated in his domain to be dispensed and withheld at will. Yet despite the assumption of these wide powers and the unexpected oil boom in the post civil-war years, operational objectives failed to relate to the stated strategic objectives in the defence sector as the Finance ministry sought a careful balance

between defence spending and overall expenditure.[49] Inevitably, the overstretching of funds in the defence sector affected overall national spending and therefore, national objectives. The reality, for the defence sector, after a prolonged civil war affected the leadership's commitment to programme implementation.[50] The tension resulting from economic pressure after the war precluded the necessary defence debate over long range defence planning to redress the inadequacies revealed in the civil war. Instead of altering the assumptions on which defence commitments were based, the proposed armed forces' re-organisation concentrated on whether and how to reduce front-line forces, not how to achieve the regional and continental objectives set. But at every opportunity, the regime never failed to make the connection between Nigeria's regional objectives and the improvement of her economic and military potentials. Save for the successful diplomatic initiative that culminated in the formation of the regional body - Economic Community of West African States[ECOWAS], by the time the regime was overthrown in a bloodless coup in 1975, direction of defence policy was not clearly measurable - by outputs of military missions, clarity of defence commitments or levels of weapons procured.

From Intent to Action - 1975 - 1979. The new regime showed more leadership's commitment to long range defence planning. It widened the scope of the substantive security objectives and changed the ambivalent posture of the Gowon administration to an assertive, even confrontational policy. In trying to resolve the problems of defence planning caused by the absence of a 'defence view' occasioned by inter-service rivalry, the regime tinkered with the defence structure, brought in a Minister of Defence and reviewed the longitudinal deployment of forces to serve the regional

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[49] The Finance Minister who was also the Deputy Chairman of the Federal Executive Council of the Gowon regime, late Chief Obafemi Awolowo was at the forefront of those very critical of this spending pattern; blaming it for a total lack of cost-benefit approach. When he finally bowed out of government, his inability to achieve this balance was cited as one of the reasons for his resignation. See Chapter 5.

[50] For details on defence budgets under the Gowon administration, see Chapter 5.

and continental objectives now raised beyond rhetorical level.[51] The regime's concentration on external threats appeared to observers as a means of maintaining internal cohesion. Its choice of common place enemies like apartheid, racism and neo-colonialism was seen by the security elite as another safeguard for ensuring regime legitimacy, but also as a genuine contribution to the liberation of African territories.[52] Yet the endless concern was how to fund regional and continental military objectives and at the same time sustain a growing economy and political stability.

Besides, the gap still in existence between declarations of the security elite and the eventual action of the state on the international scene illustrates the somewhat rhetorical nature of adopted security policies. Throughout the period covered by this study, this encouraged a misreading of Nigeria's security objectives as perceived adversaries regarded statements of intents as routine declarations of little significance.[53] Besides, other states were curious to know why Nigeria defines national interests and security goals in terms which require her to have influence beyond her territory, creating in the process an almost inevitable conflict with other states' interests and it laid Nigeria open to claims of expansionism from neighbours.

In consequence, these national security objectives, evidently caused by the perceived need to assume a greater influence in international affairs, created a tendency for leadership to blame other actors for the inevitable interface between foreign policy initiatives and perception of territorial aggrandisement. Yet experience shows that assumption of an opponent's position as a direct influence of

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[51] See Note 36 above

[52] As General Olusegun Obasanjo explained, his government's adoption of the Foreign Policy Review Panel's recommendations 'was not so much a preference for the role of 'continental policeman but because my regime had been identified at the forefront of the struggle against apartheid with the strides already taken in Angola. And in any case Nigerians too identified with our sincerity of purpose.' Personal interview. March 18, 1991.

[53] See Stephen Wright's distinction between power and authority in Nigeria's foreign policy. Stephen Wright, 'Africa's Emergent Superpower: The Resource Base of Nigerian Foreign Policy,' Paper presented to the British International Studies Association Conference, University of Keele, 1979.

exaggeration.[56]

Given the quality of leadership during this period, especially its sense of direction, of relevance to our understanding of defence planning problems is why the military organisation still failed to reflect elite declared preferences in terms of doctrine, training, weapons acquisition and battle readiness.

The administration nevertheless used the declared objectives as a basis for further development of the armed forces. Defence planning, especially its deployment strategy and weapons acquisition programme witnessed a change during the period, even though the attempt towards sophistication through large scale weapons procurement proved inadequate in combating proximate threats faced by the country.

Civilian Interregnum - 1979 - 1983. By the time the civilian administration took charge of the implementation of the Fourth National Development Plan (1981-85), the linkage between 'needs' and 'means' in defence planning received more than a casual attention. Although continental goals still occupied a significant part of national objectives as was the case with previous regimes, the withdrawal of the armed forces from direct state governance seemed to have had a salutary effect on questions of national objectives review, operational objectives identification and doctrine development. Specifically, given that most of the evolutionary trends in the armed forces: review of national security objectives; the changed order of battle, adoption of sector type allocation of forces, operational changes to a mechanised and motorised army, improvements in the navy's blue water capability and air force's assault and defence force, and the establishment of TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Unit) took place during this period, it is not unreasonable to argue that these developments were occasioned by the armed forces' concentration on its

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[56] Yet, while worse case scenarios are necessary tools for defence planning, the range of these conglomerate threats in time and space became very doubtful, as most citizens could easily identify with proximate threats in which ability to undertake cheap and effective military action rate very highly. As Nigeria's involvement in the peacekeeping force in Liberia has shown, the reasonably widespread support for the mission two years ago has turned to a clamour for withdrawal of Nigerian troops.

duties, rather than dabbling in politics.[57]

While the economic pressure on the civilian government resulted in a severe foreign exchange crisis underlining the need for a strategic justification of force balance and procurement efficacy, the countervailing political pressures provided the basis for the ineffective linkage of foreign and defence policy.[58] Equally, overall economic performance and the rising cost of modern defence equipment constituted major obstacles to acquiring the necessary military capabilities to fulfil defence commitments. Even then the defence debate during the period still revolved around romantic dichotomies: regional versus continental commitment; internal versus external commitment; maritime capabilities versus frontline commitments; conventional versus nuclear capability. In spite of the considerable pressure mounted on the need to concentrate on specific defence programmes based on economic capabilities and commitments[59], prestige and regime security won over economic prudence in the end and maintenance of continental commitments triumphed over the irreducible borderland commitments to territorial integrity.

One clear contrast in defence planning that emerged during the Shagari government was the concentration on internal security - despite its low scale on the broad priority list. While some have argued that the government had little regard for external threats except for the prestige offered by its articulation, its external security rhetorics led to external involvement and increased arms procurement. At

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[57] For details, See Chapters 4 and 6.

[58] This could be traced in part to the implementation of original budgetary plans by other regimes throughout the period discussed in this study. For instance, General Gowon's government prepared the 1975-80 Third National Development Plan in the light of that government's priority, only for it to be ousted in July 1975, an act which led to a complete review of the plan. It was the same with the Fourth National Plan, prepared by the Obasanjo regime but implemented under President Shagari's government. Oftentimes, attempts to review initial plans resulted in a complete muddle.

[59] Numerous academic and position papers written at the time stressed the need for cost effective defence policy aimed at the core of foreign policy objectives instead of prestige and delusions of grandeur. See, among others Kadzai, I, Nigeria's Global Strategy, (Lagos: N.I.I.A., 1976) and O.S.Kamanu, " Reflections on the Defence Posture for the 1980's," GeneveAfrique, Volume XIV, No.1, 1977-78, p.35.

the same time, its concerns about internal security proved to be an enduring one as it offered the opportunity for an alternative power centre to the all powerful army.[60] As explained in Chapter three, the correlation between the rise in the defence and internal security allocations of overall central expenditure and the dwindling fortunes of the national economy had more to do with the improvement of the internal organs of security under the administration.[61] With the country at the brink of economic destitution, the tendency to use force in settling domestic political objectives lay dangerously close to the surface of political life, and individuals as well as sub-state actors became as important as the state itself as referent security objects.[62]

Thus, weapons purchased were largely for regime survival rather than national security - and this shift in allegiance to the para-military forces from the army was partly responsible for the regime's overthrow.[63]

From Economic Nationalism to Economic Diplomacy - 1984 - 1990 This

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[60] Larry Diamond, 'Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism and the Struggle for Democracy,' in Larry Diamond, et-al, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p.371

[61] Not only did the Police Force had a huge salary increase, the Inspector General of Police, Sunday Adewusi acted throughout as though he was a ruling party representative. Virtually every area of the country was flooded with secret service intelligence men, and short of declaring a 'police state', weapons procured for the police were not for simple law enforcement but large scale combat operations. The government also created for the first time a Police Affairs Ministry, implicitly as a counterweight to the Ministry of Defence, but ostensibly as a patronage for a prominent party member. Equally, budget for both sectors became a severe intra-security struggle. See Approved Recurrent and Capital Estimates, 1981 - 1983; especially 1983.

[62] By 1982, private armies and terrorist organisations were already common place in pursuit of electoral successes by whatever means possible. Of note were the 'Ikemba front'in Anambra State and the Secret Squad in Ogun State among many others. The situation was not helped by the Police's pro-National Party of Nigeria's neutrality. For details, see Chapter 3. Also see Diamond, Pluralism...op-cit.

[63] Symbolically, one of the first tasks taken by the new military regime was the withdrawal of all the sophisticated weaponry procured by the Police Force. For details, See Chapter 3.

attachment to conglomerate ideas became the trend even under subsequent regimes, less so during the Buhari regime which overthrew President Shagari's civilian administration in 1983 but increasingly so after General Babangida became Head of State in 1985. Ironically, both governments pledged to tie national security policies to the state of the nation's economy.

The Buhari regime, for instance, acknowledged Nigeria's security problems as mainly situational and it reduced the overtly rhetorical continental agenda hitherto pursued by previous regimes.[64] Although this earned the Buhari regime widespread criticism as well as pressures from America, Britain and neighbouring countries who saw their interests in sharp conflict with the country's international policy, local opprobrium was minimal.[65] Although their authoritarian administration was largely resented by Nigerians, some have traced their ouster in a palace coup, after twenty months in government, to their single minded pursuit of an isolationist foreign and defence policy and their intransigent political stand.

In terms of security perceptions and defence planning, a fair conclusion will be that their period in office was too short for any clear direction to have emerged. Also, the fact that they ruled at a time of wide ranging economic problems may have precluded effective monitoring of defence spending in terms of direction and agreed goals of policy. Suffice it to say that their relatively short stay in office saw a reversal in the civilian presidency's centralisation of defence planning. The period was more to do with service protection than an integrated national security package and funds allocated were not necessarily used in enhancing the non-military dimensions of security as the regime, like others before it still perceived security

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[64] For details of the period's international involvement, See I. Gambari, op-cit.

[65] The fact that they shut Nigeria's borders, a means of livelihood in many of the contiguous countries and succeeded in forcing these countries to sign an agreement banning smuggling of Nigerian exports through their territories did not endear them to the leaders. Also, the government's refusal to allow American planes to refuel in Nigeria for President Reagan's Chad involvement irked the Americans. At the same time, its policy of "mutual reciprocity" with Britain, Nigeria's erstwhile colonial masters marked a departure from Britain's easy ride with Nigeria's ruling elite. Ironically, save for the regime's high-handedness, all these policies were praised at home as Nigerians saw in the two leaders protective messianic tendencies and the ability to stand up to their world powers.

through the narrow power-prestige prism, even in its pragmatic handling of erstwhile conglomerate themes.

The reason for this trend seems clear. To all regimes, withdrawal from continental commitments is seen to be inconsistent with Nigeria's basic foreign policy objectives which boasts of creating 'the necessary economic and political conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which would foster Nigeria's self reliance...and, the promotion and **defence** of world peace.'[66] As General Babangida correctly argued in his Gold Medal Lecture as Chief of Army Staff, 'Until our perceived threats and commitments /obligations in the international arena are reduced, less defence expenditure is not possible in the foreseeable future...therefore we should press for better management of the present allocations our deeply troubled economy can afford.'[67]

Yet, General Babangida's ambition to manage defence resource allocation more prudently through the adopted policy of "economic diplomacy" and redirect post - independence foreign affairs to the new and more specific imperative of economic development proved difficult in reality.[68] Even though 'economic diplomacy' was a pragmatic diplomatic reaction to the economic problems of the period, not only were its objectives hazy, its national security formulation reverted back to the pre-civil war alliance doctrine and the prestige content of foreign policy was raised to the maximum.

As the Foreign Minister, Major General Ike Nwachukwu explained the regime's position:

> we feel that it is the responsibility of our foreign policy to advance the course of national economic recovery. This entails negotiations and activities that will attract both foreign investment and other assistance required for the

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[66] See Note 36 above.

[67] Babangida, op-cit.p.18.

[68] See Kayode Fayemi, 'Defence Allocations and National Economy,' Guardian Financial Weekly (Lagos) January 11 & 18 1988.

successful accomplishment of our national economic goals.[69]

Within policy circles, the argument has been that national interest is best served within the context of bilateral relations with some of the western powers 'aimed at establishing a protective security umbrella over Nigeria.'[70] According to Ambassador Olisemeka, this will release Nigeria's own energies and resources towards national development. Indeed, he further argued in favour of the need for a mutual security pact, similar to the abrogated Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact in the early 1960s with any or some of the Western Powers.[71] Not surprisingly, the regime's regional as well as national components of foreign and defence policies have reflected the above policy direction almost to the exact content of the Director General's speech. The Economic Community of West African States Peacekeeping Monitoring Force (ECOMOG) in Liberia, initially spearheaded by a 7,000 man contingent from Nigeria was the most prominent example of this policy shift in a regional context.

Objectively, Nigeria and indeed, all other countries in the region have a vested interest in the stability of Liberia or any other country in the region and, taking the lead in ensuring this 'in principle' seems laudable. Besides, it fell within the broad spectrum of the objective to "ensure that our neighbours are not destabilised" since leadership believed it possessed "the means to guarantee stability within the sub-region" as stipulated in the Defence Policy objectives quoted above. However, the principle of peacekeeping places a tremendous premium on a clear

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[69]. Cited in H. Assissi Asobie, "Nigeria: Economic Diplomacy and National Interest," Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 17, No .2, 1991. Also, see Joy Ogwu & Adebayo Olukoshi, "Nigeria's Economic Diplomacy: Some Contending Issues", in the same volume.

[70] Ambassador. I. Olisemeka, 'Nigeria's Foreign Policy Options: A Review of Development Since Independence,' Lecture delivered at the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos. 22 May, 1989; p.9. At the time of the Lecture, Ambassador Olisemeka was the Director General at the Foreign Ministry.

[71] ibid, p.35.

mandate as well as a clearly defined national interest. The need to distinguish between peacekeeping and peacemaking is also imperative. Because all these were lacking, three years after the contingent went into Liberia and $30 million(N2.8 billion) reportedly down the drain[72], the crisis is nowhere near resolution and is fast becoming Nigeria's 'Vietnam.'[73]

At home, alignment between Nigeria's policies and those of other countries was hotly pursued. Although it resulted in the lower layer of what might be called a 'security umbrella' as reflected by a newly signed memorandum of understanding with Britain, (ostensibly to help Nigeria set up a War College, but increasingly reminds one of the abrogated Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact,)[74] the regime continued to walk a tight rope in seeking a balance between the country's non-aligned status and its adopted alliance doctrine. More importantly, economic diplomacy in its defence content did not deviate from the policies of previous administrations. Indeed, what the Babangida regime did was to adopt short term, seemingly pragmatic positions especially, in respect of the country's erstwhile anti-apartheid stance in South Africa.[75] The government's 'economic diplomacy' indicated a rather

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[72] See African Guardian (Lagos), 'ECOMOG: Nigeria's N2.8 Billion Mess,' September 28, 1992. See also 'Why Nigeria must pull out of ECOMOG now,' Campaign for Democracy Document, 9 September, 1992.

[73] Instead, the contingent increased to 12,000 and peacekeeping mandate changed to a peacemaking stance. Besides, allies have proved to be as unreliable as those against the ECOMOG force in Liberia - Senegal, seen as the legitimating force on the Francophone side is threatening withdrawal from the operation. See, for details, Nigeria in Liberia: Revisiting Big Brother's "Vietnam",' Nigeria Now(London), Volume 1, No.6, September 1992.

[74] For a critique of the newly signed memorandum, see Kayode Fayemi, 'A Second Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact?', Nigeria Now (London) Vol.1, No.5, August 1992. The First Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact was aborted in 1961 following fierce opposition by students, academics and politicians against its attempt to turn Nigeria into a base for British military operations.

[75] Although its rapproachment with the de-Klerk Government is often cited as a justification for economic diplomacy, it has not succeeded in creating a solid plank for equitable relationship. Despite urging by South Africa's opposition groups, especially the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress, other frontline states in Southern Africa and even the Nigerian public at large, the government still went ahead to legitimise the anti-apartheid regime with no concrete

inadequate conception of national security tied firmly to the survival of present leadership and prestige rather than need. Instead of the economic independence it sought, economic diplomacy would appear to have tied the country firmly to International financial institutions through the regime's adoption of Structural Adjustment Policies by the IMF.

While one of the conditions of the regime's economic policies is that "needs" should be related to "means" and derivatively, military expenditure should flow from realistic threat analysis, military expenditure became a factor in external indebtedness in the latter years covered by this study due to increased procurement tied to export credit guarantee schemes.[76]

In effect, Nigeria's 'peace dividend' generally expected as the gain of a post-cold war era where the African continent is no longer a proxy war zone for superpower rivalry appear to be an unfounded optimism. Asking leaders with little or no answer to their countries' economic problems to jettison the most relevant and coercive weapon of authority and repression (by making security expenditure serve national interests) may be akin to urging them to commit political suicide.[77] While Nigeria has genuine security concerns in need of attention, as this study will show, the Babangida regime's adoption of the post-cold war 'peace dividend' thesis as a justification for its economic diplomacy doctrine was erroneous in its assumption that reduced militarisation would, in turn, lead to reduced militarism because of the absence of superpower rivalry.

The implication of the global situation for Nigeria's defence planning process

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evidence of change within the country. See Adebayo Olukoshi, 'Nigeria's new relationship with Apartheid South Africa,' Southern Africa Political Economy Monthly (Harare), September 1992.

[76] West Africa (London), 'Nigeria, IMF Pact at Risk', 21-28 July, 1992. Interestingly, a recent study has confirmed the link. For details, see Colin Blackhurst, 'Arm deals linked to biggest increases in overseas aid', The Independent (London) 20 January 1994.

[77] See a detailed exposition of this dilemma, see J 'Kayode Fayemi, 'A Review of African Insecurity', African Events, (Volume 8, No.12,) December 1992.. Also, see Peter Gibbon, et-al (eds.), Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet, 1992)

bears emphasis, especially in its shaping of decision-makers' world view and threat analysis. From the inability of policymakers to relate "defence needs" to "economic means", the necessary connection between technology, strategy and economics seems missing in defence policy and planning in the period under study. In effect, not only did this result in a number of misperceptions since the security elite only saw what they believed to be the country's security threats,[78] it also led to the neglect of certain situational factors which would have aided the analysis of perceived threats and formulation of defence policy more accurately. For example, the regime's concentration on espionage, sabotage and subversion drew attention away from the government's inability to solve the mounting economic and non-military aspects of security. Yet, it may be difficult for involved insiders to distinguish between deliberate political meddling such as propaganda and espionage from spontaneous domestic dissent, thus providing security elites with a justification for perceptual confusion.

Conclusion

Despite the difference in emphasis from one regime to another, the main thrust of our argument is that elite perception of national security threats was largely coloured by the cold war environment, and in a large number of cases, this was used to justify policy formulation, defence expenditure and alliance building. Equally, psychological traits, personality and predispositions of the security elites have all played a crucial role in the concentration on external dimensions of security. This recurrent reactive sequence of behaviour by the security elite cannot be explained solely by their pre-disposition to a cold war mentality, however.[79] Equally the diffuse nature of internal dimensions of threats provided some

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[78] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception In International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.170

[79] An extensive literature already exists on the theoretical and practical effects of the viewers' historical memory and psychological make up and the attendant pressures on decisionmaking. See, *inter-alia*, Robert Jervis, ibid; Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception In International Relations,(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), Klaus Knorr, op-cit.; F.N.Trager and P.S.Kronenberg(eds) op-cit.

explanation for the blurred lines between subjective and objective threats. While a strong correlation remains between colonialism, superpower rivalry and some patterns of instability in Nigeria, elites' conceptualisation of security had often been based on an interpretation of defence planning as mainly weapons procurement, size of the armed forces, payment of salaries and self defence, in short, planning had been driven by the *structure* and not the *strategy* of military policy.

However, since these are indices that cannot in themselves justify defence spending, a rationale had to be found in the external arena, which, understandably would impel Nigeria's perpetually high defence expenditure. In effect, changing personalities did not necessarily result in perceptual changes, except in degrees since decisions seemed to have resulted from different information and peculiar circumstances even when related to the same historical facts.

Indeed, if all security threats had to be laid at the feet of neo-colonialism and superpower rivalry, the perceived end of the cold war ought to have discouraged such externally driven security elites' perception. Yet, not much seemed to have changed, even though substantial recognition is now paid to internal dimensions of threat by the security elites in Nigeria.

But the refusal to acknowledge internal security problems on the part of the security elite may also have resulted from the competition among too many intervening variables internally, while the external threats can be classified under two broad, unchanging headings: sub-regional and international. As Robert Jervis rightly observes, 'in a situation of a large number of competing values, highly complex situations, and very ambiguous information, possibilities and reasons for disagreements and misperceptions are legion.'[80]

While this study argues that the wide ranging possibilities for misperception and elite disagreements on the complex variants of internal threats in the country may have contributed to the inordinate concentration on predispositional rather than situational factors in security perception, the refusal to change these misperceptions

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[80] Jervis, ibid, p.31.

may have been deliberately aimed at promoting and protecting institutional interests.[81] This is more so because an objective assessment of policy with its attendant influence on doctrine and overall defence planning may harbour threatening potentials in terms of security sector job losses and, more importantly, for regime security.

For this reason, we it is possible to assume an intervening feedback between the security policy process and the pattern of domestic political alignments and disagreements. Yet to insist that since defence policy concentrates mainly on external environment, the defence planning process should be left in the exclusive preserve of international security agenda, is to assume that the domestic scene is rationally ordered and neutral when it is not. This study takes an all embracing overview of security, in effect.

In conclusion, situational factors would appear to have played a less significant role in Nigeria's defence planning process, either in the security elites' threat analyses or in the various measures adopted in reducing perceived security problems. Instead, the elites' belief systems about the international environment encouraged the perception that stability and peace are best achieved within the context of prestige and power politics. In spite of this outward presentation, embedded in the power politics usage was the confusion created for threat analyses by the belief that internal problems could be overriden by concentration on external involvement.

Also, it would appear that a national security policy as Nigeria's that seeks to 'police and ensure' continental security at the expense of territorial protection and national development implies an implicit assumption in national consensus, and that fewer inter-state threats worth paying attention exists. Since the security elite has found the short route to basic security through the strengthening of the nation's repressive and coercive elements, it would seem the need for an all encompassing national security model was shortcircuited in the defence planning process of the

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[81] In a few of the cases, misperception may also have been due to genuine confusion due to inadequate information. As Jervis rightly posits,'no formula will eliminate misperception or reveal what image is correct. Faced with ambiguous and confusing evidence, decisionmakers must draw inferences that will often prove incorrect.' Jervis, ibid., p.409.

period under study.

This competition between the needs of traditional security policy and what Barry Buzan called 'humanistic' development security policy constitutes a major cause for disagreements among defence decision making elite. Problems also arise in the concentration on the international goals of security policy. Given the defined goals in the 1976 Foreign Policy Review and the 1979 Defence Policy Objectives, for example, confusion arose as to what security methods should be adopted to meet these seemingly larger than life goals.[82] In other words, national security not only suffered from the concentration on international security and prestige, the defence planning process inevitably became the refuge of domestic political pressures in the security elite's bid to influence the international environment.[83]

Faced with a situation in which basic security became difficult to achieve, national security was reduced to a relative and less feasible policy objective and situational factors were subsumed in the perceptual biases of the security elite. The next two chapters show the inter-relatedness between the "real" and "psychological" environments of threats with a focus on the interpenetration of subjective and objective agents. The rest of this study analyses the trends in Nigeria's defence planning which flowed from the inextricably intertwined environments of the state and civil society, drawing attention to the linkage between the form of the geopolitical entity and the character as well as content of its supra-sectional interests in an all inclusive manner.

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[82] For a good critique of this approach, see Olajide Aluko, Necessity and Freedom in Foreign Policy Making, Inaugural Lecture Series (Ile Ife: University of Ife Press, 1981) Oddly enough, while some of the policies adopted put the country on the prestige map of global power politics and perhaps enhanced her image in the developed world, notoriety came with the recognition, and internal cohesion and external integrity were further eroded.

[83] This paradoxical feedback arrangement is inevitable for a system that thrives on sub-state actors involvement with international capital at the expense of national economic security. For details, see chapter three on internal dimensions of threat.

CHAPTER TWO

EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF THREAT TO NIGERIA'S SECURITY

I. Background.

Nigeria is a large country. With a quarter of the entire African population[1], it is the most populous nation in the African continent. It is roughly the size of France, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland put together and its land mass of 923,768 square kilometres equals those of France, Germany and Greece lumped into one.[2]

In terms of resources the country has crude petroleum and other mineral resources.[3] In essence, all these endowments make her an object of envy and fear and do not endear her to surrounding nations, who feel intimidated by her sheer size and resources. Conversely, these attributes automatically confer immense regional responsibilities on her since no other country could act as a counterweight within the region. For some of the contiguous impoverished states, this deep sense of fear has been manifested in their perception of Nigeria as an expansionist state.[4] On account

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[1] Figures released in March 1992 after the first successfully conducted population census in thirty years put the head count at 88.5 million people. See West Africa(London), March 27 -April 2, 1992. Two years after, the official census declaration is yet to be made and the estimated count of 88.5 million has been a subject of unrelenting controversy.

[2] The World in Figures, An Economist's Publication, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1984) p.8.

[3] Available in the country are Uranium, Gold, Columbite, Tin, Coal, Bauxite, Phosphate, Bitumen, Natural Gas and Petroleum in exploitable quantities. It is from petroleum, however, that the country derives the bulk of its export earnings.

[4] Nigeria is directly bordered by Benin Republic, Niger, Chad and Cameroon and is contiguous to Equatorial Guinea on the coast. They are relatively weak states but also former French colonies, a factor which changes the way they relate to Nigeria. Although this suspicion is often referred to in less concrete terms, there is

of her size, even certain great powers still perceive Nigeria as a major threat to their satellite states or interests in the region in the period covered by this study.[5] Although aware of the concern caused by the country's size at all these levels, it appeared that the pre-civil war regimes never really thought the suspicion was worth paying attention. The civil war, however, taught a different lesson on how to deal with suspicious neighbours and the aftermath of the war saw concrete steps [being] taken by government to safeguard Nigeria's security. Indeed, the unsettled question of a 'united country' at a time internal threats were more overarching also contributed to the confusion in threats' identification.[6] As a result, Nigeria's national interests were always assumed to be evident following rigidly on age long principles of international politics without any prioritization or rank ordering and consisting of such general principles like sovereignty, respect for sovereign equality of other countries, non- interference and evaluation of international crises on their merit.[7] This generalised notion of national interests and objectives were consistently pursued till

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little evidence that this made them behave in anyway that might be interpreted as fearful of Nigeria. If anything, their attitude re-inforced Michael Handel's thesis that '...small states, in short, are great powers writ small.' See Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System,(London: Frank Cass, 1984) p.52.

[5] While France is believed by the security elite to despise Nigeria because of its strong attachment to former territories, others like Britain and United States disliked Nigeria's strong involvement in Southern Africa, a region of primary strategic importance to them. Another fear rightly expressed is the discontinuity of policies due to constant change in of government which threatened stability in Africa's largest market, outside South Africa. See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, (London: Harper Collins, 1993) pp.524-526.

[6] The threat to national foreign policy, for instance, was clearly manifested in the different foreign policy pronouncements at the regional levels. Not only did this show that interests were not common, but also that their pursuit was clearly different. However, following from their united stand against colonialism, it is also possible to argue that such differing pronouncements meant that the threats were not considered formidable enough. See for details, Ibrahim Gambari, Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Nigeria under the first Republic, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1980) and Gordon Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973)

[7] See Prime Minister's Statement on Foreign Policy - House of Representatives Debate, 20 August, 1960, Column 2669 - 1672.

1970 when the need arose for proper threats assessment in order to achieve clearly codified and properly articulated national interests and objectives.

The stage for a codified structure was set by a number of factors, important of which was the successful re-integration of 'Biafra' after two and half years of civil war. The legitimacy of the military government was strengthened by the consolidation of power in the federal centre. This gave the leadership more confidence to clarify national objectives and effectively eroded the potency of regional affiliation. The increasing economic clout brought about by the huge petroleum exports enhanced the government's independence and assertiveness and made this clarification of national interests imperative. Thirdly, the role of Nigeria's neighbours and certain foreign powers in the war; either in their reluctance to openly support the Federal side or in their refusal to supply arms to Nigeria all triggered a review of national interests. This resulted in a more pragmatic approach to foreign relations; led to a more active role in the West African sub-region; an improved relations with the eastern bloc and an active interest in the affairs of Nigeria's immediate neighbours.

As explained in Chapter one, the articulation of national interests and objectives under General Gowon's post war administration as "the establishment of a united, strong and self reliant nation, a great and dynamic economy, a just and egalitarian society," among many others[8], precluded a specific appraisal of opposition and identification of threats to the country, and assumed that any implicit or explicit opposition to any of the broad objectives constitutes a threat to national security. It was not until 1976 when national interests became clearly set out in the Foreign Policy Review report established by General Obasanjo's government as ranging from the 'defence of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, to the promotion and defence of world peace,'[9] that appraisal of opposition and determination of threats became easy to articulate realistically. Yet even this continuum that stretched from basic to surplus security presented an added problem

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[8] See Chapter One for details.

[9] For details of the Foreign Policy Review recommendations, see Chapter 1, note.47.

of delineation between real and imagined threats as perceived by the security elite, a problem the government attempted to address in the 1979 Defence Policy objectives.[10]

Consequently, this chapter examines decision-makers' perception of external threats in its geopolitical, military, economic, socio-cultural and subversive dimensions on the basis of codified national interests and objectives and how commensurate government' reactions were to threats identified.

II. Geo-political dimensions.

In pursuit of the first objective of 'defence of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity', the unfinished question of national boundaries presented Nigeria with a more threatening external agenda than any other issue since independence. In many instances, boundary problems had actually set the tone for relations between Nigeria and her neighbours and decision-makers regarded their solution as a basic pre-requisite for peace in the sub-region.[11] At the same time decision-makers continuously perceived the contiguous states of Cameroon, Niger, Benin, Chad and the coastal islands of Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe directly or vicariously as veritable sources of threats to Nigeria's security which brought the country several times to the brink of war in the period covered by this study.[12]

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[10] See Chapter One, note 48.

[11] This has led to the creation at the highest level of government - a National Boundary Commission in Nigeria with a view to identifying and reducing boundary crises.

[12] In 1970, about seventy Nigerians were killed in Sao Tome (Fernando Po) an island on the Atlantic Ocean south of Nigeria, following disputes on the island between Nigerian farmers and indigenous plantation workers. This led to the evacuation of 60,000 Nigerian labourers from the island. In 1976, Nigerians were killed in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. Benin Republic overran parts of Western Nigeria in March 1981. Around the same time some parts of Sokoto State in Northern Nigeria were occupied by Nigeriennes. Constantly, the border with Chad and Cameroon led to several unresolved disputes, the most remarkable of which were the 1981 Ikanga district murder of five Nigerian soldiers on the border with Cameroon and the recent dispute over Bakassi Peninsula which nearly ended in war, and the invasion of the Kinasara island in North Eastern Nigeria by Chadian troops

The boundary crises had their background in the scramble for and partition of the African continent at the 1884-5 Berlin Conference of the European powers, where arbitrary frontiers were drawn with little or no regard for pre-existing human and geographic patterns. In the process, ethnic and language groups who, before colonial rule were culturally homogeneous became separated.[13] Hence, the resultant inter-state conflicts over national territories may have escalated from pre-colonial inter-ethnic disagreements now couched in national, economic and territorial terms as well as from colonial legacies. Several agreements[14] between the colonial powers in the region (England, France and Germany) provided legal cover for the division of many ethnic groups between Nigeria and the four neighbouring countries. However, the arbitrariness and artificiality of inter-colonial boundaries provided the basis for suspicion in Nigeria's relations with her neighbours from which other differences found easy root for germination. As one foremost scholar of African border relations notes,

> these cross border ethnic networks are not the simple contemporary phenomena assumed by policy, nor are they limited in scope to just the inter-group dimensions. They are rendered both wider and more complex by the fact of the familiar pattern of ethnic

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in 1983. All the killings resulted, in many cases from the perception of Nigeria as the overbearing hegemon about to overrun their territories.

[13] For outstanding studies of this cross cultural phenomena, see A.I.Asiwaju,(ed) Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's International Boundaries, (Lagos: Lagos University Press, 1985) and A.I.Asiwaju and P.O.Adeniyi(eds) Borderlands in Africa: A Multi-Disciplinary and Comparative focus on Nigeria and West Africa, (Lagos: Lagos University Press, 1989)

[14] For instance, the Anglo-French agreements of 10 August 1889 and 14 June 1898 set the basis for division along the Nigerian - Benin borders separating principally the Yoruba and the Borgu on both sides. In the same vein, the Anglo-French Conventions of 1890 and 1904 delimited without demarcating the present day boundaries between Niger, Chad and Nigeria separating the Hausa on both sides while the 1960 United Nations plebiscite served as the basis for boundaries settlement between Nigeria and Cameroon.

and cultural interlinks and interpenetrations...[15]

Despite major boundary revisions on some of the territories by the United Nations between 1960 and 1962, especially on the Cameroonian frontier, ethnic and dynastic fervour remained relentless. And it was this arbitrary drawing of a 'blue line' from old Calaba(now in South Eastern Nigeria) to Yola (also in North Eastern Nigeria) as one British official who participated in the negotiations described it[16], that resulted in frequent skirmishes along the eastern borders making it the most volatile of all.[17] Against the background of Cameroonian dissatisfaction with the 1960 U.N. Plebiscite that demarcated Nigeria-Cameroon borders, the Cameroonian President, Alhaji Ahmadou Ahidjo declared at independence,

> Henceforth, when we shall be talking of Cameroon, we shall always bear in mind our 800,000 brothers beyond our frontiers...who share our hopes and joys. They shall be with us in spirit **before totally being with us...**(emphasis mine)[18]

The sense of loss was equally shared on the Nigerian side. And as reflected by the Emir of Yola whose territories had been divided into two with the bulk of his people in Cameroon, he regarded himself as the 'head without its body.'[19]

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[15] A.I.Asiwaju, Artificial Boundaries, Inaugural Lecture Series, University of Lagos, Nigeria, 1984, p.15.

[16] Cited in J.C.Anene, International Boundaries of Nigeria, (London: Longman, 1973) p.19.

[17] Oscar Ede, 'The Nigerian - Cameroonian Boundaries,' Nigerian Forum, Vol.1, Nos. 7 & 8, 1981, pp.292-3.

[18] Ndifontah B.Nyamndi, The International Politics of British - Cameroons Plebiscite 1959-1961, Unpublished P.hd. Thesis, University of London, 1984, p.268.

[19] See A.Y. Oyewunmi, Cooperation and Conflict in West and Central Africa: Nigeria and its Neighbours, 1960-1983, Unpublished P.hd Thesis., University of London, 1986, p.77.

While it would seem the inherent political threats arising from incomplete and improper demarcations of borderlands would have been perceived differently and perhaps less contentiously,[20] the security elite's perception of France's role in the sub region actually heightened the geopolitical threat. Particularly relevant in this respect was the role France was thought to have played in the civil war through her use of some of the neighbouring states (formerly French colonies still strongly attached to her) in channelling arms and funds to the Biafran rebels.[21]

The powerful influence of France in the sub-region became one issue that agitated defence planners' thought processes throughout this period. To reduce the threat, Nigeria's decision-makers sought to decouple those states with strong post-colonial attachment to France bilaterally[22] and multilaterally. They believed that one reason why the countries always served proxy roles for France against Nigeria was not out of sheer hatred for Nigeria (though it may have been coextensive) but mainly because of their total dependence on France for trade and aid.[23] Multilaterally, an integrative process which started during the civil war culminated in the formation of a regional body - Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975

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[20] Indeed several agreements have been signed and joint boundary commissions created on all the borders with little respite from incursionist tendencies. The fact that some of these incursions were said to have been spearheaded by French legionnaires coupled with the fact that France has military pacts with all the countries (Chad abrogated hers in 1980) have not assuaged feelings in Nigeria. See S.C.Ukpabi, 'Perception of Threats and Defence Priorities for Nigeria's Frontiers,' in T.A.Imobighe,(ed) Nigerian Defence and Security: Issues and Options for Policy, (Kuru,Jos: NIPSS & Macmillan, 1987) p.119.

[21] For the role of Nigeria's neighbours in the civil war, see Olajide Aluko, op-cit. and A.Y.Oyewunmi, op-cit.

[22] For instance, following a pact signed in 1972, Nigeria supplies to date around 30,000 kilowatts of electricity annually to Niger Republic. She also owns 16% shares in the Uranium mines in Afatso, Niger republic. At the same time - Nigeria built two factories in Benin republic, a sugar industry and a cement making factory. With Chad republic and Cameroon, Nigeria formed the Chad River Basin Commission.

[23] For a good account of this dimension, see Yakubu Gowon, The Economic Community of West African States: A Study in Political and Economic Integration, Unpublished P.hd Thesis, University of Warwick, 1984. The author, as Nigeria's Head of State was a prime actor in the formation of the organisation.

comprising of all the sixteen West Africans states. The hopes and expectations of a more cooperative union of West Africans, devoid of external interference was however shortlived amid France's revival of a moribund, albeit wholly Francophone regional body - *Commnaute de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO) in 1977 to undercut Nigeria's leadership of ECOWAS but this was presented as a security guarantee to the Francophone countries.[24]

Against the background of increasing *rapprochement* between Nigeria and other Francophone West African states, especially her immediate neighbours after the war[25], decision-makers' continuous perception of the French threat would be better understood within the context of history and previous relations between Nigeria and France. This becomes necessary with the realisation that France remains to date one of Nigeria's big trading partners, indeed France's largest market in Africa outside South Africa.[26] Politically, the leadership of France since the era of General de Gaulle always perceived France as a great power writ large in league with the United States and United Kingdom and forever in search of independence, prestige and grandeur.[27] One area where she had played an undisputed global role and continues

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[24] See S.K.B.Asante, 'ECOWAS/CEAO: Conflict and Cooperation in West Africa,' in Ralph Onwuka and Ahmadu Sesay(eds) The Future of Regionalism in Africa,(London: Macmillan, 1985). CEAO finally ceased to exist as a regional body in 1994 when it was wound up formally in Senegal. See The News Magazine (Lagos), 28 March 1994.

[25] Apart from France's sponsorship, one reason neighbouring Francophone countries had always teamed up was to present a unified front against the 'threat of this big Anglo-phone country.' Moreso, some Nigerian politicians had bragged about extending Nigeria's borders to Benin Republic as the manifesto of Action Group pledged prior to Nigeria's independence.

[26] For details of economic relations with France, see Emeka Nwokedi,' Nigeria and France', in G.O.Olusanya & R.A.Akindele (eds) Nigeria's External Relations: The first twenty five years,(Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986)

[27] For details on France's fixations about grandeur and prestige, see Jacques Chirac, 'France: Illusions, Temptations and Ambitions,' Foreign Affairs, 56, No.3 (April 1978); John Baylis, 'French Defence Policy,' in John Baylis et-al, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, (London: Holmes & Meier, 1975); and Alan Ned Sabrosky, 'Defence Policy of France,' in Murray, D.J & Viotti, P.R.(eds) The Defence Policies of Nations: A comparative Study, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

to play the role and where her influence earned her the position of a *primus-inter-pares* was Africa, especially French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa.[28] That she did not want to lose the global influence in this area was understandable following her failure in IndoChina, Algeria and in deGaulle's attempt to form a world ruling triumvirate with Britain and America in 1958.[29] As a result, while France always couched her disagreements with Nigeria in terms of protection for the Francophone West African states, it was obvious that General de Gaulle had always been against the Federal structure.[30] The hidden suspicion that this 'big Anglophone country' could impair France's global influence in her last bastion convinced the French leadership of the need to dismember this potential hegemon. The Nigerian civil war provided the perfect opportunity for France to attempt the aim of dismembering the state. Hence, it is against this background of mutual dislike that Franco-Nigerian relations was conducted in the pre-1970 era and a major reason for all the problems encountered during this period.[31]

Although relations improved after the war, perception of the French threat

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[28] For a full analysis of France's policy of indoctrination in the region, see a recent study by Anthony Clayton, France, Soldiers and Africa, (London: Brasseys, 1988)

[29] The 1958 Memorandum was President deGaulle's proposal to Britain and America on a tripartite arrangement that would confer exclusive control of world security in their hands. America refused to accede to this request and this set the tone for France's eventual withdrawal from NATO's integrated structure. For details, see Carl Amme, NATO Without France, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1970)

[30] As his misgivings about the Canadian federal structure was already known at the time, his position on the Nigerian federation was a little less surprising when he declared that, '...the concept of federation...consists of automatically putting together very different peoples, sometimes very different indeed, and who in consequence do not like it at all...' See for details, African Research Bulletin(London) Vol.9, No.5, October, 1968, p.1186.

[31] For instance, diplomatic relations were severed barely three months into Nigeria's independence in January, 1961; France openly supported Cameroon in the UN Plebiscite in 1961, blocked Nigeria's attempt to become an associate member of the EEC in 1966 and finally, covertly supported the dismemberment of Nigeria through her funding of Biafra's rebellion.

"satellites," their former colonies.[36]

Hence, at the decision-making level, there was little doubt that the French threat was perceived to be very real and it provided defensible reasons in the articulation of national security interests, for the qualitative re-armament of the armed forces and the justification for defence spending despite the remarkable asymmetry in the balance of capability between the two countries. Clearly, Nigeria's military capability cannot be compared in any respect to France's, neither could the articulation of French threat possibly result in equality of forces through rearmament.[37] But at least, constant allusion to the French threat can serve a genuine domestic diversion as the most recent crisis in the Bakassi peninsula, straddling the Nigeria-Cameroon borderlands seem to confirm. Since January 1994, Nigeria and Cameroon have been engaged in a serious dispute over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula in South East Nigeria. This has resulted in a number of deaths. Although Cameroon has since referred the dispute to the International Court of Justice for adjudication, the Nigerian regime originally refused to be part of this. Faced with relentless internal dissension over its legitimacy, the government is believed to be fanning the embers of war in the region as a means of securing a much needed popular base at home. The Foreign Minister, Babagana Kingibe has, in turn, accused France of interfering in the dispute while urging the people to support government action. The general impression is that France is brought into the picture only to generate nationalistic fervour.[38] This recent episode illustrates why opinions continue to differ on whether the French threat is real or imagined, just as some observers earlier contended that the South African threat was serving a purely domestic purpose.

Since one of the key planks of Nigeria's foreign policy has always been the removal of vestiges of colonialism on the continent and the eradication of the

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[36] ibid., p.123.

[37] For a useful insight into Nigeria - France force balance, see Military Balance, 1990-91(London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992)

[38] See for details, The News Magazine (Lagos), 'Bakassi - A Ruse?: The Unpublished Papers', 21 March 1994.

apartheid state structure, it only stood to reason for political authorities in the country to see South Africa as a veritable source of threat to the country's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and this made Nigeria the focal point of the continent's struggle against apartheid. South Africa's covert support for Biafra during the civil war with military supplies and mercenaries,[39] shifted the declaratory tone of Nigeria's opposition of apartheid to a combative one after the war.

The fact that the first bomb dropped on Lagos, Nigeria's capital city by the rebels came from Rhodesia confirmed to the leadership the threat posed by South Africa.[40] This appreciation of the South African threat was brought out in clear relief in a post civil war speech by Nigeria's leader - General Yakubu Gowon when he addressed the O.A.U. According to him,

> ...from recent experience we are aware that in opposing colonialism and racialism...we are serving the cause of our own freedom and independence...beside the vivid affront which they (apartheid and racism) constitute to our conscience, the *threat* [emphasis mine] they pose to our political independence and security is as real as it is intolerable...[41]

However, because of post civil war reconstruction and rehabilitation as well as General Gowon's pre-occupation with the West-African sub-region, Nigeria's reaction to the threat already identified in apartheid South Africa did not gather momentum until mid-1970s when a change of government dovetailed into a radical change in posture towards the apartheid state. Nigeria's diplomatic success in Angola and Mozambique heightened the threat as the seige mentality created in South Africa by the Socialist Government in Angola increased Pretoria's desperation, and

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[39] See The Guardian, (London) 23 March, 1969 for South Africa's activities in Biafra and Gordon Winter, Inside B.O.S.S.: South Africa's Secret Police, (London: Penguin, 1981) p.296 for a detailed account of Mr Pieter Botha's [South Africa's Defence Minister and later President] involvement.

[40] See O.Aluko, op-cit., p.119.

[41] Olusanya and Akindele(eds), op-cit., Appendix V, p.519.

invariably her dislike for all supporters of the Angolan and Mozambican regimes. At the same time it increased the clout of the Nigerian government in the Southern African region as well as on the international scene as she continued to campaign strongly against all friends of apartheid.[42] That Nigeria's campaign against apartheid was closely watched by the Pretoria regime could only be appreciated in the welcome given to the incoming civilian President, Shehu Shagari in 1979 by a pro-government newspaper, **The Johannesburg Star,**

> ...Nigeria's *big stick diplomacy* towards racialism in the south has not been conspicuously successful. Mr Shagari, we hope, may be the man for a somewhat *cooler* and more pragmatic stance.[emphasis mine][43]

Instead of the 'somewhat cooler' approach called for in the editorial, the Shagari government actually continued along the path of its predecessor, seeking to ensure 'that the military and economic strength of South Africa are defeated anywhere in Africa.'[44]

In recent times, Nigeria's decision-makers have also taken into account South Africa's activities in neighbouring countries. With the realisation that a direct attack by South Africa may not be militarily feasible, her disguised presence in Equatorial Guinea was rightly perceived as a threat to Nigeria's territorial integrity and independence.[45] To the government, even if the perceived threat was less of a military kind, since threats are not merely the function of the determination of others

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[42] The nationalisation of the assets of Barclays Bank and British Petroleum in 1978 and 1979 respectively served as a warning of the country's determination not to relent efforts in this area of foreign policy.

[43] Quoted in West Africa,(London) 3 September, 1979.

[44] This view was outlined by the Chief of Army Staff in the Shagari government, Lt.General M.I.Wushishi. See, M.I.Wushishi, 'The Nigerian Army - Growth and Development of Combat Readiness,' in T.A.Imobighe(ed) op-cit., p.56.

[45] For details of Nigeria's reaction to South Africa's presence in Equatorial Guinea, see Olusola Akinrinade, 'Threats to Security and Stability in Nigeria: Perceptions and Reality,' GeneveAfrique, Vol.XXVI, No.2, 1988.

to annihilate or destroy one but also any attempt construed by the ruling authorities as damaging to other national values like the nation's prestige, South Africa was always seen as a political threat to Nigeria's goal of eradicating apartheid and colonialism in the continental sense which, in turn spilled over to its perception as an immediate threat. However, there is no evidence to suggest that a black ruled South Africa would cease to be a threat of some sort to Nigeria as she would be the only other state capable of challenging her continental leadership and prestige.[46] Indeed, events since the inauguration of a majority ruled South Africa have heightened the spectre of South Africa's domination in continental leadership.

Another country which featured prominently in the vortex of Nigeria's threat assessment during the period under study was Libya and this had always been within the context of the expansionist proclivities of the country's leadership under Colonel Gaddafi. While previous relations between Nigeria and Libya were not construed as a source of threat, Libya's tendency for interference in the affairs of other countries was noteworthy early enough.[47] But what first excited the leadership's attention to Libya's threat emanated from her role in Chad, Nigeria's north eastern neighbour. The proposed merger of Libya and Chad in January, 1981 served as the impetus for the government to act.[48] The belief that Libyans were involved in the religious riots in

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[46] Experience has shown that Nigeria's effort in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have not been as rewarding as the Nigerian leadership would have wanted. The threat to her prestige could be worse in the case of a Black ruled South Africa. See Joseph Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1987) for evidence of the lukewarm reception accorded Nigeria in all the countries she helped achieve decolonisation. The author was for the greater part of the period Nigeria's foreign Minister. See for example, Simon Baynham's futuristic analysis on the pride of place likely to be accorded only Nigeria and South Africa in the next decade. Baynham, 'Regional Security Issues: Perspectives from a transitional South Africa', Paper presented at the African Studies Association U.K. Conference, Stirling, Scotland, 8 - 10 September, 1992.

[47] Relations between the two never actually exceeded the exchange of diplomatic activities, membership of OPEC and mutual opposition to apartheid. For an overview of Libya's expansionism, see Ronald Bruce St. John, Gaddafi's World Design: Libya's Foreign Policy, 1969-1987,(London: Saqi Books, 1987)

[48] Prior to the merger, the Nigerian government had actually given implicit approval to Libya's stay in Chad while calling for the exit of all extra African forces. See West Africa,(London) 19 January, 1981.

Kano, Northern Nigeria in the same year, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people and had to be contained by the army led to increasing articulation of the Libyan threat. As one defence analyst notes,

> Libya's interventionist record in Africa clearly portrays Gaddafi's Libya as a country always prepared to fish in troubled waters. And for a country like Nigeria whose water is too easily troubled, Libya could constitute a threat.[49]

In the same vein, the Punch Newspaper, in an editorial expressed the Libyan threat more bluntly:

> Let no one make a mistake about it. Gaddafi has no business in Chad. After swallowing that war ravaged country he will settle down to his main objective, *to decimate Nigeria, and thus effectively neutralise the most powerful black nation on earth.*(emphasis added)[50]

Although the above maybe somewhat exaggerated, it soon became evident that decision-makers had been monitoring Libya's activities and it was not surprising that barely a week after the merger with Chad, the Nigerian government shut the Libyan embassy in Nigeria on account of its change of name to Libyan Peoples' Bureau in 'liaison with the citizens of Nigeria' and not the government.[51] To those in government, the fact that Libya's purported merger with Chad was not Gaddafi's first attempt at forging political unity was worrying. Having failed to secure a merger with Arab states like Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan and Egypt, a supposed aim of

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[49] Tom Imobighe, 'Libya's intervention in Chad: Security Implications for Nigeria.'Nigeria Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, Vol.2, February 1981, p.66.

[50] Punch Newspaper, (Lagos) 8 January, 1981.

[51] See West Africa,(London) 12 January, 1981. See also, David Williams, President and Power in Nigeria: A Biography of President Shehu Shagari, (London: Frank Cass, 1981)

Libya became the 'creation of a Saharan confederation dominated by her in the new role as an 'African' rather than an Arab state.'[52] Fresh attempts in the sub-saharan region to enter into political pact with Niger republic, to the north of Nigeria fell through in 1974 and the rumour was to later spread that Gaddafi was responsible for the Seyni Kountche's coup that ousted Hamani Diori's government.[53] Earlier, Libya had entered into Chad's Aouzou strip in 1973 wielding an unratified 1935 treaty between Italy and France as a justification for its claim.

Also, to Nigeria's decision-makers, Gaddafi's policy of integrating the south of the Sahara and allowing the unity to automatically spill over to the less amenable countries of the Maghreb thereby achieving his larger Afro-Arab complex by ethnographic justification should be seen within the context of a more overarching political objective. It was clear that Libya was as interested in the uranium deposits in Aouzou strip as the French. Furthermore, Libya seemed interested in the uranium deposits in the Niger republic to achieve his ambition of an 'Islamic bomb.' as Colonel Gaddafi called it, hence Libya's merger attempts with the two countries. Libya's interest in Nigeria seemed to have been predicated largely on demographic grounds. Gaddafi is said to suffer from the daily 'nightmare of the acutely sparse population of his country.'[54] Libya only has three million people out of which 35,000 are in the regular army. A lot more are in the reserves. One strategic aim of the bureaus opened all over Africa (for which Nigeria closed their Lagos embassy) in the early 1980s to deal with 'African people' was to recruit foreigners into the Libyan militia. Some press reports in Nigeria actually claimed indigent Nigerians were recruited into the militia through the bureau office in Ghana in return for pecuniary

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[52] See West Africa,(London) 16 February 1981.

[53] This somewhat proved to be unfounded as Seyni Kountche was full of complaints against Gaddafi's threat to his country at one of the Organisation of Islamic Conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia. See Richard Higgot and Finn Fulgestad, 'The 1974 Coup d'etat in Niger: Towards an explanation,' Journal of Modern African Studies, (13) No.3., 1975, pp.388-9 for a different view of Libya's complicity.

[54] I owe this information to a Nigerian diplomat once based in Tripoli, Libya.

incentives.[55]

With this seemingly well coordinated territorial expansion plan that had also involved the incumbent's regime survival, it became the implicit contention of Nigeria's decision-makers to antagonise Libya even if it meant supporting France in Chad. Outwardly though, the Nigerian government still continued to deny the perception of the Libyan threat. The Foreign Minister, however, acknowledged Gaddafi's dream of an Arab empire embracing the Tuaregs and half Arabs of the north, but still would not see him seeking any influence in the south of the Sahara.[57] The complicity of Libya in a number of coup attempts in Nigeria coupled with subsequent arrests of Libyan spies questions this outward posture while confirming some form of Libyan threat.[58] Although the Libyan threat at the time was contingent upon the success of the faction Gaddafi supported in the Chadian civil war, the defeat of the Weddeye faction merely reduced the imminence of the Libyan threat without removing it. Libya continues to constitute a reasonably viable threat to Nigeria so long as Gaddafi refuses to rescind the policy of a 'Saharan confederation' uniting all African moslems under Libya. On the practical level, Libya still occupies part of Chad and has not stopped its belligerent support for factions within the war torn country. Instead, she has embarked on a policy of sponsoring and training factions against regimes Libya has no cordial relationship with in Africa.[59] Also, Libya

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[55] This was confirmed by some Nigerians arrested in a coup plot against the civilian regime in 1982 who confessed to a N30 million deal with Libya to topple the Lagos government, out of which they had collected N5 million from Libya's bureau in Accra, Ghana. The case of Nigerian mercenaries in the Ethiopian army also came to government's attention. For details, see West Africa(London) 24 November, 1980.

[56] West Africa, (London) 9 February 1981.

[57] West Africa,(London) 27 April 1981. Yet the Nigerian Air Force moved its remaining contingent of MiG 21MF fighter bombers to Maiduguri from its original base in Kano in February 1981 ostensibly in response to Libya's increasing involvement in Chad.

[58] See West Africa, (London) 5 July 1982 and 11 February 1985.

[59] Indeed this harbours another threatening potential vis-a vis Libya's relationship with Nigeria in Liberia where Gaddafi is supporting a rival faction against the West African backed interim administration.

within the west African sub-region from engaging in military alliances with external countries, especially extra-African states. Ironically, all the states surrounding her, as a pre-requisite for their independence from France were at one stage or the other involved in defence pact or military cooperation agreements with France.[61]

Since Nigeria was not comfortable with this arrangement, she sought as an integral part of the Economic Community Treaty a defence protocol addition aimed at the formation of an **Allied Forces of the Community**(A.A.F.C.) and the exit of foreign military presence from the region. This was signed in 1981 but remained, as yet unratified.[62] To prove her commitment to some sort of backing for neighbouring states, she helped Benin republic - her western neighbour to dislodge mercenaries from the country in 1977 and thus prevented her from seeking Soviet military presence in the country. As a follow up, a military understanding covering defence, air and sea services was signed in August 1978. Another military cooperation agreement was signed in 1979. In 1985, Nigerian Air Force donated two aircraft to the republic to help boost its air defence capability.[63] Nigeria engaged in the same foreign military assistance for other neighbouring states along these lines.[64] Unfortunately, her objective of curbing involvement with extra African powers who could then use these states against Nigeria fell through mainly because of the confidence reposed in those external powers. At the time Nigeria was lobbying for the ratification of the ECOWAS Defence Protocol, France was already involved in promoting a rival military body consisting of Francophone countries in **ANAD** -

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[61] Of all Nigeria's immediate neighbours only one still has a defence agreement with France, Cameroon - interestingly, she has been the most truculent. All others have military cooperation agreement which does not entitle them to automatic intervention from France on request. John Chipman has however, argued that this hardly matters in French strategic calculations as she intervenes even in cases of military cooperation agreements as it happened in Chad. See John Chipman, French Military Policy and Africa's Security, (London: I.I.S.S., 1985) Adelphi Paper 209, p.47.

[62] See J.E.Okolo, 'Securing West Africa: The ECOWAS Defence Pact,' World Today, (38) May 1983, pp.173 - 184.

[63] Interview. Details withheld.

[64] A confidential source. Document in author's possession.

of the permanent French troops on their land.[67] Although couched as a need to assert their independence, Nigeria's decision-makers actually believed they were serving the continent's interest even while protecting the country's interest believy insisting that Africa's problems should be left for Africans to resolve.[68] Hence, the government's perception of a threat in 'the activities of foreign countries who in the guise of granting economic and military aid...are at the same time establishing military bases and warlike installations in those countries...because there are some of those countries who have, at one time or the other, nursed ill-feelings towards Nigeria.'[69]

Her consistency in pursuing this principle seemed to have come from the realisation that given her active and radical foreign policy pronouncements on the continent, especially her commitment to the total eradication of colonialism and apartheid she was bound to be the object of possible enemy attack or sabotage. This threat of regional military destabilisation was taken very seriously by decision-makers and sometimes led to interpretation of innocuous messages as palpably malicious intent.[70] Again, also taken into consideration was the possibility of a spill-over effect in the numerous civil wars taking place around Nigeria. For instance, the concern of government for the civil war in Chad was heightened by its potential for spreading into the Nigerian territory and this possibility was given serious expression by

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[67] Indeed under Article 20(3) of the yet to be ratified ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, 'member states shall undertake to end the presence of foreign military bases within their territories as soon as the community(ECOWAS) is in the position to meet their requirements in matters relating to defence.'

[68] The need to find an 'African solution to an African problem' was responsible for Nigeria's current leadership role in ECOWAS Monitoring force in Liberia, aimed at stopping the carnage in civil war ridden country.

[69] Kuru Special Panel, National Defence Policy for Nigeria: A Proposal(Kuru, Jos: N.I.P.S.S., 1988) p.18.

[70] It is within the context of destabilisation that the government interpreted the 1976 abortive coup in which the Head of State, Murtala Mohammed was assasinated as an attempt by the British and the Americans to re-impose the more amenable Yakubu Gowon who was seen as a western lackey in government. The fact that the coup statement accused the government of imposing communism on the country hardly helped matters.

> finishing with Libya. Nigeria is the most obvious choice considering the disputes on the Lake and speculations of oil deposits on the basin. It should be remarked that the Chadians are now in a position to engage Nigeria because of, firstly, the **volume** and **lethality** of weapons presently at their disposal;...because of the combat experience of the troops and...because of the exemplary leadership and better organisation recently displayed in the north.[75]

Although Chad remains the only country relevant in the scenarios perceived as threatening by Nigeria's decision-makers in the neighbourhood, the potential for civil war, continues to dog other countries in the West African sub-region. In this respect, account must be taken of Liberia's recent experience and the numerous agitations for democracy and pluralism in all the surrounding states, especially Cameroon, Togo and Niger and the desperation of their military or one-party leaders to stay in power, a face-off which could easily result in violence and sectarian strife.

Another source of military threat to decision-makers in Nigeria during the period under study was the alleged presence of nuclear weapons on the continent. The news in 1979 that South Africa possessed a nuclear 'bomb in the basement' caused a stir among Nigeria's decision-making elite. The systemic fallout of an isolated regime with the bomb automatically shifted the regional balance in Pretoria's favour. And Nigeria's reaction to this was double fold. As President Shagari noted

> ...this development poses a serious invitation to and a threat of an arms race on our continent. Naturally, we cannot fold our arms and suffer in silence while apartheid South Africa arms herself threateningly...We have scrupulously, consistently, responsibly and honourably adhere to the tenets of that treaty(NPT)...However, if Nigeria's trust in this regard is betrayed, we reserve the right to acquire the necessary means of defending our national interests...If Apartheid South Africa, with the connivance of the western democracies, fires the first gun to start arms race in Africa, the consequences will be too dreadful for world peace in general and African security in

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[75] A Confidential military source.

particular.[76]

The government as a result allocated about N10 million for research into and development of nuclear energy.[77] At the same time, debate about the 'black bomb' as a former foreign Minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi called the nuclear weapon option continued among the decision-making elite. The frequency of that debate and the polarisation that resulted was an indication of how much this threat meant to the decision-making elite.[78]

Finally, and perhaps, by far the most important military problem that agitated the minds of decision-makers throughout the period covered in the study was their awareness of the danger involved in dependence on foreign military weapons. The sad experience during the civil war whereby her western allies refused to sell arms to Nigeria to prosecute the war or refused to provide spare parts tutored her that friends can be unpredictable. The fact that she got arms from her least friendly source - the eastern bloc - to prosecute the war convinced her of the short term solution to the threat: diversification. Since the end of the war Nigeria has procured arms and equipment from all parts of the world.[79] While this helped to reduce the

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[76] Cited in Olusanya and Akindele(eds), op-cit., Appendix V, p.519. One must note however, that this reaction might have been different if the country involved was not South Africa. Indeed, around the same period Libya was widely reported to be developing an Isalmic bomb.

[77] West Africa(London), 10 November, 1980.

[78] For keen supporters of the nuclear option in the debate, see interview with Professor Iya Abubakar, Nigeria's Defence Minister by Joe Enukora Okoli, West Africa,(London) 19 May 1980 and Professor Bolaji Akinyemi(former foreign Minister's views) in Jullyette Ukabiala, 'The Black Bomb Debate,' The Guardian(Lagos) 14 September 1987. Other opinion leaders like Professors Olajide Aluko and Olusanya as well as Dr F.A.Adisa were against the option. Interestingly, as General Domkat Bali, former Defence Minister opined recently, 'As attractive as the nuclear option is, it is not a feasible one. We don't have the necessary infrastructure for maintaining reactors even if we were able to obtain them.' Bali, Personal Interview, Jos. 5 May 1991.

[79] Notable among regular contributors to the country's arsenal are Soviet Union, United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Brazil, Czechoslovakia and

the scenario of high economic activity and low political relationship.[85] Apart from all these points, the fact that a regime whose Foreign Minister acknowledged that France 'has put a spoke in our wheel for years' ended up procuring more arms from France even than Nigeria's traditional suppliers confirmed the power wielded by France's 'frontmen' in successive administrations[86] as well as increasing the level of threat that comes from dependence on foreign procurement. Not only had the strategic implications of the French threat become more worrying with the sale of the same Alpha aircraft Nigeria bought to Cameroon, the fact that French pilots and enginners were sometimes present to operate these weapons in a country Nigeria's security elite has always perceived as an immediate threat during the period exemplifies the inter-play between the real and psychological environments in which the security elite existed.[87]

IV. **Economic Dimension.**

The military threat of dependency in the specific sector of arms procurement discussed above actually formed part of the main threat of lack of national economic self reliance which leaders unanimously believed the country suffered from during this period. Interestingly, they viewed this as an external impediment. Other dimen-

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[85] See Bola Akinterinwa, 'Nigeria and France: The need for a Better Political Understanding,' Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.12, Nos.1 & 2, 1986, pp.58-67. Although the author seems at a loss about the separation since, as he puts it, 'there is neither a political decision without economic consequences nor an economic policy without some political implications.'

[86] The case of Fougerolle (Nig) Limited, a French company bears restatement in this respect. It involved the award of a N329 million contract in respect of the Steel plant in Ajaokuta,Nigeria. Fougerolle's 'frontman' later told a military tribunal investigating the case how he paid N29 million as kickback to senior members of the ruling party before the contract was awarded to the company. See Sunday Times(Lagos) 10 May 1987 and Newswatch, (Lagos) 25 August 1986. Although this was not a military contract, that slush funds go with military contracts became evident in another contract involving British Aerospace for the procurement of Jaguar jets. See The Observer(London) 13 March 1984. See Chapter Six for impact of 'slush funds' on military efficacy.

[87] For a full discussion of the implications of this interplay, see Chapter Four.

Map 2.1.

Source: A.1.Asiwaju & P.O.Adeniyi(eds.), Borderlands in Africa: A Multi-disciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa, (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1989)

sions of economic threat from the decison makers' perspective included smuggling, foreign exchange deals, certain activities of foreign multinationals, narrowness of the base of a mono-product economy and threat posed to economic independence through destabilisation of export commodity prices by foreign powers.

The contiguous borderlands with neighbouring countries have been held responsible by decision-makers for the depletion of some economic resources through the easy access provided for smuggling and foreign exchange dealers.[88] In this respect, all Nigeria's boundary corridors have fallen prey to smuggling activities and since twenty of the country's thirty states 'are directly and significantly affected by their proximity to an international boundary,'[89] it can only be assumed that decision-makers were seriously affected by the implications of this for the national economy. More so, when it is realised that the overlapping and interpenetration of cultures, economies and institutions of the distinct nation states legally separated by these borderlands actually encourage illegal transnational trade between and among similar ethnic groups across perceived 'artificial boundaries'.(see Map 2.1 above showing the ethnic configuration along Nigeria's borderlands.)

In specific cases, of threatening dimension was the way Cocoa, Nigeria's major agricultural export became a target for smugglers. For instance, international market statistics showed Benin republic exported 16,000 tonnes of cocoa in 1971/72 and 8,000 tonnes in 1972/73. By 1973, tonnages of cocoa smuggled ranged between 10,000 through 30,000 tonnes annually.[90] Since Benin republic does not grow cocoa let alone export, it can be safely assumed that this amount was smuggled from Nigeria. The government also strongly believed that the fuel shortage that gripped the country - a major oil producing nation in the mid-1970s was traceable to illegal

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[88] For a good account of the economic threats border contiguity constitutes, See J.L.Okon Ekpeyong, 'Potentials of Nigerian Boundary Corridors as Sources of International Economic Conflict,' in Asiwaju and Adeniyi(eds) op-cit., pp.293 - 305.

[89] Asiwaju, op-cit., p.63.

[90] See West Africa,(London) 19 February 1973.

outlets provided through the Nigeria/Benin borders at Klake and Idiroko.[91] It was believed about 160,000 litres of petrol got smuggled across the Nigerian boundaries with Benin republic daily.[92]

Similarly, the borderlands that separate Nigeria and Niger have served as conduit pipes for the clandestine movement of groundnuts(another major cash crop) across the Nigeria/Niger boundaries and this became a major source of concern in government.[93]

Quite apart from the economic threat arising from illegal movement of goods and currency[94], other economic threats were perceived by decision-makers from the geographical influence of borderlands, irresolution of border demarcations in areas which contained or were suspected to contain natural and/or mineral resources of huge economic potentials like the Bakassi peninsula discussed above and illegal movement of goods and persons.

It has been noted that the devastating drought and desertification that disrupted agricultural activity in the Sahel region of Africa at a time of rising petroleum prices in mid and late 1970s resulted in the flooding of Nigeria by refugees from Niger, Ghana and Chad.[95] Coming at a time when Nigeria was spearheading a regional integration move that allowed a 90-day free movement

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[91] See Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Judicial Inquiry into the Shortage of Petroleum Products,(Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1976) p.26.

[92] See John Igue, 'Le Nigeria et ses Peripheries Frontaliers: L'Exemple du Benin et du Niger,' Paper presented at the Conference on the Integration of Nigeria into the International System, Bordeaux, France. May 2 - 3, 1985, p.12.

[93] See John Collins, 'The Clandestine Movements of Groundnuts across the Niger - Nigeria Boundary,' Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol.10, No.2., 1976, pp.259 - 278.

[94] In a bid to curb this, the government shut Nigeria's borders with her neighbours from January 1984 till April, 1986. As a proviso to its opening, a Quadripartite Agreement was signed between Nigeria and three other countries in the region - Benin, Togo, and Ghana in 1985. See Ibrahim Gambari, op-cit., for details of the Quadripartite Agreement.

[95] See Ekpeyong, op-cit., p.296.

drought. At the peak of its production, Lake Chad is said to have contained close to 80 species of fish and its exploitation in 1972 for example yielded N300 million from 36,444 tonnes of fish.[99] The important point here is that poaching of the nation's marine resources had always been prevalent because of the proximity of this lake to a border region. The extension of Nigeria's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) from 48 kilometres in 1971 to 320 kilometres in 1978 hardly dissuaded the Chadian gendarmes who frequently assaulted the fishermen along the border.[100] The fact that this, among other reasons, led to a large scale open conflagration in April 1983 between Nigerian soldiers and Chadian troops underlines the critical nature of this economic threat.

But just as fish constituted a source of unrelenting conflict, so did the presence or even the remote suspicion of oil in the Lake Chad Basin and Bakassi peninsula, another marine border along Nigeria/Cameroon boundaries. In all cases of oil exploration by Nigeria's neighbours, the areas for geological surveys almost always included disputed territories with Nigeria. Apart from the strategic implication of oil exploitation in what is considered as Nigeria's estuaries for merchant shipping and the Nigerian Navy,[101] the fact that Cameroon has been pumping oil from Bakassi Peninsula since 1977 was disquieting enough to policy makers. Another dimension to it is the presence of several multinational companies like **Sonara** and Elf Serepca, drilling oil on Cameroon's behalf off-shore in the Atlantic Ocean. The Nigerian government, for her part, was not ready to let go of her claims to the Bakassi peninsula, most especially 'because of the strategic and security consequences.' As a result, a high-powered inter-ministerial committee was set up to deal with the issue in 1984. The maritime border dispute has however been compounded in two ways. First, the bulk of the people in the peninsula are

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[99] See Akpo Esajere, 'Fisheries and Marine Resources,' Daily Times(Lagos), 12 March, 1985.

[100] Ekpeyong, op-cit., p.300.

[101] See National Defence Policy Proposal, op-cit., p.19. Also see Olusegun Obasanjo, Not My Will: An Autobiography of a former Head of State,(Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1990) p.127 for an account of the Navy's incessant complaint 'about what they regarded as cessation of part of Nigeria'.

profit maximisation are better served in a conflict situation is not likely to encourage solution of the border problems. Although this view conflicts with the conventional perspective that foreign investment prefers stability to conflict, border conflicts in resource endowed areas hardly matter in so far as resource control ensures profit maximisation.[105]

Yet as a country located in the periphery of international capitalism and since the logic of capital lies in the predictability of domestic policies, the Indigenisation Decree of 1972[106] in Nigeria was seen within the context of a threat to the economic landscape of the international system.[107] And to that extent attempts were made by various multinationals affected by the promulgation of this law to protect their interests. This was done through the manipulation of local businessmen and civilian bureaucrats into acting in proxy for such multinationals. The effect of this, expectedly was damaging to the aim of promoting indigenuous entrepreneurship in the country and reduced the circulation of wealth to the mass of the people. Although some of the beneficiaries of this multinational ploy were government functionaries, the effect of their actions on national psyche created an atmosphere of fear for them within the country and affected the successful implementation of government's national self reliance programmes.

While this threat was noticed early enough by government,[108] the dislocation in the country's economy provided by the surge in oil prices which brought in ninety per cent of export earnings reduced concern for the damaging consequences of the

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[105] See "Nigeria/Cameroon: Blundering into Battle", Africa Confidential, Volume 35, No.8, April 1994, for an account of multi-national firms interest in the recent crisis.

[106] The Indigenisation Decree of 1972 aimed at nationalising foreign companies and multinationals by placing the commanding heights of the economy in the hands of Nigerians. For internal threats generated by this see Chapter two.

[107] See R.L.Heilbronner, Between Capitalism and Socialism: Essays in Political Economy,(New York: Vintage Books, 1970).

[108] See J.F.E. Ohierhenuan, 'Nigerian Economic Policy Under the Military' in The Nigerian Economy under the Military, Proceedings of the 1980 Annual Conference of The Nigerian Economic Society. Also see Onwudiba Nnoli(ed) Path to Nigerian Development,(Dakar: CODESRIA, 1986).

system of using proxies by foreign multinationals. But then, the dangers and contradictions of a mono-product economy based explicitly on the dictates of international finance soon became apparent. The fact that the oil glut happened in the wake of the country's radical foreign policy postures and its threat to the western world of using the 'oil weapon' has been variously described within government circles as a 'western conspiracy' to limit the influence of countries within the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) to which Nigeria belongs.[109] Again since Nigeria happened to be the only producer of **Brent crude**, the sale of a similar brand from the North Sea by Britain in the 1980s reduced her clout in the crude oil market at a time when Nigeria was the second largest supplier to the United States. This perceived destabilisation of exports by foreign powers, and by extension, national economy was believed to have spilled over to other commodity exports like Cocoa, Coffee, Rubber and Groundnuts, leading to fluctuations in the market which in turn resulted in exodus of people from the farms to the cities because of low returns from agricultural products.

The inability of successive governments to resolve the economic crises that resulted from the above reduced the country to a state of dependent development, the socio-cultural impact of which was more unmanageable for various regimes during the period covered by the study, instead of a condition of national self reliance and equal partnership envisaged after the civil war.

Hence, to the extent that all these factors precluded 'the creation of the necessary *economic and political conditions* in Africa and the rest of the world which would foster Nigeria's national self reliance and rapid economic development,' they were perceived as economic threats to national security.

V. Socio-Cultural and Subversive dimensions.

By far the most significant reference to socio-cultural threats is what has often

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[109] For a sober view on the extent of government vulnerability to external pressure, See Lawrence Amu, The Oil Glut and The Nigerian Economy,(Lagos: N.N.P.C. Public Affairs Division, 1983) The author was the Managing Director of Nigerian National Petroleum Company.

been referred to as "cultural imperialism" among the decision-making elite, to which they claimed Nigeria was exposed[110] through 'pornographic materials, fanatical religions, misinformation by our media and disinformation by foreign media, as well as indoctrination of trade unionists by foreign powers.'[111] Others like subversion by political fugitives, drug trafficking and foreign 'dumping' of toxic waste have also featured in articulation of threats.[112] Although it is very difficult to determine how undermining these threats are, the fact that decision-makers considered them important enough as to warrant mention make them deserving of closer attention.

While decision-makers have always talked about the threat posed to the country by political fugitives[113], the advent of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime in 1983 heightened such governmental images with the bizarre scenarios painted to Nigerians about politicians who escaped abroad in the wake of the 1983 coup d'etat. Between March and August 1984, the government claimed it had uncovered several plots aimed at unseating it. It also alleged an invasion plan bankrolled to the tune of $300 million by fugitive politicians led by a former Senate President, Joseph Wayas in America and a former Transport Minister and erstwhile ruling party campaign organiser, Umaru Dikko in Britain.[114] A month later, in another briefing to the press, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, the regime's deputy leader claimed that politicians were still meeting clandestinely with a view to destabilising 'the present government.' Foreign diplomats were also implicated with the accusation of sensitive information

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[110] See Kuru Special Panel Report, p.17.

[111] ibid.

[112] See 'Threats to National Security' presented at a two-day Seminar on Security at Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, June, 1989. Also see Briefing by the Coordinator of National Security, Brigadier A.Mohammed at the Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 11 March, 1987. It must, however, be said that toxic waste and drug trafficking as socio-cultural threats were latter day additions in the periodic review of threats not so perceived in the period covered by this study.

[113] In fact a big political issue was made out of the repatriation of Anthony Enahoro who escaped to Britain in 1963 to avoid his politically motivated trial on charges of treasonable felony. See Anthony Enahoro, The Fugitive Offender, (London: Athlone Press, 1966)

[114] See The Guardian(London) 17 March 1984.

provision to former officials of the ousted regime.[115]

Yet again, by June, the government's Information Minister, Emeka Omeruah distributed to the press a document allegedly prepared by a London "Professor" - a grand plan to overthrow the government, to be implemented over a period of three years. By August 1984, 'the bring down syndrome' as the regime spokesman called it again featured when another 'surreptitious attempt' to overthrow the government from within by spreading negative information through the media was uncovered.[116]

While the government may have had justifiable cause to raise the threat of subversion to the attention of the general public, since some politicians ousted from power by the regime indeed threatened to unleash a 'jihad'[117], in a 'fight back to restore democracy in Nigeria,'[118] (and) there can be no doubt that the government believed in the politicians ability to carry out this threat,[119] the repetition of the threat every so often created the impression of a doomsday scenario over an issue Nigerians at best considered as regime security and not national security.[120] Also in a country where opinions are often varied and diversified it is not unlikely for politicians to successfully subvert a ruling government directly or by subterfuge, especially through the successful infiltration of the military institution itself. The subversion claim however was seen in some quarters as a deliberate ruse to divert attention from more pressing problems as has often been the case. The claim of subversion was however, not limited to the military as civilian regimes have accused opposition parties of planning to unseat them and para-military forces have been strengthened on this

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[115] See The Guardian(London) 30 April 1984.

[116] See International Herald Tribune(New York) 20 January 1984.

[117] The Observer(London) 22 January 1984.

[118] The Times(London) 8 February 1984.

[119] The Guardian, op-cit., 17 March, 1984.

[120] Indeed, the Foreign Minister during the regime wrote later, regime security was partly responsible for the closure of borders throughout the duration of the regime, although the economy was more important. See Ibrahim Gambari, op-cit., p.51.

basis.[121] Equally, businessmen have been accused of planning to unseat governments.

In the sense that various governments adduced this anytime they were pressured by societal forces tended to encourage the view that threats of subversion were often exaggerated or even non-existent. This created a problem of proper perception of threats which proved dangerous for the country's stability and security since subversion allegations, in their correctness or otherwise fused national security and survival of incumbent administrations together. The presentation of these two objectives as co-extensive aims led observers to conclude that the whole conceptualization of threats on this basis was dominated by regime survival rather than any intention to enhance state security during the period under study.

Yet this is not necessarily true, even if government's presentation conveyed a less than convincing impression. To government insiders - the threat of subversion was very real and it had its roots in the notoriously bloody style of pre-civil war politics in which the Leader of Opposition, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and leading figures of his parties were convicted for treasonable felony, for allegedly planning to unseat the incumbent government by force. Besides, this internal dimension inevitably fed on external sources and every African ruler took very seriously the threat of external subversion through invasion by the opposition. The fact that many regimes have fallen in Africa through the covert support of other African and extra-African resources was never lost on Nigerian leaders. However, what can be said of the Nigerian situation is that the articulation of subversion during this period often served a dual purpose, the first stage of which was to strengthen the legitimacy of a newly installed administration. At this stage, it was often rhetorical and governments often paid scant attention to 'objective' subversive threats. However, when it crossed to the second level and the survival of the regime was at stake, leadership reactd often excessively to the threat.

As the Libyan case depicted very clearly, in spite of the fact that Libya's

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[121] In 1983, the ruling National Party of Nigeria accused leading opposition party - The Unity Party of attempting to subvert the government through **Secret Squads** formed by their Governor in one of the states. This accusation and counter accusation is not new. In the first republic, Obafemi Awolowo, Party leader of Action Group was jailed for treasonable felony on account of plans to unseat the government with assistance from Ghana.

expansionist proclivities was never in doubt and despite her alleged complicity in the 1974 coup d'etat in Niger and outright war in Chad - all these appeared to have excited little attention on decision-makers' agenda. Even in the early 1980s when Libya was implicated in a number of internal crises in Nigeria, key decision-makers still refused to acknowledge publicly that Libya constituted any threat.[122] It took the implication of Libya in an abortive coup against the Shagari government[123] and the change of its embassy in Nigeria to a Peoples' Bureau 'aimed at direct liaison' with the people,[124] for the government to modify its declaratory stance and entire perception of Libya in the country's threat index. Hence as long as the security of the state remained interchangeable with survival of the ruling authority, the security elite's objective perception based on a careful examination of available information could often be coloured by the leader's peculiar mindset.

The Nigerian security elite during this period also considered as threatening what was described as "cultural imperialism". Defined from their perspectives, this stretched from the threat the Labour Movement constituted to national security to the dangers posed by foreign and local media to national security. Labour Unions' repeated demands for a welfare state[125] in a country that had thrived more on restricted individual capitalism was interpreted in government as attempted socialist destabilisation of the country. To this end, successive governments right from the end of the civil war not only frowned at affiliation with foreign labour movements but also instituted a number of draconian decrees banning the right of workers to

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[122] The Defence Minister, Akanbi Oniyangi categorically told the National Assembly that Libya constituted no threat to Nigeria and that all that was happening could be attributed to 'media hype'. See Daily Times, (Lagos) 12 December 1980.

[123] The Bukar Mandara coup was claimed to have been hugely funded by Libya to the tune of N30 million out of which N5 million had been collected through its Peoples Bureau in Ghana according to reported evidence of the plotters.

[124] The idea of 'direct liaison' with the people was unacceptable to a government fully aware of the internal contradictions in its society which could be exploited by Libyans in engineering dissension against unfavourable administration.

[125] Nigerian Labour Congress, Workers' Charter of Demands Prepared and Presented to the Federal Government(Lagos: NLC Secretariat, 1980)

embark on strike actions.[126] In spite of all these measures, unrecorded strike actions continued unabated.[127] To justify the security elite's treatment of labour as a national security risk, a Federal government intelligence document explained that

> ...although trade union activity is not seen as a threat to national security, however, it becomes such when people with vested interests penetrate the ranks of labour and instigate protests based on selfish and parochial interests and manipulate events to justify their causes and thereby subvert national objectives and aspirations.[128]

Also linked to the issue of cultural imperialism and subversion by politicians, especially during the Buhari/Idiagbon administration were certain trade unions the regime banned for attempted destabilisation of the ruling government.[129]

Apart from the numerous bans instituted against labour organisations and other pressure groups, the governments also sought to influence election to the leadership of the labour movement. At the same time, to strengthen their influence in the labour movement and also justify its importance to national security, a place is always reserved for the labour movement in the influential one-year course for senior policy-makers at the elite National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies since it opened in 1979.

While the media in Nigeria has correctly been described as the freest on the

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[126] See for example Trade Union Decree 31(later amended as Decree 22 of 1978) which banned workers in the Nigeria Printing & Minting Company, Central Bank of Nigeria, Customs Preventive Service; Nigeria External Telecommunications; and the Police and Armed Force from Strike actions. There was also the Trade Disputes(Essential Services) Decree 23 of 1976 which regarded practically every endeavour as 'essential service' and thus prohibited from any strike action.

[127] See Julius Ihonvbere and Toyin Falola, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-84, (London: Zed Press, 1986) p.148.

[128] Confidential source. Author in possession of document.

[129] The Nigerian Medical Association, The Nigerian Labour Congress and The National Association of Nigerian Students all fell victim to this bogey of subversion.

continent, its relationship with the various regimes covered in this study was fraught with suspicion. Apart from the genuine threat of deliberate distortion articulated by decision-makers in relation to foreign media which led the Nigerian government to champion the institution of a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) at the United Nations; for her part, the Nigerian government had a history of deporting 'unruly journalists' for alleged breaches of national security from the country.[130] At home, journalists were invited regularly for interrogation euphemistically called "chats" by security agents and various decrees were promulgated to curb what governments called press 'excesses'. At least one prominent journalist [later killed by a letter bomb] was accused by the security elite of gun running and attempting to foment a socialist revolution.[131] The most notorious of these Press decrees were No.4 of 1984 and No.43 of 1993 which prohibited any press publication of material that may be construed as detrimental to the image of public servants 'in any material particular,' even if true. To further maintain government hold on information, and in turn curb cultural imperialism, it established the News Agency of Nigeria(NAN) as a news pool for internal and external sourcing of news. A process which afforded the government the opportunity to excise unfavourable information and distorted news from reaching newspapers and magazines. At the same time, state broadcasting that had been used as a tool for social and political hegemony became centralised under the Federal government to curb the menace such independent organisations had become either in spreading religious fanaticism or encouraging unbridled foreign fads and fashion, though these organs remained key instruments of hegemony even under their Federal umbrella.[132]

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[130] In 1971 and 1976 Reuters News Agency Lagos office was shut. To show that the government still perceives foreign media as a socio-political threat, a Financial Times journalist, William Keeling was deported in June 1991 for a report on how Nigeria's increased oil earnings during the Gulf War was spent on hosting an OAU Jamboree and procuring 150 main Battle tanks from Vickers in Britain.

[131] For details of this gruesome incident, see " Dele Giwa: The Assassination of a Patriot", Newswatch Magazine (Lagos) November 3, 1986. Giwa was the magazine's editor-in-chief before the incident.

[132] This may well have been the reason for the delay in licensing private broadcast media until recently and the ban on satellite linkage to Cable News

VI. **Conclusion.**

From the preceding analysis of the external dimensions of threat we can see that while the civil war experience shaped the security elites' perception and had an impact on the elites' conception of national security in the defence planing process, it remains a difficult task to delineate accurately the balance between the objective and subjective nature of this influence. Suffice it to say that most of the threats perceived by the security elite had an objective basis in experience and the geo-political realities of Nigeria, but in their pursuit of other state objectives, the security elite allowed the perception of threats based on incontrovertible evidence to succumb to less clear-cut often immediate, sometimes distorted and perhaps inevitable parameters of regime security. While the articulation may not have been clear-cut, it no doubt afforded the leadership a sense of purpose in coping with perceived threats. The singlemindedness with which the various post-war governments pursued a regional security structure was antecedent upon a perception of Nigeria's immediate neighbours' neutrality or outright opposition to the Federal side during the civil war, and the belief that this objective provided the best, non-violent means of achieving national security.

As elaborated in Chapter 5 where we discuss the defence planning process and the national economy in greater detail, domestically, the security elites' perception of external threats helped defence planners to rationalise unusual increases in defence spending in peace time through worse case scenarios simulated from the external dimensions of threat. Even though this gave a semblance of security guarantees for the country while at the same time addressing inter-state conflicts, the regional power claim implicit in the post-civil war arrangement led to regional power behaviour and resulted in unfilled gaps in the overall perception of internal threats.

While the role of some neighbours during the civil war may have justified decision-makers' perception of these states as threats to Nigeria's security, this can hardly explain other articulations of threats simply on account of artificial divisions of ethnic groups caused by bi-national boundaries. After all, the evidence showed

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Network [CNN]. See Kayode Fayemi, 'The State and The Media in Africa,' Africa Events, Volume 9, No 10, October 1993.

clearly that the threat border communities constituted and perhaps, still constitute could be partly traced to their crisis of identity caused by government's neglect of borderland communities in its bid to concentrate development projects on the 'core' rather than the 'periphery.'[133] This position is strengthened by the fact that ethnic ties, albeit strong, cannot be regarded as umbilical cords since none of the alleged cohesion of cultural groups implied to have been disrupted by the 'arbitrary partition' of the African continent existed in an enduring manner among these groups, even in pre-colonial times.[134]

Indeed, when (living) together, internecine rivalries and power struggle dominated their relationships.[135] Interestingly those who found themselves on the same side of the colonial divide still engaged in conflicts over boundary artificiality.[136] As a result, while boundary corridors may be correctly perceived as serious threats to national security, justification for such perception cannot exactly be traced to historical experience *alone* as the facts are too simplistic and only confuse decision-makers' proper judgements.

In all, while it may be difficult to assume irrational judgement on the part of decision-makers' perception of threats, it is safe to argue that less than rational factors featured in their perception, and while this study contends that governments pursued external security at the expense of internal cohesion, decision-makers' tendency to bring in personal beliefs, historical experience, political and ideological coloration led to acute misjudgments of threats from within. It also created serious conflicts between real and imagined threats since leadership perception of regime security often intruded into its interpretation of national security threats as the Libyan

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[133] See Asiwaju, op-cit., p.71.

[134] Anene, op-cit., p.11.

[135] See for instance, Robert Smith, The Eighteenth Century Yoruba Wars, (London: Penguin, 1969).

[136] For example State creations in Nigeria almost always led to boundary adjustments which, in turn gave way to unrelenting border clashes by people on the fringe. See the next chapter for a fuller discussion. Also, see Report of Justice Mohammed Nasir Boundary Commission of Inquiry,(Lagos: Government Printer, 1976)

example above illustrates. Besides, the government's confidence building measures, courtesy of a buoyant economy after the war led the security elite to believe that all was well with the solidification process of state system and threats of internal dissension were seen as fairly remote. Yet there was evidence, even after the war that this was a fairly hasty conclusion to reach, even if a perfectly reasonable one in the aftermath of a war whose scars lay dangerously close to the precarious fabric of the nation-state.

This affected governments' sensitivity to internal threats and precluded decision-makers from identifying early those internal threats with a connecting nexus to the international environment. The opportunity provided by this lapse gave potential to actual enemies to promote dissent under the cloak of internal contradictions without governments paying adequate attention. Not, at least, until the survival threshold of incumbent administrations become equally threatened. The following chapter concentrates on those internal problems and their implications for the defence planning process.

CHAPTER THREE

INTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF THREAT TO NIGERIA'S SECURITY

Introduction.

> ...the Nigerian tragedy has been bedeviled by a set of oppositions -generalized, stereotype, not necessarily of the same order and maybe imaginary, yet each widening the wound and reducing the hope of healing it: North versus South, Islam versus Christianity, alleged feudalism versus assumed socialism, federal versus unitary preferences, traditional authority versus achieved elitism, haves versus have nots, each with sinister undertones of tension, irreconcilability, and threatened withdrawal. None was entirely accurate. Nevertheless each opposing set had sufficient seed of truth within it to permit, and even, fertilize, the growth of feared fact from a semi-fiction of existence.[1]

> Neglecting the domestic-dimension of security policy leads to a forgetfulness of the extent to which the people taking critical decisions also spend much of their time worrying about the levels of taxation, competing demands on public expenditure, promoting their personal and party images...As a result, policy options which might be perfectly reasonable within some narrow security framework turn out to be wholly unrealistic...[2]

Confronted with an objective set of suppositions such as those outlined above, the Nigerian security elite would appear to have the internal dimensions of

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[1] A.H.M.Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966 - 69, Vol.1, (London: Collins, 1971), p.5.

[2] Lawrence Freedman, The Price of Peace: Living with the Nuclear Dilemma (London: Firethorne, 1986), p.7

threats accurately defined. Yet while the above reflection on the Nigerian situation captures the essential features of the internal contradictions that have engulfed Nigeria since independence, Laurence Freedman's detached description of the classic dilemma faced by every national security elite, not only in reading threats correctly but also in arriving at realistic policy options provides a useful take off point for our examination of the internal dimensions of threat to Nigerian security.

Following from the examination of the external dimension of threat in the last chapter, we examine here how the state-centric orientation of Nigeria's security as discussed in Chapter One blurred or underplayed the level of response to internal threats by the security elite. We argue that the interaction of domestic social forces, manifested through their conflicting material interests, rather than any innate expansionist proclivities or inter-state rivalry provides the most fundamental explanation of security threats to Nigeria during this period. The intention here, therefore is to critically examine decision-makers' perception of internal threats and their reaction to what Anthony Kirk-Greene described above as "feared facts" as well as "semi fictions" in their treatment of perceived threats.

Although three major ethnic groups dominate Nigeria, the country actually consists of no fewer than two hundred and fifty ethnic groups with fundamental differences in language, culture and idionsyncracies. It was a hap-hazard melange of hardly compatible groups of people with wide and varied perceptions of what the nation they now belong to should be - perceptions which hardly encouraged integration of any kind. Whereas the thirst for independence all over Africa in the 1960s provided the ephemeral impetus for Nigeria's sub-national entities to unite to achieve independence, the unique and fundamentally aberrant nature of that independence, and the political tensions to which it gave rise, were rooted in the regional structure created by the British which encouraged variegated development in the constituent regions.[3]

No sooner had independence talks finished than they reverted back to their deep seated rivalry. These inherent sub-structural contradictions hardly ever left

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[3] See James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of Calfornia Press, 1958) and Micheal Crowder, The Story of Nigeria, (London: Faber & Faber, 1978).

room for a coherent national security formulation by successive governments. As Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere emphasised

> When self government was granted to the regions in 1952, the geo-political entity called Nigeria operated as three separate countries - the east, west, and north. The regional centres even at independence were more powerful than the Federal centre; in fact, the top political figures were regionally and ethnically based. The struggle to accumulate, consolidate and expand the acquired spheres of influence gradually generated a state of insecurity and confusion in the country.[4]

This internal fragmentation also provided the necessary impetus for the projection of external threats to national security. Since consensus can hardly be reached on many serious national issues, except through coercion, political manipulation or legal fiats[5], it was difficult to present a convincing unified front to the international community. In effect, since nations are bound to read signs and signals emanating from inside, the situation externally feeds on the internal social and political instability which, invariably undermines the survival of the very institutions on which the nation state is hinged.

Against this background, our examination of decision-makers' perception of internal threats will be discussed below in its political, religious, economic, military and socio-cultural dimensions.

II. Political dimension.

The structure of the Nigerian state itself more than anything else was

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[4] Toyin Falola & Julius Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979 - 1984, (London: Third World Books, 1986) p.254.

[5] For instance, states were created by decrees in 1967, 1976, 1987 and 1991 to undercut the overriding tribal and ethnic problems by removing the erstwhile administrative and political emphasis placed on the regions. Of interest in this respect is that no civilian regime ever managed to create new states.

responsible for the institutionalised political crisis of the country. The institutions inherited from the colonial power at independence were such that found it difficult to survive. Although presented as a virtual proof for the success of British style democracy in Africa, the Westminster system of government bequeathed to the delicately balanced federal structure became inoperable mainly because the major sections of the society; the Hausa, the Ibo and the Yoruba could hardly attain any equilibrium amongst themselves. The superimposition of a regional structure over these ethnic boundaries actually gave them the feeling of freedom from the centre. Especially when considered against the background that they were large as well as distinct enough to hold their own independently.(See Map 3.1) In consequence, within five years of independence, political thuggery and uncontrollable violence had resulted from election malpractices in the Western and Middle Belt areas, with an imminent threat to the federal centre.[6] It was in this politically volatile situation that the first coup d'etat occurred on 15 January 1966.

Given the unenviable position of the politicians, the advent of the armed forces, though an aberration was reasonably welcome in so far as it would restore order and stem the tide of political upheaval. That hope of the general populace seemed to have been misplaced because no sooner had the armed forces taken over than the same political problem bequeathed by the neo-colonial structure reared its head. The resurgence of ethnic conflict assumed a wider dimension resulting in civil war under the supposedly cohesive organisation - the armed forces.[7] Although the war ended with the country still intact, the leadership had come to perceive the lack of a sense of national identity and national will as the greatest threat to the country's stability and security. In defining the nation's objectives in the Second National Development Plan produced immediately after the war, the military

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[6] For details, see O. Anifowose, Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, (New York: Nok Publishers, 1983).

[7] For a concise analysis of the ethnic question, see P.C.Lloyds, 'Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis,' in Keith-Panter Bricks, (ed) Nigerian Politics and the Military Rule, (London: Athlone Press, 1970) pp.1-13 and P.C.Lloyds, Classes, Crises and Coups,(New York: Praeger, 1972)

Map.3.1.



The Regions, to 1967

leadership stressed the need to establish "a united, strong and self reliant nation,"[8] and this was vigorously pursued through General Gowon's earlier policy of state creation [which nipped the regional fissures in the bud, albeit temporarily] and the post-war policy of national reconciliation which re-absorbed the break-away republic without any recourse to the war.

But even in this drive towards unity and consensus, the government was unable to quell the suspicion prevalent among various ethnic groups that policies adopted were mere facades. No matter how utilitarian the measures taken were, the broad room that existed for mistrust often led to a reading of suspicion and malice into decisions made.[9] Hence, the serious inadequacies that existed with institutions developed to foster unity and advance the process of integration.

The resilience of the political dimension of threat was compounded over the years by the low level of commitment to the nationality question on the part of either elected political leaders or self appointed military rulers - a situation which partly encouraged lack of commitment to the Nigerian cause, on the part of the entire populace. This was not only heightened by the evident lack of accountability among government officials, the acute level of corruption and profligacy and the rampant nature of nepotism, but also, by the conventional wisdom in Nigeria's government circles that their stay in office was tenuous, hence the best option was to enrich themselves within that short time instead of rendering any service. This uncaring arrogance of government functionaries partly explains the lack of concern for the survival of the state. The American style Presidential system of government introduced thirteen years after military rule brought the corruptive influence to a

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[8] Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970 - 1974,(Lagos: Government Printer, 1970)

[9] For instance, policies like 'quota system', 'unity schools', 'federal character' and 'national youth service corps'were greeted at inception with suspicion. While there is a sense in which all the policies remain relevant to the body politic, they have also been seen in several circles as attempts at glorifying mediocrity and undermining merit through positive discrimination. In such circles, those policies have achieved the exact opposite of unity and integration by creating further mistrust of the leadership's intentions.

head.[10]

The political threat has generated much concern in the country because of the increased level of diffidence since ethnic jingoism, rather than dissipate assumed a more protracted dimension that made problems of unity and integration more resistant to solutions. Even other measures taken to strengthen the federal centre like state creations - devolution of powers from erstwhile regional centres, increasing emphasis on a third tier of government - the local authority, and numerous attempts at resolving the inequality of revenue allocation only served as ephemeral restraints. Perhaps, left on its own, the problem of ethnic conflict in the polity might not have become an unresolvable one[11] over which compromises must be regularly applied in search of a middle ground amongst contending forces, unfortunately, polities do not exist in isolation of other forces.

In explaining the resilience of ethnicity as a security threat in Nigeria, radical scholars have contended that the forces of class always appropriate ethnic symbols in the unbridled pursuits of the "national cake" to the detriment of national security. Far from promoting national interests, supposedly national political organisations, they contend, grew out of cultural collectives which were really instruments 'used to promote class interests in the acquisition and retention of power.'[12] On the other hand, the ethnic question is seen by structuralists as a very real issue that cannot be given a short shrift in the articulation of the country's internal dimension of threats. The resultant danger is the blurry nature of the role played by ethnicity and class in the Nigerian state to date. Their mutually

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[10] In four years of civilian rule considered to be the most prosperous for the nation in terms of revenue earnings, by the time it was overthrown in 1983 Nigeria had not only lost the $5 billion left in the reserve account, but also ranked amongst the most indebted third world countries. Ironically, the country made more money in oil revenue in those four years than she did since independence. For details, see F.B.Marinho, 'Petroleum Resources and National Development,' Being text of Lecture delivered in the Eko Hotel Gold Medal Lecture Series, May 1984.

[11] Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the Second Republic, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991.), p.10.

[12] Richard Sklar, 'Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System,' Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.3, No.2 (August 1965) p.203.

reinforcing role is not in doubt in third world post-independence politics and this often made delineation and prioritization difficult for defence policy-makers. Yet, while this offers a plausible explanation for the security elite's extreme caution in its treatment of ethnicity as an internal threat, it does not detract from the fact that ethnicity is an enduring threat, not simply a product of class appropriation.[13]

As products of these two-pronged social forces themselves - class and ethnicity and given the material under-currents of most ethnic struggles, while successive leaders recognised the threat ethnicity posed to national security - they have tended to underplay their primordial and communal origins, choosing to address them materially, specifically through economic incentives, judicial reprieve and forced reduction in ethnic bonding through state creation.[14] Yet, Nigeria has lost more lives in ethnic conflicts over intra-state boundary disputes than she had in inter-state conflicts or continental disputes since 1970. In a 1988 survey of Southeastern Nigeria alone, no fewer than three hundred disputes were recorded in the five states of Anambra, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Cross River, and Imo.[15] The recent Kataf-Hausa ethnic dispute in North Central Nigeria, the Ogoni - Andoni conflict in Rivers State and the Jukun 'war' in Nigeria's middle-belt, with a death toll of

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[13] The debate on ethnicity and class and their threatening potentials to the Nigerian state provides an interesting angle to the national security question in international relations. For further enquiry into this debate, see K.W.J. Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960 - 1965, (London: Heinemann, 1973); Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic, (London: Macmillan, 1988); Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal politics, op-cit.; Gavin Williams, State and Society in Nigeria, (Idanre: Afrografika Publishers, 1980); R.J.Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent Nation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Onwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, (Enugu: Fourth Dimensions, 1982) and Billy J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973) among many others. For a more recent contextualization of the ethnic and class complex in Nigerian politics, see T. Abdul-Raheem, Politics in Nigeria's Second Republic, Unpublished D.Phil Thesis, (University of Oxford, 1990)

[14] For an examination of the sentiments, see for example, Okechukwu Ibeanu, Peasants Vs Peasants: Land Disputes in rural communities in South Eastern Nigeria. Unpublished Paper.

[15] ibid, p.1.

over three thousand people[16], all illustrated the resilience of ethnic conflagration. Yet successive governments' effort to arrest the situation by setting up judicial commissions have proved to be ineffective. As the Justice Mamman Nasir Commission on boundary disputes, [set up after the states' creation exercise in 1976] revealed, the process of demarcation, acquisition and adjudication of land disputes via judicial fiat, without adequate attention paid to the material undercurrents of ethnic conflicts only left more room for the persistence of internal conflicts among ethnic groups.

As a result, Nigeria has become the perfect example of the fluidity of state institutions in third world politics constrained mainly in its political stability by ethnic and class sentiments, resulting in frequent leadership changes, inefficiency, parochial patronage and poor public policy management. This frequent governmental changes also encouraged discontinuity in planning process as well as absence of scientific and technological culture fostering external dependence in its wake.

Unfortunately, just as enduring regional conflicts assumed less significant attention in the cold war era due to the gravity of a potential nuclear conflagration between the superpowers, the state-centric orientation of nation-states ensured that scholars concentrate more on international boundaries while paying scant regard to internal boundary disputes, and the social processes responsible for them. The fact that three decades of independence in Nigeria had not tempered the resilence of these disputes as well as the tendency in citizens to continuously interpret government decisions on the basis of which ethnic group benefited is enough evidence of the resolute intractability of the political dimension of threats to national security.[17]

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[16] Nigeria's newspaper reports. For example, see Newswatch Magazine, 'Agony of the Ogoni', September 22, 1993.

[17] It is the resilience of the ethnic question and the perceived inequality of access to state power that has led to the agitation for a sovereign national conference, aimed at addressing and re-negotiating the basis of Nigerian unity in the aftermath of the annulled June 1993 Presidential election in the country. The fact that the new military junta accedded to this request underlines how combustible the ethnic dissension has once again become thirty three years after independence.

III. Religious dimension.

Religion has been a fundamental part of Nigerian society for as long as history can be recalled. Its presence permeates every aspect of public life; every policy is dissected under the microscope of religion by the established faiths to monitor latent or apparent "foul play" by vested interests. As though on cue from the nation's political troubles, the religious dimension of instability hardly gave room for a successful integration of the Nigerian society. Even in situations where some consensus had emerged in the political sphere, this had been hampered largely by the nation's religious divide.[18] While differences of faith may not of itself constitute a threat to national security, the use it was made of in and out of government amplified its threatening potentials. Set against its demographic antecedents - the background to religious intolerance in Nigeria could be better understood - as it was the impression created in the very first census that moslems were in the majority which aroused in Islamic fundamentalists the belief that the country should not be secular but theocratic.[19]

In the same vein, it was the doubt cast on that census as overtly politically manipulated by the ruling Northern Peoples' Congress(NPC) that gave christians, most of whom are southerners the impetus to fight this seeming domination through population count manipulation. The 1963 census puts the population of muslims in the country at forty seven per-cent, christians at thirty four per cent with eighteen

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[18] For an outstanding study of the interplay between religion and politics in Nigeria, see Matthew Kukah, Religion and Politics in Northern Nigeria since Independence, Unpublished P.hd Thesis, University of London, 1989.

[19] The Sharia debate which began at this early stage of independence as a result has continuously recurred with tension on the constitutional definition of a secular state. See for instance, Walter Ofonagoro et-al, The Great Debate, (Lagos: Daily Times,1977) and Proceedings of The Constituent Assembly, Official Report Vol.1,(Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1978). The Military Government had to intervene on the two occasions as the debate proved inconclusive. But just as we argued above on political threats that ethnic symbols were many atimes chosen to advance class interests, the Sharia debate served the same class purposes. See M.Kukah, ibid., Chapter four.

per cent of the population belonging to various other faiths.[20] Although the state's constitution professed Nigeria's secular nature, states' policies were still influenced by religious sentiments and decision-makers' personal beliefs.

Successive governments have always made an issue of resolving the religious divide by underplaying its threatening potentials. For instance, because figures on religious or ethnic composition of the population are susceptible to political manipulations, government decided in the last population count in 1990 not to include details of ethnic origins or religious composition. Initial assessments by dispassionate analysts have described the census to be the most successful to date. Despite these attempts to stem the tide of religious hatred, many government actions have been seen to have pandered to religious influence. As early as independence, government policies were indeed reflective of certain religious underpinnings. For instance, choice of friends became a matter for explicit religious concern which had little or nothing to do with the costs and benefits of such relationships. For example, even though Nigeria was nowhere near the theatre of Arab/Isreali conflict in the 1960s, this did not stop the war from becoming a major crisis in decisionmaking for the government as various regional leaders took sides depending on their religious inclination and regardless of any dispassionate analysis. In the heat of the debate over diplomatic relations with Israel, the positions of the three regional premiers bear restatement. The christian premier of western Nigeria, Chief Samuel Akintola on a visit to Israel told his hosts, 'you can be assured of our promise at any place and we promise never to withdraw this.' On a similar visit to Israel, his counterpart in eastern Nigeria, also a christian, Dr Michael Okpara displayed the same sentimental attachment, 'I myself am almost an Israelite. I love and admire Israel. For my part, I shall always go to Israel.' Conversely, their counterpart in moslem dominated northern Nigeria on the other side of the religious divide - Alhaji Ahmadu Bello unequivocally declared, 'Jordan is my second home. To my mind Israel does not exist. And it would never exist...I don't know where

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[20] Federal Government of Nigeria, Report on the 1963 Census, (Lagos: Government Printer, 1964.) Because of the political sensitivity of the religious question, the latest census figures refrained from a religious classification. See The Independent(London) March 26, 1992 and West Africa(London), March 27-April 5, 1992.

it is.'[21]

While diplomatic relations with Israel eventually started in 1964, the above statements made in the currency of religious fervour were to remain instructive as to the extremes of passion with which religion is treated and how policy formulation is perennially affected by emotive issues. In this respect, it would not be wrong to explain the religious dimension of the 1973 Nigerian-led OAU policy of breaking diplomatic relations with Israel following the Yom Kippur war. Nigeria's refusal to restore diplomatic relations with Israel thirteen years after Egypt (the main reason for that boycott) established diplomatic relations further strengthens the view that the security elite considers it as a religious issue with implications for a significant portion of the population,[22] even at a time Government continues to deal with Isreal unofficially.[23]

Although Israel now has diplomatic ties with Nigeria, the surreptitious manner with which this was eventually consummated confirmed the sensitivity attached to the issue of religion in government.[24] It was not the Israeli issue alone that manifested the threat posed by religion to national stability in the period under study. It is just that it depicted very appropriately how need and relevance were always beclouded by religious sentiments as well as revealing the tool fashioned out of religion to the detriment of national security.

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[21] Bukar Bukarambe, 'Nigeria and the Arab World,' in G.O.Olusanya & R.A.Akindele (eds), Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty Five Years, (Lagos: University Press Limited, 1986), p.421. All quotations are from the chapter.

[22] See West Africa(London), 19-25 August, 1991 for full details on Israeli companies operating in Nigeria.

[23] For full details on Israeli's unofficial dealings with African governments including Nigeria, See West Africa (London), 'Israel's return to Africa,' 5-11 June 1989.

[24] It would be recalled that a former foreign minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, was sacked in 1987 when his chance meeting with Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister at the UN Headquarters in New York leaked to the press. The Minister later claimed he was 'under orders' from higher authorities, reiterating that the meeting was part of a long negotiating process, for which he was later sacrificed. See Newswatch Magazine (Lagos)26 October 1992 The fact that the Minister is of the Christian faith did not help matters.

At the same level was the threat of religious fundamentalism that has often engulfed the northern part of the country with decisionmakers caught off guard every time it occurred. For instance, after one of such religious riots in the northern city of Kano in December 1980, a body set up by the federal government to look into the causes of the riot concluded it had outside backing under the pretext of a religion. Just around the time the foreign minister spoke of 'Libya's incursions into Nigeria's territory',[25] although there was no evidence of any practical effort made to stop the incursions.[26] But then, as a military intelligence officer who worked on the group later recounted, "...the fanatics were not trained to hit and run. Their tactics were bolder than the guerillas we often read about fighting in Malaysia or in the jungle of East Asia"[27] Of course, factors not at the disposal of the outsider in government may have been responsible for the perception of government's seeming indecision, nevertheless, there is still some sense in the argument that fear of a backlash from people of the same faith, historical origins, sentimental attachment to the religious rioters and the leaders' belief in the moslem injunction of declaring holy wars against infidels may not have been unconnected with government's tempering of justice. The fact that religious riots have occurred relentlessly in the christian dominated part of northern Nigeria since 1980 could only point to the inability of successive regimes to combat the threat of religious

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[25] West Africa, December 1, 1980. This proves the point made earlier that successive governments seek external scapegoats in order not to confront the internal causes of threat; in this case - socio-economic misery masquerading as religious crisis. The interesting aspect of the Maitatsine prising was that their attacks were mostly against fellow muslims. I owe this observation to Dr.T.Abdul-Raheem.

[26] The fact that the President, Shehu Shagari, his Defence Minister, Akanbi Oniyangi and the National Security Adviser, Bukar Shuaib were all moslems from the north was widely interpreted as a strong factor that precluded stern measures that would have deterred any recurrence.

[27] See Testimony of Major Haliru Akilu, in Federal Government of Nigeria, Report of Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances,(Lagos: Government Printer, 1981) p.18. In the same vein, even the Commander that led the operation had this to say on the fanatics' indomitable spirits, "I pray that Nigerians would be able to fight for this nation in the same manner the fanatics fought in attack on Nigeria." See Colonel Y.Y.Kure's viewpoint in M.Kukah, op-cit., p.182.

fundamentalism.[28] The position of the country's leadership on the Kaduna and Kafanchan riots of 1987 which the President described as a 'civilian version of coup d'etat' seemed instructive of the precarious nature of the religious threat.[29] Despite attempts by government to stem the tide of religious antagonism the fact that at least two other religious riots have occurred under the administration gave little hope of any respite in future.[30] This has also not been helped by the clandestine manner the Babangida administration sought full membership into Organisation of Islamic Conference(OIC), an act construed by christians as the final attempt to upstage Nigeria's secular status.[31] The precedence set by riots in christian dominated areas since 1980s as well as numerous inflammatory statements by religious leaders have accentuated the problem, making it difficult even for the most dispassionate members of society to dismiss the pervasive mistrust amongst the

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[28] Kano - 1980, Bulumkutu, Kaduna -1981, Maiduguri - 1982, Jimeta, Yola - 1984, Gombe - 1985; Kaduna, Kafanchan and Zaria - 1987 and Bauchi - 1991. Although there were smaller 'religious' riots in between, all those mentioned led to deaths of no fewer than five hundred people and required armed forces to quell. See Matthew Kukah, ibid., for an extensive analysis on 'religious' riots.

[29] To emphasise government's seriousness, a consultative body (Advisory Council on Religious Activities) comprising of moslems and christians leaders was set up under the chairmanship of the Vice President with the armed forces banning at the same time proliferation of religious bodies within barracks. See Kukah, ibid.

[30] The fact that the May 1991 religious riot in Bauchi, also in Northern Nigeria replicated the northern pogrom of 1966 prior to the civil war in its selective killings of Ibos and the relatively successful members of the Sayawa ethnic group in Bauchi State who are, mostly christian could only be interpreted as a bad omen for national security as well as bringing to the fore the political connotation of religious crises.

[31] In defence, while not denying that Nigeria became a member of OIC illegally, moslem leaders advanced the argument that since Nigeria has diplomatic relations with the Vatican, membership of OIC should be left as government compensation to the moslems. Little mention was made of the fact that the Vatican is a sovereign state. Although the Federal government denied joining the organisation, it soon became apparent that the issue had divided the ranks of the ruling body as the Deputy Head of State, Commodore Ukiwe and the Defence Minister, General Bali, both christians dissociated themselves from the OIC decision in the press. For details on OIC controversy, see Kukah, ibid., Chapter Seven.

people on account of religion.[32]

President Babangida's observation that religious riots have become a 'civilian version of a coup d'etat' remains a matter for conjecture. What is not in doubt is that successive governments through deliberate inactivity raised the level of an otherwise innocuous question of faith into a real time bomb. In essence, religious sentiments continue to hold sway in government actions. That successive regimes recognised the danger posed by religion to national stability is not in doubt, what is unclear is government's practical steps in dealing with the threat, beyond acknowledging that 'it is absolutely necessary to continue to emphasise the secular nature of the Nigerian state...as much a matter of constitutional engineering as ... of day-to-day public policy',[33] while government policies still left room for accusations of double standards.

IV. Economic dimensions.

In a situation of unstable equilibrium of social and political forces and consensual disagreement over what constitutes growth and development, the economy of the state in flux is likely to be susceptible to inconsistent twist and turns according to the whims of decision-makers. Such was the experience of Nigeria in the period under study. On the one hand, one could approach the economic dilemma by examining the dialectical relationship between the objective material requirements of a typically underdeveloped economy and decision-makers' appreciation of what was desirable. On the other hand, the economic crisis in Nigeria could be seen as a product of the country's colonial history, as some

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[32] The fact that the late Moslem leader, Sheikh Mahmud Gumi, former Grand Khadi of Northern Nigeria openly said the north would not accept a non -moslem as Nigeria's President even if duly elected in effect, turned campaign hustings, mosques and churches into platforms for vituperative religious charades. Although the 1993 presidential election was fought by two moslems, the annulment of the victory of a southern moslem was still attributed to the fact that he was perceived by power brokers as a less devout moslem. See African Guardian (Lagos), November 15, 1993

[33] Kuru Special Panel, Proposal on National Defence Policy for Nigeria, (Kuru, Jos: N.I.P.S.S, 1988), p.3. Also, see National Defence Policy for Nigeria(Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1978) particularly Section 195.

scholars have argued. Examined critically, both positions are two sides of the same coin and they successfully conspired to make Nigeria the peripheral economy that it is to date.

To many who know little about Nigeria, oil seems synonymous with the country's economy. In recent times this view is correct. But prior to oil production and the post Arab-oil embargo fortune, Nigeria's prosperity had been built on its peasant agricultural development. In the 1960s, the country ranked among the largest growers of cocoa, cotton, palm oil and groundnut in the world.[34] By 1974 all of these agricultural products put together constituted less than 25% of the country's revenue from exports with crude oil bringing in between 60% -95% of total export revenue since then.[35] The basis of this gradual shift to a mono-product economy had been laid much earlier in the perpetuation of the metropolitan market(Britain) even after attainment of independence as the country was still tied strongly with the colonial economy at the expense of the indigenous economy. One must not forget that it was the colonial merchants who actually set the pace for colonialism in the eighteenth century.[36] Hence, just as the colonial administration vacated the country at independence, they left adequate proxies in multinational corporations.[37] .

Inspite of the fact that the military had taken over government from civilians and came out of a war that severely affected Nigeria's client - patron

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[34] For instance, in 1964-65 fiscal year, agriculture contributed 60% of Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product(GDP) as well as over 84% of export earnings in 1964.

[35] See Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria's Principal Economic & Financial Indicators 1970 - 1978, (Lagos: CBN Press, 1979). The case of palm oil was particularly shocking, in that by 1980 Nigeria had become a net importer of palm oil which she unquestionably produced more than any country in the world in 1960.

[36] For the role played by multinationals as forerunners of colonialism, See A.G.Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, (London: Macmillan, 1973)

[37] For good appraisals of multinationals in Nigeria and their effects, See Terisa Turner, 'Multinational Corporations and Instability of the Nigerian State,' Review of African Political Economy, 5, (1976) and Ikenna Nzimiro, 'The Political and Social Implications of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria,' in Carl Widstrand(ed), Multinational Firms in Africa,(Uppsala: SIAS, 1975).

relationship with the western world, the false resilience of the economy at the end of war saw to it that it was business as usual with western multinationals.[38] Whereas the security elite recognised the undermining influence of foreign multinationals and sought to correct this dominant feature in the national economy, and the leadership embarked on an indigenisation policy which sought to put, in the hands of Nigerians economic management hitherto controlled by foreign companies after the war. Unfortunately this proved unsustainable because the country's petroleum resources had also assumed a stronger position in the economy aided by the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and Nigeria had become the second largest supplier of petroleum to the United States, a factor which increased her dependence on the international market. Instead of addressing this uncontrolled resurgence of foreign multi-national corporations, government's declared policy of encouraging indigenuous entrepreneurship[39] collapsed at the behest of a consociational alliance[40] by the military leaders, the top echelons of the civilian bureaucracy and the business sector - the three contending social categories within the ruling class. The dependence on oil also affected the country's multi-product economy, and thus national security. Agriculture lost its pride of place and food imports totalled N818.8 million in 1979 alone.[41]

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[38] The government spent £375 million on the war without any recourse to external borrowing. See West Africa(London), March 28, 1970.

[39] For a critique of the 1972 Indigenisation Policy, see E.O. Akeredolu Ale, 'Private Foreign Investment and the Underdevelopment of Indigenous Entrepreneurship,' in Gavin Williams,(ed) Nigeria: Economy and Society, (London: Rex Collings, 1976).

[40] Arend Lijphart has defined consociationalism as the 'government by elite cartel designed to turn a ...fragmented political culture into a stable democracy' See A Lijphart, ' Consociational Democracy,' World Politics, Vol.26, No.2,(January 1969) p.211. While Lijphart's argument that ' in a political system with clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments, virtually all decisions are perceived as entailing high stakes,' is right, the assumption that all elite cartels are in search of a stable polity acceptable to all is patently false. For a critique of Lipjharts' theory, see Sue M Halpern, 'The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy,' West European Politics, Vol.9, No.2 (April 1986) pp.181-197.

[41] ibid.

Coming alongside this was the wave of unbridled corruption and graft in the economy, deliberate wastage, over-invoicing, profiteering and foreign exchange fraud amid the fluctuating fortunes of oil sales towards the end of the 1980s decade. At that stage, it had become apparent to all concerned that the ship of state was bound to capsize if the economy continuously ran as a family business.[42]

The state of the economy was so appalling by 1982 following the severe glut in the oil market which was by then generating 93% of total export earnings at a time virtually everybody had left the farm to become a member of the cartel at whatever level. The result was the Economic Stabilisation Act - the regime's 'austerity measures' which saw thousands of workers retrenched and salaries unpaid even to those who kept their jobs. In a country where the government is the largest employer, the effect of this development was near anarchy.

By 1983, it had become evident the economy could no longer sustain the nation as Central Bank reserves could only pay for one month's import. Oil sales that totalled $22.4 billion in 1980 had fallen to $9.6 billion in 1983.[43] At the same time, foreign debts were accumulating and creditors had begun refusing letters of credits for imports.[44] The crippling austerity measures imposed by the civilian government were resented by the people as they witnessed the corruption going on within the same administration. The exponential rise in rent seeking among top government officials was such that instability became imminent once again. The population fully expressed their resentment against an unpopular government which had saddled them with spiralling inflation and unprecedented unemployment levels. Against this background of economic insecurity, it was hardly surprising that Nigerians were not surprised at the overthrow of the civilian government by the end of 1983 as the situation had reached such an undermining level capable of breaking the tender fabrics of the nation's stability.

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[42] For an outstanding analysis on the centrality of corruption termed 'prebendalism', see 'Clientelism and Prebendal Politics,' in Richard Joseph, op-cit., pp.57-68.

[43] Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report: 1983, (Lagos: CBN Press, 1984)

[44] Interview with Major General Buhari in Journal of Defence and Diplomacy, (New York) April 1984, p.13.

Since the people were so disillusioned by the performance of civilians, it was easy once again for the military to take advantage of that disaffection. Indeed, giving reasons for the government takeover, the Head of State at the time, Major General Mohammed Buhari put at the top economic graft and corruption of the civilian regime:

> They mismanaged the economy, evidenced by their lack of financial discipline, huge external debts arising out of over-dependence on external and internal borrowing to execute ...projects, heavy budget deficits and a weak balance of payments position
>
> There was corruption and indiscipline, evidenced by kickbacks, inflation of contract sums, over-invoicing of imports, smuggling, illegal dealings in foreign exchange, forgery, fraud, embezzlement, misuse and abuse of office, arson
>
> The masses were miserable and hungry owing to scarcity of essential commodities in food and raw materials for industry, and unemployment arising from closure of factories that were unable to obtain import licences for their raw materials while such licences were issued to the wrong people for bribes
>
> The political leadership was insensitive to the suffering of the people; there was the **threat to national unity and stability by the widespread perversion of the electoral process and a drift towards economic collapse and political chaos.**(emphasis added)[45]

The instability generated by the civilian regime's shoddy implementation of planned projects and its continued recycling of oil wealth back into developed countries was compounded by the government's attempt to blame the country's economic woes on the influx of aliens from neighbouring countries. While it is possible to make a superficial case for the negative effects of migrant labour, a more solid case could be advanced for their contribution to any economy. In the

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[45] ibid., Interview with General Buhari.

case of Nigeria's alien workers, they were involved in menial jobs which Nigerians would not touch with a foot's pole. In spite of their exploitation, they not only did the job but also helped improve the country's level of productivity. Contrariwise, it could be argued that it was the government's panicky deportation measure, giving aliens only fifteen days to leave that partly contributed to the depletion of the country's essential commodities.[46] Apart from this, it later became clear that the measure yielded no commensurate dividend as the affected aliens (those who had not exploited either their ethnic ties with some parts of Nigeria or marriage to remain legal residents in the country) found their way back through illegal routes or collusion with customs and immigration officers.[47]

At the corporate level therefore, this action singularly dampened the good relations Nigeria had carefully cultivated with her neighbours since the civil war ended. Truly, it goes without saying that the entire livelihood of these countries(except Cameroon) had always depended on the wealth of their rich neighbour - Nigeria. By virtue of their French connection and subsequent membership of the CFA Franc currency zone, a convertible currency unit whose prevalence was used to reduce the strength of the Nigerian 'naira' through unrecorded large scale capital flight as well as foreign exchange deals. The forced exit of aliens and stoppage of their currency market undoubtedly irked the people and their governments.[48] The situation got worse with the closure of Nigerian

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[46] Several newspapers commented on this dimension, particularly how aliens flooded markets depleting the little left of the country's essential commodities stock. See The Guardian(Lagos), 15 May 1983.

[47] Indeed, the Minister of Internal Affairs during the second wave of expulsion in 1985, Major General M.Magoro confessed his men' inability to effectively police the borders. See West Africa, 14 October 1985. This is hardly surprising. As one study reveals, Nigeria had 16,000 custom/immigration officials distributed over 116 checkpoints on a land frontier of 3,800 kilometres, 800 kilometres coastal borders and 45 officially recognised trade routes. See E.C.A., E.C.O.W.A.S. Trade, Customs and Monetary Study Project - unrecorded trade flows within ECOWAS, E/CN14/WP.1/115., 28 August 1979.

[48] See John Igue, 'Le Nigeria et ses Peripheries Frontalieres: L'Exemple du Benin et du Niger,' Paper presented at a Conference on The Integration of Nigeria into the International System, Bordeaux, May 2-3, 1985, p.12.

borders for almost two years and the second round of illegal aliens' expulsion in 1985.

Rightly or wrongly, these countries felt Nigeria owed them, at least, part of their livelihood if she wanted to earn their respect and subordination. This much was revealed by ex-President Kerekou of Benin republic who even told a Nigerian delegation to his country in the aftermath of the 1983 coup that things will not be the same again, until Nigeria reopened her borders.[49] Although similar pressures were mounted by other neighbouring countries, the new government was able to withstand it until it successfully carried out a currency change which dragged the neighbours' economies into further crises. Needless to say, they(neighbouring countries) became extremely antagonistic towards Nigeria and drummed up international support and pressure on the country to reopen her borders.[50] In their small ways, they exerted enough pressures as best they could.[51] The result of this was the inward looking foreign policy of the administration which though encouraged instability and 'arm twisting' from outside, received majority support at home. Besides, many observers have noted that this border closure was actually against Nigeria's own declared strategic interests within the sub-region.

Although the regime came out with the usual rhetoric on freeing the nation's economy from the stranglehold of multinationals and international financial institutions, placing control of the economy securely in the hands of Nigerians and reducing - if not totally eliminating the country's wide ranging dependence on the major market economies of the world, the sheer difficulty of attaining this level

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[49] See Ibrahim Gambari, Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1988) p.40.

[50] For instance, Vernon Walters, President Reagan's Special Envoy came on an arm twisting mission and succeeded in getting Nigeria to allow Kano Airport's usage for temporary airlift of relief material to Chad. See Gambari, ibid.,

[51] Gambari, ibid., p.47. referred to the initial refusal of Benin and Togolese Presidents to sign the Quadripartite agreement in Lagos by trying to tie it with the border closure issue.

became apparent to them as their policies were regarded as high handed.[52]

Again, while all governments which ruled Nigeria throughout the period this research covered, and even subsequently, recognised as economic threats:

> Poverty and hunger due to the structure of our economy
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> widening gap between the rich and the poor;
>
> Excessive external dependence of our economy and the role of foreigners in its critical and strategic sectors;
>
> Failure or inability to develop indigenous technology as a result of the low level of investment in research and development;
>
> Lack of effective people oriented planning, management and utilisation of government resources and;
>
> Poor and inadequate communication systems.[53]

their attempts to re-orientate the economy have always stopped short at the altar of indecision and insensitivity to the plight of the general population. The intertwined nature of economic and political dimensions of internal threats made it difficult for leaders to affect the lives of the citizenry positively. It remains one of the contradictions of Nigeria's political economy that even though the leadership has always perceived as threatening the country's dependence on multinationals, the fact that most people in governments have worked or continue to serve as agents of foreign corporations made it difficult for the government to extricate the economy

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[52] In fairness, the regime adhered strictly to its policy of mutual reciprocity in relations to the west. But despite this assertiveness it remained confused in its policy directions.

[53] National Defence Policy for Nigeria: A Proposal, op-cit., p.14.

from the stranglehold of international capital.[54] Since multinationals are oligopolistic by their very nature and always out to maximise profit, indigenous technology and businesses remained victims of multinationals' unfair advantage. Even in the oil boom era when Nigeria's economy was buoyant, instead of using the wealth to extricate its economy from the trappings of international capitalism and re-orientate the country towards a pluralist agricultural based economy which was official government policy, the money was effectively channelled back into the western economy either through consumer imports, luxury items and sundry jamborees.[55]

As a result, it would appear the economy would remain unstable until the internal dynamics of its mono-product, internationally regulated control gave way to a more equitable interdependence in international trade.

V. Military dimension.

The threat posed at the military level to the security and stability of Nigeria in the period under study was a more profound one for an institution entrusted with the security and territorial integrity of the nation. This is important when we realise that studies of national security and military engagement in politics have often underplayed the nature of military threats to security habitually. Indeed, studies on the role of armed forces in third world's political development have always emphasised the military's commitment to modernisation and political

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[54] A usual practice in Nigeria even after the Indigenisation Decree was promulgated saw foreign firms luring people in government who had inside knowledge into procuring shares on their behalf and get paid huge commissions for this 'favour'. To date, a correlation can be found in the number of key bureaucrats who implemented the Indigenisation decree under General Gowon and the incidence of bureaucrats now serving in various capacities as Chairmen of financial institutions or Directors of 'indigenised' multinationals corporations. Same goes for the military and business leaders after leaving government.

[55] Whilst one is not advocating a total cut off from the international market and while arms purchase for the country's defence is not necessarily counterproductive, as we show in Chapter Six, the double pricing and slush funds resulting from arms procurement may have affected the country's economy in a way, even if not as fundamentally as non-defence consumer imports did.

evolution. The military is considered as a catalyst for the overall development of new states because of 'certain inherent characteristics in the nature of modern military organisations which make it imperative for them to intervene in politics.[56] Belief in the notion created by this 'political vacuum theory' or 'military as the moderniser' thesis might have been responsible for Nzeogwu's (leader of Nigeria's first coup) claim that '...only in the army do you get true Nigerianism.'[57] For Nzeogwu, in spite of the 'good intentions' behind the January 1966 coup in Nigeria to assert that only the army possessed 'true Nigerianism' (whatever that means) is to arrogate to the military the sole repository of national honour and patriotism. And there is an extent to which this stereotype represents Nigeria where historical development has shown the military to be a greater threat to stability despite all the claims of 'puritanical ethic, nationalistic ethos, **espirit-de-corp,** spartan and frugal outlook to life and an in-group cohesion.' As shown below, there was indeed, a sense in which the military served as a more undermining threat to the stability of Nigeria having ruled the country for more than two out of the three decades of independence without any corresponding restructure of the main institutions despite their professed unified outlook.

Emerging from a civil war in 1970 with a united country, the military government truly embarked on some confidence building measures weaved around factors meant to promote and consolidate the much desired unity among the patently diverse people of Nigeria through its three RRRs policy - Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation.[58] As a result of this policy, certain actions that ought to have followed war within and outside the military organisation did not because of the political leadership's sensitivity to the threat the armed forces itself

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[56] See, for instance Morris Janowitz, The Military In the Political Development of New Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) and John Johnson,(ed) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

[57] Interview with New Nigerian, (Kaduna), 18 January, 1966.

[58] The Gowon administration did this mainly for the Biafran rebels so that they could overcome a sense of guilt and inferiority that defeat was bound to engender and embrace the oneness of the nation.

constituted to the regime. Top on the list of the reconstruction programmes was the reorganisation of the armed forces. Others in the political realm were the implementation of a national development plan, the eradication of corruption in national life, the settlement of the question of the creation of [further states], the preparation and adoption of a new constitution, the introduction of a revenue allocation formula, conducting a national population census, the organisation of genuinely national political parties, and the organisation of elections and installation of popularly elected governments in the states and at the centre.[59]

To be able to pursue the lofty ideals after the war, it was not unexpected that the military itself was to be the departure point. Strategically, the ultra geometric progression the army experienced from the small manageable force of 10,500 men just before the war to a largely bloated figure of 250,000 men after the war presented the government with a military and political dilemma. Militarily, the end of a war should result in a lowering of the military participatory ratio as the tendency for full utilisation of manpower strongly depends on war exigencies.[60] While it is arguable that a military force of 250,000 men was not too large for a country of 70 million people at the time, apart from the pressure on the economy and the constant requirement for extra budgetary funding, the boredom resulting from inactivity after the war also undermined civil-military relations as soldiers became threats to the security of individual life and property.[61] The fact that the army which came out of the war had no unified structure and found themselves living among civilians due to inadequate barracks accommodation heightened the tension in the country. In spite of this, for largely political reasons the army re-

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[59] ibid.

[60] Stanislav Andreski, Types of Military Organisations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968)

[61] See R.A.Towobola, 'Army-Civilian Clashes in Post Civil War Nigeria: Tensions in civil - military relations,' B.Sc Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, June 1979. To curb the spate of armed robberies after the civil war, the government resorted to Death by firing squad for anybody convicted of robbery by violence. In spite of this armed robbery incidence barely reduced.

absorbed soldiers from the Biafran side.[62]

At this stage, it had become acceptable to military authorities that to maintain a degree of cohesion and subordination in the force, demobilisation was imperative. Also, since the conclusion reached at the end of the war was that other services had to be developed in the process of modernisation, the disproportionate size of the army had to be streamlined to make this possible. More so, the rank and file of the organisation was largely illiterate, and therefore hardly up to the challenges of a modern day army. Hence if the army was to raise a modern, efficient force to cope with the subregional preferences of the administration, the current personnel consumption of 80% - 90% of total defence budget would leave just ten or twenty percent for modernisation or an appropriation of funds from other sectors of the economy.[63]

As apparent as the situation was, demobilisation remained throughout the Gowon administration a bitter political pill to chew as General Gowon neglected the report of the Demobilisation committee that the size of the army should be reduced to 100,000 by the end of the 70s decade and buried the issue 'under the carpet' for fear of a military overthrow.[64] Despite the advances made by the economy after the war, effective planning was continuously distorted by the army's constant demand for extra funding. Even though the Second National Development Plan after the war had warned in its defence and security section of the need to move away from 'war time system of accounting to the stricter requirements of peace.' It stated further that

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[62] See F.A.Adisa, The Development of Nigeria's Defence Policy, 1960 - 1979, Unpublished P.hd Thesis, University of London, 1983, p.126.

[63] See J. 'Bayo Adekson, Nigeria: In search of a Stable Civil-Military Relations, (New York: Westview, 1981) p.91.

[64] See J. Isawa Elaigwu, Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman, (Ibadan: West Books Publishers, 1986). Also, see Lindsay Barrett, Danjuma: The Making of a General, (Enugu: Fourth Dimensions, 1980) p.72. and Hezy Idowu, 'The Demobilisation Controversy in Nigeria,' Times International, (Lagos) 12 April 1976. For a strictly military perspective on demobilisation and its effect on military strategy, see the next chapter.

> it is absolutely essential to ensure that the proportion of available resources channelled to defence and security is not so high as to incapacitate the nation's productive capacity and to paralyse the economy, otherwise there will be **nothing left for the army to defend and protect...**(emphasis added)[65]

Even when the soldiers were said to have been demobilised to 150,000 men by 1980 under General Obasanjo's regime, the bulk of the defence expenditure was still spent on personal emoluments and overhead costs for officers and other ranks.[66] In effect, the prevarication over demobilisation not only resulted in a crisis of confidence and reduction in morale, it also undermined strategy as well as perpetuated threats to the security of the country. Above all, it set the tone of failure for the other political programmes the Gowon government promised Nigerians in 1970.[67]

Granted that the demobilisation process had been sacrificed at the political altar, the threat constituted by the military caste became more apparent in its management of political issues. Military involvement in politics have often been explained as the result of chronic societal disequilibrium exemplified by the corruption of politicians.[68] In effect, it has always been consistent with military

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[65] The Second National Development Plan report in West Africa(London), 30 July 1971.

[66] And it still constituted between 60 - 70 percent of total Defence allocation towards the latter part of this study - 1979 - 1985. See Chapters Four and Six for details.

[67] By the time the regime was ousted in July 1975, none of the programmes drawn up after the civil war had been achieved.

[68] Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p.194. On Nigeria, see the view espoused by Larry Diamond that the character of the armed forces cannot be identified as a significant factor in the failure of democracy. See Larry Diamond,'Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggle for Democracy' in Larry Diamond,et-al[ed] Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy,(Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner,1990), p.392

organisations moving from its "satrapic"[69] orientation to active praetorianism in Africa to explain its intervention in politics as resulting from the "corruption" of the civilian regime and the need for a corrective junta, presenting the military as the 'heroic saviours of the nation from its rapacious politicians'.[70] Nigeria's military regimes have followed this trend even when their coups were directed against fellow military men.[71] Yet despite what the evidence suggests, some scholars of Nigeria's political development still insist that 'the institutional structure and character of the armed forces cannot be identified as a significant factor in the failure of democracy in Nigeria.'[72] Quite correctly, it may well be that praetorianism germinates faster in situations of structural disorientation and coups have a greater chance of success in auspicious moments of national psychic depression, yet recent experience in Nigeria confirms the evidence that personal ambition and institutional survival have played more prominent role in coup detat's in Nigeria than most scholars have attributed to them.[73] Samuel Decalo could not have put it better when he observes that

> it is both simplistic and empirically erroneous to relegate coups in Africa to the status of a dependent

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[69] Amos Perlmutter defines satrapism as aping a superior, usually an external culture. Psychologically, it results from colonial and patrimonial rule. See Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p.177.

[70] Kole Omotosho, Popular Speeches of Coupmakers in Nigeria since 1966, (London: New Beacon Press, 1989.)

[71] For instance, while the Mohammed/Obasanjo ouster of Gowon occurred due to lack of consultation and failure to punish corruption, The Babangida coup of 1985 also followed this trend while it was apparent that it was a realignment of forces. One exception, however, was the abortive coup of February 1976 in which Murtala Mohammed was killed in which the coup plotters accused the government of demobilisation and driving the country towards communism.

[72] Larry Diamond, 'Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism and the Struggle for Democracy', in Larry Diamond, et-al [eds], Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1990),p. 392.

[73] See,'The Khalifa's Coup' Africa Confidential,Vol.34, No.24, December 3 1993 for an explanation of General Abacha's military coup detat in November 1993.

> variable, a function of the political weaknesses and structural fragility of African states and the failings of the African civilian elites.[74]

For all the talk of structural fragility, what has emerged in the trend of African coups is that it was the group which could present some form of unified outlook coupled with the necessary coercive apparatus to back it up that can successfully effect governmental change. Hence, while there are always reasons given by the armed forces for upstaging elected governments, almost always couched in altruistic terms and the 'malfunctioning of the political system', these are seldom sufficient explanations unless hinged on the important factor that, no relatively powerful opposition exists. There are much deeper causes for the prevalence of active praetorians in governments of coup ridden states; these being that, military coups were conducted by political activists in military organisations, by officers with present or future ambition who do not see the military profession as an end in itself; by members of the political class and conspiratorial cabals within the military organisations.[75] Decalo emphasises the same point when he states that

> ...detailed examination of motivations for coups reveals that the main weakness of attempts to explain them...is that insufficient weight is placed on the personal motives of ambitious or discontented officers who have a great deal of scope in fragmented, unstructured and unstable political systems.[76]

The Nigerian example served to illustrate this better. The military was

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[74] Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, Studies in Military Style, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p.13.

[75] Amos Perlmutter, op-cit., p.101.

[76] Decalo, op-cit., p.21.

always seen as an alternative powercentre and military officers involved in coups have been sufficiently proved to have close connections to displaced politicians.[77] This point bears restatement in our pursuit of the conspiratorial linkage with the proposition that coup planners in many cases only served as protectors of their politician friends or proteges by planning pre-emptive coups to undercut wider and more uncontrollable people's revolts bound to result from years of politicians' mismanagement of the economy. To buttress this point, a former military governor when asked why the military always intervene in political development had this to say 'it will be irresponsible for the military to sit back and wait for a mass revolution.'[78] This also provided ready explanation for the military junta that eased the interim government of Nigeria out of office in November 1993.

Although the above does not explain coups involving one military group against the other, also rampant in Nigeria, it is nevertheless clear from the above illustration that the degree of conspiratorial linkage or membership of a political

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[77] Indeed one politician, ex- President Shehu Shagari once said there are two parties in Nigeria, the one he belonged to and the army. Pedestrian as this seems, it is the truth. The leader of the junta that ousted his party ironically enjoyed more than a reasonable amount of closeness to politicians. In fact, when one politician heard he was the Head of State, he concluded there had been 'no coup', just a mere change of leadership. See S.G.Ikoku, Nigeria's Fourth Coup D'etat, (Enugu: Fourth Dimensions, 1985), p.5.; also see Ebenezer Babatope, Murtala Mohammed: A Leader Betrayed, (Enugu: Ray Ezete, 1986) and his article in Sunday Tribune(Ibadan), 19 September, 1982. Interestingly, even on the Nigerian 'left', the prospects of a revolutionary intervention through the army have also formed the basis of discourse in recent times. But far from being a solution, this seems to be a recipe for long term instability. For the socialist viewpoint, see Bjorn Beckman, 'The Military as a Revolutionary Vanguard in Nigeria: A critique,' in ROAPE., (37) December 1986, pp.50-62, Edwin Madunagu, 'The Army as a Political Party,' The Guardian, (Lagos) 9 & 16 January 1986 and Dapo Fatogun, 'The Army in Politics,' in New Horizon,(Lagos) Vol.6, No.1 & 2, January 1986. See also, Zaya Yeebo, The Struggle for Popular Power in Ghana (London: New Beacon Press, 1992)

[78] Interview with Lt.Colonel Abubakar Umar, in African Guardian,(Lagos) ' The Military in Politics', 10 April 1986. Also see Newswatch Magazine, (Lagos) 'Twenty Years of Military Rule', 20 January 1986. That a recognizable level of mutual exclusivity between top military officers and politicians in Nigeria existed is no longer in doubt. It was indeed the view of some that the Buhari coup d'etat of 1983 was staged to pre-empt junior officers' coup allegely spearheaded by Lt.Colonel(now Brigadier David Mark) responsible.

class within the military organisation may be directly correlative to the organisation and success of coup d'etats.[79] The strategic implication of this for corporate professionalism of the military is obvious. An armed forces enmeshed in the restless run for political offices would have the highest disregard for enforcing discipline. It was this opportunity that the armed forces provided for eventual leadership in the political realm that added to the growing aspiration for the profession among Nigerian youths.[80] Even in situations where the armed forces gave a semblance of respect for the sanctity of democratic institutions, promises of return of political power to the elected civilians were often accompanied by an inbuilt legacy of either inoperable political system, relinquishing power to a set of irresponsible but malleable politicians or leaving insurmountable problems in the wake of civilian return which will provide it with the opportunity of an assured return.[81]

The strategic implications of the institutionalization of coups go beyond this. By their very nature, military coups are high risk ventures which in their success or abortion almost always result in huge loss of lives. The persistence of coups and the decimation of the officer class is a veritable risk to the profession and invariably, national security since the cream of the profession could be wiped off in a military coup. Robin Luckham illustrated this point with the 1966 coups in Nigeria which resulted in the deaths of two thirds of officers, of and above the rank of Lt.Colonels.[82] The 1986 abortive coup also saw the demise of some of the

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[79] There is no better evidence of this than the coalition of incompatible politicians and military men used in executing the November 17 coup detat in Nigeria.

[80] Prior to the era of coup d'etats, the military was perceived in Nigeria as the place for those who cannot excel in academic pursuits.

[81] It is in this light that one may interpret the action of a former military Head of State who allegedly stagemanaged the 1979 elections in favour of a party that later wrecked Nigeria's economy and assured the return of the military junta. As African Guardian quoted above concluded, '...the forces have never succeeded in handing over power to a set of "responsible politicians"...their fingers remain on the trigger, ever ready to shoot into office.' The recent experience of election annulment by General Babangida, his forced exit and the attendant return of the army under his deputy, General Sanni Abacha, barely three months after seem to confirm this.

[82] Robin Luckham, 'The Nigerian Military', in K.Panter Bricks, op-cit., p.32.

country's most reputable pilots.[83] The April 1990 coup resulted in the death of at least fifty military officers.[84] However, the fact that these deaths have not dissuaded prospective coup plotters suggests that the momentum actually contributed to the persistence of praetorians as well as encouraging a corresponding relegation of their primary duties to an unenviable position.

At another level was the political usurpation of military talents that always resulted from successful coup d'etats and the simultaneous angst generated in those officers neglected in the process of distributing political posts. In at least two cases, and in lesser dimensions in all Nigerian military coup d'etats, it was this sidetracking of some military officers in the scheme of things that led to the planning of other coups.[85] At the defence planning level, the manner in which officers lobbied and the way by which key installations were vacated by officers in their preference for political offices automatically led to disorientation of the men under them. The possession of power became the key to the division of the armed forces. As cohesion disappeared, a movement from military functions to political positions took its place. The evidence therefore suggests that holding of political offices by military men left the service open to acute insurbodination. The fact that decision-makers even when they are military officers shared this view provided an interesting dimension to this threat. Although, decisionmakers acknowledged the fact that

> ...of greater dimension is military threat caused by internal dissensions, alienation of the common

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[83] Twice, one of them - Wing Commander Ben Ekele was voted as the best MIGs pilot in the country.

[84] No fewer than three hundred military officers, especially from the army have been lost to coup d'etats since the first coup in January 1966.

[85] Apart from the tepid issue of communism and genuine threat of demobilisation raised in the abortive 1976 coup broadcast, it is also known that others like late Brigadier I.B.Bisalla(Defence Minister) at the time gave their backing because of perceived neglect within the administration. See Olusegun Obasanjo, Not My Will, op-cit., (Ibadan: University Press, 1990). Also, the Babangida coup of 1985 and the abortive coup of 1986 were caused by dissatisfaction with the leadership on the issue of power sharing.

> citizens, organisational disorientation, secessionist tendencies and coup d'etat.[86]

Yet there appeared not to have been much on their part (decisionmakers) to curb themselves from perpetuating this evidently anomalous process beyond rhetorical condemnation..[87]

Apart from the threat the military constituted to its profession in Nigeria which in turn impacted on the security of the entire nation, some threats it constituted to the stability of Nigeria in a non-strategic sense were more undermining. Between 1970 and 1990 covered by this study, the military produced five of the six leaders the country had, with each regime spanning three years on average. It is not coincidental that the period Nigeria enjoyed its most stable economy was the period it had an uninterrupted government for nine years.[88] Accompanying incessant change of government were constant reviews of economic policy which destroyed the whole business outlook to foreign investors and damaged indigenous small scale business growth. Many projects were halted and numerous investments lost through this inconsistency of policies as well. This inevitably earned the country the unimpressive reputation in a world wide survey by Frost Sullivan - The New York political risk consultancy firm as the 'sixth riskiest nation to invest' in the world because of the high propensity for unstable governments and discontinuity of policies.[89] In essence, even in Africa where Nigeria is expected to command some admirable level of respect, the inconsistency

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[86] The Kuru Special Panel Report, op-cit., p.15.

[87] Interestingly, every military leader in Nigeria always hoped that his regime will be the country's last military experience. General Babangida even stated categorically in a bout of crystal ball gazing that his government will be the last military regime in Nigeria. Three months after his ouster, General Abacha came in to 'make sure that Nigeria develops an enduring democratic option.'

[88] While one must admit other factors were responsible for investors confidence under General Gowon's nine year reign, especially the latter part, the fact that it guaranteed policy stability affected confidence positively.

[89] Reported in The Economist (London), 20 December 1984.

in policies precluded other nations from respecting her views.[90] In cases where there were continuity of policies by successive administrations, the wide fluctuations from government to government dissuaded investors. Hence, to assert that the presence of the armed forces in government encouraged the exit of investors from Nigeria and affected the way outsiders perceived policies is only confirming what the evidence already suggests.[91]

It is in one last respect that the threat Nigerian armed forces posed should be identified and explained. This revolved round the corrective role of the armed forces in government. The armed forces at the outset of any government takeover always displayed a known pretension to some quasi-puritanical obsession with efficiency simply conceived as, for example, punctuality. Summary detention, dismissals and retirements of corrupt officers became the order of the day, to mention a few. This often created the impression of an armed forces willing to protect the interests of the majority. Surprisingly, this sanctimonious attitude hardly generated the seriousness expected of it. Military officers, schooled in the basic principle that force made things work hardly allowed orders given adequate time to be internalised, let alone reacted to by the people. Harassing workers with threats of dismissal or retirement hardly correlates positively with efficiency. It could be argued conversely that it reduced efficiency in some ways. Equally, punctuality to workplaces did not necessarily reflect hardwork or dedication since disingenous workers often used it as a smokescreen. Also, the outward semblance of seriousness reminiscent of every incoming military regime was not often sustained and actually, often become unsustainable.

Following the pretension to efficiency, the military also embarked on

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[90] See next chapter on how this impacted on national security and inter-state disputes. The recent discord [March 1994] along the Nigerian-Cameroon dispute is evidence of how Nigerian leaderships also make use of external disputes to take focus away from internal dimension of threat while concentrating on perceived external threat.

[91] A necessary explanation in this respect is that even companies that had invested in the oil boom era who were reluctant to leave in the wake of unfavourable exchange rate and reduction in repatriation quota found it necessary to either engage in management buy outs by their local managers or non equity links with subsidiaries. At least this guaranteed continuity of sort.

psychological brainwashing of the people with the explicit aim of stamping out corruption.[92] While such measures always appear good at the level of rhetoric, corruption is a societal cankerworm in which the military had become deeply enmeshed.[93] In effect, military intervention can hardly be sustained on grounds of corruption or correcting societal ills. Not only because the institution is a microcosm of the larger society manifesting its ills, but also due to the fact that coup d'etats have occurred for reasons of maintenance of status quo, settlement of personal feuds at officer level or vaulting ambition and not necessarily because of some higher sense to dedication.

As a result of the above, it is difficult to agree with the thesis of the "military as the modernizer" or the political vacuum explanation in so far as evidence in the period of this study suggests. This could probably be traced to the country's level of development but then it hardly explains why the military did not intervene in other countries when at the same level of development. In fairness to the military in Nigeria, if development were to be taken as a simplistic and unsustainable emplacement of infrastructures in a society: modern roads, consumer imports, statistical growth in the economy[94] and a facade of unity in diversity, then the Nigerian experience may have fitted such a stereotypical notion. In the two decades covered in this study however, it failed to erect a resounding structure of the society which still left the country open to threats of dismemberment resulting from their inabilities.[95] In reality, it did not erect any strong structures in the field

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[92] Such policies as **War against Indiscipline(WAI) or National Orientation Movement** are often less than effective as they only serve to expose the high level of corruption amongst military officers.

[93] See Richard Joseph, op-cit., for a concise analysis of corruption in Nigerian politics. For corruption in high places under the military, see Review of African Political Economy, Special Issues on Nigeria, No 13 and 37.

[94] For an interesting viewpoint on the inadequacy of macro-statistical analyses as a measure of development, see Nicole Ball, ' Substituting the Computer for analysis,' in Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World, (London: Adamantine, 1990) pp.123 - 157.

[95] Th threat is now very real. Many ethnic groups are threatening to turn a national conference called to address the problems bedevilling the Nigerian state in

of modern national organisation, in economic development, and indeed in the formation of a durable political system. Although the inability of any military outfit to accomplish the above may not, as Perlmutter reasoned, have stemmed from incompetence as from its inability to 'internalize, improvise, and orchestrate the fundamentals of a modern organisation.'[96] The position seems clear however, that while civilians may have fallen short of any praises, the threats military regimes constituted to the country's security and stability in this period far outweighed its benefits. So undermining has this become to popular democracy and pluralism that what now looks like interim administrations in Nigeria are civilian regimes. The direct result is the constant reference in the media to 'civilian interregnum', a misnomer in every lexicographic sense but correct in Nigeria's political dictionary.[97]

VI. Socio-Cultural and other dimensions of threats.

Here, we discuss other threats that have often been reflected in decision-makers' threat index. In some of these cases a connecting nexus to one or more of the other dimensions already discussed appear to exist. The separate treatment here is in part, a statement on how serious successive governments have treated hese threats.

As revealed in several publications, decision-makers in Nigeria generally perceived a lack of national security consciousness as the most undermining threat in the socio-cultural context. This, in part, has been held responsible in military circles for the constant criticisms and lack of support for the "disproportionately large" defence spending in the country. Also considered relevant in the socio-cultural dimension of threats were factors of divisiveness emanating from ethnic, religious, cultural and parochial rivalry, intolerance and antagonisms; illiteracy,

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April 1994 into the avenue for chanelling demands for disintegration.

[96] Perlmutter, op-cit., p.287.

[97] As the Chambers dictionary puts it, an interregnum is 'the time between the cessation of one and establishment of another government - any breach of continuity in order.' The Nigerian version is used to depict, albeit with a tinge of sarcasm, that the 'breach of continuity' arises when the military is not in government.

ignorance and lack of civic training and promotion of foreign culture by the mass media.[98]

While one could easily agree with 'divisiveness' resulting from ethnic and religious rivalry as already pointed out above as socio-cultural dimensions of threat, it becomes surprising to consider 'lack of national security consciousness' as various governments did as a socio-cultural threat to the country's survival or as any form of threat for that matter.

To the generality, while recognising the importance of defence, it was always construed as acheivable only at the expense of growth, equitable wealth distribution, high level of productivity, high level of literacy, a reliable infrastructural base and an efficient public utilities. As well, spending on defence was seen as constituting a threat to individual life and property and a neglect of the individual security, in itself a perfect recipe for general insecurity. And they are not alone in this view. As a former United States' Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara once argued

> In a modernising society, security means development. Security is not military hardware though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development and without development there can be no security.[99]

Sharing the same view was the independent study on common security, known as **The Palme Report** which defines a secure nation as 'one that is free from both the fact and the threat of military attack and occupation, that preserves the **health and safety of its citizens and generally advances their economic well being.'**

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[98] See for instance, The Kuru Special Panel Report, op-cit., p.15.

[99] Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) cited in Bruce Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa: The Political and Economic Risks of Transfer, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984) pp.3-4.

(emphasis added)[100] As a result of this disconnection over what was considered necessary for national security between the state and its people, the nation became psychologically insecure since the twin values of nationalism and patriotism can not be successfully entrenched in the national psyche. The fact that trade unions in the vanguard of the fight for 'economic well being' of the working class were regarded by government as a threat to internal security did not help the government in the search for stability and security.

Hence, the inability of decision-makers to synthesize into a broader defence planning picture sufficient extra-military threats in turn engendered a lack of commitment among nationals. The resultant socio-psychological disenchantment made the defence planning process a very difficult task since the people it sought to protect had become thoroughly disillusioned and can no longer be relied upon to show a strong collective resolve in the face of any adversity.[101] The crux of the socio-cultural and psychological dimensions of threats to Nigeria's security during this period can be traced to this situation. Not being able to interpret the threat correctly and/or in deliberately underplaying the differences between its primordial and material contexts, decision-makers embarked on supposedly unifying socio-cultural policies aimed at engendering national feeling among the entire populace.[102] If anything, these programmes, good in conception as they were, further alienated the very people they were aimed at without necessarily reducing the perceived

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[100] Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, The Report of the Independent Commission of Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, (London: Pan Books, 1982), p.7.

[101] This was often reflected by a tiny section of the press during Nigeria's campaign against apartheid in South Africa. To this section, what should first be addressed was what they perceived as the 'apartheid' within before any show of strength outside the country. The lack of support for government's proposed action in Bakassi peninsula is also a reflection of their lack of faith in government, not a lack of security consciousness.

[102] Unfortunately, most of these policies like **The National Cultural Policy** and **The National Communication Policy** address the socio-cultural problems at a superficial level, without adequately presenting what is responsible for this lack of fellow feeling. The effort of the Babangida regime in **MAMSER** - Directorate of Social Mobilisation and **DFRRI** - Directorate of Rural Roads and Infrastructures appear too skewed to achieve the desired impact of group mentality in the nation.

socio-cultural threats within.

Conclusion.

The seriousness of internal threats from the preceding analysis cannot be overemphasised, although successive governments - outwardly at least, gave the impression that external threats deserved more attention. As a result, the commitments and obligations placed on the country in terms of continental and regional responsibilities continued to constrain government from pursuing relentlessly the primary responsibility of preventing divisions and disintegration within the country.

The problem, critical as it is, has not been attended to adequately by decisionmakers as they did not seem to agree on which issues deserved more attention. Due to their inability to successfully delineate perceived threats in terms of priority, governments seemed to have embarked on a trial and error approach, taking threats and commitments as they came and reacting to them accordingly. It is this inherent belief in government that more commitments should be added or expected that was reflected in the words of Major General Babangida in 1985 when he said, '...until our **perceived** threats, commitments and obligations are reduced, less defence spending is not foreseeable in the nearest future.'[103]

Whatever informed this conclusion, it is difficult to believe that 'our' commitments to Africa as a whole will continue to grow. It is of course possible at this stage to conjecture the eventual triumph of majority rule in South Africa - a cause Nigeria has vigorously championed -what is not clear is the continental threat that would replace apartheid with which Nigerians would closely identify as a genuine national threat or a vicarious international threat as they unquestionably did with apartheid.[104] Even if one agrees to the essentially correct notion that threats are a dynamic phenomena whose next source may be unpredictable, one might run

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[103] Babangida, op-cit., p.18.

[104] See Baynham, op-cit. Although the country has been at the forefront of many peacekeeping missions, it is difficult to see how the Nigerian public would identify fully or overwhelmingly with any of these missions.

into prioritization problems in any determination of threats where internal cohesion and maintenance of territorial integrity are held in abeyance for the paramountcy of continental threats at all times.

Instead, it would seem appropriate that any irreducible regional commitments should not challenge immediate security needs in decisionmakers' calculations. The situation in the period under study hardly left room for such delineation of interests, in spite of ledership pretensions to a rational defence planning. As discussed in the next chapter, this failure to attach any seriousness to internal threats happened not necessarily because decision makers failed to recognise the importance of internal threats to national security - after all, the only reason the armed forces ever went to war was internal, it would seem more of an in-built defence mechanism in decision-makers' psyche. This tended to reduce internal threats to the level of a dependent variable always fomented by opponents of governments, and not seen as genuine causes of national dissension. This deliberate preference did not only result often in confusion in defence policymaking, but also led to an acute dis-orientation as to the doctrinal strategy to be adopted in combating recognized threats. As a result of this confusion, the issue of "how much is enough" for defence at policy level has continuously provided a source of unending friction among decision-makers, bureaucrats, the intelligentsia and the military.[105] The next chapter explains in greater detail how this affected defence organisation and military strategy. Against this background, the chapter analyses what 'was' and what could have been, based on war experience.

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[105] See J. 'Bayo Adekson's position on what he called the military extractive ratio - "that proportion of national wealth more or less forcibly appropriated to and unproductively utilised by the military members of society at any given time.' in The Proceedings of the Nigerian Political Science Association Conference, 1985 and also reactions from two senior military men - I.B.M. Haruna and I.B.Babangida - who counterargued that 'contractors and rural communities' benefit consequent upon military expenditure. See Babangida, ibid., p.5. Also, see Kayode Fayemi, 'Defence Allocation and the National Economy,' in Guardian Financial Weekly,(Lagos) 11 & 18 January, 1988.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEFENCE ORGANISATION AND MILITARY STRATEGY

1 Introduction.

Having examined the security elites' perception of threats to national security in the preceding chapters, we turn to the structure of the central defence organisation as well as the form and content of the military strategy employed to cope with perceived threats. The chapter rests on the assumption that the perception of threats to Nigeria's security affected security elites' ability to prioritize defence needs along proper doctrinal lines, even though doctrine is of practical value as a military means-end chain of what is to be done and how this should be accomplished in the planning process.[1]

Beyond its military functions, doctrine also serves the key roles of strategic orientation, defence planning and management, rationalisation of existing policies as well as political mobilisation of nationals in support of foreign and defence policies of government.[2] Besides,

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[1] Although this chapter deals entirely with defence organisation and military strategy, doctrine is frequently used in a manner that makes it representative of strategy. Because doctrine is now wider in formulation and content beyond classical Staff Plans or Generals' war orders, our discussion in this chapter centres on bureaucratic politics and military strategy as extensions of doctrine. In the sense that doctrine now derives inputs from a variety of social and intellectual sources and an admixture of military and political concerns, the term 'political-military doctrine' is even deemed more appropriate.

[2] Many writers have examined the extra-military functions of doctrine. Of particular help to this work have been Barry R. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1984), Edward Mead Earle(ed), Makers of Modern Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987) and Frank B. Horton, et al.(eds) Comparative Defence Policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), especially chapters by Arnold Horelick, 'The Study of Comparative Military Doctrine' and Michael Handel, 'Israeli Political Military Doctrine'.

> A major function of doctrine is to devise some measure of priority, usually through some weighted combination of probability and consequences, that can be applied to a multiplicity of threats confronting a state. In its orienting function, the doctrine must answer the question: what is the best we can do with what is available to us? But in its role as a guide to future policy, the doctrine must also address the question : how can we do better, given our potentials, in confronting threats, preserving values and advancing state interests? The tension arises from the gap that is almost certain to exist between "what is" and "what ought to be"[3]

While the security elite in Nigeria were keenly aware of the need to adopt a dynamic concept of doctrine in military planning and thus limit the gap between "what is" and "what ought to be", they were wary of the dynamism of doctrines which failed to rationalise existing force posture or advanced too breathtaking a change. However, the fact that wars and political pressures to innovate have proved to be exceptions especially where doctrine had been responsible for defeat in a recent war or where victory was pyrrhic and not easily sustainable by the existing force posture as in the Nigeria's Civil War, military and political pressures to innovate became overwhelming. The analysis below thus entails a description and discussion of changing phases of post war organisational structure and doctrine, environmental and technological influence on both and an evaluation of the country's overall defence planning process in terms of flexibility, coherence, inter-service coordination, structure and relevance to stated goals.

II Background to Political-Military Doctrine.

Since it has never been explained in elaborately written official papers as is common in the developed world, Nigeria's political-military doctrine could best be understood by tracing the evolution of Nigerian Armed Forces. What emerged finally as the Nigerian Armed Forces in 1963 had a long and chequered history as a product

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[3] Horelick, ibid., p.195.

of British colonialism. It was established as a small constabulary force with the sole aim of consolidating British rule in Nigeria. This, in turn, explains the nature of the armed forces inherited at independence: an army that was solely indoctrinated toward the protection of the coloniser and its interests. Although the new political leadership at independence saw the prestige factor inherent in the notion of a sovereign army, given that the leadership and bureaucratic interests exhibited prolonged indifference to the growth of the organisation, defence policy became a reactive process, guided in its operation by the sudden materialisation of military threats.[4]

While the army continued with the existing force posture of four infantry battalions, one artillery battery, a reconnaissance squadron and a few other complementary elements organised into two brigades of 10,000 men in all, no proper defence planning picture emerged five years after independence, even though the army was already involved in some international peacekeeping assignments.[5] One of the reasons for this absence of planning was that politicians as well as soldiers after independence lost sight of who the 'enemy' actually was as we explained in Chapter one. No less important in this respect was the confusion caused by the *Nigerianisation* policy of the army which resulted in acute disorientation among the fighting men as loyalty became divided along professional and political lines. Again, the fact that the notion of threats to national security, as we explained in chapter two, was not seen in comprehensive enough terms to include internal threats to national stability, the pre-1966 political violence in the country was relegated to the realm of riots and ordinary mob actions with no military lessons learnt as a guide to future defence policy. The result was a country without any codified or properly articulated defence policy outlining broad military objectives as well as identifying internal and external threats.

Yet the political leadership exhibited a false sense of security occasioned partly by its dependence on the supposedly detached British controlled army and an

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[4] This stemmed from the general impression among first republic politicians that military men lacked nationalism, and therefore commitment to the cause of the Nigerian state.

[5] For instance, they were in the United Nations' Peacekeeping Force Contingent to Congo in 1961.

alliance doctrine which provided an all purpose defence picture for the country. Indeed, an Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact was signed at independence as confirmation of this alliance doctrine. Although abrogated in 1962 after fierce protests by university students and opposition politicians, this only removed the legal cloak for the incorporation of Nigeria into Britain's defence orbit, it did not stop the attachment. One way this clearly manifested itself was in the acquisitions policy whereby all military equipment came from a single source - Britain. Another was the near total dependence on the same country for training of military personnel. While the attachment was not unusual between a state and its erstwhile colonial master, the indifference in enhancing national defence in general and doctrinal innovation in particular by the security elite was one thing the country paid dearly for in the civil war years.

Although the civil war years do not come under the focus of this study, it is important to highlight the role played by doctrine (or lack of it) in the war in order to appreciate fully the changes that occurred afterwards which are of prime importance to the study. As stated earlier, the government of Nigeria had no codified military doctrine even though some order of battle/general staff plans possibly put into force under the British existed. While the political objective of the federal government was clear to the average observer at the outset of the civil war - at least, that of holding the nation together at whatever cost, making this possible in a swift manner and with few casualties became a major problem for war planners. The time estimated by the headquarters for the completion was just one month.[6] The fact that the war took two and half years to conclude revealed poor reconciliation between political objectives and the undeclared military doctrine. The failure of military intelligence to make a proper assessment of the strength of the Biafran army (generally underrated) made it imperative for whatever doctrine adopted to run into problems from the outset. Even when intelligence informed the military authorities of impending incursions such as the Benin invasion, the inability of the Federal side to respond adequately not only revealed operational lapses but also doctrinal incoherence. Hence, failures in battlefield objectives lay in an acute misunderstanding

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[6] Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command: A personal account of the Nigerian Civil War (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980), p.15.

of the enemy's character, capabilities and weaknesses. The rigidity of the battle operation orders worsened the situation and left the men on the field severely disoriented, confused and miffed at the planners at the headquarters.[7] While reflecting a grossly uncoordinated grand strategy, this inadequacy was also revealed in four key military areas during the war, namely; the forces' employment policy; weapons acquisition policy, deployment policy and declaratory policy.[8]

On strategies and tactics adopted there appeared to be a broad consensus around a war fought by troops based in the north, and an operation waged in four phases that would result in the capture of four main centres of Biafran rebellion: Enugu, Nsukka, Ogoja and Abakaliki. In consequence of this battle operation plan, One Infantry Brigade based in Kaduna became the First Area Command with four of the six regular battalions under it. At the same time intense mobilisation exercise went on especially among ex-servicemen bringing in about 7,000 fighting men prior to the start of the war, forming another four battalions. Barely a week after the war began the federal troops successfully entered Nsukka. The speed with which this was accomplished obviously gave federal troops hope and belief in the earlier time scale set. But no sooner had they entered Nsukka than they experienced their first shock as the rebels took control of the air using obsolete American B26 bombers.

To worsen the situation their (federal troops) main source of weapons and equipment had began to dry up under pressures mounted on the British government by the powerful media campaign on Biafra's side. This invariably limited the federal side's doctrinal choices. As Michael Handel pointed out, writing about doctrines for small and weak states, 'a small and relatively weak state has to find what weapons are available. Only then can the country formulate its doctrine.'[9] The fact that the

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[7] For two opposing views on this, see Obasanjo, ibid and J.J.Oluleye, Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966 - 79, (Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986) for a war planner's view.

[8] See Stephanie G. Neumann, 'Organising Framework', in Stephanie G.Neumann(ed), Defence Planning in Less Industrialised States, (Mass. and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1984) p.8. where she suggests this approach especially in states where doctrines are not clearly articulated.

[9] Michael Handel, 'Israeli Political-Military Doctrine' in Frank B. Horton, et-al [eds] ibid, p.187.

operation was planned, doctrine designed and battle tactics adopted before solving the key questions of building and acquiring weapons necessary to carry out the desired operation amounted to a poor integration of the political objectives with the military doctrine. A positive side to the absence of a procurement policy however was the desperation to develop the Ordnance Factory into a productive arm of the inactive defence industry. This succeeded in part as the factory actually manufactured small arms and ammunition for the duration of the war.[10]

The Nigerian Armed Forces that fought the war, apart from lacking battlefield experience were also deficient in the required logistics. They were mainly infantry forces with light arms and a few anti-tank weapons. And yet, it went on the offensive with the aim of a rapid victory over an enemy that had the support of certain medium powers in terms of weapons acquisition and mercenaries to operate them.[11] That this happened might have been due to the sabotage of Federal side's procurement plan by its erstwhile western supporters, but also due to disagreement between the Commander in Chief and some of his field commanders on the implementation of war plans. More so, as the field commanders believed they were being deliberately starved of weapons to prosecute the war swiftly. Whereas on his part the Commander-in-Chief believed

> the conduct of war has been guided by our strong desire to quell a rebellion and not to destroy our own people...We are not fighting a non-discriminatory war or total destruction as would have been the case in a total war against an enemy.[12]

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[10] For instance grenades, hollow charged bombs, bullets and guns were made on both sides, while other projects like the Armoured Watercraft Project on the Federal side and the so called "Red Devils" - armoured cars were made on the Biafran side. The end of the war saw an end to most of these initiatives.

[11] Independent sources and the rebel leader made this clear. Even if the rebel leader was given to exaggeration, that he had a sizable amount of weaponry to prosecute the war was not in doubt. See A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966 - 1969., (London: Collins, 1969) p.423.

[12] Daily Sketch,(Ibadan), Yakubu Gowon: Soldier-Statesman, October 19, 1970 cited in J.Isawa Elaigwu, Gowon, (Ibadan: West Books Publishers, 1986), p.113.

This controversy at the commanders' level prolonged the war without necessarily bringing out the humaneness of the Nigerian leadership long sought after in the statement above as many still lost their lives, ironically not through the bullet, but through certain decidedly hostile economic policies taken by the Federal government.[13] Also, the fact that most of the initiatives in the war were from the rebels' side forcing federal troops to go on the defensive revealed a fundamental flaw in doctrine. For example, the hurried creation of the 2nd Infantry Division under Colonel M. Mohammed after the Biafran invasion of 'neutral' Mid-Western Nigeria in August 1967 turned what was originally meant to be a defensive front into an offensive division without the necessary flexibility to cope with the change.

Added to this was the earlier relegation of the other services - the navy and the air force which later proved decisive in the final offensive. The way the navy aided the army in the seaborne operation to capture the Bonny sector of the 'Biafran' territory not only raised the profile of the navy but also enhanced the bargaining position of the Federal government. The capture of Bonny gave the federal troops control of the principal oil fields as well as the main river channel leading to the refinery town - Port Harcourt. Conversely, the capture of Bonny was a sad loss to Biafrans whose main bargaining chip had been the exchange of oil in Bonny for weapons to prosecute the war. As a result of the effective coordination of the navy and the army, the Bonny operation is still regarded as one of the 'most impressive operations' in the entire civil war.[14] At the doctrinal level this was to have a huge impact on the role of the 'other arms' in the post war years.

Another doctrinal malfeasance clearly noticeable occurred in the deployment policy of the federal side. Here again, what one noticed was an uncritical imitation of British military organisation and manpower deployment in war time with little consideration for the field commanders' manoeuvrability or the geographical terrain of the enemy territory. This rigidity in troops' deployment not only emphasised

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[13] Measures like the sudden change of the Nigerian currency caused the Biafran population severe hardship leading to death in many instances.

[14] Interview with Major General Yohanna Kure in Lagos, Nigeria - April 21, 1991. Another operation regarded in like manner was the final offensive by the 3 Marine Commando.

quantity over quality but also impaired initiative and ability to exploit enemy loopholes and react to unfolding circumstances in so far as final objective seemed assured. Indeed, one of the field commanders later wrote of missed opportunities and held federal war planners liable for the delay in war prosecution due to their insistence on maintaining original battle plans.[15] In short, the deployment policy during the war was not guided by strategic objectives but actually succumbed to political machinations. As a result, the hurriedly formed battalions of inadequately trained recruits defied a guiding principle of strategic deployment - that desire to minimize losses and casualties in any possible way.[16] Even amongst officers, coordination was lacking leading to constant argument between middle and higher ranking officers. Favouritism and nepotism also became the order of the day in war camps as officers struggled to keep their wards in safe 'areas' like guard or mess duties. Coupled with this was the total unfamiliarity of the men mainly trained on land with the amphibious terrain in which they found themselves.

Hence while other problems might have been encountered apart from those of acquisition and the uncertainty surrounding the way leadership wanted the war pursued, by far the most undermining problems seemed to have emanated from the employment and deployment policies of the Federal government. Since people fight war and not machines, the war not only taught that military doctrine and political objective of troops deployment must be in agreement if success was to be achieved in future campaigns. The civil war also emphasised the need for a central coordination of defence in future defence calculations. The civil war emphasised the army at the expense of the other services yet the war showed how indispensable the navy would be in the protection of the country's growing offshore oil reserve, a role played effectively after the navy helped dislodge the Biafrans from Bonny. In all, while the Nigerian armed forces achieved the objective of 'quelling a rebellion' it is doubtful if the conduct of the war, especially its trial and error doctrine can be

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[15] See Obasanjo, op-cit., p.103 on the conduct of the final offensive and an account of how headquarters would not approve the plan.

[16] This inadequate consideration led to huge loss of men in the Onitsha sector of the war as they fell easy prey to enemy and friendly fire on the battlefield. See Obasanjo,ibid, p.41.

adopted as a future model.

The fact that forces developed in peacetime anticipation were inadequate in dealing with wartime challenges can only be interpreted as a failure of organisational arrangement and strategy. On the one hand, it maximised the negative consequences of an incoherent, though seemingly defensive doctrine by creating windows of opportunities for surrounding states (especially Cameroon) to engage in piecemeal aggression into Nigerian territory. On the other hand, it proved to be a recipe for organisational inflexibility, individual aggrandizement and extreme conservatism which resulted in needless and avoidable losses of men and resources. As the following examination of doctrinal transition in the period under study shows, while some of the lessons of the war were assimilated and mistakes corrected, the reorganisation that followed seemed to have placed more emphasis on political strategies which failed to integrate fully with doctrinal change.

III. DEFENCE ORGANISATION AND DEFENCE PLANNING, 1970-1990

The Nigerian defence establishment came out of the civil war confused and directionless. Lost in the euphoria of its victory and the immediate pressures of rehabilitation, reconciliation and reconstruction of the political terrain, the security elite abandoned the creeping organisational inertia in which the armed forces became embroiled. The confusion stemmed mainly from the war experience on the use of force, combat operational command, resource allocation and weapon procurement. Despite war time successes, planners were less sanguine to believe the war was won by effective organisation of the military, and honest enough to admit that peacetime deterrence will be harder to achieve if renewed attention was not paid to organisational issues.

Of the many lessons of the war, two seemed to have stuck firmly in the minds of post-war defence planners. One, that future wars could only be fought and won through the combined operations of all services. Thus, a central rather than a separate defence organisation remained the most desirable option. Two, that future wars can only be won if the nation can guarantee a full weapons complement in peacetime and during wars. In order not to repeat past experience, diversification

of suppliers and domestic production became the government's standpoint.

In spite of this recognition, Nigeria's immediate post war defence organisation did not depart markedly from what existed in pre-war circumstances, mainly because the preference for incremental change was overwhelming. Despite General Gowon's personal relationship with the Head of the Navy and Air Force - the smaller services, re-organisation largely reflected the structure by which the war was fought, in which General Gowon combined his office as Head of State with the defence portfolio.[17] As a result, throughout his leadership, despite the semblance of unanimity displayed in the Defence Committee (a moribund body in existence prior to the civil war) and the Supreme Military Council, the services continued to conduct operations on an individual basis.(See Figure 4.1)

As to be expected under such circumstances, a wide gap existed between defence organisation and strategic purpose, in terms of weapon procurement procedures, resource allocation and combat operational command. For example, the excessive concentration of powers in the hands of the Head of State resulted in situations in which procurement approvals were determined by personalities involved and not the sequence of programmes planned. It was easier for the regime's Chief of Air Staff, Brigadier Emmanuel Ikwue for instance to override MoD's procedure on government to government purchase and insist on individual procurement arrangement with the Head of State's approval.[18] The fragmented weapons procurement policy only represented one aspect in the failure to strengthen central defence organisation under General Gowon. Others included mis-allocation of resources, duplication of programmes and, most importantly, determination of national defence needs based on service requirements and service preferences. This loose and fragmented, personality dependent approach left the direction of policy and

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[17] See Oluleye, op-cit.

[18] The fact that the Hercules' transport Planes procurement resulted in one of the most reported arms sales scandal in the country underlines the danger inherent in unchecked concentration of power. See Appendix II for details of the Lockheed Panel's report.

Figure 4.1 Defence Organisation Structure Under the Military (1970- 1979, 1984- 1990)



Source: Ministry of Defence

execution of national goals unclear.[19]

Not only did the succeeding military regime inherit the weakness of the service dependent structure without much hope for central coordination, its successful separation of the office of the defence minister and that of the Head of State early in its life was one in which the incumbent lacked a clear picture of his role and this threatened regime security. The Defence Minister, Brigadier Iliya Bisalla, who had acted as the Chief of Staff[Army] in the Gowon administration regarded his new position as sinecure, moreso as service chiefs had unrestricted access to the Head of State on matters decidedly defence oriented without coming through him. What worsened the unclear reporting lines was the promotion of his successor as Chief of Army Staff, Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma [not only his professional junior, but technically his subordinate in the new MoD structure] to the rank of Lt. General. He found the situation unacceptable and complained to the Head of State and his deputy about it.[20]

The fact that the new Head of State, General Obasanjo decided to combine the defence portfolio with his job as Head of State was partly informed by this development. Unfortunately, it heralded the issue of overly concentrated powers which created problems of its own. First came the renewed ascendancy of the civil bureaucracy in defence policy making, a feature criticised in the Gowon regime.[21] Second was the increased polarisation of the services coupled with the serious

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[19] Thus, burning issues like demobilisation and reorganisation of the war wearied, ill disciplined force was thrown to the backburner whilst the leadership pursued amorphous regional integration arrangements.

[20] See the account of the events as recounted in the Deputy Head of State's memoirs, General [Rtd] Olusegun Obasanjo, Not My Will: An Autobiography of a former Head of State., (Ibadan: University Press Ltd, 1991), pp.22-3. His alleged involvement in the abortive coup against the regime in which the Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed was executed is believed to have been caused by this ill-treatment.

[21] From 1976 - 1979, in the absence of a Minister in the Defence Ministry, the Permanent Secretary, Mr.Festus Adesanoye assumed the role of policy implementer while at the same time instrumental to a lot of initiative and actions pursued during the Obasanjo era. Oddly enough, this was a regime that sacked the 'super-permanent secretaries' of the Gowon administration for amassing too much power to themselves.

downgrading of the formal organisational structure. For a regime that came into government with a seemingly serious agenda for change, innovation was inhibited by organisational inertia of which they were the most relentless critics under the previous administration. Third, the conflict between praetorian instincts and professional goals of military officers occupying political posts became a diffidence generating measure. All these difficulties heightened the need for non-service oriented civilians in the formulation and execution of strategy, force development and weapon procurement procedures.

In recognition of the failure of the regime in combating the inherent prejudices affecting the central organisation of defence and as part of the transition programme for a civilian take-over in 1979, the constitution drafting committee recommended a central coordinating office out of which a defence view was expected to emerge.[22] Although the office of the Chief of Defence Staff was intended as the linchpin for bridging the gap between central organisation and strategic goals/foreign policy direction, by the time it appeared in the 1979 Federal Constitution, the approving military authority, the Supreme Military Council had significantly watered down the coordinating powers vested in the office.[23]

As though this was not enough, while the outgoing military regime chose service chiefs for the civilian regime, it left all decisions about the newly created office of the Chief of Defence Staff for the incoming president to make. Aware of rumblings within the military hierarchy, President Shagari decided to set up a review panel comprising the three service chiefs and the Permanent Secretary, MoD. Expectedly, partisan service interests prevailed over the earlier view proposed by the Constitution Drafting Committee. It was apparent from the review panel's eventual recommendation that they wanted the office created only as a sinecure post, a symbolic gesture but, ' single service orders should be issued on the authority of the

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[22] See The Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee Volume II (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1976), p.230 where the powers of the CDS were highlighted.

[23] Fearful of the likely erosion of their powers, incumbent and prospective service chiefs combined efforts and put paid to the earlier recommendation. See the final outcome in The Federal Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979(Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1979)

individual service chief.'[24] (The structure that emerged is shown in Figure 4.2) Their recommendation was approved by the new President who probably did not want to antagonise the military at a very early stage of his administration.

In effect, when the first Chief of Defence Staff [CDS] was appointed in April 1980, his powers were largely ceremonial.[25] Since execution of policy and financial responsibility remained with service chiefs, as Principal Defence Adviser to The President, the CDS only had control over joint activities such as strategy formulation, research and development, joint intelligence, conduct of military operation, war plan under President's direction, training coordination, presiding over the joint chiefs of Staff meeting and armed forces' resettlement scheme.[26] Despite the various responsibilities listed above, the CDS rarely took the initiative in strategic purpose and standardisation matters. Because of the dual allegiance of the service chiefs, interests were always focused on issues affecting service interests, resource allocation and personnel assignments.[27] The position of the CDS was further weakened by the quality of officers assigned to his office. Naturally, services insisted on keeping their most favoured officers and only released those officers who had fallen out of favour. This did not endear many capable hands to the office as they saw it as punishment ground for unemployable officers lacking promotional prospects.

Even with a civilian Defence Minister, the situation did not improve. Thus, throughout the four years in which civilians were in power, the fact that the Chief

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[24] A Military source. Their report also recommended that the Chief of Defence Staff will be the President's Principal Adviser on defence while the service chiefs maintained direct access to the President and also served on the National Defence Committee and National Security Committee with the Chief of Defence Staff.

[25] Ironically, the first Chief of Defence Staff, Lt.General Alani Akinrinade was at the forefront of the battle against the erosion of service chiefs' powers. Interview with Generals Obasanjo and Bali.

[26] Recommendations for the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, Defence Headquarters, Lagos. April 1980.

[27] See Major Okon Eminue, 'Threat Analysis and the formulation of Defence Policy: The Nigerian Case,' Text of Lecture to the Third Armoured Division Training Week, p.14 in which the ineffectiveness of the joint defence arrangement was decried. The author was a Staff Officer at the Supreme Headquarters at the time.

Figure 4.2 **Defence Organisational Structure during Civilian rule (1979 - 83)**



Source- Ministry of Defence, Lagos, Nigeria

of Defence Staff had no force of arms under him relegated his bargaining power with the politicians who still saw the coercive element as the strongest force the military possessed. In consequence service interests rather than strategic need played the dominant role in shaping programmes and decisions throughout the period.

The subsequent merging of the office of the Defence Minister with that of the Chief of Defence Staff when the military returned in 1984 hardly changed the service bias of the security elite. Even a prominent figure in the administration who had earlier argued that the Defence Minister should be the 'next most powerful and trusted ally of the President', recoiled from this view when made a service chief.[28] Even though more powers were vested in the Minister as a member of the three service boards coupled with his role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these improvements still fell far short of expectations. The occupant failed to become the 'next most powerful and trusted ally' of the President, despite his remarkable bipartisan qualities.[29]

As a result of the largely cosmetic attempts taken on defence organisation, subordinating the service viewpoint became the main problem in the promotion of the defence view. Service interests, service needs and service power have dominated the Nigerian military structure, frustrating all efforts to establish a rational system of strategic planning, force development, resource allocation and collective military coordination.

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[28] The then Brigadier Ibrahim Babangida had argued at a Policy and Strategic Institute seminar in 1980 that the only way to safeguard the central coordinating structure of the military over service parochialism was to appoint as Defence Minister a well respected figure in the services. Ironically, when General Bali was appointed unto the post - he was widely regarded as very suitable because of the respect he commands and his fiercely independent viewpoint.

[29] It has been argued that those qualities were actually the things that put paid to his effectiveness in the office.

IV. DOCTRINAL PHASES IN DEFENCE PLANNING - 1970 - 1990

a) Doctrine in the Immediate Post - War era: 1970 - 1975.

Far from heralding a new nation or army, the end of the civil war in 1970 brought with it attendant security problems that needed immediate but clear cut solutions. Although the war phase was followed by a calmer period intended for rational re-organisation of the fighting force, divisional restructure, demobilisation, refitting or replacement of weapons used in war, assimilation of lessons, and recuperation from war time losses, the desired change in the country's defence arrangement proved to be more difficult and resulted in little change.

As various speeches of the Head of the Federal government espoused, what would appear to be the greatest lesson learned was that friendly nations are as unpredictable as adversaries are implacable. It dawned on the government that Nigeria cannot have a credible security structure on the basis of a country wide security arrangement. It had become obvious that any country operating in a narrow subsystem like Nigeria must devise a region wide strategy that caters to the need of others in the subsystem as a confidence building and security measure. As carefully assimilated as the lesson was, it presented the leadership with a doctrinal paradox.

On the one hand, the national mood encouraged the notion within the military and among doctrine designers especially, that since the next war will be fought in a different way, the experience the recent past taught was that Nigeria cannot afford to have a defensive doctrine that professed benign treatment for an aggressor, hence the implicit call for a doctrine based primarily on an offensive capability. The paradox arose from the position adopted by the second stage of the grand strategy - that of a region wide security insurance aimed at inspiring confidence in neighbouring West Central African states. A balance in the sub regional strategy will obviously mean the adoption of an offensive doctrine may not be entirely appropriate. As it was clear to planners that the more offensive the states' military doctrine is, the 'more nervous everyone else within the system is likely to become.'[30] Especially,

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[30] Barry Posen, op-cit., p.17.

when the country professing the offensive doctrine had the advantage of the necessary elements of power over others within the subsystem. This doctrinal dilemma led to prevarication about the review necessary in the structure of the armed forces after the war.

Apart from the dilemma concerning what military doctrine to adopt, the fact that the logistics of an offensive doctrine is such that might prove more expensive raised the question of how to cope with an offensive doctrine's attendant requirements in an insolvent economy and made it unattractive to many. While it is arguable whether a defensive or deterrent doctrine is cheaper to run than an offensive doctrine, it is fair to say that an offensive doctrine may have resulted in large cuts in the army's infantry personnel, huge increases in the air force and the armour component of the army and a large fleet because of Nigeria's long coastline, thus provoking an arms race in the region. Again, because these were all capital intensive projects, the political and economic repercussions for a country just coming out of war remained incalculable. More importantly, it was thought that this may preclude her from achieving the region wide posture that was so important to the country's leadership then. At the time also was a strong lobby against an offensive doctrine within and outside the military who believed in the maintenance of status quo and actually argued for a doctrine based on the encirclement strategy of the 3 Marine Commando used to end the civil war. While this final onslaught(the encirclement strategy) had the precision of a Staff college guidebook to it, it was based more on an offensive capacity than a defensive one.

The interest of the proponents of this view would seem to have stemmed from the threat of demobilisation facing the men who came out of the war. The problem seemed to have been compounded mainly by the size of the force that came out of the war. With over 200,000 soldiers after the war, a **2,000%** increase from its pre-war size of 10,000 men, the economy in spite of the oil fortunes found it difficult to cope with a personnel bill of 90% of the total defence budget. In spite of the evidence against continued maintenance of such a large force and despite defence headquarters' claim of re-organisation 'to facilitate a good administrative and effective control and command', its effort, if any met with ineffective control and command. As was to be expected, the military had grown into a large bureaucracy, moreso since

it was now in control of political power, making the process of change painfully slow as many officers had vested interests in the maintenance of status quo and thus prevented the leadership from embarking on any demobilisation exercise till the end of the regime.[31]

Indeed, what emerged after the war was the same divisional structure that concluded it. Also, the divisions maintained the same areas of operation except that their headquarters changed, but then, only temporarily. The post war arrangement had: 1st Infantry Division with headquarters in Enugu(capital of the defunct Biafran republic); 2nd Infantry Division had its headquarters at Benin (later moved to Ibadan); 3rd Infantry Division was situated at Port Harcourt in the riverine area of South Eastern Nigeria, and finally, the Lagos Garrison Organisation which was meant to protect the nation's seat of power.

But just as the issue of demobilisation was left unattended by the Gowon administration despite the intense debate it engendered, the question of a proper doctrinal perspective was no less so. While it is difficult to conclude that the singleminded determination with which the regime pursued the regional security issue under an economic umbrella and the subsequent formation of the regional body - Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) may not have been unconnected with the internal neglect of the security question and the direction defence should take, nothing in the Gowon administration directly proved to the contrary. It could even be argued that some actions taken by the administration pointed to an unspoken compromise between the defence of the state and that of the realm, reducing doctrinal position to a merely reactive process - a dependent variable as it had happened before the war without enhancing the country's deterrent capability in order to quicken the pace as well as reduce the cost of any future war. In all, the government would appear to have shuttled gingerly between a defensive

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[31] For instance, some soldiers killed in war were still left on the payroll with senior officers collecting their salaries. The fear was also rife that demobilisation might evoke mutiny or coup d'etat on the part of those affected. General Gowon was believed to have taken the latter view seriously. See Lindsay Barret, Danjuma: The Making of a General, (Enugu: Fourth Dimensions, 1979) p.72.

doctrine and diplomatic compromise.[32]

Apart from the undecided problem of demobilisation, which no doubt left the nation's defence directionless at the stage, with morale sagging and command structure uncoordinated, in no other place was this doctrinal confusion highlighted than in the different services' posture to the country's defence, a factor which affected a cost-benefit assessment of their various arsenals as well as current procurement and deployment policies. Just as the army which constituted the bulk of the defence forces found itself in a dilemma over what to emphasise (after a war in which its large infantry force had not automatically offered a cheap or rapid victory,) between artillery improvements and armour innovation on the one hand, and on the other hand land forces who continuously disparage the importance of airborne, amphibious and underwater capabilities despite difficulties encountered in riverine operations during the war.[33]

In the smaller services - air force and the navy - which distinguished themselves in the war, it would appear that what decision makers concerned themselves with was image creation and not effectiveness.[34] As one observer of this development rightly concluded

> ...while the Navy was being ushered into the missile age through the procurement of a variety of sophisticated equipment - landing crafts, corvettes,

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[32] The most discussed in this catalogue of compromises was General Gowon's Maroua agreement with President Amadou Ahidjo of Cameroon leading to the cession of some territories along the Bakassi peninsula. Gowon's successors later refused to ratify the agreement, one reason why the area remains a veritable source of friction to date. See Obasanjo, Not My Will, pp.126-7, for details on the government's refusal to ratify the above agreement.

[33] Although there existed a marine commando during the war, it would appear that the division functioned more on land than in any seaborne operation.

[34] The Navy that came out of the civil war with a total strength of about 3,000 men and only three major ships - the frigate **Obuma**, two MK3 Corvettes and 3 seaward patrol craft ordered immediately 9 new missile armed capital ships, two tanks landing ships and also had in its procurement plans, purchase of 2 Mine Counter Measure Vessels(now procured). These did not include in-shore and off-shore patrol craft. It also established an air-wing later. See Table 6.4.

> frigates, missile systems e.t.c - and while it was attempting to demonstrate its 'blue water' capabilities by flag cruises all over the world some senior naval officers were deploring the neglect of coastguard responsibilities...a neglect which posed a serious threat to the protection of those offshore resources on which the country depended.[35]

Although it would seem coastguard responsibilities in a cost-benefit analysis was a better doctrinal option for a navy that has a navigable coastline of about 400 nautical miles to protect, an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles which contains at least 80% of Nigeria's main export earner - oil, as well as other economic resources like fish and shrimps daily open to threats by poachers, the navy relegated the coastguard duties because the government's regional inclination was seen to be better projected by acquisitive propensities for a large fleet navy.

What bothered the air force at the stage and which its officers bitterly opposed was the navy's attempt to establish pre-eminence in the immediate post-war period. It was assumed that since the air force grew out of the army, it should be qualified for a closer rapport to the army offering its air land battle doctrine a pride of place in the expected reorganisation and planning. On the contrary, it could be argued that this proved to be a disadvantage as some of the army officers drafted to start the air force still retained a strong attachment to the army in a way that never really promoted the independence or close coordination with the army, at least not at the initial stage.[36]

All this hampered the necessary development of the defence sector, precluding a proper force balance because of the prevarication of the Yakubu Gowon's administration on many issues germane to the growth of the organisation. However,

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[35] F.A.Adisa, 'Defence Planning and the Policy Process in Nigeria: In search of a Strategic Doctrine,' paper delivered at the National Workshop on Perspective Planning, Lagos, October 17-19, 1988,p.8.

[36] One must agree that Rear Admiral Akinwale Wey's closeness to the Head of State may have been exploited during and after the war, not only as Chief of Naval Staff but as Gowon's best known confidant. The naval forces' performance in the war cannot be discounted.

while the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime that succeeded Gowon was more assertive in its declaration on the doctrinal question, whether this matched eventual policy positions was debatable especially if its foreign and defence policies are juxtaposed against the quest for national and regional security.

b). Offensive Doctrine: 1975 - 1980.

The Mohammed/Obasanjo regime seized power in July 1975. The period they were in government also roughly coincided with the country's Third National Development Plan period (1975-1980). For a regime that assumed government with the notion of a corrective administration the impression that it will undo some, if not all of the existing policies was created in the minds of many Nigerians. Subsequent policy options indeed, showed how corrective the administration was.[37] In the defence, security and foreign policy sectors the regime for the first time shifted from the erstwhile system of determining what national objectives are at the whim of the current leader by commissioning a committee of experts to fashion out what became Nigeria's national interests and objectives.[38] Having set the basis for national policies, especially in its external relations, which has now been broadened to embrace continental security, its 'Africa as the centre piece' of Nigeria's foreign policy gave the impression of a country ready to go to any length in its defence of Africa's interest. Its aggressive posture in many cases of self determination in Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique and Zimbabwe brought this point nearer home. At home, the fact that many Nigerians, especially the intelligentsia supported the

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[37] Since an assessment of the regime's performance is not of interest to us here except as it affected doctrine and defence planning, suffice it to say that the consensus in Nigeria is that the regime radicalised the structures of government more than any other the country has had. See for instance, O.Oyediran,(ed) Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-79,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, for NIIA, 1979)

[38] See Report of the Committee on the Review of Nigeria's Foreign Policy, including Economic and Technical Cooperation, under the Chairmanship of Professor A.A.Adedeji (Lagos: Government Printer,1976). See Chapter One for a verbatim citation of the reports' recommendation.

regime in an unprecedented fashion strengthened its offensive resolve.[39]

To match the foreign policy options embarked upon, the regime was aware the armed forces' readiness was highly suspect at a time a strong debate ensued on whether to send forces to Angola and other trouble spots at the time. Although the government kept the existing decision-making structure in place with the Supreme Military Council taking overall decisions and service chiefs responsible for the three arms, having direct access to the Head of State. At the same time, a very senior officer was made the Minister of Defence, Brigadier I.B.Bisalla. Demobilisation, terribly neglected by the previous government became high on the regime's agenda and the leadership pursued it relentlessly.[40] Although this among other things was to cost the government the loss of its leader, the fact that demobilisation continued after this showed the level of focus and direction in government.[41] Having embarked on demobilisation, since the declaratory stance of the regime bordered on the offensive, attempts were made to change the infantry status of the army, for instance, to mechanised and motorised divisions. Earlier the regime had carried out a revision of the Third Development Plan done by its predecessor and the outcome left no one in doubt as to where emphasis lay. For example, with the new government came the introduction of heavy armour to an army hitherto dominated by artillery and infantrymen. For the first time, the country had in its five - year plan acquisition of

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[39] Neighbours hitherto pampered by General Gowon were left in no doubt that henceforth, Nigeria would dictate the tone of their relations. As a result, the headquarters of the regional body - ECOWAS shifted base from Lome to Lagos and the government refused to ratify a border agreement signed by the previous regime with Cameroon. On the liberation front, the regime spent about £50 million on Angola alone and the country was co-opted into the League of Frontline States hitherto restricted to countries geographically located in the Southern African region. See Obasanjo, Not My Will, op-cit., Appendix.

[40] By the time the regime relinquished power to the civilians in late 1979, the size of the army had been reduced by about 100,000 men.

[41] This was perhaps made possible by other senior officers, especially the new Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo and the Chief of Army Staff, General T.Y.Danjuma whose commitment dated back to the immediate post-war era. In fact, the demobilisation motion was moved by the latter in the 1972 Army's conference and they both served in the demobilisation committee set up by General Gowon. See Barret, op-cit., p.72.

main battle tanks.[42] The fact that these two major projects did not feature in the original development could be seen as a reflection of the change in policy direction. In the Air Force, emphasis shifted to the acquisition of fighter planes basically for interdiction.[43] This is not surprising if one considers that the sphere of concentration and threat perception had also shifted from regional to continental. Also, because of the continental power status the regime had projected, plans were made to improve the reach of the air force and the fighting arm of the navy. Considerable emphasis was placed on the acquisition of warships and landing crafts which resulted in an equally improved funding.[44]

In the defence inter-service projects, training, cohesion and defence production became the key issues the administration emphasised. The conviction amongst decision makers was that there 'were too few properly trained officers on the ground especially in relationship to the size of the army,'[45] thus, apart from improving the status of the premier officer training institution,[46] another inter-service middle officer training institution was set up, not only to broaden the knowledge of officers, but to reduce the number of those going on overseas training. On cohesion, by the time the regime took over power, it had become apparent that discipline was severely lacking in the army mainly because the usual channels of communication were not properly maintained. Soldiers were still living among civilians as existing barracks were not enough and much pressure was put on civil-military relations. In order to project the continental power posture the regime desired, a proper regimental system lost to the

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[42] N72 million was allocated for this project and the regime took delivery of 64 T.55 main battle tanks just before leaving office in 1979. See Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan 1975 - 1980 Revised Volume II, (Lagos: Central Planning Office, n.d.) p.455. In the same plan about N60 million was earmarked for missile with some SAMs and Roland Missile delivered in 1980.

[43] This acquisition of fighter, trainer and transport planes alone was to cost the country about N547 million in the revised plan.

[44] ibid., pp.459 - 460. An earlier budget of N100 million was increased to N300 million in the Revised Estimates for a 'number of warships and ancillary crafts.'

[45] Barrett, op-cit. p.71

[46] Revised Estimates, op-cit., p.454.

civil war had become inevitable. And this can hardly be achieved by an armed forces whose men were scattered all over the country. Hence, it is to the regime's credit that by the time it handed over power in 1979, many barracks had been completed for forcemen to move into.[47]

Again because the regime had adopted a totally uncompromising attitude to the western world, especially America on the question of Angola's independence and other liberation issues, the lesson the civil war taught on continuous dependence on foreign weapons was instructive. The regime was also aware that the soured relations with the West when placed in context with the unease of some satellite states in the sub-region could have a negative impact on its doctrinal stance. To the Head of State in particular, one important measure of power projection was for the state to design its desired doctrine and then build and acquire weapons suited for its implementation. A situation that limited choice by total dependence on foreign sources for all procurement was seen to be dangerous. In consequence, N10 million already allocated for the Defence Industries Corporation by the erstwhile Gowon's administration was increased to N100 million in the revised Development Plan for

> ...the manufacture of rifles and heavy weapons at the Federal Ordnance factory, Kaduna and establishment of factories for manufacture of explosives, tentage, uniforms, boots and heavy calibre ammunition.[48]

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[47] To show their understanding of the need for operational contact, shared experience and even common items of uniforms in order to improve cohesion, command and control, an earlier sum of N65 million earmarked for barracks accommodation was increased by the regime to #480 million for the five - year period. Same increases were made for the navy and air force. See ibid., p.454. According to Lt.General Akinrinade, Chief of Defence Staff in the succeeding administration, 75% of defence capital expenditure was spent on barracks construction during the period. See Interview with Lt General Akinrinade, Sunday Punch,(Lagos) 11 October 1981.

[48] The government signed an agreement with Steyr of Austria for the construction of an assembly plant in Bauchi to build armoured personnel carriers(APCs) and transport trucks. At the same time, contracts for hangers for the air force, the Wilmot point Naval dockyard and the army mechanisation project were speeded up. See ibid., pp.458-462.

In connecting the varying threads of their actions in defence planning and relating them to government's declarations in the international arena, the regime's position on a number of issues became easily discernible. Interestingly though decision-makers never gave a clear cut or codified doctrinal strategy. It remained largely undeclared as an offensive doctrine, but in many official speeches policy direction was often made clear. As the army chief, Lt. General Theophilus Danjuma clarified in one of the more picturesque descriptions of their policy

> while some countries had insecurity thrust upon them, and some are responsible for their own insecurity, Nigeria, like Israel is a creature of insecurity, hence the country cannot be complacent in the maintenance of its territorial integrity...This is what is responsible for what some have wrongly referred to as the radical streak of this regime...Unless and until we have men of standing who can perceive the limits of stresses(sic) this country can accommodate at the time of strife, and take appropriate measures to arrest them Nigeria shall continue to be a high risk country of questionable international standing.[49]

While the General's position may be a little exaggerated in its comparison of Nigeria's security position to Israel's, as a reinforcement of the precarious position of Nigeria's defence and the regime's stance on defence planning, it served the purpose intended. In all, since no formal codification of doctrine existed and this appeared to be a deliberate act we can only deduce from such declarations by the security elite with actions related to the employment of military forces, a connection which would redoubtedly reflect the period as one devoted to an offensive doctrine. By the time they left government in 1979, the process of transforming the infantry divisions to mechanised formations was in progress and the profile of the armoured corps had been raised tremendously, alongside those of existing 'arms' like the artillery and signal corps.

Their offensive doctrine had not only provided a clear policy guideline but

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[49] Lt. General T.Y. Danjuma, Keynote Address on Defence to Participants, delivered at the Nigeria Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies. 14 January 1980.

also given decision-makers a logical sequence to the employment, deployment and acquisition policies for the military organisation. It also helped in enhancing a common sense of values which helped mobilisation of popular consensus in support of the state's defence and foreign policies. Even at that stage one thing the regime failed to achieve was an effective inter-service coordination as the three services still acted independently of one another. This remained an enduring problem for a regime that had shown so much sense of purpose and direction.

Whether these strides were further enhanced by the incoming civilian administration would depend largely on its retention of previous leadership's belief systems, especially its continental and regional proclivities.

c) Return of the Civilians: An era of doctrinal inconsistency.

After thirteen years of military administration a civilian democracy returned to Nigeria on 1 October 1979 and the civilians were in government till December 31, 1983. The period heralded a different defence planning structure which, for the first time placed all services under a single Chief of Defence Staff who also doubled as the Principal Adviser to the President on defence through the Defence Minister. One of the key advantages of this development was thought to be the standardisation it would bring to employment, deployment and acquisition policies in the entire armed forces. The lesson of the previous years had been that services embarked on different, often conflicting and sometimes duplicating programmes leading to excessive waste. Inter-service coordination was also thought to be the key to enhancing the doctrinal position of defence in line with governmental objectives and national interests. Even though the constitution stipulated this, in the absence of any defence policy by the incoming government, 'the army and other services were obliged to function within the framework of the defence policy left by the military administration...'[50]

As a result the civilian administration continued with the continental

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[50] General M.I.Wushishi, 'The Nigerian Army - Growth and Development of Combat Readiness,' in T.A. Imobighe(ed) Nigerian Defence and Security: Issues and Options for Policy, (Kuru, Jos: NIPSS & Macmillan, 1987), p.55.

programme of the erstwhile regime with little or no modification, although the rhetoric had become less fierce and anti-west. On the doctrinal question, the government essentially reverted to the days of reactive doctrinal postures. While most security problems the regime experienced were within predictable range and manageable limit, when they occurred the administration' reactions were neither planned nor within the ambits of any articulated doctrinal process. The relatively high incidence of threats to the country's territorial integrity and the eventual (mis)management of the threats during the period made the point glaring. In particular, the handling of the Chadian threat following its purported merger with Libya (permanently seen in Nigeria as a threat) and the Cameroonian border incident of May 1981 heralded this pattern of doctrinal uncertainty.[51] The difficulty on decision-makers' part to differentiate between the policy of 'good neighbourliness' and that of 'mutual reciprocity' stood at the head of the confusion. The fact that one of the army commanders saw it as a personal responsibility to engage in a minor war with Nigeria's north eastern neighbour - Chad, in 1983 without clearance from the President or the National Assembly showed the depth of dithering and loss of control by decision-makers.[52]

The interesting dimension to all these problems was the impression given by government that it could not have had more than a reactive policy because of inadequate defence capability. This was inconsistent with the regional power rhetoric that dominated the regime's search for grandeur and prestige all over Africa. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the Chad and Cameroonian incidents which the government clearly mismanaged, huge funds were allocated to the defence sector

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[51] Discussions during my field work with some officers involved in the Cameroonian crisis revealed that it took the armed forces seven days to muster enough men to remedy the situation. This runs counter to the position that President Shagari did not want to go to war. Indeed, it would seem the President was made inactive by his service chiefs who cannot guarantee readiness on their troops' part. This is not to say he did not prefer diplomacy. This also reduces the strength of the argument that Nigeria failed to act because Cameroon acted as a proxy of France.

[52] The Commander of the 3 Armoured Division in Jos, Major General Buhari marched onto Kinasara island near Lake Chad and dislodged the Chadians in an action which earned him disfavour in government. See The Guardian (Lagos), October 23, 1984.

in 1981, but this was not within any realistic parameters of threats the country faced and how it intended dealing with them - issues at the very heart of doctrine.[53] As a result defence spending under the administration lacked a proper rationale and reflected no cost-benefit approach. The final effect was the low level of complementarity between foreign and defence policies, the consequence of which was a doctrinal standpoint dictated by occasional exigencies and prestige considerations rather than requirements of long term survival in the country's strategic environment.[54]

d). Doctrine under the New Military: The Buhari and Babangida era

Considering the pressures on the Nigerian economy by the time the military came back in December 1983, defence and its central organisation did not feature much on the initial agenda, neither was it encouraged in the accompanying public debate. Understandably, the concentration was on the profligacy that characterised the civilian era. Hence, the initial preoccupation of the regime was to 'solve the grave political and economic problems created by the past civilian administration'.[55] A striking feature of the regime, however, lay in its claim to being an offshoot of the 'radical and aggressive' Generals Mohammed/Obasanjo post - civil war era. This, to observers had a clear implication for doctrinal direction that must be taken seriously since the current leaders were also junior participants in the previous government. Reduced to its military aims, it evidently meant the regime intended to pursue an

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[53] The defence and security sector got a N4 billion allocation in the Fourth National Development Plan, 1981 - 1985 rationalised on the basis of "recent and anticipated world events forcing Nigeria to reassess its security and defence **preparedness.**"(Emphasis added) See West Africa (London), 15 January, 1981. Ironically, this followed the Libya/Chad merger plan announced the previous week.

[54] The debate on Nigeria's nuclear option typifies the preference for the prestige factor rather than the need basis in defence policy. The prestige component in defence policy is elaborately treated in O.S.Kamanu, 'Nigeria: Reflections on Defence Posture for the 1980s,' GeneveAfrique, Vol.XIV, No.1, 1977/78, p.35.

[55] JODD(New York), Journal of Defence and Diplomacy, Interview with Major General Buhari, April 1984, p.13.

offensive doctrine especially when one is reminded of the recent role played by its Head of government in warding off Chadian incursionists.[56] Since offensive doctrines are often seen to encourage huge defence spending generally, this perception of the regime was largely construed as a contradiction. This particularly became irreconcilable in an assessment of a regime that had come to power on the basis of improving a devastated economy. What soon became apparent however, was the fact that while they shared some of the fundamental ideas of the Mohammed/Obasanjo years like its 'Africa as a centrepiece' policy as well as the clear sense of direction in defence, the new leadership injected a higher level of intellectual sophistication into policy formulation in defence planning. This helped the regime in recognising the limits of aspirations and levels of realism in policy making. One thing the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime did not quite succeed at. While making their policy of mutual reciprocity in dealing with other governments very clear, the regime also adopted other approaches to solving recurrent problems with neighbouring states. Foremost in their achievement in this area was the alliance doctrine approach [adopted] which resulted in the Quadripartite Agreement signed with three of Nigeria's neighbours.[57] Far from the previous regimes' reticence in declaring what their doctrinal position was, barely four months after coming to government, the nation's Defence Minister, Major General Domkat Bali declared their doctrinal position as one of **"deterrence through active defence."**[68] (emphasis in original). Indeed, to him

> An effective defence system is one that is capable of preventing a war by deterring a potential adversary from venturing an attack. This is what building an

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[56] See note 52 above.

[57] See Ibrahim Gambari, Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1989) for a full text of the agreement signed between Nigeria, Ghana, Togo and Benin republics. The author served in the regime as foreign minister.

[58] Major General D.Y.Bali, 'Nigeria's Defence Policy - A Special briefing, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 30 April 1984, pp.5 - 6.

effective deterrent system is about.[59]

By the time the regime settled down, for the first time the task of fine tuning the country's defence policy and its doctrine became one for serious intellectual concern both in central government and at the various service levels. However, while the position of the central organisation of defence remained one of 'deterrence through defence', at the service level the articulation of doctrine seemed more clearly codified as well as deliberately aggressive. This aggression seemed to counsel concentration on the sub-region in the wake of diminishing challenges on the liberation front. For instance, the Training and Doctrine Command of the army (TRADOC - a think tank created in 1981 under the civilians) adopted the 'responsive - offensive doctrine' on the basis of which a new army order of battle which emphasised 'mobility and firepower rather than numerical strength' emerged.[60] The eventual expectations according to the Defence Minister 'are that over 60% of the force to be mechanised/armoured and over 15% amphibious/ airborne/ airportable.'[61] Even though the regime maintained the divisional structure left by the civilians, the change in arms complement was meant to emphasise direction of policy and doctrinal strategy even if this gave a picture of a double edged sword.[62] At the same time the navy and air force were evolving their own doctrines and projecting them in a way

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[59] He elaborated in a recent interview with this writer that the intention was not to create a complacent doctrine but one flexible enough to accommodate offence as well as defence depending on the situation. Interview with Lt. General D.Y.Bali (Rtd) in Jos, Nigeria. 5 May, 1991.

[60] See summary of proceedings at the TRADOC Conference in Minna, Nigeria, May 1984.

[61] Major General D.Y.Bali, 'A New Nigerian Army,' Being text of Lecture delivered at N.I.I.A. August 26, 1986, p.5.

[62] ibid., p.6. The present employment structure has two mechanised divisions, one armoured and one composite division. While central policy still talks of deterrence, this hardly disturbs an army whose aim is to ' enhance fighting potential and killing probability,' ibid., p.7.

they had never done before.[63] Inevitably, they were also caught in the web of confusion over what to emphasise between defence and offence, especially when it might conflict with the conventional posture of government.[64] The confusion, however, remained despite attempts to coordinate individual service efforts.

From technical and procurement viewpoints, it stands to reason to describe as offensive in doctrine an armed forces that emphasised mechanised armour over anti-tank capability, mobility and firepower over numerical strength, strike capability over air defence, sea lift capability and a power projecting fleet over coastguard duties. While this is not to suggest that attempts at incorporating these other elements were necessarily absent in the Nigerian armed forces, where emphasis lay was not in doubt.

Perhaps for reasons of political exigencies, most regimes in Nigeria within the scope of this study found it more appropriate to let the country's defence capability speak for their preferred doctrinal option instead of having them presented in clearly codified formats. In the few cases where this happened, it was not uncommon for policy makers to espouse the exact opposite of what was previously outlined. Again, while doctrine is reflective of the threat levels in every country, and since the threats faced by any country are not static, the discontinuity of policies under various

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[63] See for instance, Vice Admiral P.S.Koshoni,'The Role of the Nigerian Navy in the National Defence Policy,' An address presented at the 1988-89 Induction Ceremony of the Rotary Club of Agege, July 1988, p.6. for an elaboration on the navy's **Trident Doctrine** and Air Vice Marshal G.O.Osho,'Organisations, Roles and Capabilities of the Nigerian Air Force,' An unpublished paper. The author was the Air Officer Commanding Operations at the Air Force Headquarters.

[64] For instance in the heat of the debate, the Navy's spokesman, Captain O.Oladimeji put their position thus

> ...there is nothing in this strategy (Trident doctrine) to suggest that the Navy ignores the need for joint operations with the other services...and not that it overlooks the place of comprehensive military strategy. All the navy has done is to take advantage of its dominant position in maritime affairs to make a bottom up input into national defence policy.

For details, see O.Oladimeji, 'Modern Concepts of Sea Power', NAVTRAC Seminar, 3 - 5 May 1988, pp.17-18.

governments heightened the level of doctrinal inconsistency. This, in turn, precluded any long range planning process necessary for the maintenance of a doctrine amenable to change without compromising overall objective. The extent to which these factors acted in concert and the constraints and incentives - that impacted on military doctrine form the basis of our examination in the next section.

V. ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON MILITARY DOCTRINE

While the preponderance of strong offensive elements in Nigeria's military doctrine was not in doubt in the period under study, one would be making a grave error to automatically conclude therefrom that the direction of military machinery or indeed, the country's grand strategy in peacetime or war was wholly offensive. It remains one of the curious paradoxes of the country's strategy that Nigeria remained a *status quo* state during this period, always ready to withstand an adversarial incursion, thereby highlighting the lesser defensive elements in her doctrine for the greater part of the period under study. The Nigerian armed forces exhibited a propensity for high level preparation in terms of material but low risk ventures, in order to decrease the probability of failure, or for policies that entail rapid expenditure in order to justify future expenditure. This, of itself may not be a failure of policy but a reflection of the constraints and incentives present in the formulation of policies. One feature that remained consistent with every government as a result was the conventional equivalent of a 'no first use' policy since, as various leaders claimed, Nigeria had no expansionist tendencies. In turn, this non-expansionist tendency placed considerable strain on decision making and government's obvious preference for diplomatic solutions was often taken advantage of in the knowledge that her military reaction process, if any, would be late in coming.[65]

In spite of the above, it would seem Nigeria's decision makers were aware that the realities of national politics, geography and economics as well as the

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[65] It is not unreasonable to contend that Nigeria's eastern neighbour, Cameroon exhibited this tendency a lot since she appeared to feel there was no designated response to incursions in Nigeria, while it quickly blamed attacks on 'overzealous gendarmes' anytime Nigeria's reaction appeared to fall out of prediction.

country's position within the international political system were such that articulation of a single doctrine whether in its offence, defence or deterrence form was unlikely, if not, undesirable. It would prove inadequate and totally irreconcilable to the country's regional and continental proclivities. Indeed, the pressures of the continental environment in which the armed forces operated provided the security elite with further incentives to justify whatever increase it sought even if the defence sector was least interested in external involvement beyond well publicised peace keeping roles.

Yet a closer examination of Nigeria's defence policy during the period showed an unusual preference for deterrence. Interestingly, the deterrence encouraged was not one that sought to raise an adversary's risks and costs in war regardless of Nigeria's own, but one that stressed denial instead of punishment. Even in situations where the provocation was so intense, there seemed to exist an innate tendency within the Nigerian armed forces, perhaps as a result of exposure to the good things of life to play down the punitive aspects of military operations.[66] Because of determination to avoid defeat operations were often cast in terms of dissuasion rather than retaliation. This was responsible for the constant effort at manipulating military capability to discourage aggression or incursions rather than anticipate and curb it.[67] It could well be argued that what this policy achieved was the opportunity created for external aggression with no adequate coordinated response.

Quite apart from the organisational uncertainty to encourage offence as well as defence wholly, other factors seemed to have played their parts. For instance, even if the Nigerian armed forces was keen on adopting an offensive or defensive doctrine, the task of covering an extensive land and coastal borders of 3,650

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[66] One interesting point in this respect was the drastic fall in the number of applicants into the nation's cadet training institution this year following Nigeria's involvement in Liberia where soldiers died. The sudden realisation that the military (often regarded as 'where to be' by the Nigerian youth because of its prestige factor) could also be a veritable source of 'quick' death may not have been unconnected to the reduction. I am grateful to Professor Sam Ukpabi, Academic Provost of the Nigerian Defence Academy for this point.

[67] The whole idea of staging national parades and air shows and inviting neighbouring countries representatives would appear to be intimidatory with the carefully chosen array of Nigeria's "killing capability".

kilometres[68], seemed a daunting one for the most coordinated defence structure for it to be credible. This leads us not only to the constraining influence of geography on doctrine, but also at the organisational level, to the pressures of inter-service disunity on doctrine.

Due to the parochialism that existed in the different services, the result of which was the fashioning of different doctrines, it became rather difficult for a group of services with individual belief systems and adequate autonomy to construct a unified doctrine consistent with the overall grand strategy. In their different forms, the services were quick to point out they were serving the interest of overall policy, but it soon became clear they were actually protecting various niches already carved for their organisations.

A good example in this respect was the way the air force protested the creation of a composite division in the army comprising of airborne and air portable units while at the same time opposing, implicitly though, an independent naval arm. On the surface, the NAF leadership saw in these various attempts unnecessary duplication of a role that falls within its énclave. A much deeper concern though would seem to have been the sudden erosion of its exclusive hold on air power.[69] Conversely, because of the preference in the army for deterrence or what was called 'responsive offensive' doctrine, the decision by the civilian regime to procure a squadron of fighter bombers - the Jaguars in 1982 was implicitly opposed. As far as the army was concerned, priorities in the air force should be on air defence and perhaps tactical bombing coupled with air support for ground troops, not strategic countercity bombing. These organisational differences did not appear to have swayed the civilian decision makers, despite the clout the army was known to wield at the time. The fact that some air force officers did not support the purchase did not help

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[68] 710 kilometres in the west, 1,400 kilometres in the north, 1,680 kilometres in the east, and 860 kilometres ' coastal belt stretch along the Atlantic ocean in the south. The north eastern border also includes a marine border of about 98 kilometres in the Lake Chad region.

[69] The politics of who gets what and why is treated extensively in the chapter six.

their case either.[70] Again, while procurement inertia can be buttressed by legitimate military caution in the face of putative advantage from an unproven alternative, an underlying factor that worried the army leadership was the pride of place being offered the air force in terms of weapon procurement in the capital estimates for defence.[71] Significantly, the unintended consequence of this was not lost on the army.[72]

Since military organisations are hierarchical in nature and automatically restrict the flow of influence from lower to upper echelons, and since among the three services the army was always regarded as being at the top; those at the top of the army hierarchy, who have achieved their rank through the old order and doctrine definitely had no interest in negotiating their controlling influence into obsolescence by embracing a new doctrine.[73]

By far the most undermining structural problem stemmed from the inability of the political leadership to come to terms with the reality that Nigeria's military and economic powers were not equal to the political goals set throughout the period under study. In fact, the military and economic potentials appeared to be at variance with these goals. Although the coalition diplomacy pursued by the leadership in the period was, perhaps, part of a concerted effort to reduce the pressures on the economy, the

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[70] What seem to have influenced the civilian decision-makers more was the palpably threatening continental and regional situations. Since the decision followed the Libyan threat of 'swallowing' Chad, Cameroon's piecemeal aggression and the increasingly offensive South African threat, to them these threats were not likely to be solved by an infantry 'no matter how mechanised' but a credible well equipped air force that could reach into enemy territory. See Posen, op-cit., p.57.

[71] Although in real terms the army still got more in the 1981-1985 National allocation with its N1.38 billion on capital expenditure, the fact that the air force got N930 million for its small force gave no comfort to the army. For details, see Federal Government of Nigeria, Revenue, Recurrent and Capital Estimates 1982, (Lagos: Government Printer, 1982), pp.682-684.

[72] Interestingly, some army officers saw the abortive air force dominated coup in 1986 as part of these unintended consequences of raising the profile of an alternative service over the army in Nigeria. See Kayode Fayemi, " The C-130 Crash: A disaster waiting to happen" Nigeria Now, Vol.1, No 7, September 1992.

[73] Posen, op-cit., p.224.

sub-regional expectation and the constraining influence of size made mutually extended deterrence as a feasible doctrinal strategy difficult and rendered coalition diplomacy one-sided. For a country that aimed at providing a continental umbrella, this, in a sense, made the strong dissuasive component of military doctrine impracticable since regional power projection inevitably required regional power procurement.[74]

Added to the above structural factors were the geographical and technological influence on military doctrine at the strategic level. Of particular concern to this study is the impact of geography and technology on the strength of the force, employment and deployment of men, choice of weapons for the armed forces and method of procurement in the armed services.

Geography

That geographical factors helped in shaping the evolution of Nigeria's military doctrine in its doctrinal phases is one fact that is not likely to face much contention. But how? One of the foremost geographical lessons of the civil war was the limits of infantry in effectively coping with defence of Nigeria, given the need for mobility and the pressures on the resources the country has for defence. Thus, geography enhanced the level of the country's relative powerlessness in providing total defence and in the same vein encouraged the country to a more amenable formula for dissuasion. Nigeria's size in relation to others in the sub-region, essentially the product of its geography confined her to an association with neighbours that are not only smaller but also depended on her as defender of their interests. In effect, this predispositional propensity for a subregional role stripped her of an outright offensive or defensive role and confined her to a deterrent one. Perhaps this explains in a way why the country was always slow to anger in her relationship with neighbours even

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[74] See Major General I.B.Babangida, 'Defence Policy within the framework of National Planning,' Lecture delivered in the Gold Medal Public Lecture Series, Lagos, 1 March 1985. The author was the Chief of Army Staff at the time and currently Nigeria's President.

when clearly provoked. Indeed, the responsibilities that came with being the 'giant of the subregion' tended to obviate raw military power in deference to coalition diplomacy.

Another area in which geography influenced doctrine was in the struggle towards effective balance of forces, though organisational inertia and the limits of resources identified above seemed to have reduced what would have emerged as a major influence of geography. Just like the sea advantage provided by the English channel increased naval influence in Britain's overall defence strategy, the relatively good performance of the young Nigerian navy in the civil war, especially in sea blockade excited decision-makers about the need for an effective doctrinal strategy hitherto confined to the area of doctrinal neglect. The fact also dawned on the government that since the bulk of the country's wealth was offshore, there was no other force with as much capability as the navy to handle offshore security. This led to the enhanced role for the navy after the war with the acquisition of frigates as well as minesweepers and extension of the eastern naval command. The needs of geography, however, transcended enhancement of naval role in the country's defence strategy. In order not to be outdone, other services sought ways by which they could overcome geographical predilections. For the army, this did not only lead to the notion of creating a rapid deployment force (RDF),

> a strong, combat ready organ capable of reacting with speed and accuracy, and effective firepower to any military threat or whenever the need arises, and flexible enough to adjust swiftly to the numerous challenging circumstances of defence.[75]

Also developed within this context was the need for specially trained paratroopers and divers responsible for air-borne and amphibious operations. This led to the creation of the composite division in 1980 charged with these extra complements. In spite of the positive impact of geography on doctrine in so far as

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[75] Major General David M.Jemibewon, 'The Nigerian Army in Perspectives' in Tekena Tamuno, The Civil War Years: Nigerian National History Project, Vol.VII, (Zaria: 1984) p.95.

it kept the servicemen thinking about loopholes to plug and a defence strategy to adopt, there was a sense in which geography also encouraged complacency and perhaps, helplessness in Nigeria's military strategy. The idea of providing effective defence as argued earlier proved an uphill task for an armed forces whose readiness was suspect, especially in an area of operation that was unwieldy, let alone the notion of serving as the regional policeman.[76] This inevitably encouraged the idea of trading space for time, a strategy that often proved costlier than expected as piecemeal incursions became commonplace. Since such incursions by their very nature thrive on a strategy of surprise, attacks occurred in small defenceless places with built-in quick withdrawal before reinforcement comes. This resulted in an uncoordinated reaction as the armed forces confronted the confusion of deterrence or defence once again.[77]

Technology

In the strategic sense, technology seems to have impacted more on Nigeria's defence planning than geography. The country's experience in this respect was remarkable as war planners learnt in a bitter way the limits of arms supply dependence on a single nation.[78] Although Nigeria surmounted the problems of

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[76] See note 68 above. As General Obasanjo told a Press Conference towards the end of his regime, '...while we ourselves do not consider it necessary or desirable for any African country to turn itself into the **continent's watchdog** we remain convinced of the efficacy of continental collective security under the OAU umbrella.' See West Africa,(London) 30 April 1979. For a government that had earlier projected the image of a continental watchdog in its early days, this turn around remained instructive.

[77] Although sector type allocation of troops has now replaced the earlier uncoordinated approach, one still discovers that areas of responsibilities are too broad, consequently units are not only cumbersome and unwieldy, the approach delimits specialisation of troops in specific locations. As M.I.Wushishi puts it, '...this indeed, results in doctrinal stagnation... as there exists lack of effective machinery for self evaluation.' See M.I.Wushishi, op-cit., p.69.

[78] Martin Edmonds, 'Civil War and Arms Sales: The Nigerian - Biafran War and Other cases,' in R.D.S. Higham (ed), Civil Wars of the Twentieth Century (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1972) pp.203 - 216.

weapon procurement by diversifying into the Eastern bloc, by buying "off the shelf" and by producing small arms, the problem of technological deficiency and its impact on military strategy remained insuperable for the rest of the period under study.

Firstly, the plurality of suppliers brought with it myriad of problems as procurement officers repeatedly failed to give adequate consideration to the country's technological base. For instance, while the country always aimed at purchasing state of the art weaponry in the seventies and eighties, as one officer who had been involved in the procurement process pointed out, 'the operational experience of the country's armed forces and the latter's technical ability to use, maintain, improve, or modify the design of such equipment, was not taken into consideration.'[79] The result in most cases was that the multi-million pounds procurement amounted to a colossal waste as equipment became quickly unserviceable due to lack of storage facilities or multi purpose workshops for repairs. In its extreme, some of the purchases failed to function properly because of climactic differences.[80]

Besides, the proliferation and duplication that resulted from this multiple purchase of weapons brought out the dangers of inadequate technology on doctrine even more, as standardisation and coordination among various services could hardly be effected.[81] Of course, the diversification afforded the country freedom for

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[79] Major General George Innih, 'Nigerian Army: Procurement Process,' in T.A.Imobighe (ed), ibid., p.39. The officer was at a time Quarter-Master General and Chief Procurement Officer in the Nigerian Army.

[80] At a time, the Nigerian Army possessed no hard standing tools and lifting equipment to effect repairs on the heavy duty equipments like battle tanks and artillery guns. Also, lack of storage facilities was responsible for the exposure of the Roland missiles at the mercy of severe heat somewhere in the northern part of the country. I owe this information to the men of the Army's Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Corps and thank Lt.General Bali for confirming it in an interview in Jos. May 5, 1991.

[81] A typical example was how the air force procured self propelled anti-aircraft guns that was at the time being phased out in the army's artillery corps for lack of central coordination. In like manner many common items were procured from different countries at different times and at various prices, not only losing rebates associated with bulk purchases, but also increasing the cost of spares and maintenance due to proliferation. See the next chapter for the economic implications of this.

manoeuvre in its relationship with suppliers. At the same time and at a more dangerous level, the obvious lack of procurement policy did not only encourage an arms bazaar of sort with foreign salesmen swarming the country for a piece of the petr-dollar, it also created a needless competition among the services with each trying to equip its arsenal with the most sophisticated equipment irrespective of relevance to the country's defence objectives.[82] Indeed, the proliferation got so complicated at a stage when the Nigerian Army alone had in its inventory 82 different weapons system ranging from tanks to artillery guns, and 194 assorted ammunition of 62 different makes from 14 countries. At the same time, the air force had planes from Czechoslovakia, France/Germany, Britain, Italy, United States and Soviet Union. The heterogeneity of the stock inevitably created a problem for doctrine, since the size of the replacement inventories can only be more accurately calculated when there is much use of fewer types of equipment, rather than small use of many different ones. Also, the less heterogeneous the equipment, the more economical the training of repairmen and pilots was and the greater the likelihood that they will learn enough to do their work more efficiently.

By far the most damaging consequence of inadequate technology or borrowed technology had been the stunted growth of the country's defence industrial capability. Although the Defence Industries Corporation was set up in 1964, its performance to date had been less than impressive and this can be traced, partly to the preference for outside technology. In consequence, the inability to have a definitive and codified doctrine cannot be extricated from the proliferation of weapons from outside as successive governments lacked control over production, specification and sometimes even, delivery. Another dangerous point in this respect arose from the fact that Nigeria cannot restrict any supplier from selling to an adversary similar weapon she [Nigeria] procured. Not only did this happen during the war as General Obasanjo

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[82] The navy's purchase of two landing crafts, "NNS Ambe" and "NNS Offiom" for amphibious operations at a time the army brigade supposed to use it was not even formed shows the race for sophistication and prestige over need and relevance. It must be added, however,that the decision to procure the landing crafts was reactive and forced on the navy. It followed the inability of the Nigerian Navy to evacuate repatriated Nigerian labourers from the Island of Fernando Po in 1977. Examples abound in other services too, not least, the air force's Jaguar jets procurement.

pointed out[83], it remained a key feature of procurement in the post-civil war era regardless of attempts to stop it.[84] The inability to restrict or modify weapons procured to one's own exclusive use not only placed the country's defence in a precarious position but also called for a constant back up in alternative weaponry which took little account of cost effectiveness.

The technological pressures on Nigeria's defence planning revealed on the one hand, how difficult it was for the armed forces to freely pursue economies of scale in a region wide defence arrangement, and on the other hand exposed how technology can be subverted in enhancing battle preparedness. In effect, it provided evidence on how military expenditure failed to serve the functions of perceived threats. In the light of the various challenges and constraints identified above, whether strategy succeeded in helping to shape defence policy and in bringing into sharp focus defence objectives in the period under study is the concern of the final section of this chapter.

VI. EFFECTS OF DOCTRINE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING

While opinions differ as to what strategy has become in defence policy making, to reduce the efficacy of strategy to the success or failure in war seems less persuasive.[85] Yet the notion that any assessment of the qualities of Nigeria's defence establishment "without the after sight of actual combat engagements is an exercise in speculation" has gained some recognition in current literature.[86] Even though Bassey concedes that "case evaluation reports of recent large scale annual exercises...as well as peace keeping duties in Chad and Liberia...permit the creation

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[83] Obasanjo, My Command, op-cit, p.154. The fact that Cameroon possesses Alpha jets bought by Nigeria in eighties is worthy of note here.

[84] Obasanjo, interview, March 18 1991.

[85] Wars have not always been won by the strongest or the best equipped. At least that is one lesson learnt by war planners from the early days of the Peleponessian war.

[86] Celestine O. Bassey, 'Defence Planning and the Nigerian Armed Forces Modernization Process(1970 -1991): An Institutional Analysis, Armed Forces & Society, Vol19, No.2, Winter 1993, p.265.

of instructive situations and serve as a good basis for investigating current questions...", he downplays the critical importance of such insights because "the effectiveness of operational training, as well as the level of combat, might depend, inescapably, on the nature and quality of the instrument."

With no evidence to show what the outcome of any examination of the above parameters reveal about the state of defence planning and effectiveness of strategy, Bassey goes on to state unequivocally that they all "suggest a high degree of combat coordination and mastery of fundamental operational art and tactics." Yet available evidence, as shown below, all point to the contrary. While absence of war may make any attempt to measure effectiveness *a-priori* as Bassey argues, it might have been due to a conscious accession to adversarial requirements or as a function of effective deterrence without punishment. Evaluation of strategy has thus become an empirically subjective exercise open to alternative interpretations. However, if there is some agreement that planning remains at the heart of the defence establishment' effectiveness, empirical evidence available leads one to conclude that a non-speculative assessment can be possible. In essence, we are faced with an assessment of strategy based on the strength of its flexibility, coherence, inter-service coordination, structure and most importantly, relevance to state goals in its coercive or deterrent dimensions.

To assess relevance to state goals, we will need to know the essential planks on which Nigeria's national goals were based during this period. While emphasis did shift from one government to the other, one is inclined to agree with Lt.General Wushishi's position on the guidelines that have always played a part in Nigeria's search for national security and, in effect, on its doctrinal strategy. In his list are the following:

> a) The weakness and poverty of our neighbours expose them to French manipulations. Our defence policy must ensure that French machinations in Africa generally and the West African sub region in particular are curtailed.
>
> b) The defence policy must ensure that our neighbours are not destabilized - if need be Nigeria must have the means to guarantee stability within the subregion.

> c) It must also ensure that the military and economic strength of South Africa are defeated anywhere in Africa. This should constitute the maximum objective of policy.
>
> d) The minimum objectives of the policy must guarantee South Africa does not defeat Nigeria in the event of conflict anywhere in Africa.
>
> e) Complete protection of Nigeria from internal enemies.[87]

To achieve all of the above with any degree of success, defence planners in the country required a recognition of the complex inter-relatedness of technology, strategy and economy in defence planning as explained above. The Nigerian experience would appear not to lend itself to this rule of interdependent relationship. The lessons of the civil war that long term planning in a situation where security objectives are clearly identified and the most efficient weapons systems sought ultimately makes better sense seemed so ephemeral. As Charles Hitch and Roland McKean[88] tried to explain,

> strategies are ways of using budgets or resources to achieve military objectives. Technology defines possible strategies. The economic problem is to choose that strategy, including equipment and everything else necessary to implement it...which is most efficient and also the most economical.

Hence, the flexibility required of a doctrine that intended to take care of such continental objectives and at the same time offer 'complete protection from internal

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[87] M.I.Wushishi, op-cit., p.56. Of interest also is Joseph Wayas, Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa,(London: Macmillan, 1979) where the need for a strong continental leadership is also stressed.

[88] Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defence in the Nuclear Age, (London/Cambridge: Oxford University Press/Harvard University Press, 1960)p.55

enemies' was lacking in Nigeria's defence planning throughout the period. Instead at a time when military objectives can be categorised as internal, sub-regional and continental, there was an underlying assumption that higher military expenditure and increased weapons procurement lead to enhanced security. To state planners, it would appear that Nigeria's military muscle was more a status symbol, a prestige factor which did not take into account territorial integrity and national survival more than it did institutional and regime survival, regional manipulation and continental control. This was reflected in the refusal to prioritize what was considered to be a more pressing threat between the liberation crisis in the Southern African region and the country's sub-regional concerns. This curious understanding of the requirements of strategy in defence planning led to high level disagreement among key players in the post-civil war administration, especially in the role assigned to military strategy in coping with perceived internal security threats especially on account of .the institutional fragility of the Nigerian state and the intertwined problems of class, ethnicity and religion which have proved less amenable to any resolution by the leadership. Unfortunately, leadership's inability to resolve these contradictions will continue to have undermining implications for military strategy in so far as it creates an undermining crisis of confidence in government itself and exposes citizens to manipulation by external forces.

Because the armed forces always found it suitable to raise the spectre of external threat at the expense of internal insecurity since this promoted rewards for members of the organisation by justifying constant increase in military spending, internal threats have thus remained constant. As we queried in earlier sections of this study, how can the military combat insecurity at home when the institution constituted a level in the threat index of national security? How then can an organisation continuously afraid of its own shadows aim at 'securing the country against internal enemies?' In short, who guards the guardians? This institutional crisis was at the centre of defence planning confusion and remained a key reason why those constitutionally vested with the control of internal security - the police - have always found it difficult to cope, either on account of deliberate underfunding, manipulation or relegation.

Even as a measure of combat development and command structure, the

country's force posture in terms of divisional arrangement or troops deployment had not always been planned with a view to maximising the influence of geography. Neither did they reflect any clear direction in military strategy. Also, the fact that the government has been inflexible in balancing its procurement policy among its defence, offence and deterrent objectives punctures the confidence reposed in the military by the populace. In effect, what emerged in the place of an agreed military strategy was a decidedly uncertain policy, the net effect of which was the over-estimation of enemy capability. While this served the expedient purpose of justifying all manner of procurement and the influx of numerous kinds of weapon systems - most of which were more significant in their strategic irrelevance, it also contributed to the neglect of what has become the most undermining of all threats - internal dissension.

VII CONCLUSION

This chapter was premised on the assumption that threat perception affected security elites' prioritization of defence needs along proper doctrinal lines. The discussion centred on bureaucratic politics and military strategy as extensions of doctrine.

Three levels of identifiable threats to national security are deducible from the security elite's perception, for doctrine to prioritize. These can be categorised into continental, sub-regional and internal threats. At the continental level, the security elite always believed in a leading role for Nigeria in any form of continental security scenario that emerged in Africa. This was to be pursued primarily through the fight against centuries of colonialism, slavery and apartheid. Over the period of analysis, this translated into an irreducible commitment in the eradication of the South African threat. But to guarantee, as a minimum objective that 'South Africa does not defeat Nigeria in the event of conflict anywhere in Africa', as the defence policy objectives assert, seems a statement on defence' proclivity towards an offensive military doctrine. Yet the reduced circumstances of the Nigerian economy made this a less feasible option. Throughout, the forces developed in anticipation never quite matched the challenges of the leadership's continental agenda. Faced with the non-

actualisation of an offensive doctrine, this continental threat was reduced to an area of doctrinal neglect with a more feasible replacement in active diplomacy.[89]

Although the ruling elite maintained the forceful declaratory rhetoric, that military muscle played a significant functional role appeared doubtful. More so, when the gap between the image of reality projected in such declaratory stance and the opponent's perception of it was too great. While doctrine lacked credibility in this regard, it succeeded in some cases in its placatory and intimidatory role, especially among neighbours. Even here, not all neighbours believed the show of strength often put up at military parades.

It is safe therefore to contend that decision makers neglected the difference between what was feasible and what was desirable in the integration of political goals and military means, at least on the continental level. It is arguable that this was a conscious doctrinal neglect since the withdrawal from continental power broking became an inconceivable option for the leadership that saw in this a means of escaping more sensitive internal matters. Besides, as the most populous African state, the Nigerian leadership saw the need to consistently lead African nations against the moral and political repugnance apartheid South Africa represented. Yet, the absence of military capacity to control or substantially influence change ensured that the military option was never raised to any level of seriousness. More importantly, the paradoxical fear of defeat and war also reduced the primacy of the military option. Surprisingly, the fear of loss of prestige and privileges following from military ill-preparedness was enough dis-incentive to any military option the few times the subject was broached.

Following from the above, the reality of the Nigerian situation was one of a regional power in reduced circumstances whose irreducible commitments to continental leadership would appear better served by shuttle diplomacy. Since deterrent doctrine offered the most minimal opportunity for the military organisation in terms of war logistics, the deterrent elements of military strategy became

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[89] In this latter respect, Nigeria succeeded in weilding the oil-weapon much more effectively as an instrument of foreign policy. See Akanmu Adebayo, 'Oil and Nigeria's Relations with the Great Powers: The limits of oil diplomacy,' in Olajide Aluko (ed) Africa and the Great Powers in the 1980s (London & New York: University Press of America, 1987) pp.77 - 98.

preponderant and successive regimes depended more on political will than on military capability in creating credible scenarios. This became even more visible in governments' reaction to sub-regional threat levels in the period under study.

Following the civil war experience in which many neighbours were manipulated into becoming stageposts for subverting Nigeria's sovereignty, it dawned on the ruling elite that West-Central Africa should be the sphere of concern and influence for Nigeria. Although Nigerian government pioneered the effort towards a sub-regional economic community, the policy failed to press on this advantage in the defence sector. Instead of government efforts in the economic sphere ramifying into the security sector, what seemed to have happened was the limitation in the use of military capacity in the face of intense provocation. Having created a false sense of security, complacency developed and upholding the minimum defence of territorial integrity became difficult in the face of overstated generosity and what came to be known colloquially as big-brother diplomacy. Doctrinal strategy, even as a reactive force became only a process of deterrence without punishment. In short, the period was one in which doctrine played an insignificant role except in situations where the military authorities took independent action as shown by the 3rd Armoured Division repulsion of Chadian incursion in 1983 depicted .

While it is a sensible policy to lure vulnerable but recalcitrant neighbours into Nigeria's circle of friends, distribution of economic carrots has not always resulted in the best confidence building measure. Indeed, the Nigerian experience would appear to counsel the use of carrot and stick diplomacy. The fact that some of Nigeria's neighbours had other sources of economic support aside from her and still impute expansionist motives to her actions made a policy of permanent economic palliative unworkable. Repeated tests of her military capability (often heard, but rarely seen except in military parades) by her South eastern neighbour - Cameroon - seemed to show that the military display of strength had not been effective. To this particular neighbour, Nigeria's military muscle is regarded as a status symbol, a prestige factor which does not take into account territorial integrity and national

survival more than it does regional manipulation and continental control.[90]

Again, because decision makers failed to prioritize what was considered to be a more pressing threat between the liberation crisis in the Southern African region and the sub-regional concerns of the country, opportunities were missed and direction of policy lost. In consequence, neighbours refused to accept that Nigeria's interest in the region was at par with the apartheid question whose spectre was often raised by successive leadership.

In its internal dimension, doctrine remained rigid and incoherent in its reaction. At the normative level, it would seem that the problems of insecurity within cannot be resolved fully until the inherent contradictions are fully attended to. And these are problems whose solutions lie in political and socio-economic actions, not military strategy. The inability to resolve them will however, continue to have implications for military strategy. This has manifested itself in two key fronts -first, by creating a crisis of confidence in government and second, by increasing the possibility of externally inspired or controlled subversion.

In all, military strategy in its doctrinal functions can only be said to have performed less effectively as a guide to present or future policy. Placed within its financial context, the next chapter reinforces the hypothesis of a defence organisation driven by prestige and not rationally ordered organisational choices.

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[90] In the latest of such skirmishes - February, 1994, this partly explains Cameroon's disregard for the asymmetry in conventional capability. A more popular, but not necessarily more plausible interpretation of Cameroon's latest intransigence is that she acts in proxy for France's interests. At least, this is what the Nigerian leadership believes.

Part Two:
Security and Economy

A State level Analysis

In the last section of this study, we examined the middle ground in which internal political pressures and external dimensions of threats mutually interacted in the defence planning process in Nigeria. It will not be wrong to assume that any analysis of Nigeria's defence planning process will be incomplete without a detailed examination of the relationship between the defence sector and the national economy as well as the linkages between military expenditure, strategy, and technology.

As the preceding analysis shows, on the one hand, the Nigerian security elite expressed the belief that defence spending should result from potential threats to national security and within the context of available resources; on the other hand, they realised that proof of danger can only be established *ex-post facto*, hence the need to prepare adequately for unforeseen contingencies. This inevitably resulted in a paradoxical tension between defence needs and economic means too.

Given the relative paucity of longitudinal analyses of military expenditure within the context of defence planning in the third world, and in order to test adequately our hypothesized linkage between military expenditure, the efficacy of the defence sector and national economy, a secondary objective of this study is to examine the implications of military expenditure on resource availability, budgetary behaviour, defence preparedness, military-led industrialisation and manpower effectiveness. This section of the study seeks to address this objective through a critical examination of the civil war's impact on post war security spending, the influence of security spending on civil sector funding over the period of analysis and by providing a detailed analysis of security sector spending as a function of the perceived threats examined in the preceding section.

Two main strands have emerged from studies of military expenditure in the third world - with both seeking to establish either a manichean divide between economic growth and military expenditure or an inextricable link between military

expenditure and technological developement.[1] Without seeking to dismiss conclusions reached in these studies, the evidence that an increase in defence spending had occurred at the expense of socio-economic development or that military expenditure had encouraged technological development, and thus economic growth, remains very patchy. Indeed, this thesis is difficult to sustain empirically and analytically in the case of Nigeria over the period of this study. As a result, we seek to hypothesize another assumption underlying this study - that the manichean divide often attributed to military expenditure, in the sense of a zero-sum game is non - existent; that political leaders can and do pursue "guns" and "butter" objectives and that the exponential rise in military expenditure will not necessarilly lead to technological development, economic growth or, for that matter, military preparedness. In short, that in a country like Nigeria, where the military has held political office for a considerable length of time, defence spending does develop a life of its own, mixed in its overall impact, autonomous of national spending, but benefiting more from any unforeseen increase in national wealth.

However, to understand the inter-connetions in the above stated assumptions and provide an adequate state-level analysis of military expenditure as well as its impact on the defence planning process, it is also important to explain what constitutes military expenditure within the context of this study. Military expenditure in its elementary form refers to money allocated and spent on the military sector in whatever form necessary from the overall gross domestic product [GDP] towards the enhancement of national security. Beyond the realm of this basic definition, considerable uncertainties are brought into sharper focus by the

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[1] For example, see Emile Benoit, Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Boston: D.C.Heath, 1973); Gavin Kennedy, Defence Economics, (London: Duckworth, 1983), P.C.Fredricksen and Robert Looney, 'Defence Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,' Armed Forces and Society 9 (Summer 1983), pp.633-45; Saadet Deger and Somnath Sen, 'Military Expenditure, Spin Off and Economic Development', Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 13, 1983 all of which argue that defence expenditure may produce higher rate of economic growth. For contrasting viewpoints, see Nicole Ball, 'Defence and Development: A Critique of the Benoit Study,' Economic Development and Cultural Change 31, April 1983, pp.507-24 and R.D.McKinlay, Third World Military Expenditure, (London:Pinter, 1989).

absence of unanimity as to what *should* constitute military expenditure by the major assessors of such spending in the world.[2]

To IISS, what constitutes military expenditure is strictly annual fiscal policy statements in terms of budgetary allocations. SIPRI and ACDA go further by corroborating such declared statements of intent with international spending assessments by institutions like International Monetary Fund or United States' Agency for Industrial Development[USAID] or individuals like arms merchants, ex-military officers and journalists, outside of governments. As a result, SIPRI and ACDA statistics have proved more reliable, even if grossly inadequate because of the large room that still exists for confusion or deliberate distortion through 'double keeping, use of extra budgetary accounts, highly aggregated budget categories, military assistance and governmental manipulation of foreign exchange.'[3] Even a United Nation's attempt to compile a comprehensive statistical compendium of military expenditure failed to reduce this spectre of uncertainty. Despite this, our situation is a lot less complicated because this is not intended as a comparative study of military expenditure in the third world.[4] Hence, within the context of a case study, we take military expenditure as the totality of declared and undeclared statements of fiscal policy concerning the country's security.

Conceived as an issue area analysis, standardized empirical corroboration may be hard to come by through the use of locally sourced figures. Yet our

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[2] These are the International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS], which measures military expenditure in a country wide analysis published annually as Military Balance, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] which publishes a comprehensive compendium called World Armaments and Disarmaments Yearbook, and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] which also publishes annually, the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers [WMEAT].

[3] Nicole Ball, Third World Security Expenditure: A Statistical Compendium,(Stockholm: Swedish National Defence Research Institute, 1983),pp.15-19.

[4] This has been the subject of several inquiries. For an example of such studies with a wholly African focus, see O.B.C.Nwolise, Factors explaining High Defence Expenditure in Africa, 1967-1977. Unpublished P.hd Thesis, University of Ibadan, 1987, in which the author undertakes a comparative analysis of African states.

contention in this study is that certain inaccuracies fostered in cross-national studies have occurred from the use of international assessments that are, in themselves, not immune from governmental manipulation. While they offer the detachment and value-neutral knowledge expected of scientific objectivity, this veil obscures the inevitable link between inside knowledge and the quest for objectivity. In consequence, save for years when local figures of countervailing persuasion are absent, IISS, ACDA and SIPRI statistics are sparingly used in this study. This is not to diminish the usefulness of such painstakingly gathered statistics to a work of this nature. It is just to ensure a balance from both sets of figures and not fall victim of *status quo* bias.

CHAPTER FIVE

BUDGETS IN THE DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS

1. Introduction

Since defence planning in the strategic realm followed a trial and error pattern as discussed in the last chapter, the conflict between defence allocation and social welfare expenditure on the one hand, and the intra-defence sector resource struggle on the other hand provided a subject for endless debate in the academia, the media and among defence sector workers in the period under study. But then, it may be difficult to judge *a-priori* the utilisation of defence expenditure because of the complexities surrounding security issues as already highlighted. Hence this chapter seeks to examine primarily, efforts made to integrate strategy and budgetary decisions in the defence planning process, as well as the attendant successes and constraints that attended this in the period under study. The chapter is premised on three key assumptions that: (1)cessation of conflicts and economic recession do not necessarily substantially affect national security spending; that, (2) reduced military expenditure do not automatically lead to increased civil sector spending, and (3) that military budgets are more a function of prestige, than product of regional and international pressures or a function of planned response to immediate or enduring threats to national security.

Conventional wisdom portrays military expenditure as the result of the nature of perceived threats, a response to the state of the economy and a product of the effectiveness of the decision making structure. It is also often assumed in security and nation-building literature that the level of military spending is dependent on the level of government expenditure in other areas of national spending. Several cross-national studies on the subject of military expenditure have tended to confirm this zero sum

outcome.[1] As will be shown in this chapter, the Nigerian experience appear to indicate a rather subtle, and, in certain areas, entirely non-existent relationship between the former and the latter.

Hence, this chapter advances the preceding analysis by asking four specifically economic related questions in order to determine the extent to which the Nigerian situation reflected this generalisation in military expenditure literature. First, to what extent do conflict resolution and economic recession (resource availability) affect national security spending? Second, is the relatively high level of military expenditure in Nigeria in this period a function of prestige or of perceived threats?; Third, will reduced expenditure on the armed forces automatically result in increased social welfare spending? and, finally, is the budgetary decision making structure a carefully codified, all inclusive variable as it is often made out.? The intention is to locate budgetary management within the context of the overall defence planning process; to show, if any, an appreciation of the essential budgetary functions of planning, management and control through an examination of estimates, appropriation and eventual expenditure in the defence sector and how these related to declared national objectives.[2] As indicated in the introduction to this study, it was the absence of an in-depth approach relating actions to consequences in defence sector policy analysis which remained at the centre of the confusion surrounding defence budgets discourse.

In the light of this background, this chapter examines the bureaucratic underpinnings of defence budgets; defence budgets as an indicator of resource availability; defence spending versus social welfare spending and concludes with an assessment of cost effectiveness in defence budgeting in the period under study. It is

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[1] Many comparative studies into military expenditure in the third world already reflect this position, albeit with varying degree of emphasis. See for example, D.K.Whynes, The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure (London: Macmillan, 1979) and Saadet Deger and Robert West, Defence, Security and Development, (London: Pinter, 1987). Others are, however, careful in emphasising this zero-sum assumption, especially in developing countries where defence spending is often related to the need to use military force in keeping the ruling elite in power as well as to deter possible aggression.

[2] As a result, 'how much is enough' though embedded in the discussion seemed to us not as important as an examination of how allocations are utilised in meeting national security objectives.

hoped that the chapter will provide a basic premise upon which a more sector specific appraisal of military expenditure can be conducted in the following chapter.

II. Defence budgets' bureaucratic processes

Security studies literature have assumed the link between recurrent expenditure of security and prior spending in the third world.[3] Yet it is not true that the greatest determinant of current year's spending in the budget making process is often last year's spending in states where the information gathering process has been inadequate to generate information about last year's expenditure, and can only provide last year's estimate. This seems to be the case in Nigeria where the outcome is a standardized and incremental budget - a reflexive annual ritual incapable of attending to the security and strategic needs of the state. As a result, defence budget planners, in the period under study, were usually at a loss as to how to make budgets serve the objectives of state policy. Instead, they simply reverted to previous budgets as their best guides since they remain oblivious of the security objectives for the plan period. As a participant observer of the Nigerian system noted, defence budgets were mostly about, 'keeping to the ceilings of expenditure, rather than effectiveness and efficiency of that same expenditure. This retards progress due to lack of performance appraisal parameters'[4] But then, this only points to a self equilibrating mechanism in the bureaucratic network as responsible for policy, without providing an adequate explanation of the defence budget policy process itself. As Robert McKinlay rightly notes in his critique of defence budgetary process generally,

> 'the high correlations of one year's expenditure level to the next we take to be clear confirmation only of a descriptive prediction...First, it would seem to us erroneous to pretend that governments maintain education or

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[3] See Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in The Third World(London:Adamantine Press, 1990), p.54. Also see, Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of Budgetary Process, (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1974) p.13.

[4] Personal interview with Brigadier(Rtd) Aminu Basharu, a former Director of the Nigerian Army Finance and Accounts. Lagos. May 13, 1991.

> health or military expenditure simply to support appropriate bureaucracies. It would seem rather ...that function explains organisation rather than vice versa.'[5]

The defence budget forms part of the official fiscal annual report of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, prepared, collated and compiled by the Ministry of National Planning[6] with inputs from various ministries and departments. The defence budget comes under the heading, 'Ministry of Defence' and approved estimates are classified into two categories - *recurrent expenditure* which comes first (perhaps to suggest its precedence) and *capital outlay*.[7] The process of preparing annual defence estimates for the forthcoming national budget usually starts with the issuance of communications stipulating guidelines to be adopted from the Budget section of the Finance Ministry to the Ministry of Defence(MoD) about the second quarter of the fiscal year.[8] The guideline document is referred to as the *call circular*. Even at this early stage, the budgetary process became inherently inoperable because of the nature of spending

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[5] Robert McKinlay, Third World Military Expenditure,(London: Pinter, 1989) p.68.

[6] It should be mentioned that while overall Federal budget planning has always been the preserve of the National Planning Ministry, this function had been performed at various times by the Central Planning Office in The Presidency and the Finance Ministry. Presently, a full fledged Ministry for Budget Affairs, created in 1989 is charged with this responsibility. However, if we were to believe the explanation of the first Minister for Budget Affairs, defence allocation remained a "no-go area" even with this separation. Personal Interview, Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji, London, November 1993.

[7] Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, especially during the military period in government, the impression was often created with the classification of defence and internal security spending under the heading, 'General Administration,' in the budget summary that this contained portion of defence spending disguised as 'State House' or 'Dodan Barracks' expenditure. See J. 'Bayo Adekson, Nigeria in Search of a Stable Civil Military System, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981) p.56.

[8] The fiscal year in Nigeria formerly runs from April to March since independence to 1979. With the incoming of the Presidential System of Government, the fiscal year runs from January to December. The issuance of call circular also became the function of the Budget Director and Special Adviser on Budgetary Matters during the civilian era(1979-1983)

requirements and the institutionalised but often arbitrary ceilings placed on spending in the circular. In consequence, a downward spiral of arbitrary spending limitations was often created without any integrated analysis of defence requirements and national security objectives. The MoD budget officers, in turn, issue call circulars for recurrent spending estimates to the three services (since the MoD controls capital outlay centrally for the services) with guidelines such as,

> 'expenditure to be limited to 75% of previous year, while also placing embargo on maximum acceptable increase in expenditure. Increase in personal emolument(salaries) for instance might be pegged at 10% *irrespective of the tasks and objectives of the service and targets to be met in the financial year.*(emphasis mine)[9]

This soon became a veritable recipe for sharp accounting practices as individual services in their bid to protect their 'empires' resorted to open-ended requirements, cramming many activities into estimates while hoping that a favourable middle ground will emerge from the time limitations imposed. In a typical service setting like the army, on receipt of the call circular from the Permanent Secretary, MoD, the QuarterMaster General, charged with the responsibility of managing the army's recurrent budget, issues directives to all formations, corps commands and training institutions to prepare and submit their proposals for the budget year in question.

Since the arrangement required little innovation as it simply followed the traditional line item approach and also due to the time pressure, previous year's proposals get revised upwards without inflationary trends necessarily taken into account, but with enough leverage over expenditure ceilings manipulations. It must, however, be said that in certain instances, increased ceilings were allowed, not necessarily on account of programme quality, but more often than not on the strength of the power base of the corps commander requesting such extra-budgetary considerations. The formations and corps commanders' estimates are sent back to the QuarterMaster General, who reviews and collate them into a single **Command Estimate** which is then sent to the

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[9] Commander S.A.Aremo, The Concept of Financial Mangement as Practised in the Nigerian Navy, Text of Lecture delivered to the Junior Division of the Naval Faculty, Command and Staff College, Jaji, Nigeria, May 16, 1985.

MoD for further review and onward transmission to the Finance Ministry. The other services estimates are compiled in a similar manner, while reflecting service peculiarity.

At this stage, the Draft proposal is reviewed in the Budget Office and incorporated in the overall recurrent and capital estimates presented to the Supreme Military Council(1970-79, 84-5); the National Assembly(1979-1983), or the Armed Forces Ruling Council(1985-93) for final review and approval. In spite of this long winding process to which it is subjected, the defence budget hardly comes up for any thorough review.

Unlike other departmental budgets, it is often the exclusive preserve of a few officers only revealed to others on a need to know basis. During the civilian era when the defence budget had to be approved by the National Assembly, it was also treated on a 'need to know' basis as the military professionals often demurred about releasing information, insisting on the need to maintain secrecy. Besides, parliamentarians were more interested in whether last year's expenditure was completely exhausted and least concerned with how carefully arrived at the current estimates were. This would seem to have stemmed mainly from the fact that the National Assembly lacked the capacity to review the President's submission, let alone generate independent analyses and projections. Even with the 1986 radical introduction of the Presidential Advisory Council(PAC), a body of reputable technocrats, academics and businessmen charged with the responsibility for independent review of budgetary estimates, the impact was rather tenuous and insignificant since the defence portion seemed to have been exempted implicitly because the Minister for Defence never appeared before the Council from its inception to the time it became defunct.[10]

On receipt of the final approved budget for the Defence Ministry, the MoD retained the capital and inter-service projects votes while recurrent allocations were held by the QuarterMaster General(Army), Chief of Accounts & Budgets(Navy) and the Air Officer Logistics(Air Force) respectively for their services (See Figures 5.1 & 5.2). What is noticeable so far in the preparation of the defence budget was the almost

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[10] I got this impression from discussions with Professor Isawa Elaigwu, a member of the Presidential Advisory Council. The Chairman of the PAC, Professor Aboyade has also been quoted in reference to the relative powerlessness of the Council. See Poise Magazine (Lagos) May 5, 1992.

Figure 5.1

NIGERIA'S DEFENCE BUDGETING CYCLE UNDER THE CIVILIANS (1979- 1983)



Source: Ministry of Defence

Figure 5.2

DEFENCE BUDGETING CYCLE UNDER THE MILITARY- 1970-79/ 84- 90



Source: Ministry of Defence, Nigeria

complete absence of planning as decisions were made at every turn in total disregard of costs and benefits and with ineffective and unenforceable predetermined ceilings. At the same time, no corresponding statement on national security objectives and service requirements in line with resources allocated were available. Officials have justified an input system of budgeting that emphasised personnel and operation costs, in place of an output budgeting approach that is goal and objective driven and programme oriented on five main counts: first, it is central government practice informed by experience and the MoD cannot deviate from mainstream accounting practice; second, because the bulk of defence spending went on salaries, pensions and operations cost, not on any strategic based programme, it stood to reason to operate a standard line item approach; third, it was thought to increase consensus among the services in an armed forces susceptible to intense inter-service rivalry; fourth, it was believed to be effective for the services' logistics system, hence the resultant disbursement of three quarters of the recurrent spending through divisions, brigades and bases rather than through programme functions; finally, overall budget administrators in the services were thought to be in favour of the traditional budgeting system since they were often combatants with little or no accounting experience and the system reduced the burden of quantitative calculation often associated with Planning, Programming and Budgeting System(PPBS) and other result oriented budget practices.[11]

Since *call circulars* for budgets were devoid of target performance projections and related time frame for accomplishment based on overall governmental policy objectives, allocations finally approved had no in-built regulatory mechanism and they created wider economic problems in an inherently unstable polity. Again, as the Nigerian experience illustrates, the fact that budget planners never denied the need and, sometimes clamoured for a programme based budgeting system seems reflective of the desire for effective budgetary mechanisms that related defence objectives to national resource availability. This recognition must have been responsible for the change to the PPBS approach by the civilians in 1979.

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[11] See Colonel A.A.Basharu,'The Problem of Budgeting in the Nigerian Armed Forces: A Case Study of The Nigerian Army,' Unpublished Essay submitted for the Senior Executive Course at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Study.1985.

III. The PPBS Experiment and the Politics of Defence Budgeting

In line with the new presidential system of government returning civilians to power in 1979 after thirteen years of military rule, the office of Director of Budget and Special Adviser to the President on budgetary matters was created and the new government decided to adopt a new budgeting system aimed at 'defining the objective of the functional areas of government organisation and their programmes... for which criteria will be established for measuring performance against input/objectives and set targets.'[12] The system attempted a link between *Planning and Programming Budgeting System (PPBS)* and performance assessment through a feedback process. According to the Director, the new arrangement concentrated on functional lines for greater rationalisation.

Unlike the McNamara revolution in American defence budgeting, where the Secretary of Defence had a completely free hand to implement all ideas in respect of budgetary planning, management and control, the Nigerian experience proved different perhaps on account of the precarious position in which most politicians found themselves when dealing with the military. This may have stemmed from their morbid fear of coup d'etats. In this particular instance, the civilian Minister of Defence, Professor Iya Abubakar found himself effectively torn between service chiefs who continued to have direct access to the President, a Chief of Defence Staff deliberately stripped of any organisational influence and a largely symbolic ministerial role that charged him with 'complete control over both defence policy and administration of the three services', in short investing in him power without authority. In effect, even though invested with executive powers over the ministry with considerable freedom to determine what went into the budgets, thus minimising the role of Budgets Estimates Committee, there were fewer checks and balances in MoD to 'ensure the integration and

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[12] Secretary to the Federal Government of Nigeria, Circular - 0059397/5/1/17, of 21 January 1980. See for details, Working Papers on the Presidential Budgeting System Workshop held at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 1980; especially papers delivered by Ukwu I. Ukwu and E.Ero Phillips,'The Presidential Budgeting System: An Overview,' and T.A.Akinyele,'Position Paper by Director of Budget'.

harmonisation of programmes towards overall national objectives.'[13]

Due to this lack of harmony in spite of the non-partisan centralised authority in the bureaucratic/organisational innovations, the few changes in the budgetary realm only occurred at the service level and these were even cosmetic since the various services had 'empires to protect.' As the Traditional budget categories and the proposed Programme Classifications in the ministry illustrates, attempts made to take on board the PPBS as directed by the President's Budget Office was affected by the absence of well trained accounting officials and strategic analysts to carry out the difficult tasks of weighing alternatives, an essential requirement of the new system. A situation the system was not willing to correct. Where competent officers were available, they occupied less prominent roles in the accounting cycle and often were not involved in monetary decisions, planning process and detection of discrepancies for which they possessed the requisite expertise.[14]

Neither was any problem solving mechanism usually adopted in PPBS featured in the implementation of the system, which was, afterall, the basis for the reorganisation and the introduction of PPBS into the Ministry. Especially worrying was the absence of any sequence to determine the purpose and/or objectives of the defence structure, alternatives evaluating mechanisms on the basis of cost and effectiveness, decision criteria for ranking selected alternatives, method for ranking sensitivity of assumptions and uncertainties and the total lack of information systems and feedback arrangements. As the Budget director indicated, there were problems in revenue estimation due to lack of cooperation; paucity of data to guide formulation of purposeful fiscal measures; lack of statutory budget calendar for ensuring timeliness; lack of improved staff and facilities and residual role duplication between the Finance Ministry and the Budget Office.[15]

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[13] A.A.Alabi, 'The Financing of Development Programmes under the Presidential System of Government,' Workshop on Presidential Budgeting,op-cit. The Writer was the National Planning Director during Nigeria's Presidential Democracy.

[14] Aremu, op-cit., p.16.

[15] For details, see Akinyele, op-cit., p.10

TABLE 5.1 - Traditional Budget Categories and Proposed Programme Classifications in the MoD

Traditional Budget Categories	ProgrammeClassification for Planning
Personal Emolument	General Purpose Forces
(Salaries & Pensions)	Airlift and Sealift Material
Special Expenditures	Reserve Forces
Other Charges	Research & Development
Operation and Maintenance	Overhead Costs
Procurement	Central Procurement & Maintenance
Defence Industries Corporation	Intelligence & Communications

Source: Ministry of Defence Headquarters, Lagos, Nigeria.

Having failed in this harmonisation process, the only success often attributed to the introduction of PPBS was the reduction of the MoD's vote sub-heads from the unweildy 138 to a mere 20. This allowed for streamlining capital and recurrent allocation through the link created between available resources and programme costs, instead of sectoral allocations, but even this soon became unsustainable.[16] Whereas, the major spending areas in capital funding were construction outlays, defence equipments procurement/maintenance and in recurrent expenditure - personnel and operations costs, by 1988 the subheads had reverted back to the confusing and unhelpful pre-1980 position.[17]

The considerable inertia that existed in the armed services was partly responsible for the fate that befell the new budgeting arrangement. In the army for instance, despite earlier attempts before PPBS to depersonalize authority on budgetary matters with the creation of the Controller of Army Budgets Office(CAB) in 1975, 'to assume fuller technical control of budgetary functions,' as well as 'provide database for proper long range planning with reference to the services' objectives,'[18] no sooner had the office started functioning that it became 'engulfed by the overwhelming power of the Quarter

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[16] See Approved Budgets 1980 - 1987.

[17] See the budgets for 1988 and beyond.

[18] Basharu, interview.

Master General(QMG), a development acceded to by the Army Chief of Staff.[19] Yet, the CAB's office was specifically created because erstwhile QMGs were thought to have performed less creditably in handling the technical details of budgeting despite their propensity to personalise the office. Thus it was conceived as a bridge between policymakers as represented by the QMG (always a professional soldier) and effective management accountability represented by professionally qualified accountants, already commissioned as officers.[20] As though the usurpation of functions did not reflect an evident lack of interest in accountability and budgetary control, it became overt by 1979 when the incumbent QMG assumed complete control of budgetary affairs in addition to his logistics functions. His office became responsible for budgeting, purchase, disbursement and control of all funds for army use at a time the PPBS had been introduced. This was attributed to the fact that Major General Innih, the Quarter Master General at the time was too steeped in the notion of complete control, having served as Governor of two states in the preceding military regime. While this may have played a role, it did not seem entirely plausible as Major General David Ejoor who decentralised the Nigerian Army Accounting System had himself served as a political governor. Hence, a lot may be due to Major General George Innih's personal disposition or to a structure indisposed to effective delegation. An attempt was made to correct this in 1990 when the post was split into two: Chief of Operations and Training and Chief of Logistics and Administration, but it is too early to assess the effctiveness of this change.

Not unexpectedly, the same crisis was also true of the Air Force which had always taken after the army in its budgetary management. The Air Officer [Logistics] exercised complete control over the budget with the approval of the Chief of Air Staff [CAS], leaving the Director of Finance and Administration(DFA) to function basically as "a cash office" on matters he had not hitherto been involved at planning stage. Even in the Navy where a clearly delineated measure of professional autonomy over budgetary

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[19] ibid.

[20] Personal Interview with Major General David Ejoor, under whom the army became self accounting and who created the office of Controller of Army Budget while he was the Chief of Army Staff. Lagos, June 4 1991. For details, see also David Ejoor, Reminiscences, (Lagos: Malthouse Press, 1990)

planning, management and control was enjoyed by the Chief of Accounts and Budgets for most of the period covered by this study, the creation of the Logistics department out of the erstwhile Naval Supply and Secretariat Department in 1985/86 put paid to this relative professional autonomy, replacing it with a system in which 'major decisions which have far reaching implications are taken without Supply and Secretariat Department's participation, sometimes without any previous plan for such expenditure.'[21]

The effect of this organisational inertia and inherent distaste for financial accountability within the services, represented by the personalisation of powers not only created personality cults around influential officers, but also undermined the effort to create a supra-service office to check excesses. For this reason, the recurrent budget run by services was subjected to capricious planning and reflexive spending due to the absence of organisational objectives for the budget year. Budget implementers were left with considerable leeway to determine which service got what. In effect, not only did corps commanders incur expenses for which approval had not been sought at the headquarters of the various services[22], most of the earmarked resources often got tied down for the greater part of the year. As a result, only ten percent of total allocation gets spent within the first quarter of every fiscal year leaving the bulk till the last quarter when over fifty percent of allocation gets disbursed.[23]

Even in the disbursement of capital outlay centrally controlled by the Permanent

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[21] Chief of Accounts and Budgets' reaction to the introduction of the Logistics Department in the Navy. The newly formed Naval Material Supply Corps seems to be an improvement on this 1987 move, although it may be too early to judge the effectiveness of re-organisation. See for details, Vice Admiral Murtala Nyako, 'The Re-Organisation of the Nigerian Navy,' Text of Special Briefing to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs(NIIA) April 9, 1991.

[22] The Nigerian Navy incurred about N30 million debts on the execution of unapproved projects by corps commanders by the end of 1986 fiscal year alone.

[23] This system it must be said is not uncommon in the other ministries. And it is often the result of plans for the succeeding year's incremental battle which is heavily dependent on the spending of this year's allocation. This renders inapplicable Aaron Wildavsky's thesis of the commonality of 'underspending' in poor countries. It has to besaid though that the room for underspending has been blocked not by effective programming but largely by the huge capacity that exists for graft.

Secretary of the MoD, considerable care for priority and need could not be said to have been exercised as political clout and prestige factors (also) seemed to have taken precedence. Since capital allocations ratio remained the same, one assumption to reach was that the nation's security problems were more static than dynamic. Hence, no matter what the changing perceptions of threat were among the military and the foreign policy decision-making elite, this was not reflected in the spending pattern which stayed at the ratio of 5:3:2 for the army, the air force and the navy respectively, especially when foreign procurement and, inevitably foreign exchange was involved.[24]

Although this blanket ratio of spending allocation raised other questions about the competence of the civilian bureaucrats charged with capital outlay disbursement in the MoD, it appeared that the civilians at the bureaucratic level did not actually weild the influence supposedly conferred on them. The bureaucratic sector in the defence ministry, especially in the post-1975 era had become largely symbolic since decisions on force structure, construction projects and weapons/equipment procurement, all of which had serious implications on capital outlay were usually the sole prerogative of a small group of officers who were more often than not, in the army with occasional involvement of officers from smaller services.[25]

In the pre-1975 era, the influence of the bureaucrats in the Gowon administration cannot be overemphasised. In the Ministry of Defence in particular, three Permanent Secretaries: Andrew Obeya, Ibrahim Damcida and Yusuf Gobir seemed to have played a more significant role during and in the immediate aftermath of the civil war but prior to the Mohammed/Obasanjo coup d'etat. Yet, in spite of the Obasanjo's administration's portrayal of bureaucrats as the nation's major problem on assuming office and their desperation to reduce bureaucratic influence on policy making, their influence only

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[24] As Dr F.A. Adisa observes, 'The Third National Development Plan(1981-5) indicated that the army got 55%, Air Force -28% and the Navy - 17.8%' Comments in Captain O.A.Oladimeji(ed) SeaPower: An Agenda for National Survival,(Lagos: Directorate of Naval Information,1989) p.70. See also J 'Bayo Adekanye, 'The Role of Military Expenditure in the Development Process: Nigeria(Ibadan: University of Ibadan, 1983) mimeo for a general discussion of the foreign exchange requirements of Nigeria's security sector.

[25] For details, See 'Nigeria: Army Arrangements', Africa Confidential (London), Vol.34, No.13, 2 July 1993.

shrinked in military leaders' rhetoric. At least, one Permanent Secretary in the Defence Ministry during this period, Mr. Festus Adesanoye seemed to have weilded considerable influence in the MoD, partly because the emerging defence view depended on him in the absence of a substantive Minister of Defence from 1976 to 1979.[26] It would also appear that General Obasanjo, the de-facto Defence Minister had no confidence in any other senior military officer to serve in that capacity following the implication of the previous Minister, General Bisalla in the 1976 bid to oust the government. Besides, General Obasanjo did not appear to retain the same level of distrust in bureaucrats as did his assasinated predecessor, General Mohammed.

Yet, it remains very difficult to extrapolate a recurrent pattern from the above illustrations. They all appear to be isolated cases, not a conscious effort to bring bureaucrats into the inner circle of defence decision-making except when personal, business and political interests coincided. Against this background, it became understandable even if inexplicable that despite the huge capital assets in the smaller services and decision-makers' professed pre-occupation with force balance and protection of off-shore economic assets, the decisive factor in this inter-play of interests is how inflential an officer was, not how relevant the proposals were. In effect, the likelihood of any serious evaluation of funding priorities becomes a rarity in the search for personal aggrandizement.[27]

Even though capital allocations constituted a less significant part of declared defence allocations in the period under study, it is not unreasonable to assume that the civilian bureaucrats' role was significantly less than often made out to be, while priority and need even played a less significant role. Yet, civilian bureaucrats are regularly criticised for 'having little or no knowledge about the military profession.' This criticism led to the attendance at the one year course for senior military officers, at the Royal

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[26] Yet without denying his influence as Permanent Secretary, Mr Adesanoye claimed "low level army officers still prevented me from discharging my duties effectively in the three years I was there." Personal Interview, Lagos, May 23, 1991.

[27] As Nicole Ball rightly contends in her third world perspective, the Nigerian example shows that belonging to such a close knit group of officers provides the means of improving personal wealth through 'rake-offs from arms imports contracts or by channelling other kinds of military procurement and construction contracts to firms with which officers in question have interests...' Ball, op-cit., p.59.

College of Defence Studies, London by, at least one senior civil servant, MoD Permanent Secretary (Yusuf Gobir) in 1974. This was followed by the deliberate mix of military officers and civilian bureaucrats since the inception of the senior executive course at the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies under the Obasanjo administration. The eventual selection in 1990 of a retired military officer, Major General(Rtd) Olu.Bajowa as the Director General in the MoD following the 1988 civil service reforms was the culmination of the institutional attempt to be self reliant.[28] Even when normal bureaucratic requirements of submission and justifiction of capital estimates were adhered to, actual decisions on what to buy rested significantly with the 'military-middleman complex' who continued to weild a great deal of influence in the fragmented, superficially structured and inherently unstable setting.

This network of personal and political affiliations effectively precluded the emergence of any clear pattern relating defence budgets to resource allocation and declared national objectives. What emerged on a few occasions, perhaps due to public criticism of the exponential rise in defence allocation was a sense of economic prudence reflected by simultaneous cuts in defence allocations alongside other sectoral cuts. (See Table 5.3 on Defence Expenditure - 1970 - 1990.) It is arguable, however that defence spending reduction, (good as it may be, if one took the view that savings made would spill over to other productive areas of the economy) became irrational and ineffective since they were not tied to strategic and long term interests of defence. As Table 5.3 illustrates, while defence spending as a ratio of federal expenditure fell since the civil war period when it consumed forty three per-cent of Central Government Expenditure, in absolute terms it has continued to rise. The gains which ought to have followed the reduction in the armed forces by roughly 100,000 men from the post war level of 250,000 men has been significantly reduced, if not totally wiped out by the rise in defence spending per capita from $2,450 in 1971 to $10,200 in 1984.[29]

Yet in spite of our assumption in the introduction to this study that the state is a rational optimizer of national resources, to what extent can one consider irrational or

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[28] The ability of the new Director General to be an impartial arbiter in the perennial inter-service struggles in the MoD has however, been questioned.

[29] See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, WMEAT, 1986.

intriguing, if the security elite used available resources to facilitate short run survival if they lacked the resources to meet citizens demands?[30] Even where the resources were in relative abundance, can resource allocation neglect the political and economic interests of those who participated in the allocation process and impinge on their planned creation of personal empires? The question then is to what extent is it possible or, indeed desirable for politico-military judgements to ignore resource constraints indefinetely in the allocation process without undermining stated national objectives?

IV. Defence Spending and Resource Availability in Nigeria: Trends

Defence spending in Nigeria, as in many other countries is often regarded as that part of government funding towards the non-productive aspects of the economy.[31] Conceivably, defence expenditure is seen as directly impinging on government expenditure elsewhere in the economy since money so directed cannot be utilised in other sectors.[32] Yet some studies indicate a positive correlation between military expenditure and economic performance, even in the third world.[33] Notwithstanding, attributing perceived reduction in funding in other areas of socio economic development to defence resource allocation maybe instinctive and hasty. Military budgets deserve a

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[30] Robert Rothstein, 'National Security, Domestic Resource Constraints and Elite Choices in the Third World,' in Saadet Deger and Robert West(eds) Defence, Security and Development,(London: Pinter, 1987) p.153.

[31] For a review of the Nigerian situation, see J 'Kayode Fayemi, ' Defence Spending and the National Economy,' Guardian Financial Weekly(Lagos) 11 & 18 January, 1988. See also, David K.Whynes, The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure,(London: Macmillan, 1979) and Saadet Deger and Ron Smith'Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries', The Journal of Conflict Resolution 27(June 1983) pp.344-347.

[32] See Ball, op-cit., esp. Chapter Five. Also, McKinlay, op-cit. Their conclusion, however, gave a mix of national peculiarities and cross-national similarities. For a good overview, see Steve Chan, 'The Impact of Defence Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems,' Orbis,29,(Summer 1985)p.403-34.

[33] For example, see Emile Benoit, Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,(Lexington,Mass: Lexington Books, 1973) and P.C.Fredricksen and Robert N.Looney, 'Defence Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,' Armed Forces and Society 9,(Summer 1983) pp.633-45..

closer analysis. In essence, the succeeding section seeks to trace the relationship between the defence and civil sector shares of government budgets to test our earlier assumption that reduced military expenditure will not automatically result in increased social sector spending.

Within the broader context of this study, we test the impact of Nigeria's defence burden on the national growth rate in terms of savings and investments, balance of payments, external indebtedness and inflation.[34] In short, the relationship between security spending and economic downturn. We test also one of this study's hypothesis: that a reduction in military expenditure will not necessarily create additional funds for social welfare spending, while an unexpected improvement in the national economy will benefit defence more than any sector of the national economy. We adapt three methods to examine the defence burden issue. Military Expenditure(ME) as a percentage of Central Government Expenditure(CGE), Military Expenditure as a percentage of Gross National Product(GNP) and Military Expenditure as percentage of Gross Domestic Product(GDP). Although many analysts take ME/GNP as the most accurate measurement of defence burden, it is beset with problems in the immediate context. Equally, ME as a measure of GDP or CGE is not without pitfalls. They are, in effect, used interchangeably in this analysis.[35] The principal figures used in this exercise are

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[34] In a specially commissioned study by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, researchers at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs concluded that all these variables were negatively affected by military expenditure in Africa. See A.B.Akinyemi, et-al, Disarmament and Development: Utilisation of Military Resources in Black Africa(Lagos: NIIA, 1986)

[35] For example, we cannot see how GNP can provide accurate data in a country without full employment for most of the period the study covered. Even though it represents the market value of the nation's gross output, including the productive contributions of nationals outside its shores as well as exports, the fact that a significant part of GNP was unavailable for direct government allocation made it less truly representative of the real burden of defence as the tendency to distort government's real priorities appear high. Second, while ME/CGE would constitute a more accurate indicator of central government's priorities because only the central government allocates for defence, it would not be the most accurate measure of defence burden at the state and private sector levels. Third, since Gross Domestic Product(GDP) only measures the aggregate domestic output, it would not be a true reflection of the national resource capacity in a country which earned on the average seventy percent of total revenue from exports in the period under study.

total budgetary allocations, size of the health, education, agriculture and defence budgets as well as total imports, total exports, balance of payments and deficit ratio all taken from Federal Government official statistics and World Bank/IMF figures.

Table 5.2: Trends in Resource Availability and Public Spending (Nmillion except otherwise indicated)

	1970	1980	1983	1990
Population(000)	66.2	84.8	94.0	100.2
Federal Revenue	365.7	12,138.7	6,791.4	
Federal Expenditure	838.8	11,113.9	11,664.6	40,660.7
Defence Expenditure	314.8	1,285.0	1,178.9	1,744.6
Total Exports	885.4	14,977.0	7,612.3	$13,670
Oil Exports	510.0	13,523.0	7,337.4	$11,976
Total Imports	756.4	9,658.1	9,723.0	$5,694
Public Debt	1,215.4	9,785.3	40,466.6	$30,572

Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria, *Annual Reports*, World Bank *Debt Table 1991*, IMF *Statistical Returns*, *West Africa Magazine* (London) and *Financial Times* (London)

TABLE 5.3- NIGERIA'S DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1970 - 1990

FISCAL YEAR	C.G.E.(Nm)	DEF. EXP.	D.E./C.G.E
1970/71	928,417,818	314,846,014	33.90%
1971/72	1,417,138,022	285,895,214	20.17%
1972/73	1,740,289,870	370,253,689	21.26%
1973/74	2,167,728,504	420,162,573	19.38%
1974/75	5,259,702,729	532,918,838	10.13%
1975/76	9,730,028,137	1,166,699,421	11.99%
1976/77	7,411,557,575	1,037,111,131	14.14%
1977/78	7,150,618,202	695,906,172	9.71%
1978/79	12,015,194,810	1,304,660,142	10.85%
1979/80	9,510,000,000	1,122,000,000	11.79%
1980	11,322,522,000	989,396,300	8.73%
1981	12,750,017,290	1,319,169,950	10.33%
1982	10,946,188,510	1,111,222,790	10.15%
1983	10,425,329,930	1,178,925,410	11.07%
1984	10,608,130,332	928,244,100	9.27%
1985	11,269,641,320	975,650,701	8.6%
1986	11,581,732,901	907,058,060	7.83%
1987	17,506,929,000	809,797,609	4.62%
1988	24,365,266,328	1,270,000,000	5.21%
1989	30,107,057,120	1,267,288,410	4.20%
1990	40,660,700,215	1,744,693,300	4.29%

SOURCE: Ministerial breakdown of Approved Budget Estimates 1970-1990(Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information/Federal Ministry of National Planning) C.G.E. - Central Government Expenditure.DE/CGE - Defence Expenditure as percentage of CGE. Figures in millions of Naira.

A wider picture of defence budgets and resource availability is given below. Tables 5.4 and 5.5. indicate a consistently higher priority given to defence expenditure than health, education and agriculture both in intent and commitment in the period under study. This, however, should not be seen as an indication of lesser commitment to other areas of public expenditure. What it probably points to clearly was the apparent willingness of budget planners to expand defence expenditures at a much larger rate than the narrower band within which the civil sector budgets varied.

TABLE 5.4. NIGERIA'S CAPITAL EXPENDITURE IN SELECTED SECTORS AND YEARS (N.million)

ITEM	74/75/%	75/76/%	76/77/%	77/78/%	78/79/%	79/80/%
AGRIC.	104/5.5.	231.8/4.0	130.0/2.8	105.5/1.4	128.4/2.3	183.5/2.8
DEFENCE	237.1/12.6	737.7/12.8	698.4/15	900.0/11.7	708.5/12.6	602.0/9.1
EDUC.	212.5/11.3	156.1/7.9	305.1/6.6	500.0/6.5	301.4/5.4	301.1/5.9
HEALTH	21.7/1.2	82.3/1.4	36.4/1.0	114.1/1.5	49.6/1.0	80.2/1.2
TRANS. & COMM.	308.6/16.4	1540.3/26.7	1011.3/27.3	2300.5/30	1331.1/23.6	1566/23.7
MFG. & MINING.	N.A.	1205.1/20.9	677.0/14.5	N.A.	N.A.	2096/31.7
Total Cap.Exp.	1876.2	5772.3	4657.3	7676.4	5637.2	6610.0

SOURCE: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Federal Government Budget Statements

TABLE 5.5: - FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR SELECTED YEARS (Nm)

	1970	1972	1974	1976	1980	1983	1985	1987	1989	%
Govt.Expen.	1130	1863	4260	9701	14113	11695	12079	22019	41028	100
Admin, Def. & Int.Secu.	603.8	607.1	823.7	1805	3205	3643	5047	n.a	n.a	23.06
Social-Services	19.8	71.4	453.0	1534	5917	1162	1337	n.a.	n.a.	18.8
Economic-Services	67.7	179.1	540.5	2373	2131	2874	2284	n.a.	n.a.	22.7
States-Transfer	438.8	1006	2443	3988	3162	3844	3409	n.a.	n.a.	30.5

SOURCE: Central Bank of Nigeria, Principal Economic and Financial Indicators, Selected Years

Even then, if we examine the figures in Table 5.5 the consistent growth rate in defence expenditure did not in any way prevent similar growth rates in social and economic services. For instance, it is arguable that the transfers to the states (30% in the years shown in Table 5.5.) covered specifically social and economic services since defence only received allocation from central government. Also, a note of caution is necessary because what the Central Bank of Nigeria refers to as 'Administration, Defence and Internal Security' before 1980 covered a wide range of areas beyond the armed forces. This casts some doubt on the trade off paradigm between defence and the civil sector, the standpoint of those eager to seek a zero-sum relationship between expenditure in the two areas.[36] Contrariwise, this defective standpoint did not provide sufficient evidence to consider that link entirely speculative, as Bassey did, since the high rate of defence spending cannot be attributed with certainty to "the altered position of Nigeria in a regional subsystem...pressures of decolonialization, regional rivalries, and external intervention".[37] Neither could the exponential rise be traced to the "military-institutional imperative of providing infrastructural facilities and support", as he further argues.

While the above factors played some part in explaining the increase in defence spending just as prestige and personal aggrandizement did, a careful examination of budgetary allocations in the years examined clearly indicated that in an armed forces where seventy per-cent of defence allocation was expended on personnel in the period under study, provision of facilities and support could not have commanded a significant portion of the budget.[38] Also, since such spending was not tied to declared national objectives and a codified military doctrine, there is empirical evidence to substantiate the

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[36] For example, see J 'Bayo Adekanye's "Military Extractive Ratio" argument in, 'The Role of Military Expenditure in Nigeria's Development' ibid., Akinyemi. et-al, op-cit., and T.O.Odetola, Military Regimes and Development: A Comparative analysis of African states(London: Allen & Unwin, 1982.)

[37] See Celestine O. Bassey, 'Defence Planning and the Nigerian Armed Forces Modernization Process (1970 - 1991): An Institutional Analysis' Armed Forces & Society, Vol.19, No.2, Winter 1993, pp.253 -277

[38] For details, see the next chapter

role of graft and uncoordinated spending.[39]

Yet, the above does not really help the task of identifying the trend in budgetary process, except in one significant respect. It would appear to strengthen the position that countries do pursue 'guns' as well as 'butter' and that defence allocation can develop a life of its own. Indeed, Nigeria's concentration on transport and communication as Table 5.4 indicates, despite the significant allocation to health and education can be seen as correlates of a growing defence spending. While it may appear that allocations to health and education at the time was small, it is noteworthy that education was free up to university level and tuition was free at the university level. Equally, the number of universities rose from five to thirteen and health care was relatively good and almost free. Besides, state governments also had allocation for education, health, transport and communication but not for defence.

Thus, one is inclined to agree with Robert McKinlay based on the trend in Nigeria that military expenditure seemed to have a life of its own, '...independent of central financial constraints, indicative therefore...a substantial degree of autonomy'.[40] It is therefore the contention of this study, that the impression that military expenditure and civil sector allocations were always engaged in a restless competition for central government funding, plausible as it sounds, may not be supported by the evidence available in Nigeria.

This however, leads to unanswered questions. For instance, if our argument is that the Nigerian state pursued "guns" and "butter", what then was the impact on savings and investments, foreign exchange reserves and debt ratio, trade and balance of payments in the period? Put differently, what are the likely trade-offs of these welfare/military provisions since social spending and military expenditure did not necessarily aid growth and development. At another level, it raises the question: to what extent can budgets be used or abused in determining governmental priorities?

It is not uncommon in cross-national surveys to conclude that military expenditure correlated to lower rates of savings and investments. In Nigeria, the evidence leads one to conclude that this represents an over simplification, not uncommon in cross national,

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[39] ibid.

[40] R.D.McKinlay, Third World Military Expenditure,(London: Pinter, 1989) p.35.

macro statistical surveys. Two studies, which have gained prominence in the literature become particularly noteworthy in their conclusion of a negative correlation between defence spending and investment and savings growth. The first one is The Birkbeck College Centre for Defence Economics survey covering some fifty developing countries including Nigeria and the second study was carried out by Riccardo Faini, Patricia Arnez and Lance Taylor, all of Massauchetts Institute of Technology. Out of the forty six developing countries surveyed, Nigeria featured prominently among the seven countries with a significantly negative relationship between defence expenditure and growth rate.[41] (see Figure 5.3. below)

As the foregoing analysis clarifies, Nigeria's defence expenditure cannot be depicted as directly antithetical to increased savings and investment, neither can they be held responsible for the plummeting growth rate in the period under study. As a result, the conclusions of these surveys and others like them bear emphasis because defence analysts within Nigeria have followed the same reasoning without adequate justification.[42]

For example, local analysts have argued that the 'military extractive ratio' to borrow Adekanye's popular concept has 'harmed the national economy.' Others like Odetola have argued that in terms of its use of foreign exchange, reduction of capacity utilisation through lack of investments and savings, military expenditure has had a negative impact.[43] Although the expected reduction in defence allocation after the civil war which failed to materialise was held responsible for the economic problems of the post-war period,[44] Nigeria's problems of investment and growth did not feature prominently until after the Arab oil embargo induced oil boom. Indeed, it is particularly noteworthy that the country conducted the war for three years without any serious debt and weapons used to prosecute the war were paid for in cash. Besides, the economy grew

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[41] See Saadet Deger, 'Investment, Defence and Growth in Less Developed Countries,' (BirkBeck College, October 1981) and Riccardo Faini,et-al, 'Defence Spending, Economic Structure and Growth: Evidence Among Countries and Over time,' (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T., October 1980,mimeo) cited in Ball, op-cit.

[42] For details, see Adekanye, op-cit and T.O.Odetola, op-cit, p.133

[43] Odetola, ibid, p.134.

[44] See Chapter 3 above.

during the pre-oil boom era, even though not at the post-boom geometric rate.[45] Yet cross national studies have tied higher defence spending and lower savings ratio to the huge arms transfer to third world countries in the 1970s and 1980s. The US' Arms Control and Disarmament Agency figures used in Table 5.6 for example, gave a fairly accurate representation of arms imports as percentage of total imports.[46]

While arms import grew tremendously after 1975, it constituted less than one third of total defence spending in the period of study and less than five percent of total imports at its peak, as Table 5.6 clearly shows. Besides, defence capital expenditure, of which arms procurement formed a part only exceeded recurrent estimates in four of the twenty years under examination - 1975/76, 76/77, 78/79, 79/80 (See Table 6.1) - and this increase was due, more to defence construction than to arms procurement.

However, to verify the impact of military expenditure through military imports on growth rate and trade balance, we examine below the impact of military imports on civil sector imports. In doing this we are inclined to agree with Nicole Ball that, military imports can reflect on a country's trade balance in three ways; namely,(1) reduce civil sector imports but allow the overall import to remain stable;(2) reduce civil sector imports but cause the overall import level to rise; or (3) Stimulate civil sector imports and cause even larger increases in the overall import level.[47]

Any of these, according to Ball could lead to short or long term growth reduction consequences, while the third may also activate positively defence spending as a catalyst of growth rate. But as she rightly cautions, 'to evaluate the effect of rising security sector on economic growth...the analyst needs a disaggregation of civil sector imports as well' to determine the role played by all sectors without prejudice. While it is often desirable to scrutinise the rise in arms imports in the oil boom years since it was considered non-

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[45] See E.Wayne Nafziger,'Impact of the Civil War on the Nigerian Economy,' Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.10, No.2, 1972, pp.223-45.

[46] ACDA figures are not entirely accurate. In calculating arms imports, ACDA relies more on figures from the International Monetary Fund in conjunction with USAID figures. As ACDA itself makes very clear,'it must be cautioned, however, that this method may over or underestimate the actual expenditures in a given year due to the fact that payment for arms may not coincide in time with deliveries...' ACDA, WMEAT 1985, p.140.

[47] Ball, op-cit., p.186.

FIGURE 5.3. - Correlation between Defence Spending as a Share of GDP and share of investment in GDP

NEGATIVE		POSITIVE
South Korea Nigeria* Peru Phillipines Tunisia Egypt Venezuela (7)	SIGNIFICANT	Bolivia Ecuador Guatemala
Columbia Haiti Jordan El Salvador Mexico Thailand Uruguay (7)	Marginally Significant	Dominican Republic
Argentina Brazil Cambodia Sri-Lanka Costa-Rica Ethiopia Honduras Ivory Coast Nicaragua Pakistan Panama Uganda (12)	Non-Significant	Chile Taiwan India Indonesia Iran Jamaica Kenya Libya Malaysia Morocco Paraguay Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Syria Tanzania Turkey (16)

Source: Riccardo Faini,et-al, cited in Ball, ibid, p.168.

productive, it is often the case that other areas of the economy were not placed under the same microscopic scrutiny.As Table 5.6 partly illustrates, the role played by the consumptive capacity of the civil sector cannot be overemphasised. The more interesting point is that this even dated back to the pre-oil boom era even though elite consumption increased considerably after the *Udoji Salary Award.*[48]

Spurred on by the general salary increase ranging from 50% to 200% and a strong currency(£1 - N1.20), Nigerians acquired an overnight taste for consumer items ranging from the sublime to the ridiculous, mostly imported.[49] The hyper-inflation which resulted made life unbearable in the rural areas. It caused a rural drift to city centres, reduced agricultural exportation and condemned the national economy to a mono-product status, in which crude petroleum alone was bringing in 70 - 90 % of total national revenue.

In a country where government is the major employer, the ripple effect of the

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[48] This was a Federal Government review of all public sector salaries in 1974/75 which doubled and in many cases tripled salaries in the government workforce.

Comparison of pre-Udoji and post Udoji Salary Scales in Nigeria(salaries in **Naira** per annum)

Qualifications & Positions in public service	Pre-Udoji Salary scales	Post Udoji scales
Messengers	312	720
Health workers	830	2,142
Medical Doctors (Post-Qual)	1,680	4,668
Lecturers(P.hd; no experience)	2,424	5,760
Full Professor	6,000	11,568

Source: Federal Military Government of Nigeria Estimates 1974-5, Reports of the Udoji Salary Review 1975.

[49] A few of such importations included tooth picks, luxury cars and Nigeria attained the status of the highest consumer of Champagne in Africa. Interestingly, Nigeria's Nobel Laureate in Literature recently noted that the taste for expensive consumer items had been developed since the early independence era. See Wole Soyinka, Ibadan: The Penkelemes Years: A Memoir: 1946-65(London: Methuen, 1994)

unbridled consumption capacity created by the increased purchasing power probably provides a better explanation for the negative impact of import on investment and growth. For this reason, even if one agrees that military imports had played a role in the ensuing balance of payment crisis, it is difficult to attach any undermining influence to it. First, civil sector imports were not reduced at the expense of military imports. If anything, they grew more than military imports. But while all imports grew, it would be wrong to contend that this was stimulated by arms imports, since civil sector imports outstripped arms imports both in pre and post oil boom years by a large measure.[See Table 5.6]

Despite an increase in arms procurement levels during the Generals Mohammed/Obasanjo administrations and also during the subsequent civilian leadership of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, importation of arms was still no match for civil sector importation. Yet successive governments discouraged unbridled importation by banning many items. Even in the case of non-military but security related imports on which significant capital was expended like cement for barracks construction, the by-product of such expenditure spilled over to the civil sector, making it difficult for any strict classification as military imports.

Table 5.6 - Value of Arms Transfer and Total Imports and Exports for selected years in constant 1983 dollars($million)

Year	Arms imports	Total Imports	Total Exports	A.I/T.I %
1975	156	10,490	13,890	1.5
1976	82	13,420	17,600	0.6
1977	15	17,110	18,250	0.1
1978	71	18,280	14,200	0.4
1979	145	13,510	22,730	1.1
1980	85	19,930	31,420	0.4
1981	459	23,370	20,000	2.0
1982	241	16,800	12,750	1.4
1983	320	12,250	10,360	2.6
1984	464	9,052	11,460	5.1
1985	365	8,304	11,740	4.4

Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer 1986, (Washington, D.C: ACDA, 1987) p.129.

Table 5.7.- Vehicle Imports Vs Capital Spending on Agric, Health & Education in Pre/Post Udoji Award years(N.million)

Amount spent on:	1972	1973	1974	1975
Car Imports	45.36	76.39	80.53	176.07
Cap.Expenditure on Agric.	20.7	35.4	87.4	211.2
Cap.Expenditure on Education	21.3	16.3	134.4	631.1
Cap. Expenditure on Health	11.4	16.6	-	180.8

Sources: Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria cited in T.O. Odetola, op-cit., p.42 and Recurrent and Capital Estimates of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1975 (Lagos: Government Printer, 1975)

For example, there was tremendous informal sector construction related growth which derived from the barracks projects in the mid and late 1970s, i.e. local labour and construction industry growth, schools and other civil sector business initiatives were also developed. Indeed, if as General Alani Akinrinade, the first Chief of Defence Staff argued, "seventy five per-cent of capital funding between 1970-1980 went on defence construction, resulting in 16,000 extra housing units, effectively only 25% could be said to have gone on arms importation,"[50] the capital allocation spent on construction ideally aided domestic growth through provision of jobs and sustenance of small scale businesses.[51]

While it remains possible, and to some, highly probable that growth in arms import contributed to balance of payment crisis, it is safe to assume its role was less significant than the imbalance caused by the consumer side of civil sector imports. It may be argued that this sector would have freed more money into the economy than defence spending reduction as the figures above clearly indicate. Besides, instead of holding defence expenditure responsible for reduction in available resources caused by the downturn in the agriculture sector as Odetola and others argued, it was the urban wealth created by the Udoji Salary increase and the high capacity for fraud in the 1970s and 1980s that would seem responsible for reduced agricultural exports. At the same time the dependency of the Agricultural sector on the

[50] General Akinrinade interviewed, Sunday Punch(Lagos), 11 October 1981

[51] This view is reinforced by J 'Bayo Adekanye. See Adekanye, In Search, op-cit

vagaries of the international commodity market heightened the despondency that had riven the sector by then.

To buttress this point, it is important to note that while cross national studies often neglected the skewed profile of the undoubtedly huge arms transfer to Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, transfers were only concentrated in a few areas of the continent. Of the twenty large arms importers in the third world during this period, only one - South Africa is from Sub-Saharan Africa. Others were either from the Middle East or from war torn areas of the continent - Ethiopia, Morocco, Egypt, Angola and Somalia.(See Table 5.8) Hence, if arms import never constituted a significant portion of foreign exchange usage, it cannot be held solely or primarily responsible for low foreign exchange reserves and the low investment ratio that Nigeria experienced in the late 1980s.

Another area in which reduction in trade balance and investment portfolio has been attributed to defence expenditure is in its huge recurrent budgets. While it is true that all recurrent budgets, including defence encourage lower savings rate and investments ratio, and while it is also true that increase in defence spending co-relates to increased number of men under arms, demobilisation did not yield the expected peace dividend, because it was too little and too late as we argued in Chapter four and also in terms of the added pensions costs accrued even as many demobilised soldiers found jobs in other security related sectors of the economy.[52] Equally, while the 1975 salary rise in the military sector [which was significantly higher than those awarded in the civil sector,] was also accompanied by an expansion of the officer corps and coup induced retirements, all of which affected overall resource availability,[53] there is no evidence that this rise, (undesirable for the general populace as it seemed) deprived other sectors (of the economy) of necessary resources. Instead, defence sector increases would appear to have benefited mainly from the oil revenues accrued in the post-Arab oil embargo.

As the Central Bank of Nigeria's Principal Finance and Economic Indicators

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[52] Professor J 'Bayo Adekanye has traced the exponential rise of pension cost in the period under study. See Adekanye, 'The Role' Part Two, op-cit. A lot of those demobilised were offered employment in other para-military services like the police, customs and immigration while a sizable number were sent to all secondary schools in the country to take charge of discipline, still with the Federal Government footing the bill.

[53] Adekanye, The Role, ibid., p.14.

illustrated, the expansion of revenue led automatically to expansion of expenditure from N1,130million in 1970 to N5,258 in 1975 - the year the salary rise was effected. What can be said, however, is that it would seem almost axiomatic that any unexpected rise in national revenue in Nigeria would almost always result in a rise in defence spending, which is a confirmation of one of this study's major hypotheses.

Table 5.8. Leading Importers of major weapons in the Third World 1971 -1985 ($million at 1985 constant price)

Country	Value	Share	Cumulative percent
Iraq	22,771	8.0	8.0
Iran	22,085	7.7	15.7
Syria	20,585	7.2.	22.9
Egypt	20,476	7.2	30.1
Libya	20,250	7.1.	37.2
India	17,491	6.1	43.3
Israel	15,143	5.3	48.6
Saudi Arabia	12,435	4.3	52.9
Vietnam*	8,796	3.1	56.0
Argentina	7,213	2.5	58.5
Algeria	5,690	2.0	60.5
Pakistan	5,678	2.0	62.5
Taiwan	5,646	2.0	64.5
South Korea	5,519	1.9	66.4
Peru	5,436	1.9	68.3
Jordan	4,833	1.7	70.0
Brazil	4,741	1.6	71.7
South Vietnam*	4,690	1.6	73.2
Morocco	4,298	1.5	74.7
Venezuela	4,080	1.4	76.1
Cuba	3,776	1.3	77.4
Kuwait	3,335	1.2	78.6
Indonesia	3,309	1.2	79.8
Ethiopia	3,165	1.1	80.9
Nigeria	3,142	1.1	82.0
Sub Total	234,579		82.0
Third World Total	285,818		100.0

Source: M. Brzoska and T.Ohlson, SIPRI, Arms Transfer to the Third World, 1971 - 85 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) p.7 & App.7.

*South Vietnam for the period- 1971 - 74, Vietnam covering North Vietnam from 1971 - 75, then North and South added 1976 - 1985.

It also confirms partly that the defence expenditure has an autonomous existence devoid of the trappings of economic recession. This is further supported by the experience in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 as well as Nigeria's most recent experience in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.

As the 1990-91 Gulf conflict induced windfall for Nigeria's petroleum clearly depicted, whereas, Nigeria was one of the OPEC suppliers to benefit from Iraq/Kuwait's inability to supply oil throughout the crisis, a recent World Bank investigation of Nigeria's finances has revealed that at least $2 billion of the $5 billion made in the unexpected windfall was yet to be accounted for.[54] Giving room for graft and personal aggrandizement [the Babangida government also spent $1 billion hosting the annual conference of Organisation of African Unity leaders in June 1991], a thorough analysis of government spending during this period when projected revenue was surpassed, revealed a significant rise in defence spending and defence commitments. Following the short-lived oil boom in 1980 when the price of oil reached $42 a barrel, the country witnessed a large scale re-armament programme which saw the procurement of the MK.III Main Battle Tanks, the C-130-H Hercules Transport Planes, two squadrons of Jaguar jets (only one was eventually delivered), the delivery of a Naval Frigate, among many other procurements. Equally, shortly after the Gulf War induced boom in 1991, the hitherto embargoed arms procurement occasioned by the insolvent economy resumed fully with orders placed for Vickers MK-3 tanks for about $298 million,[55] finance of Nigeria's peacekeeping force in Liberia and procurement of 100 Dornier made Air beetle trainers from Germany, not to mention the arms for oil swap with the Czechoslovakians, all totalling $1.5billion.[see Appendix III]

Hence, regardless of the role played by increased defence personnel related costs or even procurement not based on any strategic need, defence expenditure cannot be held solely responsible for the receding economic growth in the post-1975 years. Reasons for this occurrence would have to be located within the context of government economic policy, the dependent nature of Nigeria's mono-product economy and the changes in the international

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[54] See William Keeling, 'Nigeria: Where the Gulf oil booty went,' Financial Times(London) 20 June 1991. The writer got deported from Nigeria as a result of the story. Two years after the initial report, the World Bank's confidential report on Nigeria's dedicated account has corroborated William Keeling's initial assessment.

[55] For details, See SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmament Report 1991

market during this period. Defence spending only seemed to have pandered more, though not exclusively to the world outside and was mainly utilised to consolidate regime security in the face of economic adversity.

As far as the argument goes therefore, Adekanye's 'military extractive ratio' thesis may thus appear somewhat exaggerated. Not only for the reasons already highlighted on account of savings, but mainly because the serious reduction in private capital investment in the period covered by this study cannot be blamed on military expenditure. Private capital investment which grew after the oil boom never really formed a significant portion of Nigeria's GDP - mostly for reasons of the ruling elite's distaste for growth promotion incentives at the expense of self-enhancement. Indeed, the country's experience over the years, has more or less proved that future reductions in defence expenditure is unlikely to ramify to investments in the productive sectors of the economy. Instead, the likelihood that it would be used in pursuit of other 'non-defence consumption' appears to be very high. Although it is arguable that instability caused by incessant military intervention and the attendant military nationalism discouraged private sector investment, this view generally lacks merit. The period of military rule (1970 -1979) which also coincided with the period foreign companies were nationalised witnessed the highest private capital growth rate in the country. In fact, while private corporation profits grew, as a proportion of national income, capital flight worsened by the elaborate method of fraud and over-invoicing, all of which affected Federal Government's level of investments.

Yet even if arms imports, recurrent budgets and defence expenditure as a whole played a relatively insignificant part in growth reduction and lack of investment, the same cannot be said affirmatively of its role in public sector indebtedness. While available international figures on the security sector portion of third world indebtedness remains highly suspect[56], Nigeria's part of that debt is often regarded as dubious.[57] As Table 5.2 indicates above, by the time the civilian regime was ousted in 1983, total foreign debt had reached

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[56] Ball, op-cit.,p.195

[57] At the height of the debate on Nigeria's indebtedness in 1984, the military regime then hired Chase Manhattan Bank in America to authenticate all alleged claims of Nigeria's indebtedness. Whilst the report claimed their was reason to believe some of the debts were not genuine, it was inconclusive on many of the debts.

N40 billion. Since this figure has remained a subject of controversy, the relationship between the security side of foreign debt and total indebtedness remains decidedly blurred.[58] Despite these uncertainties and the clearly hidden aspects of foreign related military debts, it would appear that the portion is not as significant to the country's indebtedness as the impression always given in the local press and academic fora.

The trend in security side indebtedness has shown clearly that countries affected were mostly those non-oil producing developing countries, heavily dependent on the preferential treatment of foreign military sales deals (FMS)[59]. Since Nigeria never really participated in government to government arms deals, preferring middle men arrangement because of the greater leverage for independence and patronage, most arms procured were paid for on a cash-carry basis.[60] Conversely, other sectors of the economy incurred more foreign debts than arms imports. If we calculate on the basis of the figures provided in Tables 5.6 and 5.8 above and also assume that the $3,142 million spent on arms by Nigeria during the period 1971 - 1985 was borrowed, arms related indebtedness would still amount to under ten percent of the $30 billion allegedly owed to London and Paris Clubs by 1985.(World Bank Debt Table, 1986 and Table 5.2. above). Not only will it be too far fetched to make the above assumptions since evidence abound, without any shred of doubt that Nigeria paid for all arms bought during this period, including arms procured from the Soviet Union. In most cases, she procured weapons and equipments at slightly inflated prices than countries.(SeeAppendix III)

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[58] As Adekanye notes, 'we know as a matter of fact that a good portion of the estimates during this period (1970s) covering 'general administration' and under such expenditure heads as 'State House'(or Dodan Barracks)' and 'Cabinet Office' tended to contain (hidden) components of military expenditure.' J 'Bayo Adekson, Nigeria: In Search , op-cit p.56. Thus, according to him, it becomes extremely rare for military related debts as well as repayments to be identified under such general designations.

[59] According to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute(SIPRI) estimates, during the period 1972-1982, foreign borrowing by non-oil developing economies could have been twenty percent less each year and their accumulated debts at the end of the period some 15% smaller, had they made no foreign purchases of arms - SIPRI,1985, pp.449-50.

[60] The few exceptions were the funds always described as loans to the Defence Industries Corporation allocations. Specifically, it would appear that substantial part of the money paid for the Jaguar jets procurement in 1983 was arranged on a credit guarantee basis.

Yet, some analysts of the impact of Military expenditure on development are still of the opinion that,

> Arms imports, expenditure on foreign military instructors, training of military personnel in foreign countries and even purchases of military outfit and sometimes food for the armed forces from abroad all constitute a *direct drain*(emphasis mine) on the foreign exchange reserve of an African economy. The opportunity cost of the foreign exchange earnings used for such military purposes is the badly needed consumer and capital goods that could be imported otherwise with the same amount of money.[61]

That military related usage of foreign exchange stood in the way of "badly needed" consumer and capital goods appear to be very much in doubt. That it affected savings and investments even appear more doubtful. What the governments covered by this study seemed to have done was to buy consumer goods as well as defence equipment when both could be afforded, as they never really saw the two as necessarily incompatible. Even when the economic crunch became unbearable, a lot of military contracts were abandoned as the Shagari regime had no money to pay for defence equipments.[62] As we explained in Chapter One, the security perceptions of decision-makers in the period covered by the study were two-pronged. To them, satisfying the needs of the people through short term liberalisation of the economy and maintaining state enhancement alongside regime security through deterrence are the necessary pre-requisites, not "mutual exclusives" for national security. Since the state were at no time immune to societal pressures, despite posturings to that effect by the security elite, government action was equally determined by regime security and societal pressures. The 'gun' and 'food' approach to national security only translated to a "guns" only national security policy when the security elite had no answer to economic adversity and social upheaval except internal repression.

While the 'gun' and 'food' approach to security may appear financially reckless to a detached outsider, to the Nigerian security elite this appeared technical and somewhat

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[61] Akinyemi, et-al, op-cit., p.39.

[62] Prominent among major defence items abandoned in the wake of economic problems already were a squadron of the Jaguar jets (18 aircraft), Chinook Transport planes and Puma jets from Brazil.

academic, as long as state revenue could cover the entire spectrum of procurement. To this end, one Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon was quoted in the height of the oil boom, to the effect that 'money was not Nigeria's problems, but what to spend it on.' And for the most part of the period covered in this study, this was the attitude adopted towards spending. Even while still uncertain about the cost of military related indebtedness, its negative impact on resource availability for the civil sector remained highly suspect. Yet if military related indebtedness played a part in the country's debt burden, it wasn't solely responsible, neither was it a major area of indebtedness.[63] As was the case in Brazil and Mexico, two heavily indebted third world countries, it would certainly appear that only a small part of the 1970s and 1980s indebtedness could actually be linked to military related procurement.[64]

On the other hand, because the military part of indebtedness, as we have argued seemed decidedly blurred, one cannot authoritatively absolve military related expenditure from any negative role in the debt servicing sector. To the extent that the armed forces was seen, largely as maintaining erstwhile levels of appropriation of national revenue when austerity measures were introduced in 1982, this may appear reasonably valid. What often remains hidden and deliberately excluded from public consumption is that the armed forces shared in the severe setback suffered by other sectors in the economy during these austere times. Indeed, as army records showed, the N5 billion requested for capital allocation during the plan period (1981-85) was reduced to N1.66 biliion, still a not insignificant proportion of a very weak economy.[65] The fact that the armed forces had come close to the amount initially sought by 1985 would seem to confirm our earlier hypothesis that larger deficits or debts, in actuality do not reduce government's spending latitude in the military sector, even if it does in the budgetary behaviour. This is further confirmed by the insignificant reduction defence expenditure witnessed throughout the period covered by the study, not to mention the blurred nature of security spending. The highly aggregated nature of Nigerian budgets, in terms of military related debt repayments have already been touched upon by some

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[63] For details, See John Ohierhenuan, Nigeria's Economy and the Prospects for Change,' African Studies Review, Vol.23, No.2, 1988.

[64] See Ball, op-cit., p.203.

[65] For details, see Director of Army Staff Plans and Duties brief to the 1982 Chief of Army Staff Conference - (DASD/Plans Report) pp.1-2.

researchers, principally Adekanye. The conclusion is that they tended to contain hidden components.' Due to inadequate information on the state of military related debt repayment, it will be difficult to pass any judgement in that respect, at least in so far as the argument on economic growth and available resources went.

Thus, if we conclude from the various evidence adduced that defence expenditure did not affect resource availability by hampering economic growth, the obverse of this position is not necessarily true, since defence expenditure did not bring about a military - led industrialisation either which successive governments aimed at. Yet this seemed to be a usual occurrence in the military sectors of countries which boasted of a positive association between defence and economic development. Although growth and development may be two sides of the same coin in that they both imply progress of some sort in the normative sense, an enduring process of institutional change instrumental in accelarating the rate of increase of average output,'[66] was lacking in military spending throughout this period. Had this occurred, success in domestic arms production would have encouraged industrialisation and capacity utilisation in other sectors of the economy. The experience of Brazil, Chile, South Africa and a host of other third world countries who started their domestic arms production programme alongside Nigeria in the early 1960s readily comes to mind. If only with regard to the external market created in their defence sector and also in the role defence industries played in promoting other sectors like aviation and automobile industries. The negative impact in this area is treated comprehensively in the next chapter.

To the extent that the anticipated gains in the area was lost, its impact on resource availability could reasonably be considered negative. Also, the fact that efforts made by the government to institute change in the military-industrial sector created dependencies of their own[67], with added costs to the GDP could only be explained in terms of losses to the

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[66] Fritz Machlup, Essays in Economic Semantics,(New York: W.W.Norton, 1967) p.269 -301 cited in Akinyemi, et-al, op-cit., p.42 and Dudley Seers, 'Challenges to Development Theory and Strategy: The Meaning of Development,' International Development Review(December 1969)pp.1-10.

[67] On the issue of dependent industrialisation, see Andrew L. Ross,'World Order and Arms Production in The Third World,' in James Everett Katz(ed) The Implication of Third World Military Industrialization: Sowing the Serpents'Teeth, (Lexington,Mass/Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986 and Stephanie Neumann, 'Arms Transfer, Indegeneous Defence Production and Dependency' in Hussein Amirsadegh(ed) The Security of The Persian Gulf(London: Croom Helm, 1980)

economy. But on balance, how then did defence planning fare in the light of the above examination of military budgets and resource availability?

What seems to emerge from our examination is the ability of the military sector to operate largely autonomously, even when constrained by serious domestic pressures and overwhelming external factors. As a result, it is not unreasonable to argue that in areas where capacity utilisation was likely to be high and foreign procurement reduced, decision makers preferred to go to the foreign markets because of the added personal incentives accruable from dealings with outside manufacturers, and the less preoccupation there was with construction and monitoring. Inevitably, this had dismal implications for defence planning As explained in the analysis of weapon efficiency in the succeeding chapter, the web of international economic linkages and patronage seemed to have played a significant role in the failure to direct resources available in the military sector towards guaranteeing reasonable self sufficiency in defence production and planning effectiveness. Yet this is insufficient in explaining the overall independent nature of defence spending and its capacity to operate outside the boundaries of designated budgetary parameters. The explanation for this may well lie in Chris Dandeker's recognition that "state managers have their own interests, separate from that of, and possibly antagonistic toward, the dominant class and the maintenance of capitalism."[68] Although Dandeker refers to a war environment, it could be extended in explaining a post war situation as the evidence on Nigeria now indicates.

V. Conclusion

This chapter was premised on three major assumptions that (1) cessation of conflicts and economic recession do not necessarily affect national security spending; that, (2) reduced military expenditure do not automatically lead to increased civil sector funding. and (3) that military budgets are more a function of prestige, than a product of regional and international pressures or a function of planned response to immediate or enduring threats to national security.

The findings would appear largely to corroborate these assumptions. As shown in the

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[68] Chris Dandeker, "Warfare, Planning and Economic Relations," Economy and Society 12, February 1983, pp.109-110.

main part of the chapter, because defence expenditure operated largely within its own framework, not subject to review by independent sectors of the economy, this autonomy afforded it the opportunity to determine its commitment and increase its budget with little concern for the state of the economy. Ironically, even though the budget served the purpose of ensuring that other areas were not neglected as socio-economic programmes also benefited in the period covered, the conclusion is that defence expenditure and civil sector funding were both responsible for the contraction as well as expansion of available resources. While the potential for the military to appropriate more funds was high, there is no evidence to suggest that it did. On the other hand, there seemed to be ample proof that civil sector funding, especially consumer imports impacted negatively on available resources.

On the second assumption, the outcome is clearly that defence expenditure operated largely independently of the civil sector. In the ideal world of budgetary management, a reduction of funding in a particular sector of the economy ought to result in an increase in another area[69], but in the real world of defence expenditure in Nigeria, this would appear not to be the case. The trade -off paradigm failed, however, not so much because other areas were neglected but largely because the zero-sum relationship it emphasised seemed non-existent in the period under study. Even if it were to exist, the evidence leads one to conclude that such reduction would not have been expended on the productive aspect of the civil sector i.e. investments, neither would it have gone on long term social welfare issues like education or health but, probably to non-defence consumer spending.

The third assumption that the armed forces served a prestige purpose, perhaps triggered by its interventionary role in government would also appear largely true. The fact that the area in which the armed forces appropriated more than half of the resources allocated to it was personnel related is an indication of the concentration on self aggrandizement through political posts, promotions, pay rise, desertions, retirement and pension costs. When this is placed against the military leadership's appreciation of threats, the prestige factor also remains somewhat unequalled. The argument, however, is not that there were no legitimate security needs in the country, only that the focus of the security elite on militarisation shows

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[69] See, United Nations, Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development: Report of the Secretary General,(New York: United Nations, 1981) for an expansion of this positive correlation. For a critique, see Hans Henrik Holm, 'Brandt, Palme & Thorsson: A Strategy that Does not work,' IDS Bulletin, Vol.10, No.4(October 1985) pp.23-28.

a somewhat deliberate misunderstanding of the social and material conditions underlying the incidence of violence in society. The fact that the armed forces operated a largely visible force without any sense of coordination with the stated national objectives and without direction in terms of doctrine was a good indication of this problem. Although this could be explained partly by the pressures of the international environment on Nigeria's choice of enemies, and weapons procured largely reflected the dependent inter-relationship between prestige and capital, the capacity for self indulgence and corrupt practices by the security elite cannot be over-emphasised. The succeeding chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of this inter-relationship.

Finally, it would seem that while budgetary systems were supposed to serve the purpose of identifying government priorities and balancing competing interests, this function was performed during this period at a rhetorical level. The defence budgetary procedure remained a mere theoretical construct, hardly adhered to by defence ministry officials, nor subjected to sanctions by higher authorities. They hardly formed the basis of operation for the country's budget planners. When they did, it was to serve a political purpose; either showing concern for social welfare programmes when pressured to innovate and/or as an instrument of consolidating regime security when confronted with insurmountable socio-economic adversities.

But before the impression is created that military expenditure positively predicted to increased growth rate and investment ratio in the period covered by this study because of the broader and rather rigorous examination other social sector spending were subjected to, an in-depth analysis of military expenditure's efficacy in the light of perceived threats in the next chapter gives a comprehensive treatment to defence spending.

CHAPTER SIX

DETERMINING EFFICACY: MILITARY EXPENDITURE[1] AS A FUNCTION OF PERCEIVED THREATS

I. Introduction

The last chapter examined the premise of a causal link between decisions and resource allocation in the defence sector in very broad terms. We tried to determine defence burden against other financial responsibilities government faced. However, to test adequately the hypothesis advanced in the introduction of this study that: (1) the relatively high levels of military expenditure in the period covered was more institution driven, and, (2) that the higher the level of military expenditure, the lower the state of combat readiness among the forces, it is important to move the analysis beyond defence burden unto how actual allocations were utilised. In essence, this chapter advances earlier arguments in this study but in a more specific framework. The arguments and evidence are concentrated on two main areas where available information ran less risk of inadequate corroboration and where efficiency is measurable. This is achieved by attempting a cost benefit analysis of capital allocation in the period under study as well as through an evaluation of the forces employed. We are mindful of the fact that not all defence issues lend themselves to mathematical calculation and the subsequent analysis does not seek mathematical precision. However, in spite of the 'non-quantifiables' and uncertainties in defence

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[1] Military Expenditure in this context comprised of the items listed in the Traditional Budgeting Category in Table 5.1, namely, Pay & allowances of military and civilian personnel; Operation and Maintenance, Procurement, Defence Production and Construction, military aid, pensions and research and development. Professor Adekanye has provided a useful insight in terms of measuring these items. For details, see Bayo Adekanye, 'Sources and Methods for the Nigerian Military Expenditure Data: A Research Note', Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 10, No.1,1984, pp.88-104.

planning issues, the task of determining the efficiency of military expenditure will be better enhanced by an analysis of defence capital expenditure, recurrent expenditure as well as an examination of the technical efficiency criterion, especially in defence capital spending against the backdrop of terrain, opponent capability, tactics and weapons systems.

Thus, the first part of this analysis juxtaposes stated national objectives and perceived threats with the military strategy adopted in an examination of capital allocations to services. Since we have examined the key issues relating to threats perception, national objectives and military strategy elsewhere in this study, we will only deduce from evidence already provided. Second, this chapter provides a selective efficiency analysis in specific instances of procurement, by adding the cost of acquisition and operation comparing both to the ultimate output of these weapons and equipment. The intention is to identify if what was spent, on balance, was caused by any programmed analysis of threats perceived, simply personality determined or generally bureaucratically deduced. To achieve this, a variety of methods are adopted. Expenditure figures are critically examined, procurement costs compared and personnel costs assessed.[2]

II.WHO GETS WHAT AND WHY: FUNDS ALLOCATION TO MOD AND DISTRIBUTION AMONG SERVICES.

That recurrent expenditure constituted the bulk of Nigeria's defence spending in the period under study has been the basic argument of this study. In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, this was not unexpected due to the number of soldiers that came out of the war. Even then, the political authorities, as we observed in preceding chapters, recognised the need for a reduction in personnel costs in favour of capital programmes: first, to improve the army which performed less creditably during the war and second, in recognition of the smaller services' strategic relevance to national security.

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[2] We should, however, point out that not all figures used in the chapter are actual figures. Some are estimates in areas where proper records of actual figures were not kept or released. Nevertheless, actual figures were used where available, which covered the majority of the years under consideration.

But as Table 6.1 below highlights, even as a measure of the authorities' intention to demobilise and at the same time mechanise the army, improve the navy's ability to protect commerce and sea lines of communication as well as the support and interdictive roles of the air force, capital allocations never formed a strong part of total defence expenditure throughout the period covered by this study. Interestingly, in the three years that capital estimates exceeded recurrent estimates very significantly, (1975/76, 76/77 and 78/79), actual spending fell below the original projections.

Although the civil war experience had made it clear that mere number cannot always be decisive in a war situation, as well as pointing out the need for a regional security arrangement considering the role of Nigeria's neighbours in the war, the first five years after the war never saw capital estimates rise above 36.2% of the total defence allocation. The emergent shift in foreign policy direction notwithstanding, nothing really changed in defence capital allocations as it became evident that the principal participants in government were not exactly clear about the goals and objectives of policy.

Even in the defence construction sector where the bulk of capital allocation was spent in the decade after the war, the manner of this expenditure suggested a half hearted concern for capital spending in areas where personal gains were limited and raises the question if ever there was any efficiency criterion for such spending. Granted, the argument may well be that to get the best out of any military organisation, the need for an enhanced regimental structure was imperative, so construction of barracks and bases for the military after the war could not have been out of place. The fact that this exercise allegedly appropriated seventy five percent of total capital allocation till 1980 apparently underlines our quest for efficiency in capital spending during this period.

TABLE 6.1: APPROVED CAPITAL ESTIMATES TO MoD 1970-1990

FISCAL YEAR	DEF.EXP.(Nm)	CAP.ALL.(Nm)	CA/DE %
1970/71	314.8m	55.4m	17.6
1971/72	285.9m	37.9m	13.3
1972/73	370.2m	130.1m	35.17
1973/74	420.1m	87.6m	20.85
1974/75	532.9m	193.0m	36.21
1975/76	1,166.7m	737.7m	63.22
1976/77	1,037.1m	676.2m	65.20
1977/78	1,595.9m	900m	44.7
1978/79	1,304.6m	708.5m	54.3
1979/80	1,122m	602m	53.5
1980	989.4m	500m**	50.5
1981	1,319.2m	594m	45.03
1982	1,111.2m	451.7m	40.64
1983	1,178.9m	650m	34.21
1984	928.2m	359m	38.67
1985	975.7m	319m	32.7
1986	907.0m	164.6m	18.1
1987	809.7m	92.1m	11.3
1988	1,270.0m	440m	34.6
1989	1,267.2m	676.5m	53.3
1990	1,744,6m	n.a	n.a

SOURCE: Approved Budget Estimates 1970 - 1990.

CAP.ALL: Capital allocations
** : Budget only for nine months - April-December 1980 as the fiscal year changed from April - March to January - December.

While the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime which assumed power in July 1975 attempted to redress the lopsided nature of defence spending, the impact of their effort did not become clear until they left office in 1979. By that time the army size had reduced by about 100,000 men from its wartime size of 250,000 men and defence capital spending direction under the regime reflected regional power

projection and inclinations.[3]

In spite of these efforts, however, the overall pattern of defence spending in terms of output and attainment of policy objectives, as exemplified in capital expenditure, seemed rather erratic and less reflective of stated goals and projected military strategy. As Tables 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate in the last chapter, even in areas where intentions underlying budget estimates had been lofty and reflective of stated objectives, actual expenditure fell far short of set goals. Compared with the approved estimates in Table 6.1, one clear pattern is that emerged was that actual capital expenditure in defence fell far short of budget estimates in the years for which actual expenditure were available. Also except in 1978/79 and 79/80 fiscal years, capital expenditure never exceeded recurrent costs. Even though the figures shown for the years are estimates, it is unlikely that they will differ very much from actual figures. As noted above, these were the years when the impact of demobilisation became clearly evident. In addition, delivery, and in some cases, final payment for weapons procured were made in the two years. This, however, is not to say that defence expenditure served the purpose of the national objectives which by the middle of the 1970s decade, had acquired a combative continental component.

Although the military doctrine of 'offensive-defence' had become better articulated by the principal participants in the government and efficiency had become a criterion well sought after in defence planning[4], since the key participants had the army as their constituency, only lip service seemed to have been paid to redressing the imbalance in funds allocation to the services.

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[3] On coming to power, the regime hastened the acquisition of a mechanised force and increased the combat readiness of the army, by the time they were leaving they had taken delivery of Nigeria's first consignment of main battle tanks - the Russian T-55s as well as the MiG 21s fighter jets and also ordered a Meko-Class frigate - NNS Aradu for the Navy which was commissioned by the incoming civilian regime.

[4] On assuming office, the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime set up tribunals to look into various contracts awarded by the Defence Ministry between 1970 and 1974, notable amongst which was the Lockheed Bribery Tribunal into the purchase of Hercules C-130 jets from the U.S.A.

TABLE 6.2. DEFENCE CAPITAL SPENDING DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE SERVICES/MOD 1970 - 1985[5]

F/Y	T.C.E	MOD/ISP/%	ARMY/ %	NAVY/ %	NAF/ %
70/72	75.7m	16m /21.1	53.2/ 70.2	2.58m/ 3.4	3.8m/ 5.0
72/73	81.9m	10.9/13.3	53.3/ 65.0	7.2m/ 8.8	10.4/ 12.7
73/74	114.3	11.6/10.14	89.4/ 78.2	2.5m/ 2.2	10.7/ 9.3
74/75	237.1m	20.2/8.51	176.5/74.4	18.1m/ 7.6	22.1/ 9.3
75/76	737.7mE	45.8/6.2	341.1/46.2	51.9/ 7.0	298.9/40.5
76/77	676.2mE	47.2/6.9	399.9/59.1	64.6/ 9.5	184.1/27.2
77/78	900mE	45.8/5.08	515m/ 57.2	172.2/19.1	164.5/18.3
78/79	708.5E	50m/7.05	461.2/65.1	98.5/ 13.9	98.6/ 13.9
79/80	602mE	53.5/8.8	363.3/60.3	113.8/18.9	71.2/ 11.8
1980	500mE	57m/11.4	255.3/51.0	110.4/22.1	77.2/ 15.4
1981	594mE	121.9/20.5	184.7/31.0	151.1/25.4	136.1/22.9
1982	451.7mE	76.5/16.9	143.9/31.8	107.1/23.7	105.7/23.4
1983	650mE	63.5/9.76	156m/ 24.0	80m/ 12.3	344m/52.9
1984	359mE	56m/15.6	107m/ 29.8	36m/ 10.0	160m/44.5
1985	319mE	53.8m/16.8	104.2/32.6	37.2/ 11.6	123.6/38.7

SOURCE: Ministry of Defence. NAF: Nigeria Air Force.
F/Y: Fiscal Year. MOD/ISP: Inter-Service Projects.
TCE: Total Capital Expenditure
E: Estimates. Actual Expenditures for 1975/76, 76/77, 77/78 and 1983 were N519.9,N454.9, N562 and N377.4 respectively.

While it was never in doubt that the smaller services were more capital intensive, and despite the recognition that they were better placed in the enhancement of the country's continental security objectives, capital expenditure in the navy and the air force only reflected a near balance and in some cases, exceeded the army's allocation during the 1981-85 National Plan period which was implemented by civilians. As figures in Table 6.2 show, it was only in 1981 that allocations among the three services nearly came to par. In fact, in subsequent years, funding for the

[5] Government stopped publication of service expenditure estimates in 1985.

navy and the air force either equalled or exceeded that of the army.

As we observed in Chapter Four, the reason for this during the civilian era may not have been unconnected with the fact that politicians had little or no special preference for any of the services. Besides, there was an overwhelming attraction among politicians of the period to smart technology and sophistication, factors which tended to favour the navy and the air-force. However, in spite of the seemingly dispassionate steps taken by the civilian administration, one was less certain if this happened on the strength of any re-appraissal of defence needs and national objectives or as a result of capricious and/or reactive evaluation of the regional scene. As we have argued elsewhere in this study, the events of May 1981 on the Cameroon/Nigeria border, the 1981 Nigeria/Chad frontier imbroglio and generally the fluidity in the Southern African sub-region created uncertainties about adversaries' force structure and military preparedness, the net effect of which seemed to be decisionmakers' overestimation of the damage the enemy could cause in an attack.[6]

Table 6.3 indicates the amount allocated to equipment and weapon procurement out of the total capital spending in the defence sector. In doing this, our aim is to determine how capital expenditure which remains the only evidence of long term planning in the defence sector reflected little or no direction of government's defence planning. (We have classified capital costs for all the services under two broad headings - Construction/related costs and Equipment/Weapons.) Even though most of the figures given below are estimates, except where indicated, they illustrate a consistent pattern which seemed to emphasise a service view of defence budgeting rather than a central coordinating concern for capital allocations' placement under the tutelage of civilian leadership or professionals in the Ministry of Defence. Due to the ascendancy of service options, the long term planning envisaged, in respect of a coordinated military strategy failed to emerge in the allocation as well as procurement planning processes.

Clearly noticeable also was the distant correlation between increased capital

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[6] As Barry Buzan contends, 'preparations vary according to where the observer is located in relation to the thing viewed and according to the internal constitution of the viewer.' See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, (Sussex:Wheatsheaf, 1983) p.226.

allocation in the fiscal years 1975/76 to 1981 due to 'perceived threats, increased responsibilities in the region and the uncertainties in the international environment' as well as concentration of such allocations in the construction and related costs area and not towards capability improvement.

Also, while our concern about the recurrent sector of the defence budget related to the consistent overspending of earmarked funds, the contrary seems to be the case in capital allocations, at least in years where actual figures were available.[7] Even though the above figures reveal a significant aspect of the importance attached to capital spending aimed at defence and national security, evidence of the surrounding circumstances of such expenditure and their impact on peacetime military strategy and national security indicated a lot less concern for those objectives. The succeeding section examines available evidence in defence procurement, construction and production in terms of their cost effectiveness.

III. Defence Procurement, Weapons System and Threat Perception: A Cost Benefit analysis of capital allocation

While planning remains at the heart of any organisational effectiveness, defence procurement had over the years attained a prime role in isolation of and, not necessarily in consonance, with overall defence planning. To proponents of increased defence spending updating weaponry was one reason why Nigeria cannot afford to spend less on defence in spite of the economic problems and reduction in perceived international threats.

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[7] For example, even though N737.7, N676.2, N708.5 N650.0 and N900 million were the capital allocations for 75/76 to 78/79 and 1983 fiscal years, only N519.9, N454.9, N562m and N377.4 were actually spent for those years respectively. Besides, if one were to add the grossly inflated costs of most procured capital items, cases of underspending would have been greater.

TABLE 6.3. BREAKDOWN OF DEFENCE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 1970 - 1990(in Nm)

		MoD/ISP	ARMY	NAVY	NAF
F/Y	TCE	C&RC/E&W	C&RC/E&W	C&RC/E&W	C&RC/E&W
70/2	75.7	3.53/4.3	74.3/7.8	0.8/5.5	1.2/0.8
72/3	81.9	2.30/.17	40.8/21.1	3.6/3.4	5.7/4.7
73/4	114.3	11.6/.34	61.5/28.0	1.3/1.2	4.9/5.9
74/5	237.1	19.3/1.0	146.6/30.0	2.3/15.8	12.3/9.6
75/6	737.7	83.6/12.1	174.8/166.7	23.2/28.6	44.3/252.6
76/7	676.2	37.6/9.5	126.2/273.8	14.8/49.8	51.1/133.0
77/8	900.0	43.2/2.6	297.6/217.4	87.2/85.0	71.2/93.2
78/9	708.5	31.0/2.0	412.2/28.1	34.6/4.8	77.6/22.3
79/80	602.0	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1980	500.0	49.0/8.0	132.0/123.3	45.3/65.1	34.0/43.2
1981	594.0	102.0/20.0	43.3/141.3	65.3/85.7	68.1/68.0
1982	451.7	53.3/23.1	59.6/84.4	45.9/61.2	34.1/71.2
1983	650.0	61.5/1.93	54.6/101.3	47.2/32.7	54.4/289.5
1984	359.0	54.5/1.5	54.6/52.4	26.3/9.7	140.1/139.9
1985	319.0	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1986	164.6	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1987	92.1	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1988	440.0	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1989	676.5	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1990	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A

SOURCE: Approved Budget Estimates
MOD/ISP: Ministry of Defence/ Inter-Service Projects
TCE: Total Capital Expenditure
F/Y: Fiscal Year
C&RC: Construction and Related Costs
E&W: Equipment and Weapon Costs

*: Figures do not necessarily add up in all cases since actual spending differ markedly from approved estimates. By 1986 when the Federal Government embarked on a rolling development plan, detailed breakdown was no longer available.

Equally, opponents of high defence spending considers it the central weakness in defence planning and implementation; and one good reason why spending should

be reduced to a 'manageable proportion'[8]. While the assumption that small will prove manageable appear somewhat unfounded, whether one considers the net effect of procurement spending on economic stability to be good or bad remains deeply attitudinal. This treatment of defence procurement **per se** as the ultimate key to a successful military end, albeit steeped in experience[9], constitutes a major error in contemporary analysis of defence planning in Nigeria and a reason why the debate is highly emotive. The approach here therefore is to explain the efficiency of military expenditure where it occurred and the consequences of large scale defence programmes on the overall economy.

The consistent inability or deliberate neglect in recognising the inter-relatedness of technology, strategy and economy in defence planning by decisionmakers, which has proved to be the bedrock for the seeming lack of direction in the area of procurement. Hence, attempts to isolate issues of cost effectiveness outside of technological efficiency and strategic relevance to the security objectives have only succeeded in giving a superficial plausibility to the defence planning process. While one may tend to agree with the view that the most efficient may not be the most economical since 'a weapon may be cost effective on some grounds and evidently dangerous to apply on others', the truth in the paradox should however, not preclude a country from recognising the bond that exists between militarisation and the economy in any appraisal of the nation's perceived threats. The Nigerian experience, especially in the period under study would appear not to lend itself to this rule of interdependent relationship. The key lesson of the civil war, which was that long term

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[8] For contrasting viewpoints in the procurement debate, see O.A.Oladimeji,'African defence spending in the 1990s,' African Defence,(Paris) July 1990, pp.40-1 and Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, Issues in Nigerian Politics since the Fall of the Second Republic-1984-1990,(Lampeter/Queenstown/Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991) for a critique based on this correct but simplistic tool.

[9] Defence procurement only attained this larger than life role when the Nigerian civil war broke out and the country's security elite experienced disappointment from traditional suppliers since procurement was import oriented. Instead of using the aftermath of the war to redress this problem of dependence on foreign sources of weapons which nearly cost the country its unity, the authorities chose the soft option of procurement from a variety of sources with little consideration for technology and economy.

planning in a situation where security objectives were clearly identified and the most efficient weapon systems sought ultimately makes better sense seemed so ephemeral.[10]

Instead, a more capital intensive pattern of procurement was noticeable after the war perhaps in line with the leadership's unique understanding of weapons systems processes which bore little resemblance to international practices and due to the underlying assumption carried over from the war that higher military expenditure and increased weapons procurement led to enhanced security.[11] At a time when the perceived threats and the nation's security objectives remained largely internal and border related, even though inchoate and undefined, this unusual understanding of the strategic arena created a high level of disagreement among key players in the post civil war administration,[12] as a result of which a facade of international threats as a justification for increased capital injection into the armed forces was created.

To the strategist, an overestimation of the unknown adversary's potential may be the prudent peacetime responsibility of defence planning if the country was not to be caught offguard. However, a delineation of the likely sources of threats and the capabilities as well as weaknesses of potential enemies is also necessary in order not to prepare for the wrong kind of war. Yet the idea that peacetime preparations should be exclusively shaped by perceived enemy autonomous priorities was fraught with

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[10] Even though the country diversified her sources of weapon procurement whilst maintaining links with those countries from which she suffered arms embargo, all the strides made in defence industrialisation during the war were abandoned in its aftermath.

[11] The war time exigency which forced the Head of State, General Gowon on more than one occasion to give blank cheques to individuals with little or no knowledge of the military requirements let alone specifications to procure weapons for Nigeria did not abate after the war. Middlemen continued to lurk around the defence ministry headquarters with the tacit approval of the commanders involved in this 'military-middlemen complex'.

[12] Late Chief Obafemi Awolowo- the Commissioner for Finance and Vice Chairman of the Federal Executive Council often credited with keeping the economy afloat during the war expressed serious doubts about the financial implication of this strategic choice. Indeed, he was said to have resigned from the administration over prolonged disagreement on defence spending with the then Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Hassan Katsina. I thank Odia Ofeimun, Chief Awolowo's ex-Private Secretary for this information. See note 74 in Chapter Three.

dangers. In the case of Nigeria, its ultimate consideration of arms suasion only seemed to reflect a particular perception of the policies and organisation of the armed forces in other countries without giving adequate consideration to extra-military factors.[13] Hence, the idea that more sophisticated weapons systems would provide the necessary antidote to threats, especially in terms of deterring enemies, a notion which was at the heart of weapon procurement and force structure decisionmaking in Nigeria would appear to be the central weakness of procurement policy in the period of study.[14]

As evidenced by many of the sophisticated weaponry procured in the civil war's aftermath, not only were they irrelevant to their purpose as they were mostly sophisticated weapons seldom useful in low intensity conflicts and recurrent border skirmishes,[15] such weapons often only reflected a particular service view as we show below. Even in cases where common items were concerned, they failed to serve the combat role for which they were acquired, created standardisation problems since they came from different sources, and encouraged needless duplication.

Despite the country's low absorptive capacity, its relatively limited technical base and the MoD's good but unenforceable conditionalities for procurement[16], defence

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[13] Yet, the idea that peacetime preparations should be exclusively shaped by perceived enemy autonomous priorities may be fraught with dangers. Not least because its ultimate consideration of arms suasion would only reflect particular perceptions of the policies and organisation of the military in other countries. In many cases, this often proves to be a one non-deterrent. Military strategists examine this particular conundrum rather frequently. For a classic contribution see Peter Paret and Michael Howard, Clausetwitz On War(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) and for a most recent contribution, see Edward N.Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace,(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 1987)

[14] Even though never explicitly stated, one gets the impression that the National Defence Policy was never consciously geared towards defence, if deterrence fails. See Chapter Four above for a more detailed explanation of this paradox.

[15] Carole Lancaster and Anthony Lake examined this common procurement trend. See their 'Trends in LDCs Military Expenditure,' cited in Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World, (London: Adamantine Press, 1989), p.205.

[16] Some of which are; adherence to approved procurement procedures; potential for standardisation; financial feasibility; technical consistency with existing items, equipment and facilities; potential for import substitution; private sector involvement and potential for local production by the Defence Industries Corporation.

procurement was often interpreted in the narrow sense as a 'mere shopping for military equipment all over the world and awards of contracts to suppliers. To quote one senior officer's description of the daily scenario at the MoD Headquarters,

> It is quite a sight at the MoD on any working day to see the number of foreign and Nigerian arms cum defence related items dealers who flock the complex...They all arrive carrying briefcases containing catalogues of all sorts of defence equipment ranging from rain capes to the latest destroyers and bombers. They gain access to all officers who have any influence on what equipment is to be purchased...Invitations are extended to HQ Staff and military officers to attend military trade fairs and arms bazaars...where the choicest hotel accommodation is made available to participants, all in a bid to influence decisions. The industries add all such expenses to the costs of equipment sold, and they put forward the best reasons why developing countries need the equipment and the staff are carried away by the smooth talking merchants...[17]

In an armed force where decisions about procurement have resulted in personality centered outcomes rather than task oriented impact, where state's needs were unrelated to her means, it is safe to assume that the higher the number of those involved in these decisions, the more the variety in weapons procured. Indeed, a recurrent practice was for every prospective supplier to team up with one high ranking military official who was sponsored on various 'fact finding' trips abroad whilst promising an agreed percentage of total cost of purchase as "backhander", if successful. This then provided the officer with the drive to promote the 'technological edge of his partner's product and how 'battle tested' they were.[18] In situations where many influential officers were involved, pecuniary incentives were widely distributed with little regard to the technological problems and training implications that might

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[17] Colonel(now Major General) Abdul-Salaam Abubakar,'The Centralisation and Coordination of Procurement of Common Items in Use by the Armed Forces in Nigeria', Unpublished Essay for the Senior Executive Course, NIPSS, Kuru,Jos, 1985, p.6. The author was appointed Chief of Defence Staff in November 1993 with responsibility for coordinating the three services.

[18] ibid.

have arisen from such.[19]

Apart from the inevitable proliferation that resulted from this kind of unplanned procurement, which understandably affected the weapons' efficiency[20], the element of 'needless competition' among the services with each trying to equip itself with the latest and most sophisticated arsenal and equipment irrespective of relevance to the country's immediate defence needs was attested to by many.[21] This partly explains why military expenditure often failed to function on the basis of perceived threats or agreed strategy.

Major General George Innih, who as Quarter Master General, and also the Chief Procurement Officer of the Army during the second republic[1979 - 1983] observed

> ...this is an area Nigeria's defence planners exhibited apparent neglect... For instance, when the country embarked on the modernisation of its armed forces in the late seventies it tried to introduce the latest and most technologically advanced equipment into its military inventory without giving due consideration to the other geopolitical and social influences as well as, especially, the country's technological base.[22]

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[19] This competition driven procurement style also led to serious disagreements among senior officers and served as part-justification for some coup d'etats..

[20] In many instances, weapons and equipment purchased on a life-cycle basis of say, ten years could not even withstand peacetime training use of three years. Some were bought as new only to discover they were actually refurbished and significantly unreliable in combat activities. The Jaguar jets, AerMacchi MB339 trainers and the Vickers MK-III tanks represent examples of the former whilst the newly procured Italian minesweepers represent recent example of refurbished items purchased as new. See Appendix III.

[21] In all discussions with military officers during my fieldwork, this formed a central focus, with many of them justifying why that had to be done 'if Nigeria was to live up to its image as Africa's giant.'

[22] Major General George Innih, 'The Procurement Process,' in T.A.Imobighe(ed), Nigerian Defence and Security: Issues and Options for Policy(Kuru,Jos: Macmillan for NIPSS, 1987) p.39.

The situation, however, grew worse so much that in 1980 the Office of the President in reaction to the state of things at the Defence Ministry wrote decrying the,

> current practise ...whereby each service determines what equipment it fancies, but worse still, what sources it fancies and proceeds to acquire the equipment on a one off basis without regard to standardisation and continuity of supply, much less the deliberate development of the local armament industry. Thus, the Defence Industry(DIC) has virtually been reduced to a furniture factory because rather than develop it, the military prefers to purchase abroad. The Army has tanks and armoured vehicles from USSR, UK and France, it has field guns from Sweden, Italy and Switzerland; Airforce has planes from Czechoslovakia, UK, France, Italy, Germany, USA, and USSR...[23]

In spite of this indictment, not only did central coordination of procurement fail to become a deliberate object of policy, the incumbent civilian administration failed to change the procurement system because of fears of a backlash from the military constituency.[24] Indeed, civilian administration officials were also found guilty of collusion with senior military officers and the business community - local and foreign.[25] While it may well be argued that a fundamental concern of government in

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[23] The internal memorandum was signed by President Shagari's National Security Adviser, Alhaji Bukar Shuaib and addressed to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence.

[24] Personal interview with Alhaji Akanbi Oniyangi, Minister of Defence, 1981 - 1983 in Ilorin, May 1991.

[25] See Reports of various tribunals set up by the Buhari administration in 1984, the Justice Mamman Nasir Commission of Inquiry into defence contracts from 1980 - 83 especially did show the centralisation of defence procurement decision making on a few military officers, civilian bureaucrats, close confidants of the President and powerful individuals (foreign and local) whose stakes were high in what has derogatorily become known as Nigeria's 'military-middleman complex'. As one Military Officer who served on the Panel told this writer, 'some of the men and women awarded these contracts were hardly literate enough to understand what they were asked to buy, hence all they did was to resell their *military indent* [a military version of the notorious import licence] to other arms peddlars, thus increasing the

a capitalist setting such as Nigeria's was to increase business confidence by boosting private sector investment, conscious of its coalitional incentives, this selective strentgthening of the coalitional basis for patronage proved to be the undoing of not just procurement policy, but also sustainable private sector investment as well as government economic survival.

Firstly, as the specific analysis below tries to show, the beneficiaries of most procurement deals were foreign companies since many of the products in question were mainly imports. Secondly, the more influence garnered by senior military offcers in the process of civilian protection and incorporation, the greater its chance of maintaining a continuous upward swing in the share of national funds. Also, the more leverage possessed by the officers in dabbling into funds so acquired, the more personalised such funds became and the more powerful officers became in ousting elected governments.[26]

Yet despite the numerous opportunities for arms procurement scandals during the civilian regime between 1979 and 1983, many of such deals paled into insignificance when compared with what occurred under the military regimes of the earlier years, especially the Gowon administration but more importantly, because many key beneficiaries of defence contracts during the civilian era were senior military officers. Apart from examining the unique network of corrupt practises and its impact on defence planning process, the succeeding analysis into specific procurement exercises also attempts to compare the cost of acquisition and operating costs to the ultimate output as well as the degree of obsolescence.

The most cited cases in procurement scandals remains to date, the Lockheed Hercules C-130 Transport Planes purchased in 1974, the Vickers MK-3 main battle tanks procurement and the Jaguar jets purchased from British Aerospace in 1983. The Lockheed Scandal was provoked in Nigeria by congressional disclosures in America that a bribe of $3.6 million was paid to Nigerian government officials in respect of the

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cost of the weapons to the country.'

[26] Nigeria's second republic under President Shagari seemed to be a text-book example of this thesis.

procurement of six Hercules C-130 Transport planes worth $45 million.[27] Contrary to what was usually the case when allegations of that nature were internally generated, the international exposure pressurised General Obasanjo, whose regime had by then established a 'corrective' image, to institute an investigation panel which confirmed complicity of the Chief of Air Staff, Brigadier Emmanuel Ikwue who had earlier on discouraged government to government purchase of the transport planes. Other influential individuals were also indicted, chief among whom was a Greek national, Stephen Papadoupoulos who acted as the Lockheed Corporation's agent for the contract and had always been involved in Nigeria's arms deals. Infact, he was said to have been credited by General Gowon for saving Nigeria in critical moments of the civil war when the Head of State gave him a cheque for $10 million to shop for arms out of which he made commission worth $1 milion.[28] This particular incident, like many others after it, indicated the degree of influence individuals with little or no stake in national security weilded on the decision making elite. It also showed how easily national security can be compromised by those charged with key national assignments. Despite laid down procedure guiding major procurement which stressed government to government arrangement, this was easily circumvented by the Chief of Air Staff who continuously and deliberately emphasised the gains of procurement through a middle man. The fact that he was aided in this act, albeit implicitly by the Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, despite constant reminders of the MoD's terms of procurement, underlines the depth of crisis in the country's procurement cycle.(See Appendix II for full report of the Investigation Panel on the Lockheed Scandal.)

This type of personality driven activities in defence procurement assumes a wider dimension, especially in relation to their impact on the efficacy of military expenditure. Although it may have been possible that off the shelf purchase was encouraged because it afforded post-civil war governments a means of undercutting anti-Soviet Union political conditions sometimes attached to government to government sales in the West, it would appear that the encouragement given to 'off the shelf'

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[27] For details of the congressional report, see Newsweek International, February 23, 1976.

[28] See Report of Lockeheed Scandal . See Appendix II

purchase was more in terms of enhancing individual officers' material conditions than protecting Nigeria-Soviet relations. Either way, the country's security sector witnessed a standardisation crisis caused by the proliferation of weaponry in the armed forces' inventory, a factor which also dampened the prospects for an import-led substitution and the much hoped for military led industrialisation, often held as the reason for increased importation.

The standardisation problem was made worse by the high degree of obsolescence which plagued most of the weapon acquisition programmes of the 1970s and 1980s decades, despite their relatively low peacetime output. While lack of use may make attempt to measure effectiveness an *ex-post facto* issue[29], evidence abound from our examination of major weapons procured in all the services to show that the basic criterion of efficiency, that is minimising the cost of achieving a given objective, instead of maximising the objective for a given cost was hardly a factor. For this reason, apart from assessing effectiveness by measuring output against the cost of acquisition and operation, it should also be possible to measure the basic functionality of military hardware by the extent to which they were able to perform peacetime deterrent roles.

Although the intention is to include all major weapons procured in the two decades under study, this has not been possible. Our inability to do this should in no way affect the outcome, however since enough information is provided in the following tables to reduce the impact of incomplete data. Also, our concentration on major military hardware procurement, it is hoped, will reduce the effect of spatial representation. The underlying assumption is that more deliberation and long term strategic relevance analysis would have taken place before the procurement of Armoured Vehicles, Artillerry Guns, Air Craft and Equipment, Frigates, Patrol and Landing Craft and electronic warfare configuration e.t.c. than would have gone into the purchase of boots, kits, and ammunitions to mention a few.

Appendix III shows the state of the major weapons procured by the three services since the civil war ended. Apart from the cost of the capital items under consideration, another indicator of capability used is the rate of depreciation calculated

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[29] Indeed, Celestine Bassey's argument followed this logic in his contention that any assessment can only be speculative unless weapons are used in actual combat.

on the basis of economic life span and estimated scrap value. The information provided a fairly accurate account of the state of the capital weapons and equipment in the Nigerian armed forces. What it suggests about the post-civil war re-armament programme was a process whereby strategy and military objective were tied to favoured, albeit obsolete weapons carefully prescribed as 'battle tested', with little recognition for the fact that effectiveness depended on many things outside the realm of the equipment's history of 'performance'. Factors such as the clarity and coherence of military strategy associated with the employment of the equipment, flexibility of the force structure, effectiveness of early warning, command and control systems, adequacy of industrial support as well as ancillary elements and adaptability to the local scene were very rarely considered.

Although the principal mission of Nigeria's defence posture/structure after the war was to keep the country united, deter an attack upon her territories and basic national interest as well as broaden the regional component of national security, the underlying assumption by decisionmakers that the weapons needed for deterrence will also offer a defence capability or vice versa stood at the root of procurement confusion.[30] As Desmond Ball observes, 'it is an axiom in strategic literature that the criteria for deterrence and for defence are not only different but could even be quite incompatible...'[31] Even where the same weapons indeed served a dual function of deterrence against external aggression and defence of the internal realm as General Bali contends, surely different military methods will be required for meeting foreign threats as opposed to countering domestic crisis or civil strife. An assessment of the nature and functions of principal weapons and equipment procured in the services during the period suggested none of these distinction. If anything, it provided a good

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[30] It is interesting to note that the view is still prevalent among defence decison makers in Nigeria that a thin line divides deterrence and defence. In my interview with Lt.General Domkat Bali, former Minister of Defence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he opined that the difference was only in 'semantics' as 'you can use the same weapons for deterrence and defence.' Bali, interview, op-cit.

[31] Desmond J. Ball, 'Australia's Tactical Air Requirements and the Criteria for evaluating Tactical Aircraft for Australian Procurement', in Desmond Ball,(ed) The Future of Tactical Airpower in the Defence of Australia,(Canberra: Australia National University, 1977) p.66.

evidence of policy makers' mindset in their treatment of internal threats as less substantial.

Not only were these weapons related to a palpably offensive doctrine and external threats as we explained in previous chapters, in most cases they were also not suited to the conduct of military operations in the event where deterrence failed as they often lacked the necessary wartime support despite the country's civil war experience. While this may not be traceable to weapons inadequacies, it certainly reflected a faulty procurement policy.[32]

Even though an aggregate consensus exists among military officers of a post-war strategy that envisaged a combat operation fought on at least two fronts, disagreements over the relative importance of each service persisted as they all stressed different criteria. Hence, while the army was improving its 'teeth' by acquiring main battle tanks, heavy artillery guns, precision guided missiles(PGMs) and an army air unit, the air force was busy strengthening its battlefield, interdiction, strike, air superiority and air lift capabilities by procuring 'aircrafts boasting of large payload capability, good manoeuvrability, high all round performance and good weapon delivery accuracies'. Little or no provision was made for air defence which requires radar surveillance, detection and interception at long ranges, long patrol and loiter capability. An exception to the rule was the procurement of the Soviet MiGs 21U interceptors to aid the air force role of air defence in the late 70s. Even then, the fact remained that this aircraft only had point defence capability and not comprehensive coverage. This air defence deficiency in a country where the security elite often dropped hints of threats of sabotage to off shore oil installations and neighbours' intransigence led a former Commanding Air Officer, in charge of Operations to conclude that 'our installations can be bombed by aircraft in DC3 category without the air force being able to do anything'.[33] Not to be outdone, the Navy concentrated on improving its 'blue water' capability buying a frigate and landing craft totally unsuited

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[32] For instance, production lines for most of the capital weapons in Nigeria's inventory no longer exists and where they do, guarantees of spares and a rapid airlift supply in war time are not obtained since most of the procurement contracts are not based on life cycle costs.

[33] Air Commodore T. Falope, NIPSS Discussion Document, 1980. mimeo

to the demands of maritime defence and the deterrence component of the "offensive-defensive" military strategy expounded.

The central problem in this sophistication competition seemed to be the difficulty in determining what was really necessary from the standpoint of Nigeria's defence and in the light of technological and cost considerations. Clearly, that there existed no coordination in the purchase of these items is the intuitive conclusion to be reached. Indeed, the argument may well be that in fulfilling the traditional role of interdiction, close air support and reconnaissance expected of the air force in the Air-Land battle strategy of the Nigerian Armed Forces(one of the seriously contemplated areas of strategy), the procurement of PGMs on the army's part could only be regarded as a tribute to salesmanship and an exercise in duplication, especially in a situation where the L29 Delfins, (later replaced by the AerMacchi MB339/L.39 Albatross) and the Jaguar jets were procured partly for their interdictive strike capabilities. More so, the Nigeria Army's stockpile of 16 Roland Surface to Air Missile(SAMs) as well as the Blowpipe Missiles could actually be said to have proved ineffectual since they have never been used since purchased.

While we are not oblivious of the revolution which the PGMs brought into conventional weaponry and the implication of this on tactical air power[34], there seemed to be a strong correlation between the army's insistence in maintaining 'no links' with the air force (which interestingly grew out of it) and the subsequent procurement of the PGMs. As discussed in Chapter four, when the army was to set up the air unit of its composite division, it did not only do so without the air force' knowledge, the army also established the unit at a place with no air force basing facilities.[35] Whatever the basis for this action, the interesting point to us is the amount that could have been saved had coordination been strengthened in this respect. While not suggesting that the

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[34] For an outstanding analysis of these implications, see Ross E.Babbage, 'The Implications of changing technology for the future of manned aircraft,' in Desmond Ball(ed), op-cit., pp.25-50.

[35] The impression given by a former Minister of Defence, General Bali in an interview seemed to disproof this however. According to him, 'If this is true, why then are they helping the army in the training of its parachute unit.' The indisputable fact remains that the air force regards the army's pursuit in the area as 'unjustifiable professional encroachment,' as one senior air force pilot described it.

PGMs would not have been useful, their need at that stage remained highly questionable because of the relative ease with which important off - shore economic targets beyond the range of ground based SAMs could have been attacked. Coupled with the above, the country's large size made any such substitute for an area interception capability provided by an anti-aircraft missile somewhat superflous. For instance, the Nigerian Army's landbased force of Roland SAMs in Maiduguri, Northern Nigeria would appear far too removed from potential off-shore targets, most of which are located in the south. Although they are mobile(they come on AMX-30 Chassis) and can accompany the field army, it is believed that they are best suited to a semi-static defence role than to operations in defence of forward units. Besides, they take several hours to warm up and its 64kg weight is not man-potable, a factor which could pose extreme difficulty for a rapid deployment exercise.[36] Presently, as was evident in the outcome of the joint training exercise in 1985 the three services seemed to be preparing for a different kind of war .

Given the size of the country (928,000 sq. kilometers, 900 miles coastline) and the requirement for maritime, interdiction and air defence capability; range, effective early warning systems, weapons carraige, avionics, mobility, performance and wartime support from source all became increasingly important strategic criteria for aircraft purchase. And yet, there was not much evidence of evaluative assessments or user trials matching programmes with overall requirements and capabilities expected of all these aircraft. In the few cases where definitive studies based on single service requirements were written, for example when some air force officers warned against the procurement of British Aerospace Jaguar jets, highlighting its problems with 'manoeuvrability and stability at low altitudes' together with its receding production lines and lack of guarantees for spares, very little came out of such reports. The

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[36] The army's view in this respect, as put by General Bali (a former Artillery corps Commander himself) is that infantry SAMs like the Shorts Blowpipe, a man-portable, easily manoeuvrable weapons in battle and out of battle areas were also procured. A key deficiency however, is that the Blowpipe too is a point based defence tactical SAM and 'this is why we are now considering AWACs, which arguably strengthens the air force, rather than depreciates its value'. General Bali, Interview May 1991.

government still went ahead to buy the Jaguar jets.[37] The decision to dispose of the Jaguars jets, following its extremely high peacetime attrition rate seemed to have vindicated the officers' position now.[38] However, pilots' carelessness may also have played some part in this attrition level.[39]

Again, despite the view held by General Bali that air defence remained an essential requirement of overall military strategy, little attention was paid throughout the period under study to the cost effectiveness of non-aircraft and early warning/ guidance solutions in air defence. Two technologies which would have proved very useful in this respect in terms of cost and manageable technology were (1) Over-the-horizon radar systems (OTH Systems) with their capacity to detect aircraft and cruise missiles at very long ranges regardless of altitude[40], and (2) Airborne Warning and Control aircraft (AWACs) with its capability to coordinate aircraft and groundbased missile intercepts against intruding air attacks. At a time when considerable energy had been expended by the defence community in Nigeria over the South African threat of invasion, one would have expected that air defence capability would have received priority attention from defence planners.[41]

Although the above would seem to be the apparent option for strategy at the

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[37] I owe this information to some retired as well as serving pilots and flight engineers who wrote the report in 1982.

[38] See for details on aircrafts' reduction, Air Marshal N.O.O.Yusuf, 'The Reorganisation of the Nigerian Air Force,' Text of Paper delivered by the Chief of Air Staff to Researchers at the N.I.I.A, Lagos, September 9, 1991.

[39] At least, two Jaguar trainers were lost in situations that were otherwise preventable.

[40] OTH radar systems have the capacity to increase the warning of attack by 'air breathing air threats, extending surveillance coverage by almost 200 kilometres with its capacity for an all altitude detection capability.' See for details, Janes Defence Weekly, Weapons Systems 1987-88 (Coulsdon:Janes Defence Publishing Group, 1989),p.54.

[41] Although political conditions attached to arms procurement may have been responsible for this procurement fad, the general view, however, remains that the problem was due mainly to inter-service competition. The fact that effective air defence systems dominates current thinking, according to General Bali would seem to point to the likelihood of such procurement. Bali, interview.

time, instead defence decisionmakers got caught in the temptation of having a 'little bit of everything', thus restricting flexibility, creating more logistics, command and control problems for the ground forces as well as unmanageable technological crisis in a non-technically self reliant state. The situation became such that the aircraft in each category were so few, and of different make to be strategically significant.[42]

And the best measure of that incoherent preparation has been the first joint post-civil war military exercise code-named **Operation Seadog** in 1985. As the former Director of Army Training and Operations(DATS/OPS), Major General Abdullahi Mamman revealed in an interview

> **Operation Seadog** has gone a long way to illustrate to us how uncoordinated procurement system is in our services. We had ships from the Navy that could not communicate with each other, there was no way the three services could initially communicate with each other as each service has different communication sets operating on different frequencies. For example, the air force could not communicate with the ground forces they were supporting...[43]

Ironically, it was the army (which had the least need for it) that surprisingly found in its inventory ground to air communication facilities which operated on the same frequency and distributed it round to the other services. On the same exercise, Major General Dogonyaro, the then Army Director of Armour noted, 'we found the Navy's landing craft unsuitable as they could not go more than 4 knots. The troops were on board for eight hours and there was[sic] no toilet facilities.'[44]

What is spectacular in the result was not so much that the exercise failed but that it took the armed forces that long (15 yeares after the civil war ended) to admit

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[42] It would appear this error of judgement has now been realised as the air force now contemplates reducing the aircraft in its inventory from 14 to 10. believing very strongly that a force consisting of larger numbers of relatively lower performance aircraft may be more cost effective than one of small numbers of supposedly high performance aircraft. This, in part must have been responsible for the recent counter-trade agreement between Nigeria and Czechoslovakia for more of the good 'low budget' L39 aircrafts including spares in exchange for crude petroleum and the recent Dornier production of Air Beetle Training aircraft.. See Yusuf, op-cit, p.8.

[43] Personal interview with Major General A.B.Mamman.

[44] Brigadier J.Dogonyaro cited in Abubakar, op-cit., p.27-8

that cost effectiveness criterion was lacking in most of the procurement exercises of the post-civil war era. Although there were laid down procedures requiring user trials, matching specific service programmes with overall requirements and capabilities, definitive studies based on single service requirements, centralised coordination for joint procurement and inclusion of contractual, legal and quality control aspects in all procurement exercises, in reality, it was this relegation of technical liaison and neglect of professional advice that led to many unthinkable lapses in defence procurement[45]. Indeed, in their general disatisfaction with such lapses of procurement, the Navy emphasised the need for including Naval officers in MoD's procurement panels while also stressing the need for equipments' life cycle arrangements[46].

Despite the accumulated losses resulting from the obviously over-inflated defence contracts and the inevitably short life span of these weapons , the bedrock of the procurement lapses lay with the absence of an identifiable military strategy. The outcome was that each service interpreted national objectives as it saw fit and this resulted in the prolonged absence of a procurement policy which ignored current and future realities. The post war economic boom did not help defence planning too as it reduced the economies of scale at the expense of prestige and patronage. Since the only way the goals of prestige and patronage could be achieved was through large scale procurement of weapons of dubious credibility, defence procurement became synonymous with inflated contracts. In effect, as far as strategy for defence went, power projection through the acquisition of large warships and big transport and fighter planes,[albeit capital intensive and often strategically unnecessary,] won the day over tactical air defence that emphasised the deterrence-defence complex and a maritime strategy that projected protection of sea lanes of communication for which smaller strike patrol craft seemed more appropriate.

Although the greatest responsibility for this inchoate procurement policy must

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[45] It was this lack of coordination and user trials that led to the added but avoidable costs of replaced electronic configuration for the MK-III battle tanks in the early 1980s. It was also responsible for the procurement of already rejected American Mack 4 Trucks and Tank transporters in the early 1970s. The case of the Jaguar, MB 339 and a host of others also fall into this category.

[46] See for details, Summary of Proceedings, Decisions and Implementations, Vol.1, Chief of the Naval Staff Annual Conference, July 1987.

be laid at the feet of that network of beneficiaries in the military-middlemen chain, a rational and coherent equipment policy also proved difficult in the absence of a particular threat index specifying the nature of any external armed conflict the country might face, thus leaving room for multiple scenarios. The conflict between the ends of this procurement style and the excellence and battle readiness expected of the Nigerian armed forces remained an unresolved one even now. Indeed, up till the early 1980s, the thought of the Nigerian Navy serving as a commerce protecting naval force was seen as demeaning its role in national defence.[47] Interestingly, the Navy has now adopted the commerce protecting role as the major plank in its Trident strategy and the single most important reason why it deserved, more than the other services, a frontline role in the defence of Nigeria. According to a recent official document, 'the question is whether a destroyer is tactically desirable or economically affordable ...One area of urgent need is the requirement for a number of Off-shore Patrol Vessels(OPVs) for intensive surveillance of our off-shore tapestry for anti-illegal bunkering,(sic) fishery protection, active dump watch, search and rescue, disaster relief...'[48]

In all, while it may be argued that in the realm of strategy and peacetime military planning, economic principles may be an anti-thesis to the demands of effectiveness, the gap between sensible economic choices cum effectiveness parity could still be established in any defence procurement process. With Nigeria, it would seem that the greater the capacity for pecuniary benefits in procurement exercises, the higher the likelihood of the item to be purchased. Since defence merchants seemed to be aware of this perennial craving for patronage among those in charge of procurement at the Defence Headquarters, they were more susceptible to satisfying this need without caring so much about the operational relevance of particular weapon systems to the field users. This was also common in other areas of the economy.

This occurrence, more than any other reason was responsible for the

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[47] Dr Tom Imobighe recalled the Navy's 'relatively low interest in patrol activities and amphibious operations in the riverine areas to help check smuggling', According to him,'the Naval Chief at the time, Rear Admiral Akin Aduwo resented the idea of his forces' involvement in curbing smuggling activities. Imobighe, op-cit., p.79. Also see note 14.

[48] See Captain O.A.Oladimeji(ed), Seapower: Agenda for National Survival,(Lagos: Directorate of Naval Information,1989)pp.63-4.

embarassingly slow speed of defence production in Nigeria, despite earlier strides made in this respect. As it emerged in discussions with serving and retired military officers,[49] efforts to gradually move into a self reliant position in defence production through import substitution and license arrangements foundered at the feet of officers who became less interested in self reliance for reasons connected with the possible foreclosure of personal gains, in the event that this became a reality. The experience of the civil war as regards the dangers of total dependence on foreign defence procurement would seem to have mattered so little. As is usual in cases where there had been no significant shift in pre-war environment, it was easy for the defence planners to quickly put the experience behind them and return to 'business as usual'. In its place, personal bias and the size of companies' kickbacks became the criteria for defence procurement, as distinct from strategic options and possibilities for import-led substitutions and licence production.[50] Not unexpectedly, in such a dispensation, defence production became an object of lip service and the product of individual opinion and/or group interests. The impact of defence capital expenditure on defence production and construction in overall defence planning in the period is what we turn to in the next section.

IV: Defence Production/Construction and Threat Perception: The Productive Capacity of Nigeria's Defence Sector.

The preceding discussion dealt with the issue of outlining a logical sequence of factors responsible for the ineffectual procurement process in Nigeria in the period under study. It has strengthened the argument that if defence planning begins with, relates to and is expressed in terms of a strategic threats assessment, strategic doctrine and the integral calculation of an aggressor's real strength, procurement programmes would necessarily involve cost effectiveness studies and low/high technological trade

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[49] Especially with Major General David Jemibewon, a retired Director General of the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria and Brigadier O.I.Oteri, Dean of the Engineering Faculty at the Nigerian Defence Academy.

[50] Indeed, in a recent BBC documentary on arms transfers by Anthony Sampson, author of the Arms Bazaar, one French arms dealer referred to the notoriety of Nigeria's military officers in their demand for 20% of total cost of procured items.

offs which would ultimately encourage self reliance in defence procurement. It was the failure of planners in this regard which appear responsible for procurement officers' sometimes illogical and (other often) potentially wasteful preference for high and sophisticated technology, which in many cases, rendered individual weapon credibility questionable, in their abysmal joint service usage and disappointing life cycle performance. The debate on qualitative superiority and quantitative edge is a largely unsettled one amongst strategic studies scholars and defence planners. The evidence, however, seems to point to a cost effectiveness correlation in larger numbers of weapons of relatively lower performance levels than weapons of a smaller number of high performance level. This is more the case in states where the economy is inhibitive like Nigeria. Besides, simple and less complicated weapons offer a higher opportunity for import substitution and copy technology. This has had a tremendous negative impact on the country's strides in defence production and domestic arms manufacturing.

Nigeria's first attempt at domestic production in the defence sector started with the establishment of the Defence Industries Corporation(DIC) by a 1964 Act of Parliament.[51] In itself a purposeful blueprint by first republic politicians, it was actually the threat of the civil war in 1966 and the disappointment of traditional arms suppliers which rushed the blueprint from the deliberations of decisionmakers to the production lines of the Ordnance Factory in Kaduna, Northern Nigeria.[52] Initially designed to produce small arms and ammunition, it started with assemblying the Baretta small arms range, the rifle and 9mm sub-machine guns. It also attempted to manufacture 9mm Pistols and the 12 Bore double barrel short gun without any result.[53]

This relatively impressive start which peaked during the civil war was reduced to near complete inactivity shortly after the war ended. For a number of reasons, the

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[51] Federal Government of Nigeria, Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria Act(Commencement) Order 1964,Federation of Nigeria Government Gazette(Lagos: Government Printer, 7 July 1964) No.83.

[52] The Kaduna Ordnance Factory was officially opened on 1 November, 1964 with engineers from Baretta in Italy and Fritz Warner in Germany(West).

[53] I owe the technical details here to Major General(Rtd) David Jemibewon, the first military Director General of the Defence Industries Corporation.

Nigerian government failed to take advantage of the unexpected strides, made through improvisation on both sides of the war[54], despite the opportunity for consolidation which reconciliation had offered. First, it would appear that the maintenance of the **status quo ante bellum** lulled the government of General Gowon into a false sense of security which put paid to all attempts and calls for further developments of innovations made after the civil war.[55] Since the experience of nations disappointed by traditional suppliers during wars always seemed to point to concerted effort towards self reliance,[56] it is the outcome of such wars rather than the wars themselves which produced concrete and decisive changes in defence planning and production. Hence, a loss of territory and/or prestige or a constantly undermining threat traced to a perceived inadequacy in weapons might actually force a nation to look for practical solutions, unlike a situation where the threat seemed to have been overcome, the

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[54] Mortar bombs, solid fuel rockets, riverside boats, armoured vehicles, apart from the assemblage of personal rifles were some of the minimal strides in defence production which ought to have been continued. See for details, G.O.Ezekwe, 'Military Research and Development in Nigeria', Paper presented at the Armed Forces Seminar 1986(Lagos: MoD, 1986). The author was part of the team responsible for these strides on the Biafran side and later Nigeria's Minister of Science and Technology. See also, J.O.Adeniyi, 'Prospects for a Virile Military-Industrial Complex in Nigeria,' Text of Special Briefing presented at the NIIA by the Director General, DICON, May 1987; J.'Bayo Adekanye, 'Domestic Production of Arms and the Defence Industries in Nigeria,' Current Research on Peace and Violence, 4/1983, pp.258-269; D.M.Jemibewon,'Development of Nigerian Defence Industries in the 1980s and Beyond,' Unpublished Essay submitted for the Senior Executive Course, NIPSS, Kuru,Jos, 1980 and V.O.S.Olunloyo, 'Defence Industries Potential in Nigeria: Science, Engineering and Technological Inputs, Problems and Solutions.' Unpublished Paper.

[55] As Professor Ezekwe recalled, in several instances wartime experience was not converted to peacetime development assets and many proposals sent to various ministries were given a short shrift by the bureaucrats in charge. Ezekwe, ibid., pp.9-10.

[56] In Isreal for example, it was the embargo placed on subsequent military sales by France as a result of the Six Day War in 1967 that resulted in the development of the 'Kfir aircraft' Further disappointment suffered in the hands of Britain on account of spares supplies during the Yom Kippur War strenghtened the need for a self reliant defence production capacity. Another example was how the international arms embargo immediately after 1960 Sharpeville massacre impelled the establishment of Africa's most impressive arms industry, Arms Corporation of South Africa [ARMSCOR].

unreliability of traditional suppliers notwithstanding. As Samuel Huntington noted, defence planning and policy in the latter case only becomes 'the product of the compilation of purposes within individuals and groups. It is the result of politics, not logic, more an arena than unity.'[57]

The success of arms salesmen during the Nigerian civil war also formed part of the reasons why interest in defence production waned after the war. It led to a proliferation of arms as there were as many salesmen as weapons and a rather limited use of many disparate weapons which inevitably made copy technology difficult.[58] Coupled with the above was the acute disinterest in the other services due to the fact that DIC was perceived as an army cum civilian bureaucracy project, as its products had little relevance to the air force and the navy.[59]

In the prevailing atmosphere of mutual distrust, all these factors combined and resulted in the deliberate underfunding of the DIC- the organisation held responsible for the 'singular lack of performance' in defence production.[60] The acute underfunding in defence capital allocations actually paled into insignificance when compared with the portion of capital allocation devoted to defence production in the period under study. As Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate below, at no time did allocation to the defence production sector [referred to in budget estimates as loans] exceed the 3 % mark of

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[57] Samuel Huntington,'Two faces of Military Policy,' in Frank B.Horton, et-al(eds) Comparative Defence Policy(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) p.108.

[58] D.M. Jemibewon,'The Development of Defence Industries in T.A.Imobighe(ed), op-cit, p.156.

[59] This notion is still pervasive in the other services , especially after the Navy completed its Dockyard programme and the air force embarked on its first aircraft project of which the DIC was kept in the dark. Asked about the DIC involvement in the Air Beetle project, the former Chief of Air Staff, Marshal Ibrahim Alfa confessed, ' We didn't tell them, We know if we tell them it will burst. We kept it all a secret because we were suspicious of people telling us this thing cannot be done.' Interview with Daily Times Senior Editors in Daily Times(Lagos), April 21, 1989, p.7.

[60] Adekanye, op-cit.,p.259.

capital allocations, except in 1981 and 1982.[61]

Table 6:4 - Defence Industries Corporation: Capital Allocations in post- civil war development plans. (in N million)

Devt. Plan	Defence Capital Allo.	Def.. Ind.Capital Allo.	%
1970 - 74	509,676,223	1,000,000	1.9
1975 - 80	2,897,657,000	100,000,000	3.45
1981 - 85	3,200,000,000	125,000,000	3.90

Source: National Development Plans, 1970-74; 1975-80 and 1981-85
D.C.A.: Defence Capital Allocation D.I.C.A: Defence Industries Capital Allocation
* Whereas actual capital expenditure increased significantly in all the plans, original allocations(called loans) were not even spent in D.I.C.

Whereas the maladministration and general lack of care for domestic arms production during the Gowon administration gave way to a more serious articulation of the defence industries' role from 1975/76 when the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime assumed office till 1979/80 when it left government.[62] Still, not much success attended the increasingly verbal effort of the administration. One must, however, point to two significant shifts in policy direction during the latter years of the government. Firstly, it challenged the defence production lethargy by setting up a committee on the re-organisation of the Defence Industries Corporation in 1977, which produced a report later to be known as The Wushishi Committee report - named after Lt.General I.Wushishi, the Chairman of the Committee. The report, submitted in March 1978, recommended a separate organisation structure which should lead to the creation of a Defence Production Department within the MOD with a defence production policy formulating body known as **Defence Production and Procurement Committee(DPPC).**

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[61] Even in the two years this was because of the money added to the Armoured Vehicle Project in Bauchi, Northern Nigeria.

[62] Their assumption of office saw the rise in DIC allocation from N10 million earmarked by the previous government to N100 million for the Third Development Plan -1975-80.

A new administrative body to be known as Nigerian Defence Production Organisation with a Defence Production Board as its executive arm was to have replaced the Defence Industries Corporation. The head of this board should have been a 'serving military officer' not below the rank of a Brigadier, while 'top management staff of the military industries as much as possible were to comprise of serving and retired military officers with the relevant training background.'[63] Following from these recommendations and resumption of activities by D.I.C.'s technical partners, Fritz Warner of Germany - Brigadier, now Major General(Rtd) David Jemibewon became the first military head of the institution in February, 1979. But besides these initial steps, nothing concrete was done in respect of the other recommendations in the Report.[64] While it is arguable that total self sufficiency is unattainable in defence production since there is little evidence that import substitution and licenced production strongly recommended by the Wushishi report 'has enabled, or will enable developing countries to reduce the level of their military dependence upon the advanced industrial countries,'[65] it would be difficult to gloss over the potential benefits derivable from a conscious policy effort towards domestic production as so many developing countries have discovered, especially in respect of extra-military production benefits.

By the time the civilian leadership took over in late 1979, it became obvious that the discipline required for this kind of investment would not be forthcoming. Not

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[63] Other recommendations of the Wushishi Report included the establishment of a machine tools industry, dispersal of ordnance factories, linkage with civilian industries, creation of Procurement and Supplies Department in MoD; expansion of the Ordnance Factory's capacity, the creation of an Inspections Directorate, Finance by government investments, grants, loans from financial institutions and revenue from products.

[64] For instance, nothing came out of the recommendation for the creation of a Defence Production Department to be headed by an officer of Permanent Secretary rank, which was to serve as a link between the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Defence Production Board, Directorate of Procurement and Supplies and Directorate of Inspection, even though government accepted the recomendation.

[65] As Stephanie Neumann aptly observes, ' domestic production creates other dependencies.' See Stephanie Neumann, 'Arms Transfer, Indigeneous Defence Production and Dependency,' in Hossein Amirsadegh(ed) The Security of the Persian Gulf (London: Croom Helm, 1980).

only was the military head of the organisation retired by the administration, DIC reverted back to its old style of bludgeoning bureaucracy while the patronage factor reminiscent of party apparatus put paid to the country's search for self reliance in domestic production. Due to pressures from party members serving as commissioned agents to foreign arms peddlars and since procurement was not linked to production nor contracts tied to specific requirements for licence production, the D.I.C., for the greater part of the civilian era(1979-1983) 'only produced furniture and provided wind mills for rural water supply,' reverting back to its pre-1976 role.[66]

Table 6:5 - Defence Industries Capital Allocation on a Fiscal Year basis 1970-90

FISCAL YEAR	T.C.E(Nm)	D.I.C.E.(Nm)	DICE/TCE
1970 - 73	157.6	2.2	1.1%
1973/74	114.3	1.8	1.5%
1974/5	237.1	1.0	0.4%
1975/76	737.7	4.0	0.5%
1976/77	676.2	2.5	0.3%
1977/78	900.0	2.5	0.2%
1978/79	708.5	3.2	0.4%
1979/80	602.0	10.0	1.6%
1980	500.0	6.0	1.2%
1981	594.0	19.0	3.2%
1982	451.7	21.1	4.6%
1983	650.0	8.0	1.2%
1984	359.0	n.a	n.a
1985	319.0	8.0	2.5%
1986	164.6	n.a	n.a
1987	92.1	n.a.	n.a.
1988	440.0	n.a	n.a
1989	676.5	n.a	n.a
1990	n.a	n.a	n.a

Source: Capital Estimates of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1970 - 1990.
T.C.E: Total Capital Estimates
D.I.C.E.: Defence Industries Capital Estimates.

Although the office of the Chief of Defence Staff was supposed 'to coordinate,

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[66] Colonel(now Major General) Joshua Dogonyaro,'Self Reliance in Military Hardware: Nigeria's Experience' Unpublished Essay submitted for the Senior Executive Course of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Study, 1983, p.59.

eschew waste in public expenditure, enhance the standardisation of equipment,' under the civilian administration, the facts that emerged from the Contracts Tribunal actually revealed that some of the agents were civilians who can neither identify national objectives nor articulate threats, let alone know the weapons necessary for what kind of threats'[67]

The only activity that bore any semblance to domestic production in defence was the coordination of the special assembly plant established with technical support from **Steyr Daimler Pugh** of Austria 'to produce armoured cars for the military use and some heavy duty trucks as well as agricultural tractors for sale.'[68] Indeed, it would not be uncharitable to the administration to conclude in the words of a former Director General of the D.I.C. that the 'Shagari government of Nigeria's second republic was conspicuously ignorant of what defence industrialisation is.'[69]

Although a conscious and encouraging approach to defence industrialisation seemed to have materialised under the Buhari and the Babangida administration, 'not much success had been achieved by Nigeria in the area of domestic arms production.'[70], neither does the future bode well for the industry, except if current attempt at encouraging private sector investment in defence production is consistently promoted to yield dividends.[71] The approval of a defence research development policy and the incorporation of armament technology in the National Policy on Science and Technology seemed a positive direction for policy formulation.[72] Whilst this is fine on

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[67] Major O.Oladoyin, 'Towards a better and cost-effective approach to Ministry of Defence Procurement System: An Analysis,' in Defence Strategy Review Vol.11, No.4, April 1985, Journal of the Minister of Defence Library and Information Centre, Defence Headquarters, Lagos, Nigeria. p.15.

[68] Even though money was allocated for this project between 1981 and 1985, no significant impact was recorded.

[69] Brigadier J.O.Adeniyi, op-cit., pp.18-19.

[70] Adekanye, op-cit., p.266.

[71] See Olunloyo, opcit; Adeniyi, op-cit. and personal interview with Brigadier Oteri, former Director of Research and Development at DICON.

[72] The Defence Research and Development Policy led to the establishment of the Research and Development Department at the J.C.S. Headquarters; creation of

paper, the lack of support for officers charged with this responsibility underlines the defence planners' lackadaisical approach to research. Indeed, many officers considered Research and development postings as punishment grounds.

If defence production took the backseat in the years covered by the study, defence construction occupied the frontline in defence activity and appropriated more than two-thirds of defence capital allocations. The threat posed to the state by the sheer magnitude of soldiers that came out of the civil war forced the government to embark on one of the most comprehensive military building projects ever contemplated or carried out by any African government to date. The inevitability of the construction programme became apparent to the Gowon regime immediately after the civil war and in the aftermath of severe tensions caused by the increasingly fraught civil-miltary relations in major cities. Also the necessity for regimental fellow feeling expected of any army faltered and discipline wavered as gross insurbodination as well as lack of cohesion became the order of the day[73]

Between 1971 and 1979, the first decade after the civil war, '75% of total capital expenditure' was reported to have been spent on these barracks construction projects.'[74] The average expenditure for the period covered in this study(1970-90) came to about sixty percent. As indicated in Table 6.6 below which compared construction and related costs with total capital allocation, the gross disparity in these allocations became all too evident.

It is believed that the amount spent on this sector helped resolve certain perceived internal threats especially with regards to pacifying some disaffected ranks of soldiers who fought the war. Left to fester, this might have constituted a serious threat to regime and national security. Even if the above position is accepted as true,

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development centres at different locations in the country, creation of R & D units in each of the three services. See Federal Government of Nigeria, National Policy on Science and Technology(Lagos: Federal Ministry of Science and Technology, 1986) esp. Section 3.7 on military research.

[73] . See R.A.Towobola, 'Army-Civilian Clashes in Post-Civil War Nigeria: Tensions in Civil-Military Relations', Unpublished B.Sc Thesis, Political Science Department, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. June 1979.

[74] Lt.General Alani Akinrinade, Sunday Punch(Lagos) 10 October, 1981.

how cost effective was this exercise?

Over a period of ten years(1970-1980), 16,000 units of houses were built all over the country to accommodate military personnel. Determining the amount of wastage in this situation may prove very difficult, especially because of the problem of obtaining actual figures for the years in question. One clear area of wastage was the avoidable colossal sum the country paid as demurrage charges on the cement imported for barracks construction. On balance, the defence construction sector seemed to be the most enduring, and perhaps productive part of the defence sector in the period under study, even if not the most cost effective as Table 6.6. reflects.

Apart from alleviating social welfare problems through schools and hospitals (sometimes accessible to civilians), its impact on indigenous construction industry as well as the solid creation and sustenance of an informal sector petty trading market bears emphasis. For these reasons, there is a sense in which the sector positively enhanced domestic growth through its economic spillover into the civil sector.

V. Force Development and National Security: Force Employment and Cost Effectiveness[75]

Defence manpower policy constituted a seriously fractious aspect of defence planning process in Nigeria in the period under study.[76] This is rooted perhaps in the dashed hopes for demobilisation in the aftermath of the civil war. The consequent division between civilian bureaucrats and military professionals was stepped up by the

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[75] The concentration on the army in this section is inevitable. The army constitutes the bulk of the armed forces and provides the most convincing evidence of undermined manpower effectiveness. For instance, prior to the war, the regimental arrangement was usually a batallion of 30 officers to 800 soldiers excluding attached personnel. The shift after the war to a situation of a single officer to about 1000 soldiers, divisions with as many as 12 infantry brigades and brigades of over ten batallions at the very least resulted in a decline in discipline, training, administration and the entire organisation's efficiency. The two other services, at least in relative terms have a personnel policy geared towards professionalism since they are more technically biased and require a higher minimum educational standards even for navy ratings and airmen. Again, because they are small, their officer - ranks ratio aids easy management, command, control and regimental discipline. However, the two services have manpower problems and these are also highlighted in the analysis.

[76] See note 54 in chapter four.

popular press as the country came under severe civil-military stress.[77]

All too often, the controversy over demobilisation centred around the economics of defence manpower. Ironically, military decision makers (especially in the army) who had earlier identified demobilisation as a major post-war priority subsequently justified the size of the army in economic terms. It was argued that since the army, likely to be caught in the web of size reduction, was mainly manpower intensive, it was less capital driven than the navy and air force, and by implication, more cost effective.[78] Besides, the argument further held that military expenditure in this respect had an integral social effect through the employment provided for citizens and their families.[79]

While this may be true, defence manpower policy entailed a highly interactive process in which military, political, economic and social considerations were inextricably intertwined. For this reason, viewing defence manpower policy strictly in terms of economic opportunity costs, desirable as it may be, begs the important questions with regards to the interplay between defence manpower policy and national security. Also unanswered are questions about the suitability of personnel employed in the armed forces for identified threats and likely missions; the balance achieved in sustaining institutional costs and the ability to retain qualified personnel. Also untackled were issues of the collective efficiency of the entire manpower process in terms of combat readiness. In the light of this, the foregoing analysis centres on regional/national force requirements based on mission statements, current capabilities in terms of strength, mix and type of forces, geopolitical bias in force deployment, recruitment and training conditions as well as an assessment of defence recurrent funding and sundry manpower burden.

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[77] See J 'Bayo Adekanye & Fred Onyeoziri, 'Civil-Military Relations and Public Support for Defence,' in Imobighe(ed), op-cit, pp.179-196.

[78] This was the position of post-war army chiefs like Brigadier Hassan Katsina and Major General David Ejoor.

[79] See Ibrahim B. Babangida, ' Defence Policy within the framework of National Planning', Gold Medal Public Affairs Lecture Series, March 31, 1985, p.5.

Table 6.6 - Construction Cost as part of Capital Allocation -1970-90(Nm)

FISCAL YEAR	T.C.E.	CONS/REL.COSTS	TCE/C.R.C.
1970-72	75.7	79.8	105.4%
1972-73	81.9	52.4	64%
1973-74	114.3	79.3	69.3%
1974-75	237.1	178.2	75.1%
1975-76	737.7	325.9	44.1%
1976-77	676.2	229.7	33.9%
1977-78	900.0	499.2	55.4%
1978-79	708.5	555.4	78.3%
1979-80	602.0	n.a	n.a.
1980	500.0	260.3	52%
1981	594.0	278.7	46.9%
1982	451.7	193.3	42.7%
1983	650.0	217.7	33.5%
1984	359.0	275.5	76.7%
1985*	319.0	n.a.	n.a.
1986	164.6	n.a	n.a.
1987	92.1	n.a	n.a
1988	440.0	n.a	n.a.
1989	676.5	n.a	n.a
1990	n.a	n.a	n.a

* The bulk of construction budget went on housing development for the armed forces.
Source: Approved Capital Estimates, Federal Republic of Nigeria,1970-1990.
F/Y: Fiscal Year. T.C.E: Total Capital Estimates.

As explained in the preceding analysis, the post civil war era not only saw an increase in the number of men under arms but also witnessed a decidedly significant shift to the regional component of national security objectives. In a world of improved defence technology, the expansion of objectives called to question, the credibility of erstwhile war tactics and force structure in terms of the future regional involvement envisaged.[80] Internally, the pressure mounted on national revenue by the increased size of the armed forces, which forced the military leadership to concede demobilisation

[80] The fact that the majority of the men under 'arms' had little or no education frustrated earlier plans for a mechanised force with a regional perspective.

as a key objective of the National Development Plan.[81]

As Table 6.7 illustrates below, recurrent expenditure in the immediate post war years absorbed most of the defence allocation. For example, in fiscal years 1970/71 and 71/72, it appropriated 82.4% and 86.7% of the total defence allocation, out of which, personnel costs alone absorbed 69.3% and 72.2%. Whereas the per capita population of the armed forces appear altogether manageable for the country's size and population[82], the institutional cost of maintaining such a large force had become unsustainable for the economy and unacceptable to the professional wing of the military. This group would later blame government's indecision on demobilisation for the lack of assessment on force readiness, mix, ineffectiveness of force deployment, recruitment and training problems among other reasons.[83] While calls for size reduction appeared to the leadership as professionally desirable for the armed forces, the political cost was considered a bitter pill to swallow. The institutional breakdown in discipline and general lack of a regimental structure[84] after the war, aided those officers who felt the status quo had to be maintained.[85] Considering that the tone of the Nigerian armed forces was generally set by its officer corps, an incompetent officer corps was usually a recipe for organisational dysfunction. By the time General Gowon's administration

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[81] See Second National Development Plan, see Chapter four for details. A Nigerian Army committee was also set up to examine the implications of demobilisation. See Lindsay Barret, Danjuma: The Making of a General,(Enugu: Fourth Dimensions Publishers, 1980).

[82] At the time, 250,000 to an estimated population of 74 million.

[83] General T.Y.Danjuma, who later became the Army Chief of Staff was seen at the head of this professional officers. Others in the group criticised the longitudinal deployment of men embarked upon at the end of the war as rigid and incapable of fulfilling the geographical and technological requirements of modern war.

[84] Soldiers were not living in barracks after the war.

[85] It was later discovered that the main reason why some oficers were not in favour was out of fear that they may be affected on grounds of inadequate qualification. The poor accounting system in the armed forces at the time also encouraged a pool of 'ghost workers', those killed in the war but whose salaries were being collected by some senior officers. Demobilisation would have reduced considerably the capacity for fraud in this respect.

was ousted in the July 1975 coup d'etat, the indecision over defence manpower management had resulted in an armed forces that was low on morale, cohesion and discipline. In short, what emerged was a collectively unreliable force at variance with identified force requirements.[86]

Table 6:7 - Breakdown of Recurrent Expenditure in MoD, 1970-1990

F/Y	A.R.E	P.E.	S.E.	O.C.	ARE/D.E	PE/ARE %
1970/71	259.4m	179.8m	1.4m	78.2m	82.4%	69.3
1971/72	247.9m	179.0m	2.58m	51.8m	86.7%	72.2
1972/73	240.1m	105.6m	4.02m	130.46m	64.8%	43.9
1973/74	332.5m	239.5m	9.26m	110.27m	79.1%	72.03
1974/75	339.9m	197.7m	9.37m	129.38m	63.78%	58.1
1975/76	547.2m	328.6m	23.6m	195.01m	66.8%	60.05
1976/77	824.3m	466.7m	61.4m	296.1m	56.1%	56.6
1977/78	817.6m	466.2m	60.1m	291.3m	55.2%	57.0
1978/79	596.1m	339.7m	32.4m	224.0m	38.8% ?	56.9
1979/80	521.5m	305.0m	21.8m	193.2m	46.47%	58.5
1980	489.4m	291.5m	18.0m	179.9m	49.4%	59.56
1981	725.1m	397.2m	45.4m	282.4m	54.9%	54.8
1982	660.8m	386.2m	n.a.	274.6m	59.46%	58.4
1983	535.4m	337.5m	n.a.	197.9m	65.7%	63.0
1984	569.2m	446.3m	n.a.	123.0m	61.3%	78.4
1985	656.6m	n.a.*	n.a.	656.6m	67.3%	n.a.
1986	742.4m	n.a	n.a.	742.4m	81.8%	n.a.
1987	717.6m	n.a.	n.a.	717.6m	88.6%	n.a.
1988	830.0m	n.a.	n.a.	830.0m	65.3%	n.a.
1989	590.5m	n.a.	n.a.	590.5m	46.6%?	n.a.
1990	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: **Compiled from Federal Govemment Recurrent Estimates and Actual Expenditures - 1970 - 1990.**

F/Y - Fiscal Year

A.R.E- Annual Recurrent Expenditure

P.E.- Personal Emolument. S.E. - Special Expenditure. O.C.- Other Charges.

D.E.- Total Defence Expenditure.

Special Expenditure and Other Charges merged as Overhead Costs in Budget Statements since 1982.* MoD stopped reflecting personnel costs in budget statements.

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[86] Throughout the period, the increase of men was not matched by a corresponding increase of officers which invariably resulted in unenforceable orders in the commands. Besides, the majority of the good officers had already taken up poiltical responsibility at the time.

Interestingly, the succeeding junta comprised of the professional corps in the army, the group intent on carrying out demobilisation process neglected by the ousted regime as well as attaining force objectives in line with their enhanced continent vision of 'Pax Africana' foreign policy.[87] By the time the regime handed over to a civilian administration in 1979, it had successfully reduced the size of the force to 130,000 men from the 250,000 inherited from war, amid widespread difficulties.[88]

In spite of the early problems, the defence manpower planning settled down to a gradual link between regional/sector requirements and the armed forces capability.[89] In the process, inherent deficiencies were corrected and new programmes started. For example, as the figures in Table 6.7. above indicate, between fiscal year 1975/76 and 1979/80 which represented the period they ruled - the lopsidedness between recurrent and capital funding in defence was significantly reduced, even corrected towards the tail end of the administration. Although recurrent funding estimated at N547.2m in their first year in office (75/76) represented 66.8% of the total defence expenditure (which later cost the administration N779.9m in actual expenditure), this increase was

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[87] At least four key members of this new group served on the 1972 demobilisation committee set up by the Chief of Army Staff Conference whose report was not acted upon by the ousted Head of State. They all held key positions in the new regime as Chief of Army Staff - Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma; Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo - Minister of Defence, Brigadier Iliya Bisalla - and Head of State, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed - .

[88] Expectedly, demobilsation generated a lot of furore for the government in terms of the provision of conversion skills useful in para-military establishments and pension settlements for those retired due to 'declining productivity'. The bad blood generated in those affected became one of the reasons cited in the February 1976 abortive coup. Evidently, since the scale of demobilisation and retirement was unprecedented in the country's history the government's handling of the exercise did not benefit from experience. At the same time, the fact that a corresponding cut-down was carried out in the civilian bureaucracy embroiled the government in a 'no win situation'. See Olusegun Obasanjo's, The Jaji Declaration.

[89] The regime embarked on plans for sector specific deployment of forces and cancelled the longitudinal deployment started in 1970, although this was not fully implemented before they handed over.

probably due to the implementation of the **Udoji Salary Award Scheme**[90] which improved workers' salaries and to the pensions costs of the first round of demobilisation. Interestingly, the reverse was the case for the rest of the years they were in office as the shift became consistent and capital allocations almost levelled up with recurrent allocations in actual expenditures.[91] Two key reasons appear responsible for this consistent pattern. One, the impact of demobilisation was beginning to reflect on personnel costs. Two, the deliberate involvement of the regime in regional and continental security issues set the stage for a huge weapon procurement programme which necessitated a shift in emphasis to capital spending in the defence establishment.

Since the intended process of mechanisation in the new order of battle required a mixed balance of men and equipment, the quality of selected individuals inevitably became an issue. In terms of being amenable to discipline and training, high school graduates were believed to have fewer disciplinary problems, more likely to complete enlistment and generally more productive than those of the lower categories of primary school certificate holders who formed the bulk of the pre-civil war recruits. Even though the latter day commissioned officers were well trained but severely lacking in coordination with other 'arms', retention of such good officers became a serious problem for the services because of the need for increased professionalism and inter-operability emphasised in the new order of battle. Also, considering the level of sophistication required, the more specialised these roles became, the more necessary it was to have technically able and experienced men. Given the differing manpower needs in the services, the retention problem appeared most acute in the army,[92] while assuming an often more damaging dimension at the officer level in the navy and the air force, leading to increased concern about the sudden loss of men to the private sector after state sponsorship.

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[90] This was already agreed to by the previous regime and the political cost of cancellation would have been greater.

[91] The following estimates of N824.3m, N817.6m, N596.1m and N521.5 later reduced in actual expenditure to N582.2m, N695.9m, N506.1m and N214.5m(?) for 76/77, 77/78, 78/79 and 79/80 respectively.

[92] See M.I.Wushishi,'The Nigerian Army - Growth and Development of Combat Readiness,' in Imobighe(ed) op-cit., p.60.

Although the system of recruiting, retaining and disposing of officers theoretically remained the same in the armed forces since independence, certain extra-military developments assumed wider importance which affected the ability of the forces to provide the needed category of officers. Ideally, those wishing to become officers joined after leaving high school or university, and if successful, were granted a regular commission which can be retained as long as they maintained physical and professional attributes. But the various extra-military functions taken up by the officers, especially in political administration, had not only made it impossible to maintain these physical and professional qualities[93], it had also contributed to the reduction in institutional cohesion in the armed forces. Due to their consistent political involvement, the average age at which officers left the armed forces, especially in the army, hovered close to forty or less. Having held political posts as Governor of a state or Minister in central government, returning to the 'stress' of military life which required 'physical' and 'professional' qualities became too much for some of these officers. Hence they left to embrace academic pursuits or business ventures. Other forms of premature retirement often resulted from every coup d'etat when senior officers were forced to leave to create space for the successful junta leaders. As one retired officer who had once served as a governor of the South Eastern State and Commandant of the Defence Academy graphically described it

> Take me for instance, I became a General at the age of 38 and left the service at the age of 40. Nigeria is a wasteful society. To allow me to be getting retired benefits (as a General) for upward of 30 years and doing nothing for the nation is wasteful. Not only me. There are so many Generals[94]

Although he abhorred this development and found his way back into the military in 1990, most officers caught in this predicament either wanted it or remained cynically

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[93] See 'A Military aberration,' an interview with General Olu.Bajowa, African Guardian(Lagos) 10 April 1986.

[94] Especially among officers who did not benefit from political or plum staff appointments.

indifferent. In 1990, in the immediate aftermath of the 22nd April abortive coup d'etat, the air force alone retired about thirty two officers of the rank of Air Commodore or above. More recently, many senior officers who played key political roles in the ousted Babangida administration had been retired by the incumbent regime.[95] Such wasteful exercise can hardly be justified. The impact on the force was even made worse by the total absence of training programme for prematurely retired officers who, theoretically, were expected to form the reserve force of the armed forces. Nowhere was this exemplified better than in the army. Ironically, army officers benefited most from the involvement in the armed forces in politics in the period of study.

The impact of manpower loss is, however, far more widespread in other areas reflecting the military's institutional weakness and level of discipline. Since the end of the war, desertion, first time attrition and unauthorised absence without leave (AWOL) became rampant. The cost implications of all these abnormal conditions are legion. As attrition rates increased, so did manpower costs and the need for replacements and thus, overall demand for extra military manpower. As one discovered, the time lost dealing with the problems of manpower losses consumed dedicated time for mission readiness training.[96] Added to this strictly military problems were the political pressures that impacted on new recruitment. Although the increased educational qualifications of new entrants after the war ought to have led to improved trainability and overall force readiness, the overt ethnic colouration of the recruitment process played a significant role in undermining this.[97] Without difficulty, this situation

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[95] See Africa Confidential (London), " Nigeria: The Khalifa's coup" Vol.34, N0.24, December 1993.

[96] Colonel A.B.Mamman, 'Force Readiness in the Army: A Nigerian Case Study,' Unpublished Essay submitted for the Senior Executive Course at the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos. 1984.

[97] Since the military had held political power throughout the period covered by this study, except for the four years of civilian experiment - 1979-83, recruitment into the all volunteer force was conducted from the perspective of political affiliation and class alliances. Admission into regular commission become subjected to political considerations. For example, it was common knowledge that those who could not come in through the regular commission have other commissions especially the Direct Short Service. Besides, many recruits in the post-civil war era had entered the armed forces for reasons which were not strictly military related.

revealed clearly the nominal quality of new entrants, the crisis in the manpower planning process, and the 'failure of the internal mechanism of institutional coherence and survival of the armed forces.'[98]

Thus, the turbulence that engulfed the professionalism of military manpower became rooted in this defective recruitment process and progressed gradually to a situation whereby approximately 30% of entrants failed to complete enlistment process.[99] To worsen the dismal picture, rates of desertion and unauthorised absence amongst those who finished training and got commissioned became unacceptable to the military establishment.[100] Yet, despite this unenviable record in force readiness and professionalism, interest in the services, especially the army increased geometrically in the 1980s decade.[101]

Due to this huge attraction, demobilisation of inefficient servicemen gathered pace during General Theophilus Danjuma's era as Chief of Army Staff but plumetted under subsequent army Chiefs. Although many international records of manpower statistics of the Nigerian Armed Forces reflected a significant reduction to 80.000 men from the 130,000 men achieved since the Danjuma demobilisation[102], available evidence ran counter to these suppositions.[103]

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[98] General Ibrahim Babangida, 'Jaji Doctrine' The Sailor, Vol.10, July 1990, p.51.

[99] A Ministry of Defence Personnel source.

[100] See DASD/Plans Report 1982 on desertion and court martial reports on soldiers who went away without leave.

[101] This has been attributed to the growing belief amongst entrants of the unlikelihood of war and the numerous privileges a military commission offers in the Nigerian society. The more military engagements there are, the higher the tendency for desertion and lack of interest in the armed forces. I thank Professor Samuel Ukpabi, Provost of the Nigerian Defence Academy for this useful insight. Also, see Chapter four above.

[102] See, for example Military Balance 1985-1990,(London:IISS) all of which put the active army strength at 80,000 men.

[103] For example, The Adjutant General's Report to the Chief of Army Staff Annual Conference in November 1984 puts the active army strength at about 115,000 men with the officer -rank ratio at 4,728 officers to 111,412 men. By April 1987, Army Headquarters calculated the active strength of the Nigerian Army at 103,529

Even though the progressive decline in total recurrent estimates for the years 1980 to 1985 would appear to confirm the efforts of subsequent governments towards size reduction, the relatively unchanged figures for personnel costs as reflected in Table 6.7 reduced the validity of this position.[104] This institutional reticence at reducing the strength of the army increasingly conflicted with decisionmakers' persistent arguments for the need to drastically reduce the armed forces personnel in order to enhance operational efficiency and technical professionalism.'[105]

As clarified by the deployment strategy adopted after the mechanisation of the army from its large infantry force structure in 1979, the failure to delimit the forces and maintain coherence could also be traced to decisionmakers' treatment of force restructure as a zero-sum operation. As the then Army Chief of Staff reiterated in an assessment of the period, 'the objective of the reorganisation within the Nigerian Army was to emphasise the need for sophisticated equipment **rather than manpower**'[106] (emphasis mine). While the Army Chief also referred to another dimension of reorganisation as the 'evolution of a credible stand by mixed force anywhere it is needed,'[107] the fact that the armed forces couldn't muster any force in two weeks when such a need arose underlined the defects in deployment strategy and the overall state of force readiness.[108]

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men. See for details, Army Headquarters 'A' Branch, Strength Statistics Return,(Lagos: Ministry of Defence, 1987).

[104] Whereas the army blamed the increase in personnel costs during this period on the problem of 'ghost workers', which, indeed, may have formed part of it, internal army figures, however, reveal a total recruitment of 42,952 men between March 1979 and December 1988, the bulk of which took place in the early 1980s. The Chief of Army Staff at the time said the reason for this'limited level of recruitment was...to infuse new blood in the army.' See Gen M.I.Wushishi, op-cit., p.59.

[105] Wushishi, ibid.,p.57

[106] Wushishi, ibid. Even though it is weapons which govern tactics and determine how men are trained, the fact remains that sophisticated weapons are of little value unless handled by well trained men.

[107] ibid.

[108] As the Cameroonian incident of 1981 showed, although the military succeeded in promoting a belligerent image put in check by pacifist politicians, the truth

While the revised deployment strategy and its sector-type allocation of specialised forces in replacement of the longitudinal allocation was intended as a reflection of 'geography, terrain, external threat potential and mobility of the men, 'training curricula, scenario build-up and the mix of men and weapons did not reflect this manpower deployment strategy. Indeed, one was hard put to see the loosely adopted concept of 'terrain and geography' beyond the theoretical constructs that they represented as they seldom featured in assessments. Contiguous borderlands were not even properly studied in the armed forces, neither did military authorities possessed current maps of certain regions, despite their rising threat potential.[109]

Training problems were even made worse by the difficulty encountered in establishing and disseminating a clearly articulated and all encompassing doctrine and the confusion surrounding weapon procurement. As a result, even when some form of doctrinal position had been agreed upon, weapons procurement and training of recruits still reflected the opposite of adopted doctrine.[110] Expectedly, this left training institutions confused and the entire military establishment polarised as products of the different training schools emerged with a different understanding of tactics contrary to the ones being practised in their formations.[111]

Although the Training and Doctrine Command of the army was formed in 1981 to stem the tide of this confusion by formulating doctrine centrally, this has only slightly reduced the degree of subjectivity and prejudice which hitherto accompanied

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remains that an order by the civilian president to get a force ready could not be effected in two weeks. See A.B.Mamman, 'Force Readiness: A Nigerian Case Study.' op-cit.

[109] As the 1981 Cameroonian incident revealed, operational maps of the area were nowhere to be found when needed. A confidential military source.

[110] For instance, at the time the 'offensive defence' doctrine was in vogue, it was the time Nigeria's tank capability - a palpably offensive weapon - improved. See chapter four for details on doctrinal confusion.

[111] A Military source. Indeed, the 1984 Nigerian Army training exercise showed so much disparity in the various 'arms' understanding of their roles in a joint army exercise, let alone a joint armed forces exercise.

doctrinal contribution at the various 'arms' level.[112] While the role of officers in doctrine formulation and application constituted one level of manpower ineffectiveness, the structure of officer career in the Nigerian military in peacetime represented another level of manpower management problems. Ideally, in order to derive maximum peacetime efficiency from the intense procurement activity of the period under study, tactics designed to match new weapons and equipment can only be done efficiently by those officers fit enough to withstand pressures not otherwise common in their previous infantry based experience. But the distortions in career build-up made what would have been difficult for the most committed forces, a near impossible task in the Nigerian armed forces.

The chief cause of the distortions remained what we already referred to as the political encumbrances of military officers. But added to this were the extra obligation to enhance military officers' presence in the Ministry of Defence(MoD) under military governments. This resulted in rank inflation. Duties better done by Captains and Majors were carried out by Colonels and at times Brigadiers at the Defence Headquarters. Rank inflation must also be held responsible for the change in designations at the army headquarters in which staff duties, previously carried out by junior officers, were taken over by officers of one or two ranks higher who were supposed to be in charge of commands. For instance, a 1982 Directorate of Army Staff Duties and Plans report (following the upgrading of the DASD/Plans and the DAT/OPS to the same level with the Adjutant General and Quarter Master General) envisaged a rank system placing these four officers on the rank of Lt. Generals. The approved order of battle rank structure at the time has only one General - the Chief of Army Staff, one Lt.General -the head of TRADOC and twenty Major Generals comprising of the above mentioned officers and all GOsC and Corps Commanders.[113]

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[112] Personal communication with Major General I. Williams. Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, Nigerian Army, Minna.

[113] Even though this was aimed at effective command, control and discipline, level of responsibility and career planning', one is honestly at a loss as to what difference this would make. Even the approved order that TRADOC should be headed by an officer of the rank of Lt.General has never been fulfilled throughout its history. Instead, many officers of that rank would consider a posting to the institution a punishment, while settling for lower rank duties provided they can stay

This unnecessary creation and maintenance of an added chain of command put paid to expectations of a 'defence view' as well as provided opportunities for 'unemployable' officers until they reach retirement age. It also offered soft options for proteges of decisionmakers away from the harshness of field commands to the cosy atmosphere of defence decisionmaking.[114] The negative effect of this on manpower management was the career frustration it led to among able and young officers held back in the advancement of their careers at the expense of the coup cabals. The interesting thing here is that they were also not allowed to hold command posts as their intellect, which, ironically kept many of them in sensitive positions, also served as a source of diffidence for their superiors.[115] The general impact of this on overall peacetime development of the officer corps and armed forces' ability to survive the pressures of modern war can hardly be overemphasised.[116]

As explained in Chapter Four, even in the new forces created to meet the need for rapid deployment in the new doctrine i.e. the Amphibious, Air Mobile and Parachute Brigades of the Composite division, and the Air Wing of the Navy - the uncoordinated manpower planning only resulted in well trained professionals without

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in Lagos.

[114] Despite this critique, one recognises that the military, in search of balanced career prospects bring officers to hold staff jobs especially if they belong to 'services' unlikely to produce field commanders i.e. education corps, transport and supplies, or when they are forced to keep 'operationally redundant' officers. It becomes inexplicable when it is the rule rather than the exception. Instead, a better explanation seems to be that career progression is better influenced in the office than on the field. For this reason, many officers have held staff positions with little stints in field commands for the most part of their commission.

[115] Although promising junior officers were sometimes compensated with courses abroad, it often served many purposes: one, to get them off their staff positions and create vacancies for less talented but aging officers, two, to curb the fast pace of their career progression and three, to remove them from sensitive positions where they can oust superiors.

[116] Yet again, conventional wisdom indicates that this is not an entirely Nigerian phenomenon. As Alexander Solzhenisten recalls of the Russian army in August 1914, 'Discipline which holds an army together is inevitably hostile to a man of thrusting ability...Those in authority find it intolerable to have a subordinate who has a mind of his own; for that reason, an officer of outstanding ability will always be promoted more slowly, not faster, than the mediocrities(sic).'

operational tools or procured weapons with no trained men to take charge.[117]

Defence decision makers were, however, aware of this deficiency in the military's enlisted force management structure and the impact it had on the aggregate life cycle of the average soldier.[118] What they failed to do in the period under study was, design practical options for change in employment and deployment processes of current and prospective manpower which will relate manpower to the goals and objectives of security policy. While demobilisation may have had an undesirable impact on the tender social fabrics of the country as leaders often claimed, the dismal picture cast by the 1981 study of the Nigerian Army's combat readiness[119] confirmed that retention of unproductive men only created a facade of an efficient and big regional armed forces and a false sense of security.[120] And this perhaps was the reason why the deterrent component of Nigeria's defence doctrine was never taken seriously by some aggressive neighbours.[121] The force readiness picture in the army also illustrated how inappropriate it was for a military institution with demands for

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[117] See Col. M. Said, 'Management of Manpower and Equipment in the Nigerian Army during recession' Unpublished Essay submitted for the Senior Executive Course at NIPSS. To buttress the above point, in the early 1980s, the Nigerian Army trained pilots in preparation for the Airborne and AirMobile Units and had still not procured any aircraft or helicopter for the purpose. The problem became worse since the air force refused to help, claiming they were not informed of the original plan.

[118] Current attempts are directed towards reforming the structure. See Babangida, 'The Jaji Doctrine', op-cit., p.53

[119] The said study puts the overall readiness at about 40%. See also A.B.Mamman, 'Force Readiness', op-cit.

[120] That a large army is often seen as a good army even by reputed analysts is one error of judgement that may not be easily overcome in defence assessment. However, perhaps one good lesson borne out of the Gulf war is the overblown pre-war assessment of Saddam Hussein's war machine. See Phillip Towle, 'Pundits and Patriots: Lessons from the Gulf War,' Occasional Paper 50, Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1991.

[121] See Major General Paul Omu,'Principles and Strategies of Deterrence,' Lecture delivered to Senior Executive Course No.10 Participants, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos, May 1988; especially the section on 'Deterrence Strategies in Nigeria's Security Planning.' The author was at the time Principal Staff Officer at the Joint Service Headquarters responsible for joint operations.

operational credibility to procrastinate on key issues of manpower management.

Even on the issue of cost, the anticipated gains of manpower reduction turned out to be less than impressive. Table 6.7, however, strengthens the argument that a more targeted reduction in aggregate manpower would not only reduce budgetary expenditure on manpower in absolute terms as well as in relation to the overall defence budget, but that it would also free funds for active deployment envisaged in a jointly coordinated strategy. It would improve the endangered state of the reserve component[122], enhance research and development, domestic arms production and, perhaps even control increases in defence budgets.

While the facts supported an increased savings of funds, the extent to which savings in manpower expenditure could, or would have been used for these stated purposes was admittedly conjectural. Conventional wisdom, however, indicate a progressive undercurrent towards professionalism within the Nigerian military, in which the above features may yet materialise.[123] Of course, the debate over feasibility and possibility would remain a prominent one even within the shifting quicksand of politics.

Within the framework of national security, of which military manpower remains the most potent driving force, defence manpower would appear to have performed far less efficiently from the military standpoint.

VI. Conclusion

In several respects, the evidence suggests that defence expenditure did not serve as a function of threats throughout the period under study. However, since there was no consensus as to the nature of any conflict in which the country might ultimately be embroiled, there were, at least to some extent conflicting tendencies over present capability and expansion potential. This made it difficult to blame personalities and the large bureaucracy involved solely for the ineffectiveness of defence expenditure in

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[122] More on this in the concluding chapter.

[123] See for instance, 'Nigeria: How a coup maker stops coups,' African Confidential(London) February 24, 1992, pp.3-4.

combating perceived threats. It was this strategic scenario of 'uncertainties' that aided the security elite's articulation at all times with worse case situations leading to increased defence costs.

For example, since there was no rational, coherent and consistent equipment policy, most procurement decisions ended up being very capricious. In this sense, many of the weapons and equipment procured could actually be said to have proved ineffective in service as they were never used before graduating into obsolescence. Yet, it may be simplistic to regard non-usage as proof of ineffectiveness since threats were not static and basically involve constant reviews. However, even when consideration was taken of more specific factors like the technology applied, the tactics employed, the overall strategy leading to weapon's choice, the actual combat environment and whether the potential enemy at the time of choice possessed similar weapons/counteracting weapons, the conclusion, inevitably, was that the presence of many weapons and equipment in Nigeria's inventory can be seen as the making of 'smooth talking merchants' as Major General's Abubakar earlier observed. Perhaps this is what has now informed the sudden disposal of many weapons systems in the 1990s, some barely five years after procurement.[See Appendix III]

On defence production, construction and manpower trends in the period examined, the experience has been very much similar, if not worse. As illustrated in the various sections above, the impression one was left with, was one of policies and actions largely geared towards the promotion of institutional interests as well as power-grandeur search in a political terrain where 'big' represented 'powerful', even without any authority behind the power. The final chapter evaluates the overall impact of these missed opportunities and attempts to chart a course for a new defence planning process in which 'needs' and 'means' are not diametrically opposed.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS: EVALUATION AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

I. Introduction

Two broad questions were posed at the beginning of this study: In what ways does a previous war affect decision makers' subsequent war plans and secondly, what possible interplay exists between military considerations and broader political forces [in the aftermath of war] on a country's national security? Most scholars of the transformative potentials of war have argued that wars have a tendency to strengthen rather than undermine state power and military efficiency. Indeed, the inception of the modern nation state has been traced to the thirty-year war that ended with the Westphalian Treaty in 1648.[1] The experiences of third world states like Israel, Egypt, Iraq and Iran have led others to conclude that war has positive transformative potentials for state power[2], although there is nothing to suggest that state enhancement would have been breached had there been no wars in these countries.

The Nigerian experience would appear both to confirm and deny this thesis. While on the one hand, state power seemed to have been enhanced by the civil war, we argue that the sudden improvement in the country's economy triggered by the new found oil wealth provided a more accurate understanding of the changing nature of state power. However, the externally directed nature of the economic boom and the state's dependence on external forces after the war partly undermined the institutional capacity for independent action and, in turn state power. Secondly, while the state military power

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[1] See for example, F.H.Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) and Charles Tilly, (ed) The Formation of the National States in Western Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)

[2] See for example, Michael N. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and Israel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),

was enhanced by the "no victor, no vanquished" reconciliation policy after the war and military planners sought to improve service coordination - this was directed towards external threat. Threat identification, the regional and Africa-centredness of foreign and defence policies, military strategy and weapons procurement - all reflected the external direction of threat at the expense of the internal centrifugal fissures temporarily papered over by the economic boom in the immediate post-civil war era. While we argue in Chapters 2 and 3 that the expansion of the state's external capacity came at the expense of its precarious internal and institutional survival, it was our contention that all the governments in the period of study deliberately allowed this to happen; exaggerated foreign threat as a way of concentrating domestic attention away from certain inadequacies. One basic theoretical implication for this study is that no government; civilian or military, is necessarily better or unique in its handling of the dynamic complex of threat, military expenditure and national security. Finally, this study contends that war by itself does not change defence policy, especially where there are no geo-strategic losses or gains. Hence, the Nigerian experience reflected the view that the outcome of war, rather than war *per se* encouraged change in the defence planning process.

Yet planning even in the most auspicious of circumstances is fraught with objective limitations. Besides the limitations which plague every plan, organisational dysfunction[3] and professional incompetence played key roles in Nigeria's defence planning crisis as previous discussions have so far indicated. But the problems remained more in form, than content. Since there can be no guarantee that weak leaders or politically ambitious military officers will suddenly disappear from the defence scene, in order to resolve the problems of form and structure,[4] there must be clear definitions

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[3] As argued in previous chapters, organisational dysfunction has resulted primarily from political involvement, through the incentives provided by political careerism. Both played a mutually reinforcing role in their impact on professionalism. The military cannot govern the civil society directly or effectively without losing its professional attributes.

[4] Various intrigues and subtle powerplays that have undermined political leadership and military professionalism in recent timeshave been addressed by the specialist briefing paper Africa Confidential (London) and the subsequent analysis has benefited greatly from them. See for details, 'Nigeria: Soldier come, soldier go', Africa Confidential, Vol.33, No.2. 24 January 1992; 'Nigeria: How a CoupMaker

of goals and means as well as clear identification of procedures for selecting the means towards attainment of identified goals - a problem which remained at the heart of planning, and therefore impacted on any pattern of resource allocation; adequate or optimal. Outlined in the preceding chapters are features considered critical to undermining or transforming the defence planning process and the efficacy of defence policy: [1] security elite's perception of the "enemy" and the interface between external and internal threats; [2] prestige and institutional aggrandisement, military involvement in politics and the personalised nature of rule; [3] civil society's pressures and armed forces' innovative capacity; [4] the extent to which the national question is resolved; and, [5] the extent to which the incipient corrupt practises can be curbed. We traced the lack of coordination between threat appraisal, military expenditure and national security in the defence planning process to the conflicts that characterised substantive objectives, operational methods and eventual goals.

In effect, improving the structure of the defence planning process without tackling the above critical features would not provide the results leaders always expect of defence planning. Yet it is the view of this study that defence planning can be result oriented if realistic goals are set and, internal conflicts among various goals, resolved without jeopardizing efficiency. It was the inability of the defence planning process to achieve this balance and the increasing demand for accountability and good governance which made options for change urgent and inevitable. Whether the options proffered here would be capable of achieving results will depend on the evolutionary nature of strategy, which as shown in previous chapters, has so far been a victim of *ad-hocery* rather than a product of deliberate planning.

This chapter examines the impact of the synergic absence between planning and

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stops Coups', Africa Confidential, Vol.33, No.4, 21 February 1992; 'Nigeria: Push comes to shove', Africa Confidential, Vol.33, No.11, 5 June 1992; 'Nigeria: Trust me, I'm going,' Africa Confidential, Vol.33, No.21, 23 October 1992; 'Nigeria: The *Deja Vu* agenda', Africa Confidential, Vol.33 No.24, 4 December 1992; 'Nigeria: Army Arrangements', Africa Confidential, Vol 34.No 14, 2 July 1993; 'Nigeria: The options narrow', Africa Confidential, Vol.34, No.19, 16 July 1993; 'Nigeria: Maradona plays into extra time,' Africa Confidential, Vol.34.No.17, 27 August 1993; 'Nigeria: Not yet Shonekan's soldiers', Africa Confidential, Vol.34.No.22, 5 November 1993 and 'Nigeria: The Khalifa's coup', Africa Confidential, Vol.34.No.24, 3 December 1993.

organisation and attempts to relate needs to means in its overall review of leadership's threat perception. It then suggests options for the re-direction of defence policy process and 'core' interest spending in defence.

II. Review of threat perception pespectives.

It is a truism that the two decades of Nigerian foreign/ defence policy covered in this study had taken the country back to the main principles governing its defence and foreign policy at independence, under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa. The consciousness often referred to by post-independence politicians as Nigeria's 'manifest destiny' to lead the rest of Africa that has been at the base of the country's **'Pax Africana'** foreign policy direction since independence. Although construed as a genuine attempt to make Africa the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy, implementation made this approach to national security questionable.

This became increasingly so after the first real threat faced by the country nearly resulted in its dismemberment through the 30 - month civil war. At that stage, it became clear to leaders that threats to Nigeria's security were firstly, internal rather than sub-regional or continental in character. The aftermath of the civil war witnessed a renewed vigour in pursuit of continental and regional security. Objectively, the civil war experience and the perceived role of neighbouring countries as satellites of certain extra - African powers (ostensibly, France) created a siege mentality in the leadership's assessment of threats which remained unchanged long after the war. At a time when concentration was on reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation after the war, it seemed strange that defence policy in its weapons procurement content was more directed towards extra-national, regional and continental commitments. First was the unrestrained pursuit of sub-regional integration which later resulted in the establishment of the Economic Cmmunity of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and later the regime's more open identification with the de-colonisation struggle in Southern Africa.

This concentration on perceived extra-national threats resulted in a simultaneous

neglect of primary threats along Nigeria's borders,[5] while the sore of internal contradictions festered relentlessly. As a result, the defence content of foreign policy was geared towards the need of a large infantry force, deployable to Southern Africa on account of liberation struggle and acquisition of nuclear capability with no realistic assessment of needs and means. This externalisation heightened inter-service rivalry in the battle for the service domination of the continental agenda.[6]

The changing phase of the decolonisation process with Namibia's independence and majority rule in South Africa has heightened the need for a change in Nigeria's foreign policy direction. The economic pressures of the period are seen as ample justification for a more inward looking defence policy, concentrating on territorial integrity, relating force posture, weapon procurement and overall defence spending to specific national needs and emphasising specialisation of the armed forces instead of a generalised force structure.

For too long, defence planning in Nigeria centred on a grand strategy of extraordinary continental focus, the result of which was an overextension of resources and commitments. Interestingly, at a time the dividends of the post cold war era dominate international events, Nigeria has had to play a more active role in the region, leading to the allocation of a far larger percentage of the GNP to defence as well as in propping up potential war time allies and peacetime friends. Liberia represents the most expensive of this consequence, where Nigeria has spent over N4 billion as the pivot of a West African Peace Monitoring Group[ECOMOG]. Yet the financial edge that has always extenuated the impact of the grand continental agenda on the domestic economy is no longer available, making the 'manifest destiny' extremely capricious.

To keen observers, the prevailing conditions present Nigeria with a challenge of its own; that of managing relationships with other influential countries on the continent that are of equal economic weight, and no longer as dependent upon Nigeria's favours as was the case in Nigeria's oil-boom days.

The erosion of this undisputed economic superiority heightened the trade off between ends and means, between the nation's more immediate needs and long term

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[5] See Chapter Three.

[6] For more on the battle for doctrine dominance, see Chapter Four.

goals, which invariably affected the entire thought process about threats, grand strategy and their direction. This is more so in a world that can no longer be divided neatly into superpower camps, a world in which threats are measured by the leadership's perceived world view which often correlates with the popular opinion. For example, the imminent reduction in the 'Pretorian threat', which had previously been at the forefront of Nigeria's defence planning and overall grand strategy and the additional decline in the plausibility of a French sabotage through extended deterrence to Francophone states, should ideally affect the size and the future of the Nigerian Armed Forces, and increase the tendency among decision makers to question current, albeit, traditionally militarist conception of 'national security.'

On the one hand, there is an emerging consensus that the threat to Nigeria through economic insecurity is far more undermining than the challenges of military insecurity. In addition, popular attention has moved from the strictly militaristic perspective of threats as traditionally conceived by the realist school to the incorporation of threats to educational standards, the environment and the damage done to the country's security by corruption, graft and drug trafficking. Equally, many consider the nation's debt burden and the notion of being permanently beholden to international finance stranglehold as the most pressing dangers to the country's security in the forseeable future. On the other hand, the Liberian peacekeeping/enforcement experience has reinforced the notion, among decision makers, of a world that is still an inherently dangerous place. Yet, this realistic balance has not succeeded in reducing the spate of criticisms of the Liberian venture, neither has the debate on whether it is in Nigerian's national interest or not subsided.[7]

In the midst of this debate, festering ethnic and religious strife, hitherto regarded as a thing of the past resurfaced, placing national survival issues at the forefront of Nigeria's security threats. Increasingly, it is becoming less doubtful that the most unyielding threat to national security in Nigeria is predominantly domestic, not inter-state conflicts or regional insecurity. While border conflicts remain prevalent, they are partly the by-products of numerous attempts to unify divergent internal positions against

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[7] See Ebenezer Babatope, 'Nigeria should leave Liberia', Nigeria Tribune, March 7 1990. The writer argued that Nigeria has no national interest at stake.

perceived common enemies.[8] Thus, the underlying causes of insecurity lay embedded in Nigeria's political economy. In essence, it seemed less doubtful that until domestic inequalities can be greatly resolved, there can be no sustained reduction in real threats because the erstwhile defence policy process was tied to a continental agenda and was largely unrelated to any objective analysis of threats. In consequence, even if the industrial world were to achieve the much expected peace dividend, which in itself, has become a doubtful proposal[9], the optimism about the transfer of security 'gains' to the productive and social sector in Nigeria remains far fetched.

However, in spite of the strong case that can be made for this zero-sum transfer, and thus, an isolationist foreign policy since Grand strategy in war is necessarily more militaristic in an unsafe world than during a perceived period of peace, 'the real task ...is to ensure that, in wartime, the non-military aspects are not totally neglected; and that in peacetime, the military aspects are not totally neglected...'[10] It is in the process of re-ordering priorities politically that the necessary balance will have to be struck between not having too little of defence and too much of the non- military aspects of national security. It will seem that the only way by which this can be achieved is to encourage a holistic understanding of national security with no assumption of any difference between the military dimensions of strategy from its important non-military aspects and no fundamental change in the conceptualization of grand strategic thought during war and peace times.

Translated in concrete terms and in the light of our recognition of the internal nature of threats, it is safe to argue in favour of an objective threat analysis which concentrates on a containable West-Central Africa security agenda. Having reduced the need for a continent wide grand - strategy, a rejection of 'Pax -Africana' policy may pave the way for an adoption of 'Pax West Africana' policy rather than outright isolationism,

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[8] The unending border feud between Nigeria and Cameroon is perceived by many in this light.

[9] See Marek Thee, Whatever Happened to the Peace Dividend? The Post-Cold War Armaments Momentum, (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1991).

[10] Paul Kennedy, 'American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning from the European Experience,' in Paul Kennedy,(ed.) Grand Strategy in War and Peace, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1991) p169.

one's recognition of the enduring peacetime goal of the defence and survival of the Nigerian state notwithstanding. With the interwoven nature of conflict in the sub-region, it may be possible to link the occurence and resilience of inter-state problems in the West African sub-region to the domestic national security problems within nation states without being superficial as well as adapt a comprehensive threat index and realistic problem solving framework.

While this study emphasised the military aspects of national security, security was seen as an all encompassing phenomenon in which the interconnected, albeit independent nature of political and economic positions, and even the structure of polarisation within civil society can impact severely. The over-extension of this interconnections, especially in its continental framework retained inherent conflictual tendency under every administration. The conflict arose from the elastic definition of the interconnections leading to the amalgamation of two sometimes contradictory political goals - such as protection of the Nigerian state within the nation states system and the pursuit of an Afro-centric world view - one which if carried to its logical conclusion, will effectively serve to undermine the initial goal of state protection. This conflict of determinism lay at the centre of the tension in Nigerian grand strategy.

While the avoidance of war and protection of the Nigerian state remained the overarching aim of national security, to the extent that this objective also incorporated the 'manifest destiny' of a continental legitimating myth, the leadership was permanently constrained to play the role of the 'big brother' ready to police the rest of Africa.[11] It was perhaps in respect of this 'poisoned chalice' that General Babangida noted that until the current threats are reduced, reduction of military spending is unforeseen...[12] Over the years however, the fundamental problem with this double agenda had been the failure to see the projection of power abroad and continental prestige as an extension of the territorial invulnerability of the homeland, and that, if the latter is assured, the former will not be insurmountable. However, achieving the latter may well require more than

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[11] See Joseph Wayas, Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa, (London: Macmillan, 1979)

[12] Ibrahim B. Babangida, " Defence Policy Within the Framework of National Planning", Gold Medal Public Affairs Lecture Series, 1 March 1985, p.17. The writer was Chief of Army Staff at the time of writing and later, Head of State.

a grand strategy that only concentrated on fire power but one that was multi-layered in its economic and political dimensions. Yet, a recognition of the necessity for a multi-layered definition of security without a re-orientation of the notion of sovereignty itself begs the issue of 'total security'.[13] The problem with this in a period of great economic hardship lay in its perception as nascent imperialism by smaller partners.[14]

This leads us to the second strand of the threat perception review. Given the obvious difficulties that had put paid to an emergent pan-regional strategy, an evolutionist paradigm that allows a spill over from the territorial invulnerability strategy in war and peace to the objective concerns outside of Nigeria's national boundaries would appear to be the way forward in the light of the new international order. However, the temporary nature of this cannot be overemphasised since international order itself revolves between war and peace; poverty and wealth. Hence the need for a constant review and periodic re-assessment of grand strategy in the light of changing circumstances and national ends and means chain.

In this vein, the leadership must decide whether it still wants to continue to emphasise a continental 'manifest destiny', a sub-regional role, a Nigeria-centric security policy or indeed a mixture of all with no clear direction in any area in the perennial struggle between interventionism and isolationism. In whatever form or shape it takes, as Professor Paul Kennedy rightly notes,

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[13] In arguing for a redefinition of the sovereignty concept in the sub-region and indeed, the whole of the continent, which de-emphasises post-colonial artificial boundaries, the motive is not directed towards territorial revisionism. Instead, we are revisiting the territorial state in Africa where artificial boundaries have formed a legitimising force for arresting the progress that would have automatically followed the withdrawal of colonial powers from the continent. The drift in the world today seems directed towards a more integrated political structure. Besides, the United Nations Charter still contains clauses in support of national armed forces acting on behalf of the Security Council. Whilst the dangers inherent in this option are clear, especially the potential for usurpation by a larger power, the consideration of a workable, even if not foolproof alternative models to the nation state cannot be over-emphasised.

[14] This is the view which some countries hold of Nigeria's leadership of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Liberia. A perception which is not helped by General Babangida's relationship with the Late Sergeant Samuel Doe of Liberia and the obvious partiality of the Nigerian contingent of peacekeepers.

> the crux of grand strategy lies...in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long term (that is war and peacetime) best interests.[15]

The greater part of this study has analysed the performance of the country's leadership in respect of the above, with the conclusion that it was less than satisfactory. What we turn to in the next section is a discussion of options for a re-direction of the defence policy process, with a view to achieving an enduring and flexible form of grand strategy, reflective of the military content of policy.

III. Re-Direction of Defence Policy Process.

Since threats during the period of study have proven to be more leader determined than task centred or structure oriented, the direction of policy and doctrinal selection also followed a similar pattern. The failure to seize the opportunity provided at the end of the Nigeria Civil War to redress policy inconsistencies laid the basis for a direction-less defence planning in the succeeding decades.

The problems were, however, not primarily organisational even though it is clear that they were due, in part, to structural incoherence. As long as authoritarianism remains a fundamental principle for conflict resolution and national security, the armed forces cannot realise their full potentials as professional institutions geared towards the defence of the people and the enhancement of state power.[16] Yet the involvement of the military in governance and the future orientation of the organisation outside politics is central to any realistic re-direction of the defence policy process. Having ruled Nigeria for twenty four of the thirty three years of independence with no sign of relinquishing power, the ability of the organisation to maintain its professional stance had become severely limited. This affected the defence policy process, now self superintended without any benefit of the necessary civic restraint. Since military interventionists are

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[15] Kennedy, op-cit.,p.5.

[16] See for details, J. 'Kayode Fayemi, 'The Role of the Military in a New Nigeria,' Nigeria Now, Volume 1, No.5, August 15, 1992, p.2.

firstly, political activists in military uniform - using the armed forces as a stepping stone to their ultimate ambition of political control - the need to satisfy personal whims and powerful cliques have repeatedly overriden the publicly professed commitment to a strong, centrally coordinated military leadership capable of articulating a 'defence' view.[17]

Thus, carrying out professional duties alongside political rule did not only impede the growth of the organisation, it also impacted adversely on its ability to articulate its needs satisfactorily in terms of doctrine, discipline, training, weapons acquistion and overall efficiency. To address the organisational dysfunction however, it is important to understand and resolve the political conundrum that led to it. Especially, when all attempts to settle the country's political crisis have decidedly addressed the military question superficially. What seemed very clear from this study is that armed forces' inefficiency was not due to lack of knowledge of what will enhance the organisation's professional capacity, either in terms of reducing inter-service rivalry by creating a coordinated defence view; size reduction, recruitment pattern or in re-ordering priorities within the means of the organisation. It was the lack of civic restraint and political will that has been primarily responsible for the inaction within the organisation.

The lack of knowledge and/or commitment to a professional armed forces by the civilian political elite makes one wonder if professionalism was not an elusive ideal incapable of translation to reality. Yet, as Nigeria moved towards another democratic experiment, there is a strong perception that a repeat of past experience seemed inevitable as regards central organisation of defence unless these issues are comprehensively addressed. Hence, the yet unanswered question remains: how do we make the military organisation accountable and answerable to civil society?

The problem that requires immediate attention from our examination, is the need to separate operational and policy control over broad defence matters such as size, shape, organisation, equipment, weapon acquistion and pay/conditions in the services on the one hand, and administrative control over the services. The damaging effect of this on the defence planning process has already been identified in the main body of this

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[17] See J 'Kayode Fayemi, 'No farewell to Arms - The Military and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria's Third Republic,' Paper presented at the African Studies Association Bi-ennial Conference, University of Stirling, Scotland, September 8 - 10, 1992.

study. What remains to be said is how it led to the creation of an alternative powercentre within the military, completely unaccountable to the political leadership in the Defence Ministry.[18]

Besides the damage done to the professional cadre within the military, hitherto dedicated to the understanding of modern warfare and the incorporation of new technologies, the Babangida administration through the usurpation of political power, has helped in the destruction of that which it helped to create. For example, with the inexplicable purges of the late 1980s and early 1990s which liquidated the senior ranks of the professional cadre[19], the remaining officer corps became understandably reticent and many of them who had survived the purges abandoned any attempt to give professional military advice necessary for the improvement of the organisation.[20]

Given the collective damage the organisation had suffered from this leader-centred approach, it seems much less sensible to have destroyed the little professionalism left in the military by turning the intelligence gathering networks into a gestapo for regime security, and generally weakening the armed forces of Nigeria through the creation of an alternative para-military service - the National Guard.[21] But then, this also

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[18] As two former Defence Ministers, Alhaji Akanbi Oniyangi and General Domkat Bali told this writer in separate interviews, as a result of the lack of institutional as well as constitutional legitimacy for the Office even when held by a professional military officer, service chiefs continued to carry on in a 'business as usual' manner. Even though, General Bali was a military officer and also served as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to him, 'a lot of decisions were taken which I only heard of after approval had come from the Presidency. I don't think any serious person will regard such affront as a sensible decision-making process.' Interview. May 5, 1991. Also see General Bali's interview after his abrupt resignation as Defence Minister and retirement from the armed forces in Newswatch Magazine(Lagos) 22 January 1990., p.15.

[19] See for an account of recent purges in the Air Force and its impact on the Nigerian Armed Forces., The Sunday Magazine(Lagos), 'Trouble in Nigerian Air Force,' Volume 5, No.9, March 1 , 1992

[20] Indeed, very few officers express contrary opinion against the mainstream views in the supposedly no-holds barred annual Chief of Army Staff Conferences.

[21] The National Guard first conceived in 1990 was finally set up in May 1992 following the uprisings all over the country protesting the regime's economic policy. Due to the circumstances surrounding its establishment, it is seen largely in the country as another attempt to increase the repressive edge of government. By

appeared to be the inevitable consequence of every personality-based system. Of course, the quest for self defence through unquestioning loyalty may have been served, but that this occurred at the expense of a weakened military instrument of the grand strategy also seemed not in doubt.

Unifying the centrifugal forces unleashed by this has thus become inevitable if defence planning is ever to get back on the right tracks. What has prevented coordination in the period under study, as mentioned earlier, seemed to be rooted in the diffidence of the civilian elite in taking control of planning in defence as they did in other areas of state governance.[22] It has been argued by some officials in government that the civilian leadership decided to allow coordination develop naturally out of the services, rather than superimpose a coordinated structure on the military which may well have had an equally dangerous effect,[23] but it remains undeniable that some other factors played a significant role in this political choice.

To take the example of the Shagari government (1979-83), one reason would appear to be the fear of upsetting the applecart in inter-service relationship (i.e army domination) at that early stage of the regime's life, which could have been tantamount to inviting an early coup d'etat. The other factor, partially responsible for the inherent

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making the Guard only accountable to the President and none of the armed forces services or the Police Force, it is viewed with equal suspicion and a duplication of role by the three main branches of the armed services. Interestingly, government insists there is a strategic need for the new para-military force to act as a cross between the armed forces and the mobile police force. See Interview with National Guard Coordinator, (Rtd) Vice Admiral Tunde Koshoni in The Sunday Magazine,(Lagos)'National Guard: Terror Squad or Super Police? Vol.5, No.23, June 7, 1992. Also, see Newswatch Magazine(Lagos), 'The Riot Act,' 8 June 1992. The Guard was disbanded in November 1993.

[22] As evidenced by the first attempt to achieve a coordinated 'defence planning' under a civilian leadership in 1979, the effort floundered primarily because President Shagari delegated the preparation of the Chief of Defence Staff's job description to Service chiefs who should ideally be subordinate to that office. This undermined the coordinating leadership role expected of the occupant. As explained in Chapter Four, the service chiefs 'colluded' and turned the office into an ineffective, 'paper pushing' job in the attempt to strengthen or at least maintain their own untrammeled powers.

[23] See, NIPSS, The Proceedings of the Concluding Seminars on Selected National Policy Matters, Februeary 1980. Also repeated in the interview with Alhaji Akanbi Oniyangi, Defence.Minister under President Shagari.

fear of the military, was the complete dearth of knowledge of the operational effectiveness and/or direction of the military in Shagari's government. With no institutional capacity to evaluate military proposals, let alone put forward alternatives, the leadership was left with little choice than to depend on service chiefs and arms salesmen solely for advice. It could not be gainsaid that such advice was often coloured by the service orientation of the former and the pecuniary incentives accruable to the latter.

Ironically, the civilian bureaucracy which ought to have provided the government with alternative advice was deficient in this knowledge as well. With hindsight, one of the key effects of the thirteen years of military rule preceding the civilian administration in 1979 was the near total control of the Defence Ministry by the armed forces. Even middle ranking positions which should have been held by civilian bureaucrats were turned into staff offices for military men and undeployable officers.[24] Indeed, throughout the period covered in this study, not only were civilians working in the MoD employed independently by the various services, (hardly the feature in other ministries where they were centrally recruited) at least 90% of the civilian staff belonged to the Junior grade.[25]

Yet even the less than ten percent in the senior administrative cadre played no crucial role in defence policy deliberations, except in a few cases, often through personal rapport with senior military officers rather than on the strength of independent institutional contribution. They were usually kept in the dark about developments[26],

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[24] See Chapter Six for details.

[25] As the military's information scientist revealed, 90% belonged to Levels 03-07 - the clerical and secretarial cadre of the Nigerian civil service. See Major D.O.Oladoyin, Evolution of the Office of Chief of Defence Staff in Nigeria's Minsitry of Defence,' Defence Strategy Review (Lagos: Ministry of Defence Headquarters, 1985)

[26] The excuse for this exclusion of bureaucrats from the necessary information in the Defence Ministry is often that 'the amount of power vested in the ministry could be a source of concern to the armed forces because the ministry consists mainly of ***civilians who have little or no knowledge of the military profession***...' See, NIPSS Proceedings...op-cit., p.130. Interestingly, the above statement was made by the former Head of State, General Babangida - then a Student at the Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies. Even though his suggestion then was to invest the

and/or treated with contempt by military officers (with their advice regularly shoved aside) even after schooling themselves in the intricacies of the military organisation.[27] This institutional vacuum is worsened by the restrictions placed on institutional research bodies such as the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs(NIIA); the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research.(NISER), or even university researchers and independent journalists interested in military research. Even research institutions like Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies,(NIPSS) often paraded as extension of the armed forces and its hallmark of intellectual excellence and independent judgement have hitherto, failed in this role because their programmes were dominated by retired or active military officers with the few civilian staff playing no significant role.

Thus, while it is clear from the above that the question of structure and the process of improving the defence planning mechanism should occupy our minds than the details of who does what, a simultaneous process of increased civilian participation in military activities must be made a key objective. Though the armed forces continuously prided itself as the most organised group and blamed civilians for lack of interest in military activities, military cohesion and *espirit de corps* have been severely damaged over the years. What seemed to have aided the monopoly of knowledge to date has been the military's coercive edge and the inability of the civilian political elite to challenge military judgement on operational as well as security matters. The failure up till now, in certain quarters, to realise that the military cannot be the vanguard for organisational change has partly aided civilian reticence on seeking professional knowledge in this important area of the body politic in order to balance the current monopoly of coercive powers.

Ministry with considerable political power and the administrative and political leadership with considerable institutional knowledge of the military to earn the confidence of the armed forces. Needless to say, this proved easier said than done even under his leadership of the country, even though civilian bureaucrats had for long embarked on the knowledge acquisition programme proposed.

[27] For instance, Yusuf Gobir, the Permanent Secretary of the Defence Ministry in 1975 attended the 1 year course at the Imperial Defence College, London, with the then Brigadiers Obasanjo and Bisalla in 1974. Also, civilian bureaucrats in the MoD attend courses at the Command and Staff College, Jaji with military officers.

The increasing awareness on the part of the civilian population in the later years covered in this study coupled with the broad consensus currently developing within the armed forces, in support of a structured organisation and centralised coordination of defence appeared to be the best signs of the possible options for change yet to appear in the horizon. This has no doubt been helped by the fortuitous pressures on the national economy and the increasing urge for democratisation and accountability all over the world. As pressures for economies of scale impacted on resource efficiency, reaction within the armed forces became one of alarm and soul searching for alternatives. Yet, in spite of the pressures to innovate, the paradox of the constricting economy revolved around the competition for scarce resources as manifested in the desire for modern weaponry in a situation where weapon acquisition for enhancement of service prestige became the hallmark of inter-service rivalry. Getting the services to stop this unhealthy bickering by relinquishing their powers of supply to a central authority would have to depend on the abilities of the civilian political elite to forge a link with the professional wing of the armed forces.[28] The first area for this link will be in redefining goals and objectives in programming and war planning and then reprioritising the chosen options for change.

Since the initial goal of continentalism that guided policy in the first three decades no longer seem feasible, at least in the light of shrinking resources, actual threat and even perceived enemy capability as observed in the preceding section, the conclusion to be reached is that Nigeria's war planners who have traditionally devoted most of their efforts to planning for the most demanding and least likely scenarios should now devote their time to the most likely and less demanding ones without neglecting completely more demanding contingencies. There should be little doubt in the minds of planners now that the greatest security threats faced by Nigeria will not come from South Africa or France but increasingly from within and the neighbouring countries. As a result, while defence should remain at the core of Nigeria's military

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[28] Before the impression is created that they are in ultimate control of supply, I must add that technically, it is the sole prerogative of the MoD and not the individual services to order supplies; in reality - the process is often dominated by Staff Officers who should have advisory roles ideally. Professional is not used here in a generic sense but mainly to distinguish between dedicated officers and politically inclined ones who only see their commission as a means to a lucrative political end.

operation at the outbreak of any aggression, it is the nature of the enemy methods and means of warfare that should determine how far this defence option should extend. Having established the non-expansionist motives of Nigeria's foreign policy, at all times, the defensive mission of the Nigerian Armed Forces should be the repulsion of any aggression should this occur, the defence of the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity while maintaining the capability for the most rapid cessation of war and restoration of peace.

This redirection in defence planning will inevitably require a different kind of expertise. New officers will be needed, new contingencies will have to be mapped out, and the forces required for likely contingencies may not be the same procured for the worse case scenarios of the earlier decades. While we have already stressed the need in the study to procure weapons that will guarantee appropriate and effective response against an aggressor, whatever the exigencies, the important issue for planners to bear in mind in the next decade will be the need to maintain national defence under a climate of greatly reduced resources. This is not insurmountable a task, but getting the leadership to regard the country's borders as a first line of threat, without abandoning external sources of threat to the survival of the Nigerian nation remains one arduous task worthy of vigorous pursuit, because the workable strategy for Nigeria's defence can only be meaningful after this realisation.

Whatever the leadership's response to this, the key to a new and successful national security strategy is not to tie it to one single service but the entire defence establishment; neither should it be the responsibility of the active forces alone. Response to aggression in future will only meet with resounding success if it is a jointly coordinated responsibility of all services and a mix of active and selected reserve units. The ordinary citizen must partake in this ownership of change. Indeed, any new contingency strategy for the rapid deployment force should regard as a priority, a mix of Army air borne, air defence, air assault, light and highly mobile divisions, air force long range conventional bombers, navy attack patrol craft and mine counter measure vehicles.

Since there appears to be a consensus on a sub-regional role as an objective basis for promoting national security, and an increasing urge towards resolution of internal contradictions and strengthening the national fabric, a doctrine that entertains the

possibility of fighting a continental war and the desirability, even if only rhetorical, of surviving a nuclear debacle would no longer suffice, if only in its requirements for large quantities of men and materials.[29] Yet, this has been the historically generated outlook which coloured the perception of the military leaders and political elite as argued in earlier chapters.

Nevertheless, the triumph of regionalism over continentalism is a more defensible threat appraisal despite the difficulty in resisting the introspective urge in this era of economic constraint. While it may still not satisfy the clamouring for a complete severance from extra -national security arrangements, there is no doubt that one of its first requirements will be an asymmetrical reduction in force size which satisfies partly the increasing demand for a resource based defence planning.

While noting the benefits of a sub-regional security arrangement or the usual assumption in policy quarters that any war will only be prosecuted as part of an alliance, regional or bilateral, policy makers should be more circumspect about the notion of a 'protective security umbrella' or that of leading a sub-regional imperative which needs a longer gestation period. In the short term, one solution is for the Nigerian Armed Forces to retain its capacity to act independently of alliances at all times. This should, however, not be construed as a farewell to alliances. If anything, continued working relationships with allies should remain a specific goal of national security policy, but unilateral capability must not be sacrificed at its expense.

The above is the lesson to draw from the Nigerian military's continued involvement in the sub-regional multilateral peacekeeping force in Liberia. Not only have allies proved to be unreliable just as foes remained implacable, the fact that the basic minimum requirements of territorial defence[30] suffered significantly during this period is an example of how not to sacrifice unilateral capability in the search for

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[29] Indeed, all the goals and objectives set out in the 1976 Foreign Policy Review as well as the ones in the 1979 Defence Policy, especially as regarding fighting a major continental war with South Africa would no longer seem feasible except for those directly related to internal cohesion and territorial integrity. See notes 38 and 39 in Chapter One and the sub-section on doctrine in Chapter Four.

[30] The incursions into Nigerian territories from the Camerounian borders have continued and villages have been overun before the security service could respond to the early warnings. See The Independent (London), January 10, 1994.

grandeur.[31]

In resolving the strategic problem of what to emphasise, organizationally, a significant thawing process needs to be encouraged through changes in relationships leading to a gradual redistribution of knowledge between the military and the civilian political elite, and a significant increase in contacts between Nigerian opinion moulders and the outside world. Active interactions must be sought with the civilian community in order to make meaningful contributions and immediate changes to conventional war planning. Specific use can be made of strategists, political scientists, military historians, physical and industrial scientists, area studies specialists, economists, and other range of professionals, all of who can provide assistance in respect of determining planning scenarios for war and peace.[32]

Current military attempt to encourage officer training in these professional fields is commendable, but it is too dangerous to wait until young officers embarking on such studies are sufficiently qualified before breaking the logjam of current intuitive, arbitrary and whimsical decision making process. The only way to do this is to encourage more deliberation with the outside world, bridge the gap between academia and the military beyond current cosmetic arrangements, remove the insidious cloak of secrecy, encourage expert advice, information and analyses, which will in turn lead to a devolution of responsibility to technocrats.

Any attempt to allow the transfusion of civilian expertise and the political leadership' participation in the debate on options for change will result in key changes in decisionmaking practices and organisational dynamics. The key areas that will likely buck the trend will be the structure of the organization, the size of the armed forces, force posture, weapons acquisition, and a clear cut, yet flexible doctrinal paradigm based

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[31] See, for example, ' Liberia: Nigeria facing both ways,' Africa Confidential, Vol.33, No.2, 24 January 1992.

[32] Presently, the military carries out this task 'in-house' except for occasional invitations extended to academics and practitioners who often only legitimate current war plans or support future programmes, if not the existing organisational structure. The reason for this is not far fetched: First, if you differ significantly from the *status quo*, you are not likely to be invited again; Second, the fact that these professionals are not necessarily 'outsiders' since they are government employees, in the universities or research institutes under a military dispensation make independent judgement difficult.

on the emergent threats in the decade. This should reflect a shift from the oratory and morale sagging doctrine of old to at least one that combines prospective and forward looking principles with occasionally retrospective and rationalising content. In short, an elastic doctrine in which force postures will be consistent to a given doctrinal standpoint - that of the defence of the country's territorial integrity.

On structure, Figure 7.1 shows the proposed higher organisation of the Ministry of Defence, which suggests key changes that will have a significant input towards a centralisation of the decision making process, without jeopardising service interests. While the best organisation chart in the world is unsound if the men who have to make it work do not believe in it, there seems to be no better way of addressing the structural deficiency already identified in the decision making process without any preference for scientific decision making in the specific mould of planning and programming. This is not to say that centralised coordination could be foolproof but, the emergent consensus even within the armed forces is that the best aims of national security cannot be served by the deep seated service parochialism now prevalent.[33]

Apart from the obvious organizational challenges posed by the requirements for re-direction of policy, the need to address the type of individuals to be involved in this major overhaul of the organizational structure also assumes prime importance. The lessons of the past CDS's structure (which emerged as a compromise between those who favoured full service integration and those who feared centralization of military authority) shows clearly that the conditions existing at the time (which is still the norm) prevented joint staff from shedding their service background, hence the lack of commitment.[34]

The armed forces should provide individuals who understand service interests and capabilities and appreciate at the same time the need for centralised coordination. The

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[33] See for details, "Defence Headquarters Report on the Review Committee for the Re-Organization of the Defence Headquarters" (Lagos: Ministry of Defence, 1984) An unpublished Paper.

[34] Individual services still control the postings, assignments and promotions of officers sent to the CDS' Office. The perception was rife that officers sent there from the services were either on their way out to overseas appointments or on punishment. As a result, there was a high turn-over of Joint staff during its short period of operation. See Oladoyin, op-cit.,.



Figure 7.1 - Proposed Higher Defence Organisation

country can ill afford at this stage, another talk shop of inter-agency leaders where only cosmetic changes full of compromises is the norm, with one service holding the entire process to ransom through threats and objections. The task at hand will hurt and officer involvement will at the minimum require allegiance to the country and national security, rather than service parochialism and regime security.

Having examined the failure of past attempts towards centralisation of national defence and coordination of service programmes, the aim of creating national security officers out of the present service oriented military men can only succeed with constitutional and institutional backing to the above structure and not through any timid tinkering of a badly outmoded structure incapable of self reform. We cannot even begin to contemplate any change in the moribund structure currently in existence if there is no significant change in the three service acts as enacted in the 1960s, which would make way for a major change in the National Security Act beyond the cosmetic clauses in Section 179 of 1979 Constitution.[35]

IV. Options

If the above is achievable, the institutional changes that will lead to the desired structure can be effected in three interconnected yet detachable ways. However, not all the options are equally pragmatic. In all, the creation of a national defence strategy not subject to service parochialism and civilian usurpation of military roles should be held paramount. All officers interviewed for this work must consider it as the only step that can encourage accountability and change.

The first option deriving from our earlier contention on the absence of civilian expertise is the replacement of military expertise by civilian analysts. This can be done through the creation of a national strategic cell within the MoD structure wholly dedicated to academic analysis of the strategic content of policy, systemic cost-benefit

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[35] The strict compartmentalisation aimed at by the various Service Acts is clearly inadequate in the light of the identified need for linkages rather than separation. Since the Acts setting up the services make service chiefs only responsible to the Defence Minister with no other layer of management above them, this offered them the leeway to sidetrack any central coordinating role in a national defence structure without necessarily contravening the legislation.

analysis reminiscent of the Systems Analysis office under the McNamara leadership of the United States' Department of Defence. While substantial benefit may be derived from civilian presence, not only in terms of the required self discipline but also the necessary organisational impartiality in presenting the true choices of national military strategy, they would only significantly impact on the quantifiable areas of national strategy. Other areas of defence like cohesion, morale building and even battle readiness cannot be easily subjected to any bean counting process to determine effectiveness. Since tactics and overall strategy are not reducible to numbers, the linear logic tendency in every systems analysis in determining which forces to increase or decrease according to computer simulations and mathematical modelling make the case for complete dependence on civilian academic input weak. Besides, the attendant problem of substituting military incompetence completely with civilian inexperience in a political setting as impaired as Nigeria's, remains a recipe for organisational failure.

This leaves us with two other options for the creation of a workable national defence structure. Firstly, recruiting from scratch a completely new set of **national** military officers who show themselves not to be biased by traditional service loyalty and parochialism and whose career advancement is not wholly dependent on loyalty to service credo. The second option is that of systematically creating the national defence office out of the present service arrangement. This can be staffed initially by officers who have sufficiently become convinced of the need for central coordination of defence but have been consistently frustrated by regimental cohesion expected of them in their service; and later through recruitment into the office by a stiff competition. In both cases, the need to invest this office with the institutional superiority presently lacking in the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is imperative.

Pragmatically, if the main functions of central coordination (currently left to the whims of an ineffectual joint chief of defence staff and service chiefs and half heartedly carried out by them through compromise on the most acceptable, not the most adequate solution since inception) are to be fulfilled, creating nationally minded officers becomes inevitable. The functions of central military planning of operations involving more than one service, - central command of the forces of the different services in the event of a peacekeeping or expeditionary force; and provision of professional military advice to the Minister of Defence and President of the Country especially in such policy and

budgetary matters regarding distribution of forces, allocation of resources, strategic management, force structure, procurement and acquisition matters as well as research and development will depend on this.

An outright recruitment of a new band of officers to carry out this very important role would seem counterproductive, especially because of the amount of resentment it would generate among regular officers and it is very doubtful to what extent this can even succeed in a military institution that totally lacks a joint command orientation. Besides, an attempt like this has the potential for damaging the little regimental discipline left in the Nigerian Armed Forces and would seem possible only on a graduated scale.

This leaves us with only one short term option to get national defence officers with a significantly less opposition: recruit direct from the services themselves. In fact, this is not without precedence in the Nigerian Armed Forces. For instance, when the Air Force started in 1963, the first set of recruits into the Nigeria Air Force were drafted from the army. Equally, initial recruitment into the now defunct National Guards by the Babangida administration in 1991 has benefited from the three main services as well as other para-military forces.

Apart from the fact that there are some nationally minded officers whose views are totally in favour of central coordination[36], an effective and systematic way of recruiting into the national defence office may be to select promising[37] middle ranking officers from the three services who have been through the Command and Staff College and have held staff and command positions. Unlike now when officers are just selected from their services and sent straight into the Chairman's Office in an unsystematic fashion without leaving behind, their 'service baggage', officers given the opportunity to move to the new service should not only go through competitive examinations but also

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[36] For details on professionally minded officers, see, 'Nigeria: How a CoupMaker Stops Coups,' Africa Confidential, op-cit and 'Nigeria: The "De Javu" Agenda', Africa Confidential, op-cit..

[37] Although these are value laden terms, it should be easy to determine high flying officers from staff college's performance and command and staff responsibilities previously held. In the event that some still got selected through close connection to senior officers or politicians, it is hoped that the weeding process of stiff examinations and well drafted interviews will bring out the best.

a demanding **viva voce**. When they finally leave their service, they will know they are gone for good, not for a tour of duty, and hence, would not have to watch their back constantly.

Those successful in the stiff recruitment process will automatically disengage from their various services as their career progression would now depend solely on the national defence office, not their erstwhile services. The task then for the new cadre is to unlearn their service bias and assume fully the garb of national officers. This can only be done through another round of re-education. Since the officers we have in mind here will not be due as yet to attend the 'higher defence college' - National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies [NIPSS] - there may be need at this stage for a professional military 'staff and command' school wholly dedicated to national rather than single-service operations. The newly established War College may well be dedicated to this task in a more advanced format rather than its present tokenistic approach. Clearly, the Command and Staff College in Jaji has failed in this task.

Simultaneously, the process of familiarisation with the doctrine, tactics, jargons and operational procedures of various services would need to take place. With this completed, officers should be ready to take staff appointments as national defence officers and then higher command positions as may be appropriate. At all times, education should remain at the forefront of national defence officers' career. At some stage in the development of the national defence office, it may be necessary to incorporate the service fully into the curriculum of the National Defence Academy. This may be a step in the earlier suggested graduated scale. Fortunately, the academic content of the defence academy's curriculum has increased since it became a degree awarding institution in 1985 and that should serve as an impetus to those who may want to have a non-service orientation. At the stage in their education where cadets part ways to embrace the various service courses, another course can be created for national defence officers. And this will later become the permanent recruitment ground for the national defence office. The reason for this is clear. No matter how well national defence officers recruited from the services unlearn their service parochialism, it is very difficult for officers whose background and orientation had been service led to *totally* abandon their service bias. A residual loyalty to their service, no matter how harmless can be expected. Besides, as the National Guard experience has indicated, any office

superimposed on the traditional services would always be regarded as an alternative power centre and will be undermined. This is more the case if the armed forces also involve themselves in politics. Contrarily, young cadets who have chosen to dedicate their career to national defence would not look forward to changing their career mid-stream and will not be bound to any regimental loyalty to any single service.

While the attraction of commanding a service will be overwhelming to any cadet starting a military career, the obvious and no less attractive option of control over the higher direction of national defence as well as central commands i.e. peacekeeping, regional command and/or a newly created rapid deployment force all to be headed by national defence officers, not to mention the control of staff departments at the Defence Headquarters cannot be overlooked. Besides, if the objective of the young cadet is to be the best in the military profession and the Chief Adviser to the Minister and President on defence matters, it follows naturally that this will only be possible by joining the national defence office.

Of course, there is at least one practical problem that will arise from this second layer of recruitment, especially if all these supra-service powers are invested in national defence officers. Every cadet may want to join the national defence office as it provides the only way of becoming the nation's chief military officer, leaving the fighting services with perhaps less able men.[38] The tendency is also there that some latter day national defence officers recruited through the defence academy may not hold command positions throughout their career, which will not be the case with the first mode of recruitment in which officers have commanded brigades, battalions, frigates and air squadrons before assuming their national defence ranks. Single service officers may view this with immense suspicion and loathing, seeing themselves 'in the eye of the storm' and being commanded by officers with little or no command experience.

While this is a problem that has to be addressed, it cannot detract from the fact that one basic objective of creating a national defence office would have been significantly achieved. At least, by separating operational and policy making functions

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[38] There must be a method of addressing the mutinous tendency inherent in such an arrangement. One possible way of doing this is through an enhanced status for the political leadership in the Defence Ministry who can now effectively mediate between these conflicting tendencies.

from administrative leadership, which afterall, is the main function of service chiefs. The task of operational responsibilities, force structure and weapons acquisition decisions will now have to be guided by national priorities. In short, service' empire building' will no longer be easy to accomplish. Alternatively - the structure of the new system will not only serve national defence interests but also address service concerns. Also, it is still possible to have fulfilling service careers, except for the impossibility of becoming the Chief military officer. Service chiefs can still carry out their moral leadership role and administrative/personnel functions over the men under their commands and still attain the highest possible ranks. Since this format is envisaged for a democratic and civilian structure, the important constant in all of these must be the maintenance of a defence structure whereby the Minister of Defence asserts civilian authority on behalf of the President over the entire military structure. And since this has to be done in a two - track yet complementary approach through the operational chain of command consisting of national defence officers and the administrative chain of command - led by service chiefs, the decision of the civilian authority will be binding on all military officers.

The other option necessary in making this a workable structure is significantly dependent on the human factor. No matter the positive prospects of the above suggestions, the ability to have men who genuinely believe in the need for joint command and at the same time command enough service clout to break the control of regular officers who consider it their ultimate prerogative to make the joint structure eternally weak and sterile, is imperative. As noted earlier, we already have some of these 'joint' and nationally minded officers, but the probability of creating a more permanent corps remains open to debate.

Still another positive approach in strengthening the hands of national defence officers may come from civilian expertise of the kind already referred to as a ***strategic cell.*** They will come in handy in the help they can render to national defence officers in policy areas identified in Figure 7.1. These include: Policy & Plans, Operations, Research & Development, Force Structure, Organization, Logistics and Evaluation, all in the bid to achieve the centralisation of defence structure.

But in order to lessen the unavoidable friction between experienced military officers and newly injected and relatively inexperienced civilian experts in the MoD, a careful balance must be sought between professional military advice and civilian

academic proposals. At all times, care must be taken so that academic input is not construed as a wholesale dismantling of the defence process built over the years by military officers. The balancing act is better left to the political leaders for resolution if this option is taken up.

One inevitable consequence of a restructure of the military organisation is the reduction of the country's military strength. While this inevitability has been known and prevaricatingly pursued since the end of the civil war, the reality is still that the size of the Nigerian Armed Forces is not consistent with the current requirements of national defence. This perhaps, has been responsible for the current demobilisation of men, especially in the army. Despite the cosmetic nature of current reduction, the regime is finding it increasingly difficult to justify, even to its military constituency - a four divisional structure of almost 100,000 men in an era of structural adjustment for the civilian population. Hence, even while still maintaining the structure and most of the men, the logic of a 'huge' all-volunteer armed forces in the light of threats as presented in this study no longer seemed appropriate. Indeed, a growing undercurrent of opinion within the army, for instance seems to be in support of a one, or at most, two divisional structure, of a highly trained, mobile and rapidly deployable force.[39]

The fact that the re-organisation of the armed forces which started in 1990 -(a forced innovation on the military leadership after the April 22nd coup of that year) has now seen a reduction in the size of the army by some 18,000 men[40] - almost the strength of one division - would seem to support the 'new thinking' on size. Besides, the military leadership has often been quoted as aiming towards a 60,000 man army - which would mean an approximately 40,000 men reduction from current strength - a figure arguably still larger than current requirements. If needs are to be based on current threat assessment, it would seem very clear that peacekeeping forces even in the light of the United Nations' embrace of preventive diplomacy or a rapid deployment force in respect

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[39] As one former Defence Minister and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Domkat Bali told this writer, 'the army does not need more than one or two all purpose division(s) in the light of current threat assessments. What is needed is the mechanism to have a well trained reserve force to act as a back up to the main force in the event of need.' Interview. 5 May, 1991.

[40] Military Balance 1992-3, op-cit., p.89. Independent figures obtained by this writer remains significantly less than the above. See Chapter Six.

of borderland security, cannot justify a huge infantry force. In a region likely to suffer from an increasing wave of guerilla activities between now and the early part of the next century, armed forces will benefit more from better operational tactics and high level intelligence network rather than intimidatory array of men and weapons. More than anything else, the Liberian experience has brought out the tactical folly of a huge infantry against guerilla fighters who are never massed on one spot. It also proved the irrelevance of battle tanks or artillery battery in conducting a war with indigenes who possessed a better mastery of the terrain, and, in effect, the opportunity for effective dispersal not common in conventional battles.

In spite of ongoing cutbacks in size, the political implications on the leadership, whose main constituency remains the military is instructive. The increasing pressure on the leadership has so far limited the nature of current reductions - which has resulted mainly from attrition and reduced recruitment. The reality in future will have to accommodate tough decisionmaking. Yet as an all volunteer force, this is the only life known to the military men, hence demobilization can often result in a loss of self esteem. This will not be the case if they were draftees into a war as they will be eager to return to the world they knew.

Besides, the nationwide recession cannot make job-hunting easier for demobilised military men. Unlike in the air force and the navy, not all army skills are readily transferable. The adaptability factor is further hampered by the low literacy rate among the rank and file of the army which remains a sad reflection of the national literacy rate. Apart from constituting an active part of the reserve force, military authorities should ensure that demobilised men are helped to fit into society through various personnel development methods. They may also enjoy certain privileges such as military scholarships for their wards, free health in military hospitals and other social welfare activities likely to put pressure on their gratuity and pensions.

The unwanted baggage of force reduction notwithstanding, the challenges for the military in the next decade can only be grappled by men with outstanding education and skills who would need to keep abreast of today's complex weaponry. This also underlines the need to complement the request for a reduced but highly mobile active

force within a streamlined recruitment pattern[41] with a compulsory national military service and a highly structured procurement plan, all geared towards a credible deterrent doctrine.

The rubric for a reserve component of the armed forces already exists in the National Youth Service Corps. When the National Youth Service Corps Scheme [NYSC] was introduced in 1972, the idea to give all able bodied young graduates military training was broached but not taken up. Since then, it has come up in debates at several armed forces conferences with no serious thought given to it. Yet all, including military officers, accept that war is a national problem not restricted to the armed forces alone. Perhaps the current effort to re-organise the armed forces will lead to serious thought being given to this attempt to create another element of the active reserve forces called upon at a minimum notice. This would help the armed forces to cope with the inevitable reduction in size. All that is needed is a clear training guideline and timescale for the national service. It will be ideal to maintain the present yearly call-up system and the forces trained will augment the reduced active duty troops should war occur.

Given an agreement, or at least a consensus of opinion on the goals and objectives stipulated above, create a process by which the military organization can examine its environment, monitor trends, assess perceived competitors and evolve a command and control system which guarantees centralised coordination and a constant review process for monitoring viability, then a flexible force posture can be built on such an agreement. The lesson for the future is that long term planning, which assumes continuation of present trends can only lead to ineffective defence planning process since nothing definite can be predicted about the next century. Whether this consensus on the minimum conditions can be reached is open to debate. What seems clear at this point is that it is unlikely that the Nigerian public will be willing to sustain a huge defence burden in the current absence of a clear and imminent external danger.

The above point is also relevant in respect of weapons acquisition and procurement patterns as well as doctrinal evolution. The key issue revolves round the

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[41] By this we mean that recruitment into the armed fores should be more properly monitored whilst it is reduced to a single competition for the Combatants' regular course. All other support officers can be recruited by the Armed Forces through the Federal Civil Service Commission.

realism of goals and objectives. If goals and objectives are realistic rather than conglomerate and idealistic, and if there is a broad consensus that new goals do not have to toe the line of past objectives, fewer problems should be expected in terms of reaching a consensus on force requirement, weapon procurement and core interest defence spending. The country cannot afford to be presumptuous about the content of force structure before settling the overall questions of goals and objectives of Nigeria's defence planning.

V. 'Core' interest spending

If threats are reviewed and the defence policy process re-orientated along the lines of suggested options, it should follow that "core" national interest spending would be more rigorously task determined in a centralised structure, leading to the reduction in fraud and abuse of the budgetary arrangements. By this we do not intend an automatic reduction in military expenditure but a defence spending whose allocation takes into account short term economic pressures and long term defence needs. To suggest that this translates to automatic cutbacks is to confuse the decision making process with the policy outcome. In fact, there is every likelihood that the above suggestions may initially lead to a significant rise in defence spending in the cost of pensions and demobilisation packages, creation of national defence office and expansion of the peacekeeping element of the defence strategy[42]

However, two critical points - independent but interwoven are worth paying significant attention as regards military spending. One, a substantially large amount of allocated resources went on personnel-related expenses de-linked from perceived threats and enemy capabilities and this eventually undermined the effectiveness of the armed forces. Two, in the absence of any consensus as to what doctrine should guide security policy and, thus defence spending, even the percentage of military expenditure directed

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[42] This was the case when the Generals Mohammed and Obasanjo's administration carried out the first level of demobilisation in the armed forces. Not only did the military witness a rise in budgetary allocations, the sharp decline in actual military pay failed to translate fully into higher expenditure on hardware because 'pensions and retired military pay' increased exponentially. See Chapters Four and Five for details

towards weapons acquisition and other hardware proved to be less well spent than otherwise expected of any result oriented weapons acquisition policy.

Yet as constricting as the country's economic situation has become, military spending in the last three years has proved to be less value for money as in the preceding years under study, if not worse in certain areas. Whereas defence maintained a significant proportion of GNP, goals and objectives still proved unattainable except in superficial terms.

To eschew the lack of value for money which characterised security spending in the past two decades, it stands to reason that planners should work from agreed goals and objectives in the light of current changes in the international order and hopefully, conclusions reached would be result-oriented - especially in the way it affects a re-ordering of priorities in the military content of grand strategy and in the link it forges with the multi - dimensional nature of national security.

CONCLUSION

"Would you tell me please which way I ought to go from here?"[asked Alice]

"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the cat.

Lewis Carrol,
Alice in Wonderland

The perspective adopted in this state-level analysis of defence planning trends has been valuable in several respects. In its deliberate mix of historical materialism, rational-choice explanation and the recognition of the state as a product of the international environment and societal pressures, it has aided our comprehensive understanding of unique circumstances not often borne out of cross-national studies. Thus, instead of assuming the nation state and the inter-state system as the given and unquestionable ends of policy, as neo-realists do, the study represents an explanation of the state's nature in terms of its dialectical relationship with the civil-society. More importantly, the synthesis achieved between the primacy of inner politics and the extant international dimension in defence planning has helped in generating a performance related study of defence policy analysis in Nigeria which a purely rational model analysis is unlikely to achieve.

It has also helped us in answering the questions asked in the introduction, with regard to the goals of Nigeria's defence policy; the real or perceived threats that governed its articulation and conception, the inter-relationship between the subjective and objective social forces in the nation's development, the programmes adopted to attain ends of policy and the extent to which the nature of threats influenced doctrine, force structure, arms procurement and other defence issues in a systematic and coherent fashion.

The result has not only been an enquiry into the impact of war on a country's defence planning process but also an evaluation of the defence planning arrangement in the past two decades. While the work may not have answered Lewis Carrol's analogous poser on the destination of Nigeria's defence planning in full since the

nation itself is unclear of its destination[1], its criticism of prevailing orthodoxies has been useful in creating a new research agenda for national security studies in third world countries. For example, by refusing to assume a basic continuity in the logic of anarchy and the dominance of inter-state rivalry in international relations, it emphasises the need for a broader based and more integrated perspective in any analysis of defence planning.

By straddling mainstream realist discourse of threats and national security, and the collectivist notion of security embedded in most of idealist discourse, the study has been able to elicit the transformative potential of Nigeria's defence planning, as well as cast a retrospective overview on the benefits of the traditional approach to national security studies. While this enabled us to understand the constraining influence of the international environment and the realities of *realpolitik* in order to seek the best means of achieving state-centric security, both in terms of maintaining territorial integrity and seeking the primacy of the nation-state, state-centrism did not become the sole defining characteristic of the work, hence the suggestion that the country adopts a 'Pax West Africana' defence policy as well as an internal dimension to national security in its options for change.

In doing this, our multi-layered approach to security not only diminishes the self sustaining politics of anarchy required of state-centrism, but it also seeks a re-definition of the sovereignty concept in the sub-region; one which de-emphasises post-colonial artificial boundaries which have served as constant sources of territorial vulnerability. As this study repeatedly posits, the billiard board perception of state-centrism as offered by the founders of the realist school decidedly blurs scores of social processes within the international and domestic environments, such as the interaction of classes, ethnic groups and other social divisions. It is the evidence gathered from this holistic view of security that leads us to conclude that it is the interaction between social forces - states or ethnic groups divided along artificial boundaries, rather than international anarchy or any expansionist proclivity on the part of the security elite, that provides the most fundamental explanation of threats

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[1] At the moment, the clamour for the restructuring of the Nigerian state has forced the present regime into organising a Constitutional Conference to detrmine the future of Nigeria.

to Nigeria's national security. Yet, as utopian as this might seem to realists because of its seeming surface plausibility, it is a feasible utopia. Until the internal and inter-state dimensions of security assume equal centrality alongside the international dimension in national security literature, the imbalance between the international and the domestic environments, between the individual, national and international perspectives of security will continue to be a constant source of controversy in a modern-nation state like Nigeria. The preceding chapters are replete with examples and explanations of why this will continue to be the case if the whole notion of security is not broadened beyond the current spectrum.

Yet, by traversing the power-peace complex of realist and idealist thought, this study also treads on the path of attitudinal research and straddles the realm of objectivity and subjectivity in social science inquiry, a subject of constant controversy among international relations scholars. The idea that defence policy analysis can be successfully conducted without the interaction between subjective and objective factors seem to us a naive one at best, a wishful thinking at worst. As Robert McKinlay argues, 'subjective factors are in part a function of objective factors, recognized in attitudinal research as the cognitive component.'. Hence, the notion encouraged in most cross-national studies of defence planning that hard facts and figures are sacred patently neglect the factors behind the facts and figures. Factors that tend to restrain the purpose of security from its emancipatory, yet 'humanistic' ends, leaving it in a cold war time-warp. As Christian Reus- Smit correctly argues,

> ...all theories that assert value-neutrality, for deliberate ideological purposes or not, contain status quo bias. Their objectivist ethos formally denies any emancipatory commitments...in the perpetuation of the dominant social order. Scientific objectivity, therefore, masks ideology while stripping theory of the power of criticism.[2]

Although this work cannot be accused of status-quo bias because of the numerous possibilities addressed in its options for change, recognising the

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[2] Charles Reus Smit, 'Realist and Resistance Utopias: Community, Security and Political Action in the New Europe,' Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.21, No.1.(Spring 1992), p.11.

inadequacy of traditional national security perspectives and suggesting structural changes may not provide needed change after all, as long as the tools for dealing with policy problems remain the same. Since there can be no guarantee that weak leaders or politically ambitious military officers will suddenly disappear from the defence scene - to resolve the problem of form and structure of defence planning, there must be clear definition of goals and means and a clear identification of procedures for selecting the means towards the attainment of identified goals. Yet the only possible change to current means will have to come with a reconstituted leadership ready to protect service needs as well as fulfill the task of national defence at hand. For now, it can be assumed that the master's tools will not destroy the master's house.

It remains doubtful whether the civilian successors to the Nigeria's military leadership would find it possible - or desirable to alter the *status quo* unless forced by events. This is more so because recruitment into the leadership smacks of a remarkably traditional gradualism making change a bitter pill to swallow. Indeed, despite the economic pressures following the declining rate of growth, the tendency for a muddling through approach as well as the squeezing out of resources from the economy, through a host of other equilibrating mechanisms, into the military has never been more likely.

Consequently, it is safe to predict that the 'muddling through' approach will not be altered by shifts in the economic fortunes unless economic problems reach crisis levels and unless a new leadership with different values emerges. Otherwise, there has to be a significant change in the level of internal threats in which the civil society becomes the key determining factor for change.[3]

One thing is very clear. If the objective of an efficient and effective national defence is to be achieved, this can only be done by a cohesive cadre of nationally minded officers, which increasingly seems only possible under a civilian authority accountable and answerable to the civil society. After all, it is no longer in doubt that the inadequate conception of the role of the armed forces in a democratic

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[3] See J 'Kayode Fayemi, 'No Farewell to Arms: The Future of the Military in Nigeria's Third Republic', Paper presented at the African Studies Association Bi-ennial Conference, University of Stirling, Scotland, September 1992.

Nigeria is responsible for the current stasis of thought and action, not to mention the lack of credibility and total diffidence in the present military cum political leadership in the country. However, in spite of the military leadership's preference for a superficial tinkering of the national defence structure which can only result in tenuous change, the fact is that the majority of the country's military officers will innovate if and when pressured by a countervailing authority.

Hence, if the state must solve the problems of accountability and lack of democracy arising from the character of the post-colonial state and military rule, knowledge becomes the key to change. Perhaps the incumbent's repressive tendencies and the economic destitution of the populace may lead the civil society to tilt towards changing the existing structure. Popular participation and not exclusivity is thus what is needed to counter military control and widen national security perspectives. From the numerous pressures converging on the military and the civil society - externally and internally - a clear reading of the reaction within the organisation is one of alarm and tremendous soul searching. The disparate state of organisation among the population makes mobilisation of the kind necessary for achieving objective political control over the military less likely at this stage and does not encourage any prognostication as to the exact timing of this change in the future.[4]

In conclusion, the impact of the personalisation of state power under military Generals should force a serious rethink within and outside the military organisation as to what to do with intervention. Whether the rhetoric about professionalising the military is true or not, the onus remains with the civil society to make this a reality. It is hoped that the increasing spectre of democratisation all over the world will compel the military organisation to address the issue of intervention in politics seriously and thus retain the opportunity to concentrate on the main task of national defence.

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[4] This, at least, seems to be the case in the country's current political crisis. Having developed the instinct for power retention and institutional survival, the armed forces sacrificed General Babangida, Nigeria's erstwhile military president and adopted an accommodational strategy, incorporating key critics in civil society without restructuring the format of military dictatorship. See 'Nigeria: The Khalifa's coup', op-cit.

The best case scenario following from this is the rise of nationally minded, rather than service oriented officers ready to carry out the necessary surgery in the organisation with an added commitment to civilian supremacy. The worst case scenario, however, is the continuation of the *status quo* which cannot bring out the best in the defence organisation. The reality lies somewhere between the two scenarios. Needless to say, until dedicated military professionals are put in charge and a workable organisational structure put in place, the military will be unable to play its rightful role and help democracy steer its course in Nigeria.

Whether the various hypotheses, arguments, positions and suggestions for a new research agenda here are taken up or not, it is hoped that the relevance of the methodological, theoretical and empirical mix has been brought out clearly in our alternative post war analysis of defence planning in Nigeria.

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The Guardian(Lagos), ***Independent***

New Nigerian(Kaduna), ***Independent***

Daily Sketch(Ibadan), ***State owned***

Nigerian Tribune(Ibadan), ***Independent***

Newswatch Magazine(Lagos), ***independent***

The News Magazine(Lagos), ***independent***

African Guardian(Lagos), ***independent***

African Concord(Lagos), ***independent***

African Defence(Paris)

Journal of Defence and Diplomacy(New York)

Africa Confidential(London)

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The Guardian(London)

The Daily Telegraph(London)

Financial Times(London)

Time Magazine(Washington)

Nigeria Now(London), ***independent***

West Africa(London), ***Nigerian government owned***

The Wish Stream (Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst)

Interviews

The following are listed with titles and positions held at the time of interview.

Abdul-raheem, Tajudeen, Several discussions, London
Dr Abdulraheem wrote a critically acclaimed doctoral thesis on Nigeria's Political Parties in the Second Republic. He was Director, Africa Research and Information Bureau, London at the time of discussions.

Adeleye,Ernest Air-Commodore, Kaduna, 9 May 1991.
Air-Commodore Adeleye was Deputy Commandant of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna at the time of the interview. Before then, he was Commanding Officer of the Air Force Base in Benin and later Military Governor of Rivers States in South Eastern Nigeria. He retired from the Air Force in 1993.

Adesanoye, Festus Lagos, 23 May 1991.
Mr Adesanoye was a Consultant to The Guardian Newspaper at the time of interview. He was Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence between 1976 and 1979 before he moved to the Ministry of Education. He is now the Traditional ruler of Ondo, Ondo State.

Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji, London, 3 November 1993.
Alhaji Alhaji was at various times Permanent Secretary at the Trade, National Planning, Finance and Economic Development Ministries and Minister for Budget Affairs and later Finance between 1975 and 1992. He assumed office as Nigeria's High Commissioner to the Court of St' James in August 1992.

Allam. V, Air Commodore, Lagos, 17 April, 1991.
Air Commdore Allam was one of the Air Force pioneer pilots. He was the Air Officer in charge of Operations at the time of interview.

Bali, Domkat, Lt.General(Rtd.), Jos, 5 May 1991.
General Bali was Nigeria's Defence Minister and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1984 and 1990 when he retired from the armed forces. He remains to date the longest serving Defence Minister.

Basharu, Aminu Brigadier(Rtd), Lagos, 29 March, 1991.
Brigadier Basharu was Director of Army Finance and Accounts before he retired in 1990.

Bashorun Debo, Major(Rtd), New York, December 10, 1993
Major Bashorun was on political asylum in the United States at the time of interview. He was formally Public Relations Officer to two former Chiefs of Army Staff, Generals Wushishi and Ibrahim Babangida, who later became Head of State.

Dan-Asabe,Abdalla Major, London, Several discussions, 1992.
Major Dan-Asabe was studying for an MA in War Studies at the time of discussions. Prior to that, he was defence attache at the Nigerian High Commission in London.

Ejoor, David, Major General[Rtd.], Lagos, 4 June 1991
General Ejoor was at various times Military Governor, Corp Commander and Staff Officer. He retired from the army as Chief of Army Staff in 1975.

Clayton, Anthony, Sandhurst, August 1991.
Dr Clayton is a Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy. He has written extensively on Africa's military organisations as well as the involvement of colonail powers on the continent.

Jemibewon, David, Major General(Rtd), Lagos, 26 April, 1991.
Major General Jemibewon was Director General at the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria before retirement in 1980. He was once Military Governor in Western State, and later Oyo State. He is the author of *Combatants in Government*, (Ibadan: Heineman, 1978). He now practises law in Lagos.

Kure, Y.Y., Major General, Lagos, 21 April, 1991.
Major General Kure held several key command and staff positions in the Nigerian Army. He was once GOC, 2nd Division and was in charge of the Maitasine Operations(Religious Disturbances) in Kano in 1980. At the time of interview, he was Federal Minister of Sports and Youth Development. He has since retired from the Army.

Mamman, A.B., Major General, 24 April 1991
Major General Mamman was Minister in charge of Industries at the time of interview. He was formerly, Commandant of the Command and Staff College, Jaji and Director of Army Training and Operations at the Army Headquarters.

Nyiam, Tony, Colonel(Rtd), London, discussions, 1992.
Colonel Nyiam was Staff Officer to Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff, Major General Ibrahim Babangida between 1984 and 1986. He studied Military Engineering at Heriot Watt University, Scotland and lectured at the Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna. He has been in exile in the United Kingdom since 1992 April, after leading an abortive military coup d'etat against the Federal Military Government.

Obasanjo Olusegun, General(Rtd), Otta, 18 March, 1991.
General Obasanjo was Nigeria's Head of State between 1976 and 1979 when he relinquished power to the civilians. Prior to his leadership of the country, he was Commander of the 3rd Marine Commando during the Civil War, Head of the Nigerian Army Engineering Corps and Federal Commissioner for Transport at various times. Since retirement, he has served on various international bodies including the United Nations and the Commonwealth. He is Chairman of the Africa Leadership Forum.

Ofeimun, Odia, London, 1992, Discussions
Odia Ofeimun is a renowned newspaper columnist, poet and former private secretary to late leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria, Chief Obafemi Awolowo. At the time of discussions, he was a Fellow at Oxford University where he was writing a biography of Chief Awolowo.

Ogunseitan, O, Air Commodore, Lagos, 17 April, 1991.
Air Commodore Ogunseitan was the Air Officer, Personnel at the Nigerian Air Force Headquarters at the time of interview.

Oladimeji, O, Captain, Lagos, 16 April, 1991.
He was the Nigerian Navy's Director of Information at the time of interview.

Oniyangi,Akanbi Ilorin, 8 May, 1991.
Alhaji Akanbi Oniyangi was Nigeria's Defence Minister between 1981 and 1983.

Osunmakinde, Tunde, Commodore, Lagos, 11 April, 1991
Commodore Osunmakinde was Director of Operations at the Naval Headquarters at the time of the interview. He was also the Navy's representative on the Board of the National Maritime Authority.

Oteri, O, Brigadier, Kaduna, 10 May, 1991
Dean of the Engineering Faculty at the Nigerian Defence Academy. Brigadier Oteri was until then Director of Research at the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria.

Smith, Patrick, London, 1992 -94
Patrick Smith is the editor of the well regarded publication, Africa Confidential. He is a noted commentator on the Nigerian military and political configurations. All discussions took place in London.

Ukabiala, Jullyette, London, Several discussions, 1991-93.
Ms Ukabialla pioneered defence reporting in Nigeria as The Guardian(Lagos) Defence Correspondent between 1983 and 1989. She is now studying for her doctorate degree in War Studies at King's College, London where she obtained an MA.

Ukpabi,Sam C. Kaduna, 9 May 1991.
Professor Ukpabi is the Academic Provost of the Nigerian Defence Academy. A pioneer military historian, and former Head of the History Department at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is the author of *Military Involvement in African Politics,* (New York: Conch Publishers, 1972).

Williams, R.O.I, Major General, Minna, 22 April 1991.
Major General Ishola Williams was the Commander, Nigerian Army Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters in Minna. He was Director of Research at the Defence Headquarters before assuming office at TRADOC. He resigned from the army in November, 1993.

Yusuf, N.O.O., Air Marshal, Lagos, 25 April, 1991.
Marshal NureiniYusuf was Chief of Air Staff at the time of the interview. He has held various staff and command positions before then, including, Air Officer, Tactical Air Command, Makurdi and Air Officer, Operations at the Air Force Headquarters. He has since retired from the air force.

APPENDIX 1. NIGERIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS' MILITARY BALANCE.

NIGERIA	CAMEROON	CHAD	BENIN	NIGER
Popu: 115m	Popu: 12m	Pop: 5.7m	4.8m	7.5m
Total Armed Forces: 94,500	Total Armed Forces: 11,600	TAF: 17000	4,350	3,300
ARMY: 80,000	ARMY: 6,600	ARMY:17000e	3,800	3,200
EQPT:	EQPT:	EQPT:	EQPT:	EQPT:
MBT:132:60T-55, 72 Vickers MK3	RECCE:8-M8, Ferret,8V-150	AFV:Some 63: 4 Panhard	LGT TKS: 20PT-76	RECCE: 50+:M-8,18
LIGHT TANKS: 100 Scorpion	Commando(20mm gun)	ERC-90, Some 50AML-60/-90	RECCE:9M-8,14BRDM2	AML-90, 18AML-60-7,
RECCE:20 Saladin,120AML-60, 60AML-90,55 FOX	AIFV:12V-150 Commando(90mm)	9V-150 with 90mm	TOWED ARTY:105 mm,4M-101	AML-60-20
APC: 10 Saracen; 3004k-7FA	APC:29V-150 Commando,12M-3 Half truck.	TOWED ARTY: 105mm:5M-101	MORTARS: 81mm	APC:14 M-3
TOWED ARTY: 105 mm: 200M-56; 122 mm:200D-30/-74;	TOWED ARTY: 22: 75mm,120mm:16 Brandt.	MORTARS:81mm; 120mm:AM:50	RL:89mm: LRAC	MORTARS 81mm:30; 120mm:15 Brandt
155mm:24FH-77B	ATGW: Milan	ATGW:Milan	NAVY:200	RCL:57mm
SP ARTY: 155mm:25 Palmaria	RL:89mm:LRAC	RL:89mm:LRAC	TORPEDO CRAFT:2	8M-18;75 mm:6M-20
MORTARS:81mm: Carl Gustav;106mm :M-40A1.	RCL:57mm:13 Ch Type-52;106mm: 40M-40A2	RCL:106mm:M-40AI;112mm: APILAS	PATROL, INSHORE: 4	AD GUN: 20mm:10 M-3 VDA SP.
AD GUNS: 20mm: Some 60;23mm: ZU-23,30ZSU-23-4SP;40mm:L/60	AD GUNS:14.5mm: 18Ch-Type-58; 35mm:18twin Oerlikon;37mm: 18Ch-Type-63	AD GUNS:20mm, 30mm.	AIR - FORCE:350 no cbt ac, 1 armed hel.	AIR FORCE: 100+;no cbt.ac/ hel.
SAM:48 Blowpipe, 16 Roland	NAVY: 700	SAM: 10 Stinger.	AIRCRAFT: 10	TPT:8
NAVY: 5,000	MISSILE CRAFT: 1	AIR FORCE:200	HEL: ATTACK: 1	L:5
FRIGATES:2	PATROL,INSHORE: 3	4 cbt ac;no armed hel.	TPT:4	PARA: G: 900
CORVETTES:3 with ASW.	RIVERINE:Boats only.	COIN: 2PC-7, 2SF-260W	PARA MILITARY:	PG:200
MISSILE CRAFT: 6	AMPH: Crafts:	TPT: 3C-47,	GENDARMERIE:2000	RG: 1,900
PATROL,INSHORE:42	2 LCM;5LCVP	1 C-130A, 2 -B,I-H,I C-212, 2DC-4	P.M:2000	
MCMVs: 2		HEL: 4 SA-330,1 SA-341		
AMPH.LANDING CRAFTS: 2	AIR FORCE: 300,	LIAISON:2 PC-6B, 5 Reims-Cessna FTB337		
SUPPORT & MISC: 1 Survey ship.	16 cbt ac, 4 armed hel.	PARA MILITARY:		
NAVAL AVIATION:	Composite Sqn,	GENDA: 5,700		
Hel: 2 Westland Lynx MK89MR/SAR	1 Pres.Fleet FGA/COIN:5 Alpha jet,11	OPPOSITION: 1000(Libyan backed)		
AIR FORCE: 9,500	CM-170	FOREIGN FORCES:FRANCE		
95 Cbt ac, 16 armed helicopters	MR:2 Do-128D-6	1,100, 3 Inf Coy, AD Arty		
FGA/FIGHTER:3 Sqn.	ATTACK HEL:4 SA-342L(with HOT)	Units, cbt &		
1 with 22 Alpha jets;1 with 11MiG-21MF, 6 MiG-21U (plus 12MiG-21MF being mod); 1 with 17 Jaguar (13-SN,4-BN)	TPT: 3C-130H/-H -30,1DHC-4,4DHC -5D,1IAI-201, 2 PA-23	tpt ac/hel.		
COIN/TRG:23 L.39, 12MB-339AN.	HEL: 3 Bell 206			
ATTACK HEL:16 Bo-105D	3 SE-3130,1SA-318			
MR/SAR:1 Sqn with AIRCRAFT:2F-27MR (Armed)	4 SA-319.			
HEL: 4 Bo-105D	PARA MILITARY:			
TPT: 2 Sqn with	GENDAMARIE:4000			
6 C-130H, 3-H-30	10 Regional Grps			
3 Do-228,3 F-27MR	4 Patrol Boats			
5 G-222				
LIGHT TPT: 3 Sqn with 18 Do-28D,18 Do-128-6				
Hel:incl 4AS-322, 4 Bo-105c, 2SA-330				
TRAINING:				
AIRCRAFT:2 MiG-21U 25 Bulldog;				
HEL: 14 Hughes 300				
MISSILES:				
AAM: AA-2 Atoll				
PARA-MILTARY:				
Coast Guard;				
Port Security				
Sec. & Civil Def.				

SOURCE: THE MILITARY BALANCE,1990-1991,(London: Brassey's for The IISS,1990)

Nigerian Tooday , No. 73, 1 November 1976.

COMMISSIONER GARBA SPEAKS OF LOCKHEED BRIBERY IN NIGERIA

Details of the international Lockheed bribery scandal as it affects Nigeria were given in Lagos recently by the Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier Joseph Garba.

The full text of the Commissioner's press statement, in which the name of deposed Head of State Yakubu Gowon featured prominently, is as follows:

'You are no doubt aware that early this year some press reports, and particularly a special report contained in the Feburary 23, 1976, edition of the *NEWSWEEK* magazine, featured the United States Congressional disclosures on what has become known as the Lockheed scandal in which it was alleged, among other things, that a sum of US 3.6 million dollars had been paid to some Nigerians as kick-backs out of a business deal of US 45 million dollars in respect of the purchase by the Nigerian Government of six Hercules C-130 military transport aircraft from the American Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Following this publication, the Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces ordered that immediate investigation should be carried out and that my Ministry should request the United States Government for every possible assistance by way of shedding more light on this report in order to establish the facts of the matter and to identify the role played by the Nigerians who might have been involved in the transaction. The information so far made available to the Federal Military Government by the United States Government, though useful in a way, has not been sufficiently helpful for the purpose of determining that any pay-offs were made to the Nigerians who have featured so prominently in the purchase of C-130 transport aircraft for the Nigerian Air Force and the exact amount of such kick-backs.

It has been decided that you should be briefed on this matter as the Federal Military Government is of the view that the general public are fully entitled to a detailed account of the international Lockheed scandal particularly in so far as it is relevant to Nigeria. To begin with, the initial proposal to purchase heavy transport planes for use by the Nigerian Air Force was mooted in August 1973 when the then Chief of Air Staff, Brigadier Emmanuel Ikwue, arranged a meeting with the then Head of State Yakubu Gowon on the overall aircraft requirements of the Nigerian Air Force. At that time, the DC-3 airplanes were being phased out and the following alternative types of aircraft were suggested:

the Russian Antonov-12
the Lockheed Hercules C-130
the German/French Transal C-160

The meeting with the then Head of State was held on April 2, 1974 during which approval was given for the various types of aircraft to be purchased by the Nigerian Air Force. Among these, it was agreed that six C-130 Hercules Aircraft should be purchased immediately. From the minutes of that meeting, it would appear that the Anatov-26 and the DHC-5 were eliminated on grounds of range and payload which were said to be very similar to the F-27 already acquired by the Air Force. The former Head of State further directed that there was no point wasting time going into further studies on the C-160 Transal as it was not widely used and that the Air Force should purchase six C-130 Hercules immediately in view of the fact that the aircraft was being used in many parts of the world. If the C-130 could not be purchased, the Air Force was to further explore the possibility of buying the C-160.

Curiously, in March 1974, copies of a revealing letter addressed to General Gowon were addressed to both the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs by one Dr. E. Manon from the Savoy Hotel, Zurich, Switzerland. In the letter, Dr. Manon claimed that he knew that the Nigerian Government was actively negotiating for the purchase of three to six military transport aircraft of the C-130 Hercules type and gave the total costs as between twenty to forty million American dollars. He further claimed that since the purchase was being negotiated through some intermediaries, the cost to Nigeria would be higher than necessary as the price already included hefty commissions to be paid to people whom he described as these 'ambassadors'. It was suggested by Dr. Manon that it would be cheaper to buy the aircraft either through the American Ambassador in Lagos or the Nigerian Ambassador in Washington direct from the United States Government. This method, he believed, would eliminate the intermediaries, stop any pay-offs that might have been contemplated and lead to about ten per cent reduction

in the contract price. After stating that other countries, notably Zaire, had used this government-to-government direct method of transaction he added that the method would stop a certain Greek Mr. Tenper center who was acting as Lockheed's agent in the transaction from corrupting certain highly placed Nigerian officials with hundreds of thousands if not millions of ill-gotten dollars.

On account of this letter, and the earlier government decision on the purchase of expensive military hardware on a government-to-government basis, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Mr. Ibrahim Damcida, addressed a letter to the Ministry of External Affairs requesting that Ministry to discuss with the United States Ambassador in Lagos the possibility of the United States Government selling to us six C-130 Hercules aircraft. What was intended was that the United States Government should make the planes available from their Air Force existing stock. Alternatively, the United States Government should place an order for the planes from the manufacturers.

Another letter was later addressed to the Chief of Air Staff intimating him with the outcome of the discussion between the United States Ambassador, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence and Mr. George Dove-Edwin, Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs. At the instance of the Chief of Air Staff, another meeting was held under the chairmanship of Lt.-Col. Yisa-Doko of the Nigerian Air Force Headquarters at which it was decided that both offers, that is, that of the Government and that of the manufacturers, should be compared with one another when received before a recommendation could be made to the Ministry of Defence.

A meeting was again arranged in June 1974 between the United States Ambassador and the Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs. As a result, a lengthy letter was addressed to our Ambassador in Washington, pointing out mainly the following differences between the proposal of the United States Government and that of the manufacturers.

Fluctuation in price

Lockheed quoted the firm price of 6,467,600 U.S. dollars per aircraft if the contract was signed by July 1, 1974 but the price quoted by the United States Air Force which was 6,200,000 dollars was significantly less, although there was no guarantee that there would be no fluctuation.

Delivery

Lockheed, through a representative called Mr. A. Beavers, had informed the Nigerian Embassy in the United States that, because of cancellation, they would be able to supply two of the six aircraft in the last quarter of 1975 and thereafter, at the rate of one aircraft per month beginning in January, 1976. Because the United States Air Force would have to take its place in the queue when Nigeria's order was firm, the United States Government would not be in a position to deliver until the first half of 1977.

It was reported in the letter that the United States Ambassador stressed that, while it was up to Nigeria to proceed in whatever manner we desired, his Government was of the view that it would be in our liberated interest not to use middlemen for the purchase. After indicating our preference for the supply of the aircraft through the United States Government, in view of the difference of 1,605,600 dollars on the total cost of the six aircraft based on the information as stated earlier, our Ambassador in the United States was requested to discreetly make enquiries from the United States Government about the aircraft and later forward his comments on the two methods of purchase to the Ministry of Defence.

Brigadier Joseph N. Garba

In the meantime, a minute was addressed to Yakubu Gowon by the Permanent Secretary, Mr. Damcida, stating the position in respect of the offer by Messrs. Lockheed and that of the United States Government. The most significant aspect of this minute appears to be the emphasis on the price differentials and the time of delivery. Lockheed offered to sell each aircraft for 6,467,600 dollars with two to be delivered in November/December 1975 and one each per month from January, 1976, whereas, the United States Government offer was 6,200,000 dollars per aircraft for delivery in 1977. The Permanent Secretary then recommended that the aircraft should be

urchased through the United States Government on ccount of the lower price and in accordance with the rinciple that such purchases should be made through he governments of manufacturing countries. Yakubu owon, however, directed that, since the new or odified offer by Lockheed seemed very attractive, should be taken up and that, if the United States overnment was keen to help, they should be able to ake the aircraft available much earlier than 1977. fter indicating that Lockheed should be persuaded cut down the price a little, Gowon asked the ermanent Secretary to take up the purchase with ockheed with vigour and ensure that the planes ere obtained soonest.

On the 15th of July, 1974, a memorandum was ddressed to Yakubu Gowon by the Chief of Air taff, Brigadier Ikwue, stating that the price of the 130 aircraft was 6,515,417 dollars if ordered rough the United States Government whereas it ould cost 6,454,600 dollars if ordered through ockheed. The memorandum was sent to Yakubu owon for information only, according to the Chief Air Staff, as he (Gowon) had already decided nyway that the aircraft should be purchased direct om the manufacturers.

Thereafter, a minute was addressed to Yakubu owon by the Permanent Secretary, Mr. Damcida, eappraising the problem of purchasing the aircraft rough the United States Government as the Minisy had only two weeks from that time within which make up its mind. This minute was prompted by he fact that the former Head of State was being rongly briefed that the Ministry was employing elaying tactics because the Ministry's officals were ent on frustrating the Lockheed deal, preferring stead to go through the United States Government. he Permanent Secretary explained that it was not he intention of the Ministry to frustrate the Air orce efforts but that the attempt to purchase the ircraft through the United States Government was n accordance with government decision and would ave us some valuable foreign exchange. Yakubu owon was then invited to give a ruling on the matter. he former Head of State on the same day directed hat the aircraft should be purchased from Lockheed nd asked the Permanent Secretary to inform the inistry of External Affairs to politely thank the nited States Ambassador for his efforts and those of he United States Government. The directives of akubu Gowon were conveyed to the Ministry of xternal Affairs on July 23, 1974 and a cablegram as sent on July 27, 1974 to Lockheed informing the ompany about Government's decision to buy six ercules aircraft from it. On the same day, a letter as received direct from the Air Force urging the inistry of Defence to contact Lockheed about the urchase. A letter was also addressed to Lockheed confirming the cablegram earlier sent to the company and asking them to send us a draft agreement on the purchase for the consideration of the Ministry of Defence.

The draft agreement on the purchase was sent to the Ministry of Defence through Chief of Air Staff by Lockheed on July 30, 1974 and this document was sent to the Ministry of Finance for comments after due vetting by the Ministry on August 19, 1974. The total cost of the six aircraft was given as U.S. $47,177,880 or U.S. $7,872,980 per aircraft (including accessories). Further negotiation was held between the officials of the Ministry of Defence, including Lt.-Col. Yisa-Doko and Mr. Panter, the representative and chief negotiator of Lockheed. On August 30, 1974 the Air Force confirmed to the Ministry of Defence that the provisions of the draft agreement were satisfactory and that the cost of training and technical assistance for which Lockheed was charging U.S.$2.14 million was fair and reasonable.

It is now necessary for me to relate briefly the activities of certain Nigerians or non-Nigerians who were operating from this country and who, according to the information made available to us by the American Government and on being interrogated, appear to have been linked with Lockheed in rather suspicious circumstances.

Stephen Paparadopoulos

Paparadopoulos (Papa for short) is obviously the Mr. Greek Ten-per center mentioned by Dr. Manon in his letter referred to earlier. He is truly a Greek national and, incidentally, part owner of the T.C.N. He is known to have been introduced to the Ministry of Defence by Yakubu Gowon at a time when he only ran a small electrical contracting firm in Lagos where he had maintained residence since 1967. He had no other qualifications than his connections in government to have qualified him for the business of buying arms and planes for the Nigerian Army and the Air Force. As a matter of fact, Yakubu Gowon is reported to have commended him for having saved Nigeria through his purchase of Military equipment for and on behalf of the Nigerian Government during the civil war. In 1967/68 having been introduced to an Italian gun runner called Marlia, he became involved with Andrew Obeya, then Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence in an unsuccessful attempt to purchase Italian T.326 trainer planes for the Federal Military Government. Papa is reported in the papers submitted by the United States Government to have boastfully spoken of Obeya as an interesting asset.

In March 1968, Papa was entrusted with a cheque for U.S. $10 million to buy German arms for Nigeria which he did and in the process realised a commission of U.S. $1 million. He obtained the Lockheed agency in preference to Ibrahim Waziri,

Chief S.L. Edu and Ibrahim Isiaku, who were also considered for the assignment but later dropped. Papa had been advised by his principals to contact the then Chief of Air Staff, Ikwue, in an effort to find out about Nigeria's needs for Military transport. He met Ikwue in Bonn in 1968 at a time when Ikwue was our Defence Attache in the Federal Republic of Germany. At a meeting which was arranged in May 1973 between Papa, Ikwue and a representative of Lockheed called W.W. Cowden, Ikwue is reported to have impressed upon Lockheed that if the company was serious about selling their C-130 aircraft to Nigeria, they had better act through Papa as intermediary, although Ikwue denied ever saying such a thing. Throughout the period from 1968 until 1975 during which the Nigerian Air Force took the first delivery of the C-130 aircraft, Papa was closely involved with the Ministry of Defence and the Air Force either in buying arms or aircraft. Papa had been clearly mentioned in the Lockheed documents released to us by the United States Government as having received the sum of U.S.$3.6 million from Lockheed on behalf of his Nigerian friends. To buttress this assertion, it is necessary to make mention of the fact that in a letter addressed to the vice-president of Lockheed by the consultant for special projects of the company, Mr. Fred Mouser, there is some apprehension about the possibility that Papa and, through him, certain Nigerian government officials might be cut off any commission payment obligations should the negotiation for the purchase of the Lockheed C-130 aircraft be conducted on government-to-government basis. This disclosure, at least, could partly explain why the transaction had been conducted through intermediaries and also goes to confirm the existence of some form of understanding whereby Papa was to receive the kick-backs either as commission for himself and/or on behalf of certain unnamed Nigerian beneficiaries. Papa has fled the country since the fall of Gowon from power and is reported to be now resident in Italy.

Ikwue

There is more than ample evidence of Ikwue's hobnobbing with the Lockheed people. He was first introduced to Paparadopoulos in Bonn in 1967 by the late Ambassador Abdul Maliki when Ikwue was Defence Attache/Inspector of Arms at our Embassy there and Papa was busy buying arms for the Federal Military Government for the prosecution of the civil war. On 29th and 30th May, 1973, Ikwue, Papa and a Lockheed official, W.W. Cowden, discussed in Ikwue's Paris hotel room about the Lockheed contract during which Ikwue told Cowden in no uncertain terms that it would be in Lockheed's interest to act through Papa. Thereafter, following this important contact, Papa was appointed as Lockheed's agent for the sale of C-130 aircraft to the Nigerian Air Force. On 17th and 18th September, 1973 Ikwue visited Marietta in company of Papa and had discussions with Lockheed officials on the proposed purchase by the Nigerian Air Force of the C-130 planes. He was again reported to be Papa's guest in Rome and Athens for a month's holiday. During the same period Papa travelled with Ikwue to London where Ikwue was to buy a house. Both the arrangement for the house purchase and the trip to Marietta were sponsored by Papa. Ikwue has, however, denied this story.

On 15th July, 1974, Ikwue sent a memorandum to the then Head of State in which he said that it was cheaper to buy the Lockheed aircraft from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation through its agent Papa rather than through the United States Government where it would have been cheaper as recommended by the Ministry of Defence. He stated that the aircraft would cost U.S. $6,515,417 each if ordered through the United States Government and U.S. $6,454,600 if bought through Lockheed. This was contrary to an earlier advice to Gowon by the Ministry of Defence that the aircraft would cost U.S. $6,200,000 if bought through the United States Government. On 27th July, 1974, a letter directed by Ikwue was sent from N.A.F. urging the Ministry of Defence to expedite purchase of the aircraft from Lockheed. The draft agreement from Lockheed on the purchase was sent to the Ministry of Defence on 30th July, 1974 through Ikwue. On 30th August, 1974 the N.A.F. under Ikwue confirmed that U.S. $2.14 million being charged by Lockheed for training and technical assistance was fair. And on 4th September, 1974, the agreement for the Lockheed aircraft was signed in London between Damcida while he was receiving medical treatment on behalf of the Nigerian Government and R.C. Panter for Lockheed. Again Ikwue was present in London at the time. Later, four amendments to the agreement with Lockheed were made. Two of the amendments which were made at the recommendation of Ikwue, being Chief of Air Staff, were on 21st October, 1974 to cost U.S. $500,000 for training and on 9th December, 1974 for new items to be added to the aircraft at an additional cost of U.S. $563,000. This meant an extra cost of U.S. $1,063,000 to the Nigerian Government.

During interrogation, Ikwue admitted his connections with Paparadopoulos but claimed that the Greek was introduced to him by Yakubu Gowon and that all his transactions with the Greek were in the legitimate interest of the N.A.F. He also admitted that he is at present an active chairman of Papa's partly owned Nigerian company called T.C.N. Other functionaries of the former administration who are

Continued on page 13

OCKHEED SCANDAL (Continued from page 6)

now directors of T.C.N. are the retired Nigerian assador and Permanent Representative to the ed Nations, Mr. Edwin Ogbu, and the retired anent Secretary of the Ministry of External rs, Mr. Joe Iyalla.

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Obeya was closely involved with Papa from 1967 ı he was Permanent Secretary, Ministry of nce. In 1967/68 when the Federal Military rnment was desperately seeking to buy arms to ecute the civil war, Obeya introduced Papa to an ın gun runner called Marlia, through whom the stry of Defence was negotiating to buy some ın trainer planes T.326 from the Italian Aircraft ufacturing Company, Aeronautical Macchi. At time, Obeya is reported to have told Marlia the matter of the purchase of the planes would peeded up if Papa, and by implication Obeya, personally involved in the deal. For some politi- reasons the deal failed to materialise when the an side cancelled the deal, in the last minute. y in 1968, during the civil war, still in collabora- with Obeya, Papa was handed a Federal Military ernment cheque for U.S. $10,000,000 to buy s for the prosecution of the civil war. Papa secured ommission of U.S. $1,000,000 from the deal ough there is no evidence that any money passed)beya. Obeya, on being interrogated, admitted his nection with Papa and claimed that it was the ner Head of State, Yakubu Gowon, who intro- ed Papa to him. It was also revealed that Papa led Obeya in his official capacity on a number of asions and was accompanied on one such visit by in Ogbu, former Permanent Representative to United Nations.

It may interest you to know that the mode of ment of kick-backs adopted by Lockheed was ingenious and neatly contrived as to leave no holes for easy detection of the names of the eficiaries or the exact amount of their respective ards. As soon as agreement had been reached ween Lockheed and the Nigerian Government for purchase of the C-130 aircraft, Mr. radopoulos adopted a fake business name for his ly formed company known as Afrikaros S.A. which he opened a numbered bank account with Banque Cantonale at Vaudoise, Yverdon in Switzerland. He advised Lockheed to arrange payments of kick-backs into this account as and when they became due in accordance with a programme which was drawn up whereby such payments were due and payable to him proportionately with instalmental payment made by the Nigerian government to Lockheed in settlements of the purchase price of the aircraft. Paparadopoulos in fact appointed a lawyer, Mr. Staub, to manage the Swiss account so as not to leave any trace of his connection with the Afrikaros bank account.

It has also transpired that simultaneously as the deal between Lockheed and Paparadopoulos was being concluded, a parallel agreement was also being concluded between the representatives of Lockheed and a Nigerian company which provided for ten per cent commission on net sales of security equipment to Nigeria. Lockheed, in March 1975, is known to have approved a consultant agreement with the Nigerian Systems and Equipment Consultants Ltd, whose registered address is in Lagos, for the payment of ten per cent of net sales of security technology systems and products to the Nigerian authorities. Lockheed had specifically stipulated to its representatives that the transaction should in no way conflict with the existing consultant agreement which it had earlier concluded with Paparadopoulos with respect to aircraft only. On this occasion, it was clearly stated that the commission of ten per cent would be comprehensive, as this was a customary thing in Nigeria, if the way was to be paved for contact with the appropriate government officials. As a matter of fact, the appointment of the Nigerian company, whose chairman is Chief Mike Ibru of the Ibru Organisation, is claimed to have been based partly on the favourable response by the Nigerian Army to Lockheed's proposals in November, 1975, and partly on the assurances given by the Nigerian company after its initial contacts with the competent Nigerian authorities on behalf of Lockheed.

Ibru

Mr. Mike Ibru, during interrogation, stated that he had never had any direct dealing with Lockheed or for that matter Paparadopoulos. He stated that in 1970/71 when he was in Lebanon on business, some American who introduced himself as having links with

Lockheed tried to interest him about Lockheed aircraft sales but he dismissed the man, whose name he could not recollect readily, because he did not want to involve himself or his company in aircraft sales. Ibru admitted that he owned 30/40 per cent shares in the Nigerian Systems and Equipment Consultants Limited but that he was not in any way involved in the management of the company. He claimed to be ignorant of the exact functions of the company since its Lebanese owner, El-Khalil, induced him to take out the 30/40 per cent share. According to Ibru, El-Khalil has been living in London and has left the management of the company in the hands of another Lebanese called Franjil who should know something about the transaction with the Army on the security equipment.

Other Nigerians

The other Nigerians whose names have featured in the Lockheed papers so far released are as follows:

Ibrahim Waziri: he was described as agent for Scottish Aviation and one of the Nigerian candidates who was considered by Lockheed for agency in Nigeria but later dropped in favour of Paparadopoulos.

Isiaku Ibrahim and Chief S.L. Edu: both were mentioned as agents for Fokker in the same context as Ibrahim Waziri.

Yakubu Gowon

Papa was very well known to Gowon who introduced him to Obeya. The Lockheed papers mentioned that Gowon publicly embraced Papa and commended him for having saved Nigeria during the civil war through the purchase of arms and aircraft on behalf of the Federal Military Government. Gowon was the Head of State at the material time of the Lockheed transaction and it was his decision that finally led to the purchase of C-130 military transport aircraft as it was purchased and the price at which it was purchased. From the papers submitted by the United States Government there is no indication that Gowon benefited materially from the transaction. Unless more information is supplied by the United States Government or Gowon and Papa can be procured for interrogation, the Federal Military Government may not know more than we know at the moment.

The information so far made available to the Federal Military Government by the United States Government in the released Lockheed papers is insufficient to warrant or justify the apprehension of any of the Nigerians who are known to be linked with Lockheed in this international scandal particularly as the exact nature and extent of the benefits, if any, derived cannot be ascertained or determined. As regards Papa, however, Interpol is being requested to secure his arrest and delivery to the Federal Military Government. Pending his being made available to the Federal Military Government to face interrogation, it has been decided that his property and assets in Nigeria should be confiscated forthwith. There is no case against Obeya. There is also no case against Ibru at the moment although active investigation will now turn on Franjil, the Lebanese whose name was mentioned by Ibru during interrogation.

Appendix III

State of Nigeria's Major Weapons 1970- 1990

Item	W.D	N.O.	T.O.O	T.O.D.	T.D.	I.C.O.	Supplier	Comments
T.55	MBT	70	1979	1980/81	70	#72m allo.in Dev.Plan	U.S.S.R.	Only 32 still in service.No mtce. agrt.
MK.III	"	72	80/84	83/85	72	Ist order of 36 -#125m (£68.7m)	U.K/Vickers	53 still in use. Added cost of elect.config. A 1991 order for 150($298m)
Eagles	LT	94	n.a.	n.a.	94	n.a.	?	58 still in use.
Scorpion/ Fox	LT/ APC	142	75/82	77-9/ 82-3	142	One order of 33- #16.7m	U.K/Alvis	78 in service.Re-pairs cost £86.6 in 1980
AML-60/ 90	AC	180	79/81	80-2	180	Ist order of 60 - #30.4m	France/ Mecaniques	73 out of 180 now unservicable.
4K-7FA	APC	200	80/82	81-3	200	#40m	Austria/ Steyr	Additional prod. under licence in Nigeria.
Piranha	APC	70	81	82	70	#17.8m	Switzerland/ Mowag	
Palmaria 155mm	SPH	25	82	83-6	24	#36.6m	Italy/Oto-Melara	-

G-222	Tpt	5	1982	1984	5	$117m	Italy/ Aeritalia	Offered for sale in 1989.
SA-330/ 330L Puma	Hel	13	1977	77-8	13	n.a.	France/ Aerospatiale	9 exchanged for 12 order. in 85. Only 2 in service. Del. of order stpd due to funds.
MB-339AN	trn/ Arm.opt.	12	1983	85/86	12	$82m	Italy/Aae-macchi.	Phased out. Offer. for sale.
Bulldog	trn.	37	71,77, 80	73/78, 82	37	17 del.btwn 78-82/$24.5m	U.K.	Plans to rep. with 'Air Bee-tle.' No.in use unknown.
AeroL39M Albatros	trn/ opt. for lgt.att.	24	1984	1986	24	Oil for Plane Swap.	Czech.	23 still in use(?)
C-130H -30	Tpt	3	1981	1983	3	$71.3m	USA/Lock-heed	Spares, traning inc. All still in use.
Jaguar Sepecat	fgt.	36	1983	84/5	18	$360m	UK/India/ BaE.	Mtce.Prob. Offered for sale in 1991.
DO-28, 128-2s	Tpt	36	73-85	74-86	36	?	Germany/ Dornier	Phased out in 1990.
BO-105	Hel.	24	73,78	74,79	24	?	Germany/ Dornier	Some ass-embled in Nig.

Hughes 300c	Hel/trn	15	1982	1983	15	?	USA/Hughes	14 in use.
CH-47C Chinook	Hel	5	1983	?	?	$74m	USA/Boeing	Funding crisis, re-nego.in 85.
Lynx MK89MR	Hel	3	1981	1984	3	$27.2	UK/West land	Cost inc. hel.base in Navytown, Ojo.
MiG 21 MF	fgt/ I'tor	18	1984	1985	18	exc. for 17 earlier proc. Cost unknown	USSR	3 crashed others still in service.
MiG 21 'U' Mongol	trn.	8	1984	1985	8	Unknown	USSR	Still in use.(?)
Meko 366 type (Aradu)	Destroyer	1	1977	1981	1	#15m(?)	Germany	mtce. prob.
RoRo1300 "Offiom & Ambe"	Landing Craft	2	1976	1979	2	#10m(?)	Germany	Inade. for peacetime amph.operations
Lerici Class	Mine Hunter	2	1983	88-9	2	$100m	Italy	Refurbished.
Vosper T'Croft "Erinomi class"	Corvette	2	1975	79-80	2	$36.8m	U.K.	Refitted in 1984
"Dorina class"	Corvette	2	1968	1972	2	$9.6m	U.K.	Refitted 1975, #15m for refit in 1983

FH-77B 155mm	TH	42	82	83-5	42	#50.6m	Sweden/ Bofors	-
Blowpipe	SAM	62	81	82	48	#28m	U.K/Shorts	-
AMX-30 Roland	AAV(M)	28	82	82-3	16	#204.6m	France/ Euromissile	Order included 595 Roland 2 Landmob SAM.
MiG 17	Trn/fgt	41	67-8	68-72	41	n.a.	USSR/Czech/ Egypt.	Most destroyed or grounded. Phased out.
L29 Delfins	"	24	67	68-70	24	Ist order of 12- $2.4m	Czech.	Many grounded. 12 trfd to Ghana in 1989.
C-130 Hercules	Tpt	6	74	75-6	6	$47.2m	USA/Lock-heed.	Inflated contract. See Appen.I.
F-27	Mar.Pat Tpt.	12	70,71 77,82	72,73 78,85	12	n.a.	Holland/ Fokker	4 trfd. to Nig. Airways in 1976, 2 to Benin Rep., 2 to the Navy, 1 for VIP, 2 in use.
MiG 21 MF	Trn/ bombers	25	75	75-6	25	n.a.	USSR	3 crashed, Many grd. 17 ex-changed for new set in 1984.
Piper Navajo	Lt.Plane	6	71/74	73-4	6	$2m	USA/ Switzer.	?
Alpha	Trn/ Strike	24	79/83	81-2, 85-6	24	Ist order of 12-$80m(DM150m)	Germany/ Dornier	Still in use.

budget.

FPB 57	Missile Strike craft	6	1977	1981	6	#45.3m	FRG/France	-
Inshore Boats	Patrol	42 84.	72,80	73,81-85	42	Ist order of 2 - $3.3m	UK/France	-

Sources: Ministry of Defence,Lagos; SIPRI Arms Register(Oxford:O.U.P,1975); SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmaments Report,1991(Oxford: Oxford University Press,1991), M.Brzoska & T.Ohlson, SIPRI Arms Transfer to the Third World 1971-85,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) Military Balance, 1971-91(London: IISS), Personal communication and interviews.
- Nigerian currency(Naira) W.D.- Weapon Description N.O.- Number ordered T.O.O - Time of order T.O.D. - Time of Delivery T.D - Total Delivered I.C.O.- Initial Cost of Order